Judgment : Plaintiff in O.S.No.84 of 1995, on the file of First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, is the revision petitioner. 2. Plaintiff is aggrieved by the impugned order whereby the lower court has directed the plaintiff to value the suit under Sec.40(1) of the Pondicherry Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, and also directed her to pay the deficit court-fee within 15 days from the date of order and amend the plaint accordingly. The lower court further observed that if there was default in complying with that direction, the suit will be dismissed. 3. The material averments which are necessary for the purpose of this revision may be summed up as follows: The reliefs sought for in the suit are as hereunder: “(1) declaring that the plaintiff’s surely for 1st defendant is not enforceable against her; .(2) directing the defendant No. 1 to return the title deeds mentioned in the schedule hereunder to the plaintiff; .(3) restraining the defendant No.3 from proceeding against the plaintiff for non-payment of licence fees by defendant No. 1; .(4) directing the defendants to pay the cost of the suit; and .(5) pass such further or other relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances.” 4. In the body of the plaint, it is said that the first defendant approached her stating that he is taking part in auctioning of arrack shops for the year 1993-94, and he wanted the plaintiff to offer her title deeds for giving surety. First defendant further promised that in case he was declared as the successful bidder, he will pay Rs. 10,000 per mensem to the plaintiff for offering surety. Plaintiff also accepted the promise and gave her title deeds. First defendant was declared as successful bidder in respect of Arrack shop No. 1/ B at Karayamputhoor. On 8. 1993, first defendant brought a typed lease agreement with full of blanks and asked her to sign at the places marked ‘X’ The lease form was not signed by anybody at that time. Plaintiff signed the lease agreement form in her house believing the assurance given by the first defendant. It is further said that the first defendant also told the plaintiff that all the blanks in the typed lease form would be filled up by the Excise officials, and, at the time of registration, the contents of the document would be read over to her. It is further said that the first defendant also told the plaintiff that all the blanks in the typed lease form would be filled up by the Excise officials, and, at the time of registration, the contents of the document would be read over to her. Plaintiff also waited with the hope that she would be sent for at the time of registration. 5. Thereafter, plaintiff approached the first defendant and asked him to pay Rs. 10,000 per month. But the first defendant evaded payment. It was at that time represented by the first defendant that the plaintiff was a surety and, therefore, he is not liable to pay any amount to her. It is further said that on enquiry in the third defendant’s office, she came to know that the registration of the lease deed was without her admission of execution and her surety was accepted by the third defendant. Second defendant registered the lease agreement on 111. 1993, though the plaintiff did not admit the execution. Plaintiff requested for a copy of the lease deed. But it was not furnished to her. She sent a suit notice, but it was not replied. The cause of action of the suit is said to have arisen at Pondicherry within the jurisdiction of the trial court, on 8. 1993 when the plaintiff signed the unfilled typed lease agreement on 3. 1994 and 23. 1994 when notices were sent to defendants 3 and 1 respectively and on 111. 1993 when the alleged lease agreement was registered, and on subsequent dates. 6. It is seen that the first defendant has filed a written statement and one of the contentions raised was the suit has not been correctly valued and correct court-fee has not been paid. 7. By the impugned order, the lower court found that the valuation of the suit under Sec.25(d) is not correct. It said that without a prayer for setting aside the document, plaintiff is not entitled to any relief even though the relief is couched in the form of a declaration. The lower court has further found that it is the substance of the plaint that has to be looked into and not the form in which it has been drafted, and if the relief is to be granted, court-fee will have to be paid under Sec.40 of the Court-fees Act. The lower court has further found that it is the substance of the plaint that has to be looked into and not the form in which it has been drafted, and if the relief is to be granted, court-fee will have to be paid under Sec.40 of the Court-fees Act. So holding, plaintiff was directed to amend the valuation and also pay the balance court-fees. 8. I heard the learned counsel for both parties in detail. I feel that the order of the lower court does not call for any interference. Reasons for coming to the said conclusion are as follows: It is not the case of the plaintiff that any of defendants 2, 3 and 4 have played any part in executing the deed. The enforcing authority for recovery of the dues under Abkari Laws of Pondicherry is the third defendant, The District Registrar, Registration Department has also not played any part in the plaintiff executing the deed, and he has only registered the document that was presented before him. Under the Registration Act, it is not necessary that all the persons executing a deed should admit the execution before him. 9. Defendant No. 1 is the licencee. The contract is by plaintiff with first defendant. As per the allegations in the plaint, the contract was that if the 1st defendant became successful in getting licence of arrack shop, plaintiff will be the surety for him, and in consideration therefore, first defendant will pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 per mensem to her. The title deeds of plaintiff were also handed over to the first defendant. It is thereafter the document came into existence, which makes the plaintiff surety for the first defendant. But certain circumstances are stated in the plaint, alleging that it is not binding on her. The reason is that there were certain blanks in the document when she signed the same, and that the document was not read over to her. When there was an intention to execute the document, and in fact, she executed it, a declaration cannot be granted without setting aside the same. So long as there is no misrepresentation by any of the respondents 2, 3 and 4, and the enforcing authority under the Abkari Laws is the third respondent, they are entitled to enforce the terms of the agreement, unless it is set aside. So long as there is no misrepresentation by any of the respondents 2, 3 and 4, and the enforcing authority under the Abkari Laws is the third respondent, they are entitled to enforce the terms of the agreement, unless it is set aside. A mere declaration will not be sufficient, Misrepresentation, if any, is only alleged against the first defendant, and that alone will not make the document void. It is liable to be set aside even as against the first defendant. 