Judgment :- 1. All the above Civil Revision Petitions in C.R.P. Nos. 1125 of 1993, 2023 of 1994 and 2657 of 1997 are directed against the common judgment dated 14.12.92 made in R.C.A. Nos. 986 of 1990 and 1137 of 1990 by the Court of Rent Control Appellate Authority and XI Judge, Small Causes, Madras, thereby dismissing the R.C.A. No. 986 of 1990 preferred by the respondent/tenant and partly allowing the other R.C.A. 1137 of 1990 preferred by the petitioner/landlord as against the fair and decretal order dated 3.9.1990 made in R.C.O.P. No. 1208 of 1983 by the Rent Controller and XI Judge, Court of Small Causes Madias, thereby fixing the fair rent under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (in short TNBLRC Act) filed by the landlord. 2. In fact, the landlord filed the R.C.O.P. No. 1208 of 1983 under Section 4 of the TNBLRC Act, thereby praying for the fixation of the fair rent for the non-residential premises under the tenancy of the respondent bearing D. No. 831 (new) and 181 (old), Mount Road (Anna Salai), Madras-2, at Rs. 31,075/- per month on grounds that the petitioner/landlord is the sole and absolute owner of the premises, which is a pre-1960 construction, that the respondents are his statutory tenant of the said building on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,800/-; that the building is fully built up ground floor with Madras terrace, which is about 100 years old, the first floor is of 4000 sq.ft. with concrete roof constructed in 1969 and the second floor is of about 1000 sq.ft. 2,800/-; that the building is fully built up ground floor with Madras terrace, which is about 100 years old, the first floor is of 4000 sq.ft. with concrete roof constructed in 1969 and the second floor is of about 1000 sq.ft. with asbestos roof put up 8 years back; that the premises has a strategic view from the point of business and arrests the attention of the customers, facing foremost the city, flanked by the Wallaja Road and Blackers Road, situated in the centre of Madras city wherein the business, commercial and industrial activities arc the highest and where every inch of space is greatly in demand; that there is no locality in the combined States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala which could stand comparison in the matter of around importance and business potential encircled with leading cinema houses, hotels, markets, bazaars, public and private offices, city and mofussil bus routes and all the place of public utility and urban importance; that the premises is also abound with all internal amenities like water, electricity and mosaic floor, motor and pumpsets, etc. 3. That in consideration of the importance and facilities of the premises, the monthly rent of Rs. 2,800/- is paltry, disproportionate, immeasurable and unfeasible in law; that the rate of rent per sq.foot in the area would easily come about Rs. 5/- to Rs. 10/- and in the case of the said premises, it does not even work out to Rs. 0.25 ps. per sq.ft., the bulk of which is swallowed by Sales Tax, Income-tax and Corporation taxes leaving almost nothing to the petitioner; that there was a Registered Lease Deed dated 7.7.1971 for a period of 10 years and on expiry with an option on the part of the lessee to renew the same for a further period of 5 years on a written notice of 3 months before the date of expiry. 4. 4. That the respondents claim to have put up the first floor in 1969 without the previous knowledge or previous consent of the petitioner thereby amounting in law to an accretion and as per the provision under Section 108(b)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, the said unauthorised additional construction lapses to the property and becomes part thereof to the ownership of the petitioner; that the second floor constructed by the respondents, since being on the same line, it also lapses to the property and the petitioner is entitled to have a fair rent fixed for the whole building as it now obtains. The petition would further give the value of the site as not less than Rs. 2,60,000/-per ground thereby further making a special mention of the facilities and the market rate i.e. prevalent, the P.W.D. rates, the cost of construction etc. He would also provide with such details, such as, the age of the ground and first floor extent and age of the ground floor, the extent of the first floor, age of the first and second floors, the area of the site, nature of construction, kind of roofing, the window work, type of building, basic amenities, value of the land site and further the calculations accordingly for the cost of construction of the ground floor, first floor and the second floor, the depreciation caused, cost of land sites and would ultimately arrive at the grand total at Rs. 31,07,544/- in all and would fix the monthly rent at 12 per cent amounting to Rs. 31,075/-and would pray for the fixation of the said amount of Rs. 31,075/- as the fair rent per month. 5. In the counter filed by the respondents it would be contended that the application under Section 4 of the Act is not maintainable and the petitioner has filed RCOP 1207 of 1983 in the same Court for eviction under Section 10(2)(iii) and for demolition and reconstruction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act; that both the cases are destructive of each other and both these applications cannot be maintained together. 6. 6. The respondents would also deny the allegations para-wise specifically denying that they are the statutory tenants and that the tenancy is monthly, further stating that the respondents are tenants for more than 40 years based on periodical lease deeds executed between them right from the lease deed dated 11.8.1954 for a period of five years commencing from 1.4.1954 on a monthly rent of Rs. 725/-which expired on 31.3.1959 and subsequently by the lease deed dated 27.4.1961, it had been leased out for 10 years, commencing from January, 1961 and on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/- and later by yet another lease deed dated 7.1.1971, the premises had been leased to the respondents for 10 years commencing from 1.1.1972 on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,500/-and subsequently Rs. 2,800/-; that clause 4(d) of the lease deed dated 7.7.1971 provides for the renewal of lease deed for 5 years from 1.1.1981 at the option of the respondents; that the respondents by their letter dated 4.9.1980 exercised their option for renewal under the said clause for a period from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1985 and in spite of such demand, the petitioner has not agreed for the same and since they have exercised their option for renewal, the lease is deemed to have been renewed for 5 years consequently, the petitioner becoming not entitled to treat the respondents as tenants from month to month or even as a statutory tenant; and in any event since the petitioner has been receiving the rent from the respondent after 31.12.1980 and treating the respondents as his tenants and the respondents are tenants holding over for the period of 5 years from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1985. The further averments of the counter statement are that the building was not 100 years old, but constructed in the year 1919 and hence the age is only 63 years; that the total extent of the land is 4,485 sq.ft., the plinth area of the ground floor construction is 4379 sq.ft. the first floor with R.C. roof 1428 sq.ft. and AC sheet roof 1232 sq.ft. the first floor with R.C. roof 1428 sq.ft. and AC sheet roof 1232 sq.ft. totally 2700 sq.ft., the second floor construction with AC sheet roof is 451 sq.ft., that only with the consent of the petitioner at their own costs, the first floor was constructed in the year 1979; that the building is situate in a crowded and a conjested place in Anna Salai in the city of Madras without any car parking facility and without any advantage or potentiality; that after the extension of the city by various neighbourhood schemes, in all three sides of the city with residential and non-residential complexes, the area wherein the premises is situate has lost its importance and the value as a shopping area and hence the allegation that the ground floor rent is between Rs. 5/- and Rs. 10/- per sq.ft. is also too much; that the petitioner has not spent any money for the maintenance of the buildings; that having entered into the fresh deed from 7.7.1971, the petitioner cannot contend that the construction made in the year 1969 is without his consent and the said construction was comprised even in the earlier leases as per the provisions of Section 108(b) and (d) of the Transfer of Property Act. The Schedule to 1971 lease deed includes the entire land and the building as it stood in the execution of the lease deed. 7. The further averments of the respondents are that it is totally false to claim that the land value of the said area is Rs. 7,50,000/- and the petitioners land value is at Rs. 9,60,000/- per ground. The market value of the land in the area is only Rs. 1,50,000/- per ground; that the P.W.D. rates are only applicable in arriving at the cost of construction, which is mandatory and that as per the claim of the petitioner, the cost of construction is Rs. 140/- per sq.ft. is untenable and false and it has no application to fix the fair rent under the Act; that P.W.D. rates and market rates are the same; that the respondents have arrived at the fair rent for the premises engaging Chartered Engineers and according to him the fair rent is Rs. 140/- per sq.ft. is untenable and false and it has no application to fix the fair rent under the Act; that P.W.D. rates and market rates are the same; that the respondents have arrived at the fair rent for the premises engaging Chartered Engineers and according to him the fair rent is Rs. 4,562.80 per month and would offer reasons for arriving at such conclusion specifying the superstructure for the ground floor, type of construction as Type-II for the first floor and for the second floor; basic amenties; age of the floors, the built up area, the cost of construction and the present value of the building would be arrived at Rs. 1,94,680/-and would thus justify the fair rent arrived at by the respondents at Rs. 4,562-80 ps. and would end up their statement ultimately branding the claim of the petitioner that the fair rent is Rs. 31,075/- as false and highly excess. 8. During trial, the petitioner would examine four witnesses as P.Ws.1 to 4 and would mark 11 documents as Exs. A.1 to A.11 and on the part of the respondents, 2 witnesses would be examined as R.W.I and 2 equal number of documents would be marked as Exs. Bl to B11. The trial Court in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, as pleaded by parties having regard to the evidence placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to fix the value of the site and building at Rs. 8,35,000/- and the fair rent at Rs. 8,350/-per month, further providing for payment of the said monthly rent from the date of application as per its judgment dated 3.9.1990. Aggrieved, two appeals have been filed, one by the petitioner/1 landlord in R.C.O.P as per R.C.A. No. 1137 of 1990 and the other by the respondent/tenant in R.C.A. 986 of 1990. So far as the first appeal preferred in R.C.A. 986 of 1990 by the respondent/tenant is concerned, they would brand the fixation of the fair rent by the Rent Controller at Rs. 8,350/- per month as excess, unreasonable and arbitrary. So far as the first appeal preferred in R.C.A. 986 of 1990 by the respondent/tenant is concerned, they would brand the fixation of the fair rent by the Rent Controller at Rs. 8,350/- per month as excess, unreasonable and arbitrary. So far as the other appeal preferred by the petitioner/landlord in R.C.A. No. 1137/90 before the appellate authority is concerned, he would consider the said fixation of the fair rent to be too low and would call the order improper and unsound, thereby praying to fix the fair rent in the vicinity of the figure prayed for. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, hearing both the above appeals preferred by the tenant and the landlord in the abovesaid manner, would pass his common judgment thereby fixing the fair rent at Rs. 16,527/- thus allowing the appeal of the landlord to that extent and dismissing the appeal preferred by the tenant. 