JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.—This second appeal of the plaintiff-appellant is directed against the judgment and decree of the Court of Ms Kiran Aggarwal, the then District Judge, Una dated 29.6.1990, whereby reversing the decree of Shri M.R. Chauhan, Sub Judge, 1st Class, Amb dated 31.1.1986, she has allowed the appeal of the defendant-respondent and dismissed the suit. 2. The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration with the consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from dispossessing him from the enjoyment of the suit property, fully described in the plaint, and in the alternative a decree for possession of the suit land, as according to the plaintiff, the same was a joint Hindu family property comprising him and one Panna Lal, who was the real brother of the plaintiff and both the brothers were also the coparceners. 3. It may be mentioned here that the original plaintiff was Kaudu alias Izzat Rai and the present appellant is his legal representative who has stepped into his shoes after the formers death. It was pleaded that on the death of Panna Lal on 8.2.1970, his interest devolved upon the original plaintiff, i.e., Kaudu, however, the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Una wrongly sanctioned the mutation of inheritance in favour of the defendant-respondent i.e. Des Raj. The alternative plea in this connection was that the disputed property being ancestral joint Hindu family property of the plaintiff and the deceased Panna Lal, therefore, he was not competent to alienate the same by way of a will. 4. The defendant-respondent, while contesting the suit in the written statement, took up the preliminary objection that since he was in possession of the suit property, the suit for declaration in the present form was not maintainable. It was also disputed by him that there was any will/adoption deed of deceased plaintiff in favour of Mahavir Prasad the present plaintiff, and that the suit in the absence of the other heirs of deceased plaintiff cannot proceed, therefore, Mahavir Prasad had no locus standi to pursue the suit as the right to sue does not survive. 5. On merits, it was started that Panna Lal deceased separated from the plaintiff in the year 1944 and a memorandum of partition to this effect was duly executed and was produced during the mutation proceedings. 5. On merits, it was started that Panna Lal deceased separated from the plaintiff in the year 1944 and a memorandum of partition to this effect was duly executed and was produced during the mutation proceedings. The date of death of Panna Lal is stated to be 3.2.1970 and not 8.2.1970 as stated in the plaint. It was denied that the property in dispute was a joint Hindu family property and that there was a joint Hindu family in existence at the time of death of Panna Lal. According to the defendant-respondent, he rendered services to Panna Lal deceased by living with him and in lieu of the same, the latter executed a will of his entire property on 20.1.1970 and therefore, the defendant is the legal heir of the estate of the deceased. In this view of the matter, the mutation was rightly stated to who have been sanctioned in his favour. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the property in suit was an ancestral joint Hindu family property of the plaintiff and Panna Lal deceased? OPP. 2. Whether there has been a partition of the family properties between the plaintiff and Panna Lal deceased? OPD. 3. Whether Panna Lal deceased executed a valid will in favour of the defendant? If so, its effect? OPD. 4. Whether the document alleged to be a will is a will? O.P. Parties. 5. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable as alleged? OPD. 6. Relief." 7. All the issues were decided by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff, resulting in his suit being decreed. However, in appeal, the learned District Judge, has reversed the findings of the trial Court and has dismissed the suit by allowing the appeal. 8. In the impugned judgment, great stress has been laid on the genuineness of the document Ex. DW-2/A, i.e. the will propounded by the defendant-respondent in his favour stated to have been executed by Panna Lal deceased during his life time. In this connection, the handwriting experts had opined during the trial that the signatures of deceased Panna Lal on the said document have been forged. The recitals in the will were drawn up later. This was challenged before the lower appellate Court and has found favour with her. In this connection, the handwriting experts had opined during the trial that the signatures of deceased Panna Lal on the said document have been forged. The recitals in the will were drawn up later. This was challenged before the lower appellate Court and has found favour with her. The argument, which prevailed with her was that the questioned signatures of deceased Panna Lal on the document Ex. DW-2/A when compared with mortgage deed Ex. O/A tallied with each other. 9. Surprisingly, the learned lower appellate Court has at the outset discarded the reports based on the opinion of two handwriting experts, one of these being Diwan K.S. Puri, a renowned examiner of questioned documents in his life time, who was produced by the plaintiff and after examining the document Ex. DW-2/A and comparing the questioned signatures of Panna Lal with the standard signatures on the document Ex. O/A and other entries on the Bahi, shown from points A to G, had opined that the questioned signatures on the document Ex. DW-2/A of Panna Lal deceased were forged. Similar was the opinion even by the Government Examiner, who was examined by the lower appellate Court. His opinion is also based on sound reasons. 