10. Learned counsel submitted that in this case, the plaintiff need not seek to set aside the document when she is not admitting the execution. I do not agree with the submission of learned counsel. I need rely only on certain decisions of this Court, and also on a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, which are binding on me. 11. In one of the earlier decisions reported in Vellayya Konar and another v. Ramaswami Konar and another, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 894: 50 L. W. 248, a learned Judge of this Court considered the difference between a suit for cancellation of an instrument and one for declaration that the instrument is not binding on the plaintiff. It was held in that case thus: “There is a difference between a suit for the cancellation of an instrument and a suit for a declaration that the instrument is not binding upon the plaintiff. When plaintiff seeks to establish a title in himself and cannot establish that title without removing an insuperable obstruction such as a decree to which he has been a party or a deed to which he has been a party, then quite clearly he must get that decree or deed cancelled or declared void in toto and his suit is in substance a suit for the cancellation of the decree or deed even though it be framed as a suit for a declaration. But when he is seeking to establish a title and finds himself threatened by a decree or a transaction between third parties he is not in a position to get that decree or that deed canceled in toto. That is a thing which can only be done by parties to the decree or deed or their representatives. But when he is seeking to establish a title and finds himself threatened by a decree or a transaction between third parties he is not in a position to get that decree or that deed canceled in toto. That is a thing which can only be done by parties to the decree or deed or their representatives. His proper remedy therefore, in order to clear the way with a view to establish his title, is to get a declaration that the decree or deed is invalid so far as he himself is concerned and he must therefore sue for such a declaration and not for the cancellation of the decree or deed.” 12. In that case, the learned Judge said thus: “My attention has not been drawn to any decision which throws any real doubt on the general proposition that when a person seeks to establish title which cannot be established without removing a decree or an instrument to which he is himself a party, then whatever be the garb in which he dresses his suit, its substantial character must be a suit for the cancellation of the decree or instrument; but if the establishment of his title is being impeded by the effect of a transaction between other parties, he cannot legitimately ask for the cancellation of that transaction but can only ask for a declaration that so far as he is concerned, it is not binding.” 13. In this case, whatever may be the invalid circumstance, it cannot be doubted that the plaintiff is a party to the document. She has executed the deed with an intention to execute it, and so long as that deed stands, which is an insuperable obstruction, and without removing the same, a declaration cannot be granted. 14. A Division Bench of this Court, headed by two eminent Judges of this Court, has also taken a similar view in the decision reported in Narasamma v. Satyanarayana, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 793. That is a case of minor who was represented in the suit as a major. The suit was filed alleging that during that time he was a minor and, therefore, the decree was void. A declaration was sought for. 793. That is a case of minor who was represented in the suit as a major. The suit was filed alleging that during that time he was a minor and, therefore, the decree was void. A declaration was sought for. The Division Bench held thus: “Where a person though in fact a minor, is impleaded as a major defendant in a suit for possession of certain property and a decree is passed against him by a court having jurisdiction, the decree is ex facie regular and not void or passed without jurisdiction. If in such a case, the minor subsequently brings a suit for declaring the decree as invalid on the ground of his minority, the suit must be considered to be one for cancellation of the decree falling under S.7 (IV-A) of the Madras Court-fees Act.... [Italics supplied] 15. Their Lordships further went on and said thus: ”Even if the plaintiff be considered not to have been a party at all to the prior suit by reason of his minority still since he has chosen to sue for a declaration of the invalidity of that decree he must pay court-fee under the main part of Rule 2, Court-fees Rules framed under Sec.9, Suits Valuation Act, the proviso being inapplicable to the case. Whether the suit is governed by Sec.7 (IV-A) or Rule 2 of the Court-fees Rules, ‘ad valorem’ court-fee must be paid on the marked value of the properties which formed the subject of previous decree.“ 16. A Full Bench of this Court has also dealt with a similar question in the decision reported in Sankaranarayana Pillai and another v. Kandasami Pillai, A.I.R. 1956 Mad 670: 69 L. W. 686. That was a case where a minor was made an eo-nomine party to an alienation by his mother and guardian. Plaintiff filed suits for a declaration that the document is not binding on him. Regarding payment of court-fee, the Full Bench held thus: ”The plaintiff, who as a minor, has been made eo-nomine a party to a sale deed or other document of alienation by his mother and guardian has to pay court-fee under Sec.7 (iv-A) (Madras), Court-fees Act and to pray for the cancellation of the sale-deed expressly or impliedly. He cannot ignore and bypass such alienation alleging illiteracy, ignorance. Lack of worbly knowledge, undue influence coercion, etc. He cannot ignore and bypass such alienation alleging illiteracy, ignorance. Lack of worbly knowledge, undue influence coercion, etc. and pray for mere possession of the lands paying court-fee under Sec.7(v)(b) Court-fees Act.