9. Aggrieved against the fixation of the fair rent at Rs. 16,527/- as per R.C.A. No. 1137 of 1990, i.e. the appeal preferred by the landlord, the tenants have come forward to file the C.R.P. No. 1125 of 1993 and the very same tenants having become aggrieved against the dismissal of the appeal preferred R.C.A. No. 986 of 1990, have come forward to file C.R.P. No. 2023 of 1994 and the landlord having become not satisfied with the fixation of fair rent at Rs. 16,527/- and seeking enhancement of the same, has come forward to file the C.R.P. No. 2657 of 1997. 10. During arguments, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in the first two C.R.Ps. i.e. C.R.P. Nos. 1125 of 1993 and 2023 of 1994 and for the respondent in C.R.P. No. 2057 of 1997 would contend that the building consists of three floors-the ground floor constructed by the landlord in the year 1919, the first and second floors constructed by the tenant in the year 1969; that admittedly, to the above facts, following the ruling of the Court, the learned Rent Controller decided that the landlord is entitled to the rent of only the ground floor and not for the first and second floors, since he did not construct the same and hence he would fix the fair rent only for the ground floor; that by the common judgment dated 14.12.1992, the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirmed the same, but modified the ground floor rent to Rs. 13,080/-, that with reference to the area of the land and with reference to the construction, there is no controversy at all, but as far as the cost of construction is concerned, regarding the age of the building, there is a minor controversy and regarding the type of the building - whether the building is I Type or II Type the controversy exists; that all the Engineers admitted that the building is of Type-II. In the written arguments, it is admitted that the building is of Type-II. The two relevant points that are to be considered are that, the value of the land is predominantly a major factor i.e. the market value, secondly whether the landlord is entitled for the fair rent; that under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, while apportioning the area, there are more than one floor; that the appellate authority has calculated it at Rs. 16,527/-. The learned counsel would then cite para No. 4 of the petition filed by the landlord, wherein the age of the building, the measurements of the building site, ground floor, the first floor have been given and citing para 6 of the counter affidavit and further citing the deposition of P.W.3, wherein in the cross-examination, this witness has deposed to the effect that whatever has stated in Para No. 4 of the petition is correct; that R.W.I, the Secretary of the respondents company would depose that the I floor has been constructed in the year 1969 at a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- for which permission had been obtained from the landlord, but the landlord did not give any money towards the construction cost; that the second floor also got constructed by them in the same year with prior permission of the landlord and even for the construction of the second floor, the landlord did not give any money; that prior to 1969, the first floor was vacant and there was no second floor at all; that they installed electricity, A/c. etc. and there is no vacant land, nor car parking; that the built up area is 4379 sq.ft. with Madras terrace; that the first floor measures 1476 sq.ft. with R.C.C. roofing and the rest 1232 sq.ft. with asbestos and the second floor with A/c. measuring 459 sq.ft.; that they have been working in the respondents company for 22 years. 11. and there is no vacant land, nor car parking; that the built up area is 4379 sq.ft. with Madras terrace; that the first floor measures 1476 sq.ft. with R.C.C. roofing and the rest 1232 sq.ft. with asbestos and the second floor with A/c. measuring 459 sq.ft.; that they have been working in the respondents company for 22 years. 11. In the written arguments, the petitioner/landlord, in para 6 would say that it is assumed that the respondent has put up the first and second floors as alleged by him and he is not entitled in law to claim exemption of the rent for the same and this admission would be cited by the learned counsel for the respondents and Revision Petitioners in the first two C.R.Ps. as above. 12. The learned counsel would further point out from the judgment of the appellate authority, thereby pointing out that it has been stoutly established from the evidence made available that it was only the tenant, who constructed the first and second floors, since it is an admission on the part of the landlord in the R.C.O.P. filed by him in No. 1207 of 1983 admitting the construction of the first and second floors by the tenant and thereby concluding that the first and second floors have been constructed by the tenant and the Rent Controller had rightly held not to take into consideration the first and second floors for fixation of the fair rent on ground that they have been constructed by the tenant. The learned counsel would further point out that even in such an event, if the constructed portions by the tenants is used for the gains, he must part with the rent for that portion and hence the appellate authority has decided to determine the rents for the 1st and 2nd floors taking into consideration the cost of the site and the constructed area. Hence caking the norms fixed, the judgment reported in (1989) I MLJ 494 Raj Rani Devi v. Yakoop Sherif the Appellate Authority concludes to decide the rent and accordingly taking into consideration the site value, the extent, etc. the learned Appellate Authority would assess the value and would arrive at the figure of Rs. 3,102/-to be the rent of the first floor and Rs. 344/- to be the rent of the second floor and for the ground floor, fixing the rent of Rs. the learned Appellate Authority would assess the value and would arrive at the figure of Rs. 3,102/-to be the rent of the first floor and Rs. 344/- to be the rent of the second floor and for the ground floor, fixing the rent of Rs. 13,080/- has arrived at the total monthly rent of the premises at Rs. 16,527/- as found in para 13 of the judgment of the lower Court. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the tenant would cite 5 judgments respectively reported in: (i) 1985 (1) MLJ 205 = 98 L.W. 212 (Sherwood Educational Society v. Hussainy Begum Namazie) (ii) 1989-2- L.W. 225 = 1989 (1) MLJ 494 (Rajrani Devi v. Yacoop Sheriff) (iii) 1996-2-L.W. 658 (K. Ramanathan (died) and others v. B.K. Nalini Jayanthi) (iv) 1996-2-L.W. 637 (Rahmath Fathima, T.H.S. v. T.K. Kader Mohideen) (v) 1996-3-L.W. 193 (Srinivasa Gounder v. K. Venkatesan) 13. In the first two judgments cited above, the point that is driven home is that the building erected by the tenant cannot compel him to pay the rent for the land which has been utilised for the purpose of erecting the superstructure thereby the vacant land appurtenant to the building should be considered for the purpose of fixing fair rent of the site. So far as the third judgment cited above is concerned, it would contemplate that mere production and marking of a document by consent is not sufficient to prove its contents - proving of the facts or contents stated in the document by evidence of persons who can vonchsafe the facts necessary; that persons connected with sale deeds or the attesting witnesses should be examined in order to prove the transaction as well as the factors referred to therein. The 4th judgment cited above is to the effect of determining the market value on examination of the parties to the document and merely marking the document by consent will not prove its contents as contemplated under the third judgment of the Division Bench cited above. So far as the 5th judgment cited is one which is to the effect of determination of the market value. Transaction between the willing purchaser and willing seller will have to be considered; that the value fixed by the Government for the purpose of stamp duty has no relevance. 14. So far as the 5th judgment cited is one which is to the effect of determination of the market value. Transaction between the willing purchaser and willing seller will have to be considered; that the value fixed by the Government for the purpose of stamp duty has no relevance. 14. The learned counsel for the tenant would further contend that the type of the building is admitted as Type-II; that so far as the area is concerned, it has to be remitted for fixation of fair rent and would say that the area is only 4700 sq.ft. and not 7000 and odd sqit. and would also cite a judgment reported in 1968 (2) MLJ 406 ( A.C. Charities v. M/s. S. Aushadalaya ) wherein it is held: “In the case of buildings, having more than one floor the principle ought to be one of apportionment in accordance with the number of storeys. If there are two storeys, the market value of the land for the first floor will be half. If there are more than two storeys, it will be proportionately distributed in accordance with the number of storeys in the building. If a literal interpretation were to be given to the meaning of the Act, it would either result in a conclusion that there is no site for the first, second and the nth (sic) storeys at all which has to be considered, or taking the extreme view, such value of the site below has to be added on to each of the storeys in the building. Such addition of the value of the site to each of such storeys would, in my opinion, result in unjust enrichment to the landlord or the landlady, which has to be relieved against, bearing in mind the beneficial aspect of the Act. I am therefore of the opinion that the principle adopted by the lower Court in apportioning the value of the site as between the two storeys in both the Civil Revision Petitions is well founded”. Hence, the learned counsel would emphasise that the ground area should be apportioned and would cite yet another judgment reported in 1972 (2) MLJ 446 = 85 L.W. 827 ( Rainbow Electric Supply Corpn. Hence, the learned counsel would emphasise that the ground area should be apportioned and would cite yet another judgment reported in 1972 (2) MLJ 446 = 85 L.W. 827 ( Rainbow Electric Supply Corpn. v. Chenchuramiah ) wherein it is held: “that the site value in the case of a building having more than one floor, must be proportionately distributed in accordance with the number of storeys in the building”. that so far as the question of law regarding the provision under Section 108(b) of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, they are also well aware of the fact and would conclude his argument. 15. In reply, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in the first two Revision Petitions and the Revision Petitioner in the last Revision Petition who is the landlord would contend that the counsel for the tenant had omitted to read Ex. B.1 lease deed dated 7.7.1971 and it would be objeted by the other side on ground that it is not at all exhibited. Citing the relevant paras 22, 3 and 5 clause F in Ex. B.2, the counsel would contend that the lessee shall not make any additions or alterations in the premises without the prior written consent of the lessor. The learned counsel would then give the description and location of the property concerned, stating that it is adjacent to the Elphinstone theatre and the building is described as the ground, the first and second floors, but the lease deed is silent about the same. But it includes the definition of the building under Section 2(2), it does not say part of the building, its imagination to mean the part of the building. Whether the first and second floors include the lease or not is the point to be decided; that in RCOP No. 1207 of 1983, the landlords petition for eviction is allowed and the respondent/tenant was directed to vacate and hand over vacant possession as against which RCA No. 986 of 1990 had been filed and the said appeal was allowed and the CRP filed in view of the decision of the P.ORR and Sons case , it had been withdrawn waiting for the change; that RCOP 1208 of 1983 has been filed for fixation of fair rent and allowed and the rent was fixed at Rs. 850/- as against the present rent of Rs. 850/- as against the present rent of Rs. 2,500/-; that it is not the only petition that the landlord had filed, but also yet another RCOP 120 of 1983 got allowed and ordered eviction and the appeal preferred by the tenant also got allowed and the CRP filed by the landlord not perused even at the numbering stage; that yet another RCOP No. 443 of 1995 had also been filed by the landlord. 