10. In support of her finding, the learned lower appellate Court relied on two reported judgments of the Apex Court, namely, Bhagwan Kaur v. Shri Maharaj Krishan Sharma and others, (AIR 1973 SC 1346) and Shashi Kumar Banerjee and others v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 529). 11. After discarding the opinion of the two handwriting experts referred to above, the learned lower appellate Court proceeded to examine the documents herself, by having recourse to the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. In other words, she has substituted her own opinion in place of the two opinions, which were similar, of the two experts. This means she has deemed herself to be a better expert of the knowledge and art of handwriting in comparison thereon than the opinion of a renowned examiner of the questioned documents and an expert on handwriting over a long period of time, i.e. Diwan K.S. Puri. This means she has deemed herself to be a better expert of the knowledge and art of handwriting in comparison thereon than the opinion of a renowned examiner of the questioned documents and an expert on handwriting over a long period of time, i.e. Diwan K.S. Puri. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that during his life time, Diwan K.S. Puri had occasion to deal with a number of questioned documents and disputed signatures and his opinion based on minute examination and sound reasons was accepted with respect not only by Courts but by other Government agencies, in this view of the matter, the course adopted by the learned lower Appellate Court, to say the least, is contrary to all judicial norms. Moreover, the reasons, which are given in the impugned judgment for holding the signatures of late Panna Lal on the disputed document Ex. DW-2/A as genuine, are not at all sound and cannot be sustained. 12. As regards the execution of the document Ex. DW-2/A, the lower Appellate Court has relied on the testimony of the scribe Kewal Krishan DW-2, Ram Lai DW-3 and Parmeshwar Dass DW-7. Their evidence in this behalf has been accepted by both the Courts below and no challenge has been made to the same before me. 13. The finding of both the Courts below as to the nature of the document Ex.DW-2/A is categorical, i.e. that in the garb of a will, in fact it is a gift. Since it purports to gift away immovable property of the family, valuing Rs. 100/- or more, it was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act. On this aspect, the learned lower Appellate Court has again adopted a casual approach by holding that during the time when this gift deed was executed i.e. in the year 1970, it was not uncommon to make oral gifts. Further the astounding reason given in para 20 of the impugned judgment is that a gift cannot be refused to be acted upon merely because it is not a registered instrument particularly when there are no such pleadings and issue in this regard. The lower Appellate Court has reiterated her observation again that in the year 1970, the gifts used to be made verbally and even with attestion of mutation. However, no concrete example is forthcoming in the impugned judgment. The lower Appellate Court has reiterated her observation again that in the year 1970, the gifts used to be made verbally and even with attestion of mutation. However, no concrete example is forthcoming in the impugned judgment. At the outset, this reasoning is contrary to law and has to be set aside. 14. As against the above approach of the-teamed lower appellate Court on this aspect of the case, the learned trial Court has rightly held that in the State of Himachal Pradesh any transaction antered into between the parties under Sections 54, 58,122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act were required to be compulsorily registered. It also relied on a case reported as Bah Madhav Parshad v. Rasak Lal (AIR 1959 MP 23), wherein it was held that a deed of gift of immovable property executed after the passing of the Transfer of Property Act is invalid for want of registration. No fault can be found with this approach of the learned trial Court and setting aside of his decree by the lower Appellate Court on untenable grounds is wholly unjustified. 15. Reverting back to the opinion of the experts, particularly, Diwan K.S. Puri as regards genuineness of the signatures of Panna Lal deceased on the document Ex.DJ/V-2/A, the learned trial Court vide its discussion from para 14 onwards of his judgment has given cogent reasons for relying on the testimony of the expert Diwan K.S. Puri and has therefore, rightly upheld the contention c raised on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant before him regarding the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the document Ex.DW-2/A and the same has been held to be a forged document. Setting aside of this finding by the lower appellate Court, as already discussed above, is wholly untenable. 16. Shri K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent has laid great stress on the two rulings referred to in the impugned judgment. However, the ratio of the two judgments does not give handle to the lower appellate Court to substitute her own opinion as regards the genuineness of Panna Lals signatures on the disputed document Ex.DW-2/A, in the manner she has done, for the reasons already referred to above. In the considered view of this Court, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the two rulings of the Apex Court do not apply. 17. In the considered view of this Court, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the two rulings of the Apex Court do not apply. 