“ 17. In a recent decision reported in Arunmugham Pillai v. A.P. Aruladum Perumal Pillai (died) and another, (1986)1 M.L.J. 462 : 99 L. W. 624, the entire case-law has been considered by the learned Judge, and it has been held thus: ”Even though the plaintiff revision petitioner has not asked for the relief of cancellation of the settlement deed in favour of the first respondent in the relief, yet it is clear from the substance of the relief as disclosed in the plaint taken as a whole that without the settlement deed in favour of the first respondent being cancelled and set aside, no relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession can be granted to the petitioner in respect of the suit property as the petitioner himself has admitted the execution of the deed. The deed filed along with the plaint clearly reads that it was executed out of love and affection towards the first respondent and that possession was delivered in pursuance of the same. Admittedly the first respondent is in possession of the suit property and even in the reply notice, which is referred to in the plaint he is claiming title only through the said settlement deed. It is not in dispute that the recitals in the settlement deed purport to create rights in favour of the first respondent.“ While discussing the case, Their Lordships, after following the prior decisions, held that the plaintiff can-not be allowed to evade the payment of proper fee or undervalue the suit for purposes of jurisdiction by omitting to ask for a relief when the success of suit depends on the relief being granted to him” [Italics]. Their Lordships also followed an early decision of this Court by M.M.Ismail, J., as he then was, in Mrs.J.Kasthuri v. Seth Ghanshamdas V.D.Bank, (1979)2 M.L.J. 11 : 92 L. W. 454, wherein it was held thus: “For the purpose of determining the court-fee payable, it is the substance of the relief that a plaintiff prays for that has to be taken into account and not the technical form of the prayer. Otherwise. Otherwise. Mere astuteness and ingenuity of the person drafting the plaint will have the effect of not only camouflaging and disguising the real relief which a plaintiff claims in a suit but also nullifying and defeating the provisions of law dealing with the payment of court-fee on the nature of the relief litigants seek in a court of law.” [Italics supplied] It was further held: “By merely couching the prayer in the form of a declaratory relief, the plaintiffs cannot avoid the reality of the situation.” 18. Regarding court-fee, a decision of the Supreme Court also requires consideration which is reported in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and others, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2384. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, Their Lordships have said thus: “As regards the main question that arises for decision it appears to us that while the Court-fee payable on a plaint is certainly to. be decided on the basis of the allegations and the prayer in the plaint and the question whether the plaintiffs suit will have to fail for failure to ask for consequential relief is of no concern to the court at that stage, the court in deciding the question of Court-fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the court, looking at the substance of the relief asked for.” 19. In view of this settled legal position, apart from the declaration that is sought for, plaintiff has also asked for a consequential injunction restraining the third defendant from proceeding against the plaintiff for payment of licence-fee and also for return of the title deeds from the first defendant. On a reading of the entire plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff, though alleges certain irregularities in the preparation of the document, has signed the same with the intention to execute a deed. The invalidity is stated only because the first defendant did not pay the consideration thereafter. That will not ex facie invalidate the document which has been executed voluntarily. 20. Even if the allegations are true, before court, these are documents purported to have been executed by the plaintiff. The same cannot be declared as invalid without setting aside the same. By declaration, plaintiff is really asking for setting aside the deed. That will not ex facie invalidate the document which has been executed voluntarily. 20. Even if the allegations are true, before court, these are documents purported to have been executed by the plaintiff. The same cannot be declared as invalid without setting aside the same. By declaration, plaintiff is really asking for setting aside the deed. Naturally, she has to pay the Court-fee under Sec.40 of the Court-fees Act (Old Sec.7 (iv-A) of the Madras Court-fees Act), which deals with setting aside a document. 21. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that she will be satisfied with the relief that is sought for even without setting aside the deed, and if so construed, the court-fee paid is sufficient. Though prima facie that argument seems to be attractive, in view of the decisions referred to above, I do not think that the said argument could be accepted. If the grant of declaration really amounts to setting aside the deed, court-fee will have to be paid under the relevant section, namely, Sec.40. 22. The lower court has said that if the court-fee is not paid within the stipulated time, the suit will be dismissed. I do not think the sard observation of the power court is correct. 23. Under O.7, Rule 11, C.P.C., the court can only reject the plaint and cannot dismiss the suit. 0.7, Rule 11(b), C.P.C. says: "Rejection of plaint: The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (b) Where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so.....(Rest of the provision is omitted as it is not necessary for our purpose)...... Therefore, the observation of the court below that in case of default of payment of court-fee within the given time, the suit will stand dismissed, is not correct. 24. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. The impugned order is confirmed as stated above. There will be no order as to costs. Plaintiff is given a month’s time more to comply with the direction of the lower court, to amend the valuation and also to pay the deficit court-fee. In case if she fails to do so, the lower court will act in terms of O.7, Rule 11, C.P.C. C.M.P.No.7129 of 1996 for stay is also dismissed consequently.