16. The learned counsel would further contend that the whole building consisting of ground floor, first and second floors, that the lease deed, Ex. A.1 refers to the whole building and it should obviously include the ground, first and second floors of the building. At para 2, the property has been described in the schedule does not disclose only the ground floor, but all; that it is not the first, and second floors were constructed by the tenant after the lease deed; that the tenant never disputed the whole building consisting of ground, first and second floors and the liability to pay the fair rent to all the 3 floors as per the lease deed dated 7.7.1971 cannot be disputed; that the relationship of the landlord-tenant in 1971 does not make a mention of a tenancy only of the ground floor thereby meaning all the 3 floors. Hence, not having spoken about the non-existence of the first and second floors, the tenant is estopped from contending that the tenancy is confined only to the ground floor; that the tenant never disputed at any point of time regarding his tenancy of all the 3 floors, but he disputes only the fixation of the fair rent; if the tenancy is admitted, it automatically extends to the fixation of fair rent under Section IV based on the factual position of the lease deed dated 7.7.1971 (Ex. A.12) and the legal position under Section 108(b) of the Transfer of Property Act. 17. Then the learned counsel would point out clause 2(f) wherein the lessee shall not make any alteration to the demised premises and condition ‘g’ that according to the terms and conditions of clause 2(f)(g) of the lease deed, Ex. A.12) and the legal position under Section 108(b) of the Transfer of Property Act. 17. Then the learned counsel would point out clause 2(f) wherein the lessee shall not make any alteration to the demised premises and condition ‘g’ that according to the terms and conditions of clause 2(f)(g) of the lease deed, Ex. A.12 and according to Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the superstructure claimed to have been constructed by the tenant lapses to the landlord, Section 108(a) contemplates the rights and liabilities of the lessor and Section 108(b) contemplates the rights and liabil ities of the lessee. According to Section 108(b) if during the continuance, an addition is made to the property, it is construed to be part of the lease and even if he claims that without consent, he constructed, the scope of Section 108(b) is attracted. Only to establish the claim of the respondent that he constructed the first and second floors and continues to be the tenant of all the 3 floors and that he does not fall under the scope of Section IV is not acceptable; that apart from the lease deed dated 7.7.1971, the Transfer of Property Act, Section 108 in the definition Section 2 (2) that ‘building’ means any building or part of the building are relevant to be considered in order to bring the tenant under the scope of Section IV of the TNBLRC Act. 18. Coming to the trial Court judgment, the learned counsel would submit that the trial Court has fixed the cost of construction at Rs. 58/- per sq.ft. for the ground floor, Rs. 52/-for the first floor and Rs. 53/- for the second floor; that it has also held that it is the type-I building; that at no stretch of imagination the cost of construction at Rs. 50/- could be fixed even in the year 1983; that Ex. A.11 is the plan of the neighbouring building i.e. Elphinstone theatre and its boundary and it is as shown in the petitioners land that the respondent-tenant himself is the owner of the property, that a case was registered in the High Court in 1948 and the case was that the superstructure constructed on the land of Ex. A.11 i.e. of Elphinstone theatre referring to the boundary of the landlord that was followed in the New Globe theatre and that Ex. A.11 i.e. of Elphinstone theatre referring to the boundary of the landlord that was followed in the New Globe theatre and that Ex. A.11 which is the adjacent property is tenants property in 1948. 19. Referring to marking of the certified copies of the document without examining parties and a case has to be remanded back, as it has been argued on the part of the learned counsel for the other side, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that this case does not come under the facts and circumstances of the cases cited by the other side reported in 1996-II-LW 658 (D.B.) and 1997-II-LW 637 (Supra). The learned counsel would contend regarding the Evidence Act, the law is that the certified copy of the documents can be marked; that so far as this is not amended, this procedure cannot be altered which is still in vogue; that the Court can rely upon the statutory provision and thus the CRPs are disposed of accordingly. The second submission is that, these decisions reported are based on facts and the question of law as pronounced in S.S. Subramani, J.s judgment based on the legal question, whether the certified copies can be marked only to the knowledge of the parties to the document; that the party is aware of the document and the exhibits filed in the Court below, the respondent is personally aware of. In the Elphinstone Theatre case of the year 1948, the tenant himself was a party to the proceeding and the case was in respect of the superstructure constructed by the tenant Kishinchand Chellaram, the tenant herein, filed the case in 1948; that the tenant Chellaram here is personally aware of the certified copy of the sale deed filed in RCOP 1208 of 1933; that in Ex. A.12, the north boundary has been shown as Elphinstone theatre; that Ex. A.10 dated 16.9.1982 is the certified copy of the plan of Elphinstone theatre complex; that it is 9.6 lakhs per ground i.e. Rs. 400/- per sq.ft. and he could rely upon in fixing the fair rent and on monthly rent of Rs. 31,075/-. 20. Regarding Ex. A.10, the learned counsel would contend that it pertains to the neighbouring property of the petitioners premises in which the respondent Chellaram had owned the building and filed the case in 1948 against the tenant in the High Court, Madras. and he could rely upon in fixing the fair rent and on monthly rent of Rs. 31,075/-. 20. Regarding Ex. A.10, the learned counsel would contend that it pertains to the neighbouring property of the petitioners premises in which the respondent Chellaram had owned the building and filed the case in 1948 against the tenant in the High Court, Madras. i.e. by virtue of filing in 1948 even if it is not accepted, Chellaram, the tenant here is personally aware of the neighbouring building i.e. Elphinstone theatre; therefore, Ex. A.10 is with the personal knowledge of the tenant establishes Ex. A.10; that the very case of this defence on the document dated 7.7.1971 in which Chellaram is a party and this mentions the whole building which is adjacent to Elphinstone theatre. The learned counsel would say that his endeavour is to establish that the tenant had his personal knowledge of Ex. A.10 through Ex. A.12; that it is not proper to ask for a remand since the certified copy of Ex. A.10 had been marked with the knowledge of the landlord and the tenant, therefore, the decisions cited especially that of S.S. Subramani, J. would not apply to the facts of this case. Hence remand is not at all necessary and would say that basically the facts and points of law are different; that the judgment of S.S. Subramani, J. which is based on the Supreme Courts Judgment delivered in a Land Acquisition case; that the document is concerned with valuation register for collecting the stamp duty which had not statutory basis, but here is a public document which is recognized by the Registration Act and the relevant Section of the Stamp Act, the Evidence Act, the Transfer of Property Act, etc. These provisions of law which very much speak about a valuation register required by the executive authorities cannot be equated with the facts and circumstances of this case. Para 8 of the judgment of S.S. Subramani, J. itself is clear that the said judgment cannot apply to the facts of this case. Para 9 is also relevant at this context. 21. That within the meaning of the above Supreme Court decision, the facts and circumstances are different and they need not be on that score remanded at all. 22. Para 9 is also relevant at this context. 21. That within the meaning of the above Supreme Court decision, the facts and circumstances are different and they need not be on that score remanded at all. 22. Referring to ExA.13 the grounds in paras 22, 23 and 24, the learned counsel would submit that they would confirm the claim of the respondent i.e. owner of the first and second floors of the building also; that it has been confirmed in the judgment in RCA 986 of 1990; that RCOP 1208 of 1983 has been filed by the landlord for eviction on ground of demolition and reconstruction and RCOP 1208 of 1983 was filed by the landlord for fixation of fair rent and simultaneously, the present 3 CRPs have arisen out of one RCOP 1208 of 1983 for fixation of fair rent; that RCOP 443 of 1995 was filed on ground of denial of title and wilful default and change of user of the building wherein the petition was allowed and eviction was ordered, as per Ex. A.14. that on an appeal in RCA 388 of 1995 and 642 of 1995 by both the landlord and tenant respectively on 30.6.1998, the eviction ordered made in RCOP 443 of 1995 was confirmed. The present position is both the rent controller and the Appellate Authority have ordered eviction on ground of denial of title; that Exs. A.13 and A.14 are to answer foremost the points raised by the tenant in the two out of 3 CRPs, namely, CRPs. 1125 of 1993 and 2023 of 1997 filed by the tenant, the Court findings, therefore established that the first and second floors of the building are part and parcel of the main building of the landlord and the fixation of the fair rent is for the ground floor, first and secondlloors. For fixation of fairrent, the judgment reported in (1989) I MLJ 213 set at rest the dispute regarding the fixation of the fair rent of the building, that it set a format to calculate the market value of the site and the building constructed on it. For fixation of fairrent, the judgment reported in (1989) I MLJ 213 set at rest the dispute regarding the fixation of the fair rent of the building, that it set a format to calculate the market value of the site and the building constructed on it. More than one storey occupied by many tenants is different; that this is one building occupied by one tenant and there is no necessity for apportionment of the building or the site for the purpose or the fixation of fair rent, the land and building consisting of 4 floors are the contiguous part of all the 4 floors built up on the site of the ground floor has to be taken. In view of Section 2(2) of the Act, the market value of the building has to be calculated as per Section IV of the Act; that the decision of the Full Bench will not apply to this case, since it is the case of one landlord, one tenant, so far as it applies to the apportionment of one. The appellate authority did not take into account, i.e. to be rectified by this Court holding fixation of fair rent would apply to the first and second floors while calculating the cost of the building; that correction is necessary. 