17. Shri Naresh Thakur, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has cited State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram (AIR 1979 SC 14). It has been observed therein that it is not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other, and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert. This observation applies with full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case where the learned District Judge has taken recourse to the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act and has substituted her own opinion in the matter by discarding the opinion of the two experts, without any cogent reasons. Shri N.K. Thakur has then cited State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh and another (AIR 1992 SC 2100). It has been laid down in para 29 of the said report as follows : "It is well settled that evidence regarding the identity of the author of any document can be rendered (i) by examining the person who is conversant and familiar with the handwriting of such person, or (ii) through the testimony of an expert who is qualified and competent to make a comparison of the disputed writing and the admitted writing on a scientific basis, and (iii) by the Court comparing the disputed document with the admitted one. In the present case, the prosecution has resorted to the second mode by relying on the opinion evidence of the handwriting expert PW 120. But since the science of identification of handwriting by comparison is not an infalliable one, prudence demands that before acting on such opinion the Court should also be fully satisfied about the authorship of the admitted writings which is made the sole basis for comparison and the Court should also be fully satisfied about the competence and credibility of the handwriting expert. It is indeed true that by nature and habit, over a period of time, each individual develops certain traits which give a distinct character to his writings making it possible to identify the author but it must at the same time be realised that since handwriting experts are generally engaged by one of the contesting parties, they consciously or unconsciously, tend to lean in favour of an opinion which is helpful to the party engaging him. That is why we come across cases of conflicting opinions given by two handwriting experts engaged by opposite parties. It is, therefore, necessary to exercise extra care and caution in evaluating their opinion before accepting the same. So Courts have as a rule of prudence refused to place implicit faith on the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. Normally Courts have considered it dangerous to base a conviction solely on the testimony of a handwriting expert because such evidence is not regarded as conclusive. Since such opinion evidence cannot take the place of substantive evidence, Courts have, as a rule of prudence, looked for corroboration before acting on such evidence. True it is there is no rule of law that the evidence of a handwriting expert cannot be acted upon unless substantially corroborated but Courts have been slow in placing implicit reliance on such opinion evidence, without more, because of the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting and its accepted fallibility. There is no absolute rule of law or even of prudence which has ripened into a rule of law that in no case can the Courts base its findings solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert but the imperfect and frail nature of the science of identification of the author by comparison of his admitted handwriting with the disputed ones has placed an extra care and caution before acting on such opinion. Before a Court can place reliance on such opinion of an expert, it must be shown that he has not betrayed any bias and the reasons on which he has based his opinion are convincing and satisfactory. Before a Court can place reliance on such opinion of an expert, it must be shown that he has not betrayed any bias and the reasons on which he has based his opinion are convincing and satisfactory. It is for this reason that the Courts are wary to act solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert; that, however, does not mean that even if there exist numerous striking peculiarities and mannerisms which stand out to identify the writer, the Courts will not act on the experts evidence. In the end it all depends on the character of the evidence of the expert and the facts and circumstances of each case." 18. The observations referred to above, in the Apex Court ruling, have a bearing on the present case and to that extent this ruling is applicable. Lastly, Shri N.K. Thakur has cited Murarilal v. State of M.P. (AIR 1980 SC 531). The observations contained there are more or less on the same lines in the case referred to above (AIR 1992 SC 2100). 19. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent Shri K.D. Sood has invited my attention to the case reported as Smt Dipo v. Wassan Singh and others (AIR 1983 SC 846). On a perusal of the same, I do not find any observation which has relevance or bearing to the facts of the present case. He has also referred to two unreported decisions of this Court in RSA No. 376/94 decided on 2.4.1997 and C.R. 259 of 1992 decided on 22.4.1997. I have gone through the two judgments and do not find that they are applicable to the facts of the present case. 20. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is allowed. Consequently, setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, I restore the judgment and decree of the trial Court with costs. Appeal allowed.