23. In the light of the eviction on the ground of denial of title to the first and second floors that the first and second floor was belonging to the tenant, the cost of construction of the first and second floors should also be calculated since they are also belonging to the landlord because they are part and parcel of the building. In this case, it would be much more than Rs. 31,025/- i.e. claimed as the monthly rent by the landlord; that Ex. A7 filed by the landlord dated 28.3.1988 of the neighbouring land, this document has been executed none else than the tenant himself in respect of the adjoining property in door No. 831, Mount Road, Madras-2, the tenant himself is a party to this to Exs. A.7, A.8 and A.10; that relying upon Ex. A.10, the appellate authority fixed the land value at Rs. 55.000/-failing to consider Exs. A.7 and A.8 executed by the tenant himself; that this case does not come under the category to the remand case and it has to be considered by this Court itself; that Ex. A.7, A.8 and A.10; that relying upon Ex. A.10, the appellate authority fixed the land value at Rs. 55.000/-failing to consider Exs. A.7 and A.8 executed by the tenant himself; that this case does not come under the category to the remand case and it has to be considered by this Court itself; that Ex. A.10 pertains to a property which is now the Raheja Complex and previously known as Elphinstone theatre; though Ex. A.10 belongs to the clause in the neighbouring property, it was known as Elphinstone theatre; that the landlord filed a case in this Court against Kevalchand Chellarams tenant on an identical case of the present landlord; That the calculation pattern regarding the land, site value, cost of construction, amenities, etc. have not been considered properly by the lower Court; Section 2(2) of the TNBLRC Act, Section 108(b) and (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, the appellate authority has failed to consider that the petition building consisted of ground floor, first and second floors; that the decisions of the appellate Court with the fair rent should be fixed as prayed for in the petition filed in RCOP 1208 of 1983 in the light of the judgment made in RCOP 443 of 1995 and confirmed in RCA 357 of 1995 and RCOP 645 of 1995 by the appellate authority. 24. So far as the judgment reported in 1997 (3) LW 193 is concerned, wherein a Single Judge of this Court has held that, “In this case since no materials had been placed before the Rent Controller, he was of the opinion that the fair rent could not be fixed, and the petition was dismissed with costs. An application for fixation of fair rent cannot be dismissed and the procedure adopted by the Rent Controller is wrong. If no evidence is let in, law presumes that the agreed rent should be fixed as fair rent”. Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. This extract is taken from M/s. Kishinchand Chellarams (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. G. Varadappa, (1999) 1 LW 495 , at page 506 : “It is well-settled that in case regarding fixation of fair rent, Court is bound to decide the same according to statutory provisions and not on the basis of mere statement of either party. This extract is taken from M/s. Kishinchand Chellarams (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. G. Varadappa, (1999) 1 LW 495 , at page 506 : “It is well-settled that in case regarding fixation of fair rent, Court is bound to decide the same according to statutory provisions and not on the basis of mere statement of either party. There is a duty cast on the Court to abide by the statutory provisions and then determine the fair rent. This has not been done by the Appellate Authority, which has occasioned grave failure of justice”. The above propositions have been propounded by the Single Judge of this Court in the case where no materials have been placed, the Rent Controller had dismissed the petition with costs, stating that the fair rent could not be fixed, the second part of proposition by the learned Judge of this Court has been propounded following the decision of the Apex Court reported in (1994) 4 SCC 595 wherein their Lordships have held that the Basic Valuation Register maintained by the Collector for the purpose of levy of stamp duty cannot be the basis for determination of market value of the land, and the said decision had been followed by the same Apex Court in (1996) 3 SCC 124 wherein their Lordships held that the basic valuation is only for the purpose of collecting the stamp duty and that, therefore, it cannot form foundation to determine the market value. 25. The above decision had been followed by the Full Bench of our High Court while determining the market value for the purpose of fixation of fair rent and the Tamil Nadu Rent Controller in 1996 2 LW 658. As per this judgment, evidence must be examined by the persons connected with the sale deed or the transactions in that case, even though registration copy of the sale deeds were produced to determine the market value, their Lordships held that they were not sufficient and persons connected with those transactions have to prove the contents also. 26. As per this judgment, evidence must be examined by the persons connected with the sale deed or the transactions in that case, even though registration copy of the sale deeds were produced to determine the market value, their Lordships held that they were not sufficient and persons connected with those transactions have to prove the contents also. 26. The learned senior counsel for the landlord would further contend that coming to the question whether the tenant is a statutory tenant as claimed by the landlord or a contractual tenant, he would cite Sections 2 and 4 of the Rent Control Act with reference to the point, namely whether the tenant is a statutory tenant or a contractual tenant; that any relationship between the landlord and the tenant is based on the leasee agreement whether oral or in writing; that in this case, the lease deed Ex. A.12 dated 7.7.1971 is in writing which came to an end in the year 1981 i.e. 10 years after the lease. Thereafter, according to para 4 of the counter, the tenant claims himself to be a tenant holding over which shows only that the tenant is not clear in his mind whether he is a statutory tenant or a contractual tenant. In para 3, there is a categorical statement admitting that the respondent is the contractual tenant for over 40 years and in this document, it needs to be known who is a statutory tenant and who is a contractual tenant. The Supreme Court in M/s. Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran (F.B.) reported in (1966) II MLJ 68 = 79 L.W. 331 has defined (the statutory tenant starts when contratual tenant comes to extinction.) Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. This extract is taken from M/s. Kishinchand Chellarams (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. G. Varadappa, (1999) 1 LW 495 , at page 507 : 27. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. This extract is taken from M/s. Kishinchand Chellarams (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. G. Varadappa, (1999) 1 LW 495 , at page 507 : 27. The other judgment cited at this juncture is one in Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar Dutta reported in (1980) I SCC 185 wherein a tenant is loosely described as a statutory tenant which is another name for his status of irremovability as though he is entitled for any extra right in a petition for the fixation of fair rent in the name of statutory tenant which is a misnomer and would pose a question as to where does a statutory tenant stand in a petition under Section 4 of the Act for the fixation of the fair rent and would cite 3 cases in (i) M/s. Raval and Co. v. K.G. Ramachandran reported in (1974) I SCC 424, (ii) in M/s. George Oakes Ltd. v. The Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras , reported in (1950) I MLJ 317, = 63 L.W. 860 and (iii) in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1998 SC 602 . 28. So far as the first judgment cited above is concerned, it is held by the Apex Court in consideration of the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court that, “A close analysis of the Madras Act shows that it has a scheme of its own and it is intended to provide a complete code in respect of both contractual tenancies as well as what are popularly called statutory tenancies. As noticed earlier the definition of the term ‘landlord’ as well as the term ‘tenant’ shows that the Act applies to contractual tenancies as well as cases of “statutory tenants” and their landlords. On some supposed general principles governing all Rent Acts it cannot be argued that such fixation can only be for the benefit of the tenants when the act clearly lays down that both landlords and tenants can apply for fixation of fair rent. A close reading of the Act shows that the fair rent is fixed for the building and itt is payable by whoever is the tenant whether a contractual tenant or statutory tenant. A close reading of the Act shows that the fair rent is fixed for the building and itt is payable by whoever is the tenant whether a contractual tenant or statutory tenant. What is fixed is not the fair rent payable by the tenant or to the landlord who applies for fixation of fair rent but fair rent for the building something like an incident of the tenure regarding the building”. 29. So far as the second judgment cited above is concerned, it is held: “If there is an ambiguity or doubt about the language of Section 4 of the Act, read by itself or in conjunction with the other Sections of the Act, and two constructions are reasonably possible or plausible, one of which would upset fundamental principles of law or produce a manifestly unreasonable or uunjust result, while the other is free from such taint, the Court might reject the former and accept the latter. In other cases, we have to see not what, in our opinion, the Legislature might reasonably do, but what it has actually done by way of enacted words. In my opinion, the language of Section 4 of the Act is as plain as it could be and there is nothing intrinsically wrong or unjust in a tenant being asked to pay a “fail rent”, if the rent stipulated as payable under the lease is lower than the fair rent, when that very tenant is given a right to compel his landlord to accept a “fair rent” as determined by the Controller and forego any higher rent which he himself had agreed to pay under the cont ract of lease. It is not correct to assume that it is only on tenants and not on landlords that new rights and privileges were conferred under the Act. Overriding the terms and conditions of leases as well as the provisions of Section III of the Transfer of Property Act, Section 7 of the Act confers valuable rights on landlords in the matter of ejectment of tenants who commit default in payment of rent or transfer or sub-let the buildings leased or use the buildings for purposes other than those for which they were leased, etc. The landlord is bound by the contractual terms of the tenancy only to the extent specified in Section 7, Sub-Section (3) of the Act”. 30. The landlord is bound by the contractual terms of the tenancy only to the extent specified in Section 7, Sub-Section (3) of the Act”. 30. So far as the third judgment cited above is concerned, the Full Bench of the Apex Court differing from the Bombay High Court in a case wherein ‘Lex injusta non est lex’ that unjust laws are not laws is what was contended by the landlords in testing the validity of the relevant provision of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 in so far as it provides that landlords cannot charge rent in excess of the standard rent. Considering the decision of a 3 Judge Bench in the cases of Rattan Arya ( AIR 1986 SC 1444 = 99 L.W. 325); Motor General Traders ( AIR 1984 SC 121 = 97 L.W. 42 SN) and Synthetics and Chemicals ( AIR 1990 SC 1927 ) that with the passage of time and with the consequent change of circumstances the continued operation of an Act which was valid when enacted may become arbitrary and unreasonable, and held: “The aforesaid decisions clearly recognise and establish that a statute which when enacted was justified may, with the passage of time, become arbitrary and unreasonable. It is, therefore, to be seen whether the aforesaid principle is applicable in the instant case. Can it be said that even though the provisions relating to the fixation of standard rent were valid when the Bombay Rent Act was passed in 1947 the said provision, as amended, can still be regarded as valid now?” “Reports of different committees and resolutions of the ministers have been placed on record in an effort to show that these official agencies have, since over the last two decades, themselves felt that increase in rents was called for. The correctness or the authenticity of this material has not, in any way, been doubted and therefore we see no reason as to why this cannot be taken into consideration in order to determine whether the submission of Mr. Nariman merits acceptance”. “The aforesaid illustration, which has not been seriously disputed, clearly brings out the arbitrariness of the standard rent provisions contained in the Bombay Rent Act. It is true that the aforesaid illustration has reference to the monthly rent of Rs. Nariman merits acceptance”. “The aforesaid illustration, which has not been seriously disputed, clearly brings out the arbitrariness of the standard rent provisions contained in the Bombay Rent Act. It is true that the aforesaid illustration has reference to the monthly rent of Rs. 100 as on 1.9.1940 and does not relate to the premises which are let out after the Act had come in force. As far as S. 5(10) is concerned the standard rent of the premises let out after 1.9.1940 is that rent at which the premises were first let. Even so with the rapid increase in the expenses for repair and other outgoings and the decreasing net amount of rent which remains with the landlord, clearly sh ows that the non-provisions in the Act for reasonable increase in the rent, with the passage of time, is leading to arbitrary results”. “In so far as social legislation, like the Rent Control Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all. That ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another Section of the society. When there is shortage of accommodation it is desirable, nay, necessary that some protection should be given to the tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited. At the same time such a law has to be revised periodically so as to ensure that a disproportionately larger benefit than the one which was intended is not given to the tenants. It is not as if the government does not take remedial measures to try and offset the effects of inflation. In order to provide fair wage to the salaried employees the government provides for payment of dearness and other allowances from time to time. Surprisingly this principle is lost sight of while providing for increase in the standard rent-the increases made even in 1987 are not adequate, fair or just and the provisions continue to be arbitrary in todays context. “When enacting socially progressive legislation the need is greater to approach the problem from a holistic perspective and not to have a narrow or short sighted parochial approach. Giving a greater than due emphasis to a vocal Section of society results not merely in the miscarriage of justice but in the abdication of responsibility of the legislative authority. “When enacting socially progressive legislation the need is greater to approach the problem from a holistic perspective and not to have a narrow or short sighted parochial approach. Giving a greater than due emphasis to a vocal Section of society results not merely in the miscarriage of justice but in the abdication of responsibility of the legislative authority. Social Legislation is treated with deference by the Courts not merely because the Legislature represents the people but also because in representing them the entire spectrum of views is expected to be taken into account. The Legislature is not shackled by the same constraints as the Courts of law. But its power is coupled with a responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the Courts to look at Legislation from the altar of Article 14 of the Constitution. This article is intended, as is obvious from its words, to check this tendency, giving undue preference to some over others”. “Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, we have no doubt that the existing provisions of the Bombay Rent Act relating to the determination and fixation of the standard rent can no longer be considered to be reasonable. The said provisions would have been struck down as having now become unreasonable and arbitrary but we think it is not necessary to strike down the same in view of the fact that the present extended period of the Bombay Rent Act comes to an end on 31st March, 1998. The governments thinking reflected in various documents itself shows that the existing provisions have now become unreasonable and, therefore, require reconsideration. The new bill is under consideration and we leave it to the Legislature to frame a just and fair law keeping in view the interests of all concerned and in particular the resolution of the State Ministers for Housing of 1992 and the National Model Law which has been circulated by the Central Government in 1992. We are not expressing any opinion on the provisions of the said Model law but as the same has been drafted and circulated amongst all the States after due deliberation and thought, then will, perhaps, have to be very good and compelling reasons in departing from the said Model law. Mr. Nargolkar assured us that this Model law will be taken into consideration in the framing of the proposed new Rent Control Act”. Mr. Nargolkar assured us that this Model law will be taken into consideration in the framing of the proposed new Rent Control Act”. It was ultimately held by the Apex Court, “that the decision of the High Court upholding the validity of the impugned provisions relating to standard rent was not correct”. Further refraining from striking down the said provisions as the existing Act elapses on 31.3.1998 further expressing the hope that a new Rent Control Act will be enacted with effect from 1st April, 1998 keeping in view the observations made in the judgment in so far as the fixation of standard rent is concerned. 31. In reply, the learned senior counsel appearing for the tenant would contend that though the tenant entered into a contract by virtue of the document periodically getting renewed and registered, since the Act registered into being in 1960, the contractual tenant in view of the operation of the Act, became the statutory tenant; that the Act is intended to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenant; that the landlord relied on the judgment reported in 1974 I SCC 424 (Supra) wherein the Act is the complete code by itself. Whenever there is difference or controvercy, the Act will override. For instance, Section 1 and 6 of the Transfer of Property Act prescribes a statutory notice, but herein no notice need be necessary, since all is meant for fixation of fair rent, not only irremovability and hence for provision of amenities, the Act overrides; that in the last judgment cited by the learned counsel for the landlord reported in AIR 1998 SC 602 the Bombay Rent Control Act has been challenged and the fixation of fair rent is justified and there the Act itself was going to die. Reminding the case decided by Shanmukam, J. reported in 1986 TNLJ 257 = 99 L.W. 320 ( Raja Ponnuthambi v. K. Augustine ), the learned counsel would point out that 1993 amendment whether authorised or unauthorised under the Constitution, one has to pay the fair rent in respect of the premises as per the judgment reported in 1989 I MLJ 494 = 1989-2- L.W. 225 ( Rajrani Devi v. Yacoob Sheriff ) wherein it is held that according to TNBLRC Act Sections 2(2) and 4(4) Proviso - Landlord - Leasing out land with building. Tenant putting up superstructure in a portion of land - Entire vacant land appurtenant to the building - To be considered for purpose of fixing fair rent - Area of superstructure put up by tenant cannot be excluded, wherein it is held: “if the definition under Section 2(2) is applied to the Proviso to Section 4(4), it is clear that the ‘building’ mentioned in the proviso would only refer to the building which has been let out to the tenant. It cannot by any stretch of imagination include the building constructed by the tenant. The tenant is certainly having the advantage of the space on which he has constructed a superstructure. Having put that portion of the vacant land to profitable use, it is not open to the tenant to contend that he is not liable to pay any rent either for that portion of land or for the building erected by him. Certainly, the statute cannot compel him to pay rent for the superstructure erected by him. But, he will be liable to pay rent for the land which has been utilised by him for the purpose of erecting the superstructure. Consequently, the vacant land appurtenant to the building which was let out by the landlord to the tenant should be considered for the purpose of proviso to S. 4(4) of the Act”. 32. The learned senior counsel would then cite a passage from the book of V.N. Krishnamurthis TNBLRC Act, 1960 revised by P.B. Ramanujam for the point that parties cannot contract out of the statute which reads: “It is well settled that where tenancy is governed by Act it is not open to the landlord or the tenant to contract, themselves out of the obligations under the Act or to agree resort to a procedure not contemplated by the Act. It is not therefore open to the parties to enter into contracts which could have the effect of by-passing the Act. The legal position would be the same even though such a contract is embodied in a compromise which has received the imprimature of a tribunal contemplated by the special enactment (Ramiah Chettiar v. Sankaralingam Pillai, 1970 (I) MLJ 483 at 484 = 83 L.W. 39). The legal position would be the same even though such a contract is embodied in a compromise which has received the imprimature of a tribunal contemplated by the special enactment (Ramiah Chettiar v. Sankaralingam Pillai, 1970 (I) MLJ 483 at 484 = 83 L.W. 39). If there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute, no question can arise of any one entering into a contract which is so prohibited but where there is no such prohibition, it will have to be seen whether the Act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy (Lachoo Mal v. Radhe Shyam , 1971 (I) SCC 619 at 622). By an agreement of the kind embodied in the compromise petition, the parties could not curtail the powers of the District Magistrate. It was unlawful and against public policy to do so (Shri Krishna v. District Magistrate, Kanpur, 1975 (2) SCC 361 at 369). Public Policy requires that the parties cannot be permitted to contract out of the legislative mandate which requires certain kind of disputes to be settled by special Courts constituted between parties whose rights are regulated by the Rent Act (Nataraj Studios v. Navrang Studios, 1981 (I) SCC 526 at 532)”. 33. Public Policy requires that the parties cannot be permitted to contract out of the legislative mandate which requires certain kind of disputes to be settled by special Courts constituted between parties whose rights are regulated by the Rent Act (Nataraj Studios v. Navrang Studios, 1981 (I) SCC 526 at 532)”. 33. The learned senior counsel would then cite two judgments reported in (i) 1954 (II) MLJ 752 ( Maragani Ramalingam v. Kondapalli Gurumurthi Reddi ) wherein also it is held that a tenant cannot contract himself out of the rights conferred on him by the Act and the tenant could take advantaage of the provisions of the Act notwithstanding that the lease was for a specified period only, and the second judgment reported in 1970 (I) MLJ 483 = 83 L.W. 39 ( Ramiah Chettiar v. K. Sankaralingam Pillai ) wherein in a petition filed by the landlord, for eviction on the ground of wilful default, a compromise entered by the landlord, will be entitled to possession if the tenant committed default in payment of rents in future in assessing the legality of the order passed in terms of compromise, this Court held that “objection to jurisdiction may be raised in execution proceedings”, and further held “it is well-settled where the tenancy is governed by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, it is not open to the landlord or the tenant to contract themselves out of the obligations under the Act or to agree to resort to a procedure not contemplated by the Act. It is not, therefore, open to the parties to enter into a contract, which would have the effect of bypassing the provisions of the Act”. 34. On the part of the learned counsel appearing for the landlord ultimately would remark that it is not that it could withstand against the provision under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the judgment reported in (1989) I MLJ 494 = 1989-2- L.W. 225 (Supra) does not apply to this case. 35. From out of the pleadings, the facts and circumstances encircling the whole case, having regard to the evidence placed on record and upon hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for both, the points that arise for determination are as follows: 1. 35. From out of the pleadings, the facts and circumstances encircling the whole case, having regard to the evidence placed on record and upon hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for both, the points that arise for determination are as follows: 1. Whether the type of building is type I as advocated on the part of the landlord or type II as argued on the part of the tenant? 2. Whether the tenant is a ‘statutory tenant’ or ‘contractual tenant’ on payment of rents on monthly basis? 3. Whether it is the tenant, who constructed the first and second floors of the building and if so had it been constructed by the tenant with prior permission of the landlord? 4. If the first and second floors of the building are concluded to have been constructed by the tenant at his own cost, what are the legal consequences regarding the rights of parties in view of the legal position, under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act? 5. What rights would accrue to the landlord regarding the first and second floors in the fixation of fair rent? 6. Whether the proposition of Law as propounded by the Apex Court that mere production and marking of a document is not sufficient to prove its contents - proving of the facts or contents of the documents by evidence of parties to the document or the attesting witnesses, who know the facts necessary - whether applicable to this case? If so to what extent and consequence? 7. What is the fair rent of the premises as on the date of petition and whether the fixation of faiirrent by the lower Appellate Court is just and reasonable? 36. To trace the history of the case, in short, G. Varadappa is the landlord of the premises and M/s. Kishinchand Chellarams (India) Private Limited are the tenants of the non-residential premises bearing new door number 831 and old door number 181 of Mount Road (Anna Salai), Madras-2 and the building is said to be in existence in the land measuring 4485 sq.ft., the plinth area of the ground floor constructed 4379 sq. ft., the first floor with RC roof measuring 1428 sq. feet and with A.C. sheet 1232 sq. ft. totally measuring 2660 sq.ft. and the second floor constructed with A.C. roof measuring 451 sq. ft., the first floor with RC roof measuring 1428 sq. feet and with A.C. sheet 1232 sq. ft. totally measuring 2660 sq.ft. and the second floor constructed with A.C. roof measuring 451 sq. ft., thus, all the three floors put together measuring 7530 sq.ft., which is, no doubt, located at the most important and the nerve centre of business activity i.e. Mount Road (Anna Salai) Roundtana of Madras city. The landlord would claim that the ground floor was put up with Madras Terrace 100 years back and the first and second floors were constructed in the year 1969 and the tenant would deny the same and would contend that the main building with the ground floor is of 63 years old and the first and second floors were put up by him at his own cost. Again, the landlord, though initially argued that the first and second floors of the building were put up by the tenant in violation of the agreed conditions of the contract the registered sale deed dated 7.7.1971, which was for a period of 10 years, it would be denied by the tenant to the emphatic assertion that the first and second floors were put up by him around the year 1969 at his own cost and with the prior permission from the landlord and there was no hue or cry raised against such an additional construction and the very act of the landlord in admitting the monthly rents thereafter would be a proof to the permission accorded for such additional construction put up by the tenant and hence, either regarding the tenancy of the building by the tenant or the lease entered into in his favour by the landlord or the occupancy of the entire building by the tenant for quite some time from the mid 50s of the century till dace starting with a monthly rent of Rs. 725/-, commencing the tenancy from 1.4.1954 initially for a period of five years and with further extension of the period for ten more years by the subsequent lease deed dated 24.9.1961 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/- and the further extension of the lease period by 10 years by the lease deed dated 7.1.1971 on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,500/-enhancing the same subsequently to Rs. 1,500/- and the further extension of the lease period by 10 years by the lease deed dated 7.1.1971 on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,500/-enhancing the same subsequently to Rs. 2,800/-with provision thereof for the extension of the term of lease for yet another five years from 1.1.1981 are all not in dispute in between the parties. It is only the extension of the lease period over and beyond the expiry of the ten years lease on 6.7.1981, which is vehemently challenged by the landlord and without such extension of the lease for any further term, as contemplated in the lease deed of 7.7.1971, the tenant is said to be in occupation of the building, himself assuming in the name of exercising his option for renewal by a letter dated 4.9.1980 for the period between 1.1.1981 and 31.12.1985 and since the landlord did not come forward to renew the lease period and thereafter the tenant taking it for granted that the lease is deemed to have been renewed, thereby proclaiming that they are the tenants holding over for the said period are all strongly objected on the part of the landlord. 37. Regarding the extent of the ground, the area of construction of the ground floor, first floor and the second floor, there is not much of dispute among the parties and the disputes are that the construction of first and second floors by the tenant was unauthorised and that he should have obtained the written consent from the lessor, as per the terms of the lease agreement in Ex. B.2, prior to resorting to construct the first and second floors; that Section 2(2) of the TNBLRC Act does not mean part of the building; that the first and second floors get merged with the main building and lapses to the landlord within the meaning of Section 108-B of the Transfer of Property Act. 38. The petition in R.C.O.P. No. 1208 of 1983 has been filed by the landlord for the lixatiion of fair rent. 38. The petition in R.C.O.P. No. 1208 of 1983 has been filed by the landlord for the lixatiion of fair rent. As already discussed, it is the argument of the landlord that he is entitled to the fair rent for all the three floors but on the contrary, on the part of the lessees, it would be argued that since the first and second floors were constructed by the lessee at his own cost, the lessor is not entitled to claim any rent for the first and second floors but entitled to claim rent only to the ground floor of the building. 39. Four witnesses would be examined as P.Ws.1 to 4 on the part of the petitioner/landlord before the Rent Controller and two witnesses would be examined on the side of the tenant/respondent as R.Ws. 1 and 2 and equal number of documents would be marked on either side, numbering 11, as Exs. A.1 to A.11 and B.1 to B.11. 40. It is the contention of the landlord that the valuation of the site itself is Rs. 9,60,000/-, but the value of the site by the lessee is Rs. 1,50,000/-; that the lessors claim of fair rent is Rs. 31,075/-, but the estimation of the lessee would show it at Rs. 4,562.80 ps. The trial Court in analysing the facts, circumstances and the evidence placed on record, appreciating them in its own may, would fix the value of the site and building at Rs. 8,35,000/- and fix the fair rent at Rs. 8,350/-. But the Rent Control Appellate Authority would fix the value of tthe land and building at Rs. 16,20,583/- and would fix the fair rent at Rs. 16,527/-. It is only testing the validity of the judgment and decree passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the tenant has preferred the first two Revision Petitions and the landlord has preferred the third Revision Petition as vividly dealt with above. At this stage, it is relevant to answer the points framed above in order to arrive at a valid and reasonable conclusion regarding fixation of the fair rent of the premises. Point No. 1 : 41. At this stage, it is relevant to answer the points framed above in order to arrive at a valid and reasonable conclusion regarding fixation of the fair rent of the premises. Point No. 1 : 41. Regarding this point, on the part of the tenant it would be argued that the building is of type II and not that of type I and it is even admitted at a stage by the landlord that it is a building of type II. The learned counsel appearing for the tenant would agree that the two relevant points that arc to be considered in this aspect are: (i) the value of the land, which is predominantly a major factor i.e. the market value and (ii) whether the landlord is really entitled for the fair rent considering the building as that of Type I. His argument is that the building is very old and it is pleaded in Para No. 9 of the counter affidavit in R.C.O.P. No. 1208 of 1983 that the ground floor walls are constructed with brick work in lime mortar and plastered with cement mortar; that the roof is with Madras terrace; that country wood is used for doors, joints etc. and the flooring is with cement; that the first floor walls are also constructed and plastered with cement mortar; that the roof is with reinforced cement concrete and Asbestos cement sheets; that country wood is used for the doors, windows etc. with cement flooring; that the second floor walls are also constructed with brick work and plastered with cement mortar, roofing is provided with asbestos cement sheets; that country wood is used for doors, rafters etc. and that cement flooring is provided with for the second floor and that the ground floor is of 63 years old and the first and second floors are 14 years old. Hence, the learned counsel for the tenant would strongly advocate that the building is of Type II and not Type I. 42. On the contrary, on the part of the landlord, it would be alleged that the plinth area of ground floor is 4832 sq.ft. of Madras terraced and it is a 100 years old construction; that first floor is 4000 sq.ft. of concrete roof construction of 14 years old and that the second floor is 1000 sq.ft. On the contrary, on the part of the landlord, it would be alleged that the plinth area of ground floor is 4832 sq.ft. of Madras terraced and it is a 100 years old construction; that first floor is 4000 sq.ft. of concrete roof construction of 14 years old and that the second floor is 1000 sq.ft. of asbestos roof construction which is 8 years old and that the land site area is 4832 sq.ft. The landlord would further allege that the nature of construction for the ground lloor as with brick and lime and for the first and second floors it is with brick and cement; that the ground floor is provided with Madras terrace, the first floor is provided with concrete floor and the second floor is provided with asbestos sheet; that the woodwork is mentioned as teak wood; the basic amenities that are provided to the building are given as water, electricity and sanitary installation; that the value of the land site itself is given as Rs. 9,60,000/- per ground and would ultimately mention the type of building as Type-I. P.Ws.2 and 4-both Civil Engineers would also almost confirm the claim of the landlord by their oral evidence and by Exs. A3, A.10. On the part of the tenant, R.W.1-the Manager of the first respondent-company and R.W.2-the Engineer of their choice would estimate the value of the ground to be Rs. 1,40,000/- and according to them, the building is of Type-II. In consideration of the above pleadings and evidence, the trial Court having found the tenant almost confirming the stability and amenities of the building as advocated by the landlord and the tenant differing only with regard to the wood used for those joints, rafters etc., which is made of teak wood as per the landlord but country wood as per the tenant, would arrive at the firm conclusion that the building is of Type I. The appellate Court would also concur with the trial Court regarding the type of the building, stating thereby that the building consists of mosaic flooring, overhead tank with motor and pump sets, sun brakers, balcony and such other facilities that are necessary for a Type-I building and further saying that just for the simple reason that they are not shown in Ex. A.3, the privileges that are provided to the building should not be denied and based on the evidence and Ex. A.3, the privileges that are provided to the building should not be denied and based on the evidence and Ex. A.3, the lower Appellate Court also would conclude that the building is of Type I. Since the reasons offered by both the Courts below, in order to arrive at the conclusion that the building is of Type I, is convincing and no error is found, affirming the same, this Court also concludes that the building is of Type-I building, thus answering point No. 1, regarding the type of building, in favour of the landlord. Point No. 2: 43. The next question that is to be considered is whether the tenant is a statutory tenant or a contractual tenant, since it is made an issue on the part of the lessee branding him to be a statutory tenant and claiming certain privileges. Spelling out as to what are those privileges that a statutory tenant is entitled to in law, the learned counsel for the tenant would argue, pointing to the irremovability of the tenant, who is qualified as a statutory tenant, that since on the date of coming into being of the TNBLRC Act, 1960, he was a tenant of the building, his rights are governed by the said statute and hence he is a statutory tenant. 44. On the part of the landlord, it would be argued that the relationship between the landlord and the tenant is based on the lease agreement, whether orally or in writing; that in Para No. 4 of the counter, the tenant claims himself to be a tenant holding over, which shows only that the tenant is not clear in his mind whether he is a statutory tenant or a contractual tenant; that in Para No. 3, there is an admission that the respondent is the contractual tenant for over 40 years. The Supreme Court would define that a “statutory tenant starts when contractual tenant comes to extinction” as per its judgment reported in 1966 (II) M.L.J. 68 = 79 L.W. 331 (cited supra). 45. In the case reported in (1980) I S.C.C. 185, a tenant is loosely described as a ‘statutory tenant’, which is another name for his status of irremovability. The Supreme Court would define that a “statutory tenant starts when contractual tenant comes to extinction” as per its judgment reported in 1966 (II) M.L.J. 68 = 79 L.W. 331 (cited supra). 45. In the case reported in (1980) I S.C.C. 185, a tenant is loosely described as a ‘statutory tenant’, which is another name for his status of irremovability. In yet another case reported in (1974) I S.C.C. 424 (cited supra), the Apex Court has laid down that “the Act applies to ‘contractual tenancies’ as well as cases of ‘statutory tenants’ and their landlords and it cannot be argued that such fixation can only be for the benefit of the tenant” “that the fair rent is fixed for the building and it is payable by whoever is the tenant, whether a contractual tenant or statutory tenant”. In the judgment reported in 1950(I) M.L.J. 317 = 63 L.W. 860 (cited supra) it has been held that the landlord is bound by the contractual terms of the tenancy only to the extent specified in Section 7, Sub-Section (3) of the T.N.B.L.R.C. Act. The last judgment cited in this context is one reported in A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 602, wherein the Full Bench of the Apex Court differed with the Bombay High Court in case, wherein, on the part of the landlord, in testifying the validity of the relevant provision of the Bombay Rents (Hotel and Lodging House Rates) Control Act, 1947, it is provided that the Landlord cannot charge rent in excess of the standard rent, pleading thereby the maxim ‘Lex injusta non est lex’ i.e. ‘unjust laws are not laws’ and the Bombay High Court declined to interfere with the legislation. But, the Apex Court considering the earlier decisions of the Bench in the cases of (i) Rattan Arya , (ii) Motor General Traders and (iii) Synthetics and Chemical respectively reported in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1444 = 99 L.W. 325 A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121 = 97 L.W. 42 SN and A.I.R. 1990 SC 1927, ultimately concluded that with the passage of time and with the consequent change of circumstances, a continued operation of an Act, which was valid when enacted, may become arbitrary and unreasonable, thus holding that the fixation of fair rent might be valid, when the Bombay Rent Act was passed in 1947, but the same could not be regarded valid still under the circumstances that are prevalent at present and declined to concur with the Bombay High Court, further suggesting the Legislature to carry out proper amendments in the Bombay Rent Control Act, thus forming the statutory safeguards in the matter of rent control proceedings. 46. So far as the case in hand is concerned, it would be argued on the part of the landlord that the tenancy having commenced under the lease deed and having got periodically extended from time to time, it is rather governed by the contract and it is unfair on the part of the tenant to loosely describe himself as a statutory tenant, which is another name for his status of irremovability, as though he is entitled for any extra right in a petition for the fixation of fair rent in the name of statutory tenant which is a misnomer and would question as to where does a statutory tenant stand in a petition under Section 4 of the Act for the fixation of fair rent. This argument advanced on the part of the learned counsel for the landlord is quite appropriate for the case in hand, in the sense that it is not a case initiated by the landlord either for ejection of the tenant or seeking possession of the premises to be handed over for any purpose and since the only question is pertaining to the fixation of fair rent, the tenant, whether he is a statutory tenant or a contractual tenant, does not become entitled to any privilege. Since the fair rent is fixed by the Court on certain norms and propositions of law, having been arrived at by different judgments delivered by the High Courts and the Supreme Court, there cannot be two versions of it, one for the statutory tenant and the other for the contractual tenant and hence the argument of the learned counsel for the tenant in this regard, holds no water for the fixation of the fair rent. It is clear that the arguments of the learned counsel for the tenant that he is a statutory tenant in a petition for the fixation of fair rent is unnecessary and uncalled for. Hence, point No. 2 is decided accordingly. 47. Points Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 : No much of arguments need be necessary so far as the question whether it is the tenant who constructed the first and second floors or the landlord and whether the tenant constructed the said floors with prior permission of the landlord of without being permitted and in violation of the terms of contract, since by overwhelming evidence - oral, documentary and circumstancial, it is well-established that the first and second floors of the building have been constructed only by the tenant and from the very same arguments advanced on the part of the landlord to the effect that the first and second floors of the building were constructed by the tenant unnauthorisedly, goes to show that the first and second floors of the building were constructed by the tenant only. The only question that arises for consideration in this regard is whether the first and second floors of the building were constructed by the tenant with prior permission of the landlord or without being permitted. So far as this question is concerned, not much of oral evidence has been let in on the part of the landlord nor any documentary evidence was produced to show that in spite of his protests, the tenant put up the additional constructions without his permission. But, from the evidence of defence witnesses, it comes to be known that only with the agreed norms and permission of the landlord, the tenant constructed the first and second floors of the building and that the landlord was also in the habit of inspecting the progress of the construction. But, from the evidence of defence witnesses, it comes to be known that only with the agreed norms and permission of the landlord, the tenant constructed the first and second floors of the building and that the landlord was also in the habit of inspecting the progress of the construction. If really the landlord was against the construction of the first and second floors of the building by the tenant, which should have prolonged for months together, in the natural course, the landlord could have, then and there, initiated legal proceedings, challenging such of the acts perpetrated on the part of the tenant and the dead silence maintained by the landlord at the time of the construction amounts to permission and approval. Only of late, the landlord had, on that score, initiated eviction proceedings (not then and there). It is in the year 1969, when additional construction is alleged to have been put up. Even those eviction proceedings, based on the alleged illegal construction, had been ultimately withdrawn by the landlord for reasons known to himself. Thereafter, the landlord had come forward to initiate the above proceedings, for fixation of fair rent, in the year 1983 and hence it is quite undesirable and unnecessary on the part of the landlord to come forward to put up the plea that the first and second floors of the building have been constructed by the tenant without his prior permission. Moreover, receiving of the rent from the tenant, evenafter putting up the alleged additional construction, as pointed out by he learned counsel for the tenant, would further strengthen the argument of the tenant that only with the prior permission of the landlord, those additional constructions were put up. Hence, so far as the question of the additional construction of the first and second floors is concerned, it is decided that they have been put up by the tenant at his cost only with the prior permission of the landlord. Hence, point No. 3 is answered in above manner. 48. The next point that is to be solved is whether the first and second floors put by the tenant belongs to the landlord and whether the landlord is entitled for the fixation of fair rent for the first and second floors also and if so at what rate. Hence, point No. 3 is answered in above manner. 48. The next point that is to be solved is whether the first and second floors put by the tenant belongs to the landlord and whether the landlord is entitled for the fixation of fair rent for the first and second floors also and if so at what rate. It would be argued on the part of the learned counsel for the landlord that under Section 108 of The Transfer of Property Act, the additional construction put up by the tenant, i.e. the first and second floors in the case in hand, would lapse to the landlord and the building refers to the whole building and not part of the building and that the newly constructed portion of first and second floors are used by the tenant for gains and he must part with the rent for that portion and hence the Appellate Authority has decided to determine the rents for the first and second floors also taking into consideration the cost of the site and the constructed area. But, at the same time, the Appellate Authority has not fixed the rent, as propounded by Law. It would also be argued that thee tenant never disputed, at any point of time, regarding his tenancy, of all the three floors, but he disputes only about the fixation of fair rent and if the tenancy is admitted, it automatically extends to the fixation of fair rent under Section 4 of the TNBLRC Act based on the factual position of the lease deed dated 7.1.1977. 49. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant, citing the judgment reported in 1968(2) M.L.J. 406 = 81 L.W. 196 would contend that the area that is available for fixation of fair rent, so far as the premises is concerned, is only 4700 sq.ft. and not 7530 sq.ft. 49. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant, citing the judgment reported in 1968(2) M.L.J. 406 = 81 L.W. 196 would contend that the area that is available for fixation of fair rent, so far as the premises is concerned, is only 4700 sq.ft. and not 7530 sq.ft. In the case cited above, the apportionment in accordance with the number of storeys, if it is a building of more than one floor, it is advocated as if there are two storeys, the market value of the land for the first floor will be half and if there are more than two storeys, it will be proportionately distributed in accordance with the number of storeys in the building and that if such addition of the value of the site to each of such storeys would result in unjust enrichment to the landlord or the landlady and hence apportioning of the value of the site is well founded. Yet anaother judgment cited in this regard is one reported in 1972(2) M.L.J. 446 = 85 L.W. 827 wherein also, the same theory is advocated in the language that the site value in the case of a building having more than one floor, must be proportionately distributed in accordance with the number of storeys in the building”. 50. The lower Court in assessing the value of the site and building and fixing the fair rent for the building, would fix the age of the ground floor at 75 years, thereby agreeing with the Rent Controller in this respect. The Appellate Authority would also agree with the Rent Controller in allowing 15% to be the cost of construction for amenities, even though the Rent Controller has not allowed anything, the Appellate Authority would allow 5% besides confirming the type of the building as type-I. Regarding the cost of the land, even though the Rent Controller has fixed it as Rs. 3.6 lakhs per ground in consideration of the location of the property in busy commercial centre and to be the most important locality in the city of Madras and the cost of price of land would definitely be more than what it is estimated by the Rent Controller. In appreciation of the evidence placed in the form of Exs. P.4, P.7, P.8, P.10 and P.11 and Exs. R.6 to R. 8, the value of the land site was estimated at Rs. In appreciation of the evidence placed in the form of Exs. P.4, P.7, P.8, P.10 and P.11 and Exs. R.6 to R. 8, the value of the land site was estimated at Rs. 7.4 lakhs per ground. The lower Court further weighing the evidence in various aspects in relation to the neighbouring building and finding that the landlords engineer has adopted a reasonable estimate for the premises and the neighbouring building without any variation, quite contrary to that of the Engineer of the tenant and on wide discussions held, would arrive at the conclusion to fix the land site value at Rs. 5.5 lakhs per ground. 51. The main consideration by the Appellate Authority is in taking into account of all the three floors i.e. the ground floor, first floor and the second floor. But, on the contrary, the Rent Controller has not estimated the cost of construction for the first and second floors since they were held to be constructed by the tenant, but considered only the ground floor. Hence, following the dictum followed in the decision reported in 1989(1) M.LJ. 494 ( Raj Rani Devi v. Yacoob Sheriff ) and taking the roof of the first floor to be the land site for the upper floors and following the said line of approach as held in the said judgment, thus giving site value for the upper floors and rectifying even those defects that occurred in the judgment of the Rent Controller, the Appellate Authority would ultimately arrive at the figure of Rs. 13,080/- as the fair rent for the ground floor, Rs. 3,103/- as the fair rent for the first floor and Rs. 344/- as the fair rent for the second floor, thus, would arrive at the total of Rs. 16,527/- as the monthly fair rent of the entire building. 13,080/- as the fair rent for the ground floor, Rs. 3,103/- as the fair rent for the first floor and Rs. 344/- as the fair rent for the second floor, thus, would arrive at the total of Rs. 16,527/- as the monthly fair rent of the entire building. Since on the part of both the parties, no better evidence was brought-forth over the proposition of Law cited, thereby establishing that they are entitled to more than what has been arrived at by the Appellate Authority, the figures arrived at by the Appellate Authority being quite reasonable and acceptable for the conditions that were prevalent at the time of filing of the petition for fixation of the fair rent, taking into consideration of the relevant factors that are to be considered, such as the market value and the extent of the building site, the built-up area in the ground floor, first floor and the second floor, the stability of the building, the materials used, the location and the commercial advantages connected to the area and on such others relevant factors as already discussed, has ultimately arrived at to fix the monthly rent of the building at Rs. 16,527/-on the date of the petition and the same being very fair, no interference need be necessarily warranted into the well merited and well considered conclusions arrived at by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. Hence points Nos. 4, 5 and 7 are answered accordingly. Point No. 6: 52. So far as the proposition of Law as propounded by the Apex Court that mere production of the document is not sufficient to prove its contents i.e. proving of the facts or contents by evidence of parties to the document or the attesting witnesses who know the facts necessary, the learned counsel for the tenant would cite four judgments reported in (1) K. Ramanathan (Died) and others v. B.K. Nalini Jayanthi ( 1996 (2) L.W. 658 ), (2) Rahmath Fathima, T.H.S. v. T.K. Kader Mohideen (1996 (2) L.W. 637) (3) Srinivasa Gounder v. K. Venkatesan (1996 (3) L.W. 193) and (4) A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 454. In the first judgment cited above, it is held that mere production and marking of a document by consent is not sufficient to prove its contents proving of the facts or contents stated in the documents by evidence of persons who can vonchsafe the facts necessary by examining all the parties to the sale deed for the witnesses in order to prove the transaction, as well as the factors referred to therein. The second judgment cited above is to the effect of determining the market value of examination of the parties to the document and merely marking the document by consent will not prove its contents. It is held that the transactions between the willing purchaser and the willing seller will have to be considered with the value fixed and that value fixed by the Government for the purpose of stamp duty has no relevance. 53. Hence, based on the above judgments, the learned counsel for the tenant would contend that marking the mere certified copy without examining the parties to prove the contents of the documents are not concluded to have been proved and the parties to the documents should examine themselves and prove the contents by oral evidence also, but in this case, it is not that wholly relying upon the contents of some certified copies, the lower Court has fixed the market value, nor is it the case of the tenant that in this case, the market value has been fixed duly relying upon certain copies. If at all the learned counsel has not cited in the instant case pointing out specifically, that based on a particular document and totally relying upon its contents, either the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority has fixed the market value. The oral evidence has also been let in before the Rent Controller and only in consideration of the facts and circumstances in the context of the oral and documentary evidence and that of the expert witnesses, the Rent Controller as well the Appellate Authority have arrived at the conclusion as they have concluded in the instant case. The oral evidence has also been let in before the Rent Controller and only in consideration of the facts and circumstances in the context of the oral and documentary evidence and that of the expert witnesses, the Rent Controller as well the Appellate Authority have arrived at the conclusion as they have concluded in the instant case. The judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 (4) SCC 595 would speak about the register maintained by the Collector for the purpose of levy of stamp duty stating thereby for the said purpose, the register maintained by the Collector cannot be the basis for determination of the market value of the land. No such register has been taken into consideration for fixation of the market value in the instant case. Even in the Division Bench judgment of our High Court, to suit the case in hand, it has been held that the evidence must be let in to determine the market value for the purpose of fixation of fan-rent under the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act. Such evidence has been let in by parties not based on any document marked but independently on the facts and circumstances of the case and on inspection of the premises. 54. The learned counsel for the tenant who trusts in the service of the above judgment has not pointed out how in the instant case, the lower Appellate Authority has fixed the market value and relying on which document without the examination of the oral evidence. He has also not pointed out the particular document, which formed the basis for the conclusion arrived at without offering such details simply stating the above judgments to the effect that the documents should not be taken as the basis without examining the parties concerned regarding the proof of the contents of the document, he is not entitled to seek for a remand of the above cases. Hence, the generalised argument advanced by the counsel for the tenant to the effect that parties were not examined and merely based on the contents of the documents, the case has been decided by the lower Court cannot be accepted unless it is established as to how and taking into account which document to form the basis to arrive at the conclusion to fix the market value and the fair rent by the lower Court. Hence, this argument is not sound nor acceptable nor the above judgments cited, become applicable to the facts of this case, wherein authenticated documents have been filed on the part of the other side, which have a bearing on statutory provisions of law, such as, the Stamp Act, the Transfer of Property Act, the Evidence Act and the TNBLRC Act as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the landlord and hence those documents since being statutorily governed, the norms propounded by the propositions of Law cited above cannot be set against those documents, which have the statutory locus standi . Hence, the argument advanced on the part of the learned counsel for the tenant seeking for a remand on such ambiguous and generalized propositions is hereby rejected. It is, therefore, hereby concluded that the propositions arrived at in the aforementioned judgments, pertaining to the examination of witnesses, to the documents marked, have absolutely no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and hence the plea of the lessee for the remand of the above matter on such untenable ground is hereby rejected, thus answering Point No. 6 in the above terms. 55. For the foregoing conclusions arrived at, the plea putforth on the part of the landlord, as per C.R.P. No. 2657 of 1997 for the enhancement of the rent, on such terms as claimed by him, either at Rs. 31,025/- or even at the vicinity of the said figure is not accepted and such of the prayers are also hereby rejected. In result, in consideration of the various facts and circumstances encircling the whole case, as widely discussed and decided above, this Court hereby orders dismissing the C.R.P. Nos. 1125 of 1993 and 2023 of 1994 filed by the tenant with the costs of the landlord throughout, further dismissing the C.R.P. No. 2657 of 1997 filed by the landlord without costs and subject to the clarifications to the points above and regarding the costs confirming the common judgment dated 14.12.1992 made in R.C.A. Nos. 986 of 1990 and 1137 of 1990 by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the IV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras.