ORDER : V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—Rule. Heard forthwith with the consent of the parties. 2. Petitioner is the Trade Union. They pray for a writ, directing the respondent-State of Tamil Nadu to appoint Mr. S. Vaidyanathan, Advocate of M/s. Row and Reddy at No. 156, Thambu Chetty Street, Madras-1 as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct C.C. No 10403 of 1995. 3 Following are the facts which would be essential to understand the controversy :--Government of Tamil Nadu by its order dated November 7, 1995 sanctioned the prosecution of the Directors and four other officers of Addisons Paints and Chemicals Limited for an offence u/s 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act for not implementing the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras in I.D. No. 83 of 1984 dated December 29, 1992 relating to Dearness Allowance, House Rent allowance and benefits u/s 12(3) of the I.D. Act. Accordingly, the complaint came to be filed before II Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Egmore, Madras and is pending in C.C. No. 10403 of 1995. 4. The petitioner-union claims that this prosecution was challenged by way of writ petition by the employees in W.P.No. 32 of 1996, but the same came to be dismissed on March 21, 1996 and the writ appeal against the same was also dismissed. According to the petitioner, 77 workmen had already retired or resigned after the award, while 23 workmen had died. The petitioner pleads that since the case is being conducted by the Assistant Public Prosecutor attached to the Court, he finds no time for this particular case. It is further pleaded that the case involved violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and such violation being intricate, the Prosecutor would need specialised knowledge for conducting the same. It is pleaded that it is humanly not possible for the Assistant Public Prosecutor to prosecute the case with the same diligence in all the cases. It is pointed out that the Government has declined to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor for this case and the employer was making adjournments on the slightest excuse. It was, therefore, claimed that in the interest of justice, a Special Public Prosecutor should be appointed u/s 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner also goes on to suggest the name of the Counsel to be so appointed. 5. It was, therefore, claimed that in the interest of justice, a Special Public Prosecutor should be appointed u/s 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner also goes on to suggest the name of the Counsel to be so appointed. 5. The Government has opposed this petition at the admission stage itself on the ground that the petition is not maintainable. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Mr, Prasad vociferously contends that the petitioner would certainly have a right particularly because the petitioner was deeply interested in the welfare of its members. He points out that it has been held by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Gupta Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi and others, (1997) 1 SCC 556 , that now the Government could authorise any person u/s 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act to file a complaint against the management and, therefore, according to the learned counsel, there would be no impediment in even ordering the appointment of Public Prosecutor or Special Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, for conducting any prosecution even if it is filed at the behest of the Government. On the other hand, the Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State relies on the provisions of Section 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code and points out that a prosecution by the State has, to be conducted only by the Public Prosecutor, though the Court may have the powers at the instance of a private person to allow any other pleader to assist the said Public Prosecutor and to submit the written arguments. According to the learned counsel appearing for the State, even Section 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not create any right in the complainant to insist upon engaging a counsel particularly in any prosecution at the behest of the State. According to the learned Counsel for the Government, it is a sole prerogative of the Central Government or the State Government and a private complainant or a person interested in the prosecution cannot have any right u/s 24(8) to insist upon a particular person being appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor for the purpose of any case. 7. According to the learned Counsel for the Government, it is a sole prerogative of the Central Government or the State Government and a private complainant or a person interested in the prosecution cannot have any right u/s 24(8) to insist upon a particular person being appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor for the purpose of any case. 7. Section 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as under:-- "The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor." This would undoubtedly spell a power in the Central Government or the State Government to appoint any Special Public Prosecutor for the purposes of any case or class of cases. The only condition is that such person should have been in practice for not less than 10 years. However, the language of Section 24(8) does not suggest that any person like the petitioner, who is not in reality a complainant can insist upon an appointment of some other lawyer as a Special Public Prosecutor. The language of Section 24(8) is extremely plain and clear. In fact, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision Vijay Valia and etc. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and etc., (1986) CriLJ 2093, relying on Rule 22 of Maharashtra Law Officers (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Remuneration) Rules, 1984, had held that where a private complainant is prepared to pay the legal fees for engaging such a private counsel even in the prosecution at the behest of the Government, then it would be incumbent on the legal remembrancer to permit the complainant to engage such counsel. Though this decision was not cited, it is being mentioned as the subject of the interpretation of Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C. has been dealt with in this judgment. The decision is of no use to the petitioner as there is no such parallel Rule 22 in case of Tamil Nadu and on interpretation putforth by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court has found it unreasonable and constitutionally invalid in the decision reported in Mukul Dalal and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1988) 3 SCC 144 . That apart, the plain language of Section 24(8) of Cr. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1988) 3 SCC 144 . That apart, the plain language of Section 24(8) of Cr. P.C. does not help the petitioner in any manner. 8. The learned counsel, however, relies on the provisions of Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the interpretation thereof by the Apex Court in the decision Raj Kumar Gupta v. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors. 1997 LLJ 994 . This was a case where the Lt. Governorof Union Territory of Delhi had authorised one Raj Kumar Gupta, Patron, Garden Silk Mills Ltd., Karamchari Sangh to file a complaint against the management of Garden Silks Limited and its Officers for punishing them u/s 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act. This authorisation was given u/s 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition holding that because of the peculiar language of Section 34, the State Government could not have authorised any other person to file a complaint and the Court could not take cognizance on the basis of such complaint in that, the Delhi High Court had relied upon its decision in Tobu Enterprises Limited and Ors. v. The Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. (C.W.P.No. 1715 of 1991). The matter was taken to the Supreme Court by a person who held that there was nothing wrong if the State authorised any private person to launch a prosecution. In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Judgment, the Apex Court has stated thus :-- "14. The provisions of Section 34 require that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the said Act or of the abetment of such offence save on a complaint made by the appropriate Government or under the authority of the appropriate Government. There is no limitation therein in regard to the party to whom the authorisation may be given. It is the workman, the trade union and the employer who are most concerned with offences under the said Act and neither the terms of Section 34 nor public policy require that they should be excluded from making such complaints. 15. At the same time, the provisions of Section 34 are in the nature of a limitation on the entitlement of a workman or a trade union or an employer to complain of offences under the said Act. 15. At the same time, the provisions of Section 34 are in the nature of a limitation on the entitlement of a workman or a trade union or an employer to complain of offences under the said Act. They should not, in the public interest, be permitted to make frivolous, vexatious or otherwise patently untenable complaints, and to this end Section 34 requires that no complaint shall be taken cognizance of unless it is made with the authorisation of the appropriate Government." The learned counsel, therefore, heavily relies on these observations and suggests that by necessary logic, the State Government could even appoint the Special Public Prosecutor or allow any private person to engage his counsel to conduct such prosecution. This submission is clearly incorrect. Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act runs as under:-- "34 Cognizance of offences--(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. (2) No Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act." It implies that any offence is punishable under the Industrial Disputes Act only on the complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. The Supreme Court has relied particularly on the words "or under the authority of the appropriate Government" and has held that a restricted meaning could not be given. It has further held that the only idea of the Section was that it provided a limitation on the entitlement of a workman of a trade union or an employee to file the complaint of the offence lest they would make frivolous, vexatious or otherwise untenable complaints. The Court, therefore, held that a complaint could be filed not only by the appropriate Government but also by any person authorised by the State Government. The learned Counsel tries to take advantage of this ruling and canvasses the further extension thereof in the matter of appointment of a Public Prosecutor which exercise clearly is not possible on the plain reading of the ruling. The ruling operates altogether on a different sphere. The learned Counsel tries to take advantage of this ruling and canvasses the further extension thereof in the matter of appointment of a Public Prosecutor which exercise clearly is not possible on the plain reading of the ruling. The ruling operates altogether on a different sphere. It only suggests, on the basis of the language in Section 34 that the "appropriate Government" could authorise any other person to file a complaint regarding the offence under the Act of which a cognizance could be taken by the Court and the Court could take cognizance on the basis of the complaint even if filed by some one who is authorised by the appropriate Government. The words "under the authority of were given broad meaning so as to include any other private person authorised by the appropriate Government to file the complaint. This, however, has no relevance or nexus with the matter of appointing a Special Public Prosecutor. It is clear from the language of Section 301 Cr.P.C. as also Section 24(8) that even for such a case, the State could appoint a Special Public Prosecutor. But that would be in the domain of the discretion of the appropriate Government alone. Such appointment could not be insisted upon as of right by a union much less in favour of any particular named advocate. u/s 301 of Cr.P.C., it is only the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor who has been given the powers to conduct the prosecution. Now in this case, it is not as if any private person has been authorised to lodge a complaint. On the other hand, the State itself has chosen to become the complainant. Under such circumstances, any person, howsoever he may be interested in the cause, cannot insist upon representing the State for conducting the prosecution. The concerned petitioner- union is an utter outsider insofar as the prosecution is concerned. It may have become a cause for such prosecution. But in the wake of the language of Section 34, it is not a complainant. The offence which is committed would be deemed to have been committed against the State and in this case, the State has not authorised this union to conduct the prosecution as per the Apex Court's ruling. It may have become a cause for such prosecution. But in the wake of the language of Section 34, it is not a complainant. The offence which is committed would be deemed to have been committed against the State and in this case, the State has not authorised this union to conduct the prosecution as per the Apex Court's ruling. Had that been the case, there could be some force in the contention of the union that it might choose the lawyer of its choice, but that is not the case here. The State itself has chosen to prosecute. If that be so, the petitioner cannot insist upon the advocate of its choice to represent the State. 9. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-union, further argued that to prosecute a person was a police power and if the Apex Court had permitted the State to authorise any other person to exercise the police power then in that light, it would be the right of such person to decide as to who should represent "such other person". The argument has to be rejected for the simple reason that in the present case, there is no such eventuality. In fact, the State Government has not authorised the said trade union to prosecute at all. On the other hand, the State Government itself has chosen to become a complainant. In the circumstances, it would be for that State Government to decide as to who should represent the State Government. The present petitioner-union cannot insist that the prosecution should be conducted by their counsel. 10. Though haltingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to suggest that the question involved related to labour laws and, therefore, a person having specialised knowledge of the Labour Jurisprudence would be in a better position to conduct the prosecution, it will be very unfair on my part to say that the Government Counsel would not be able to represent the Government in an equally competent manner as that of a private counsel. There is no factual submission before the Court that the concerned Assistant Public Prosecutor or the Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, lacked such a knowledge or competence to conduct the prosecution. It is not for this Court to decide as to who would be a better counsel in the matter. That is for the state to decide. There is no factual submission before the Court that the concerned Assistant Public Prosecutor or the Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, lacked such a knowledge or competence to conduct the prosecution. It is not for this Court to decide as to who would be a better counsel in the matter. That is for the state to decide. If the State so wishes, it may appoint a Special Counsel as the language of Section 24(8) Cr.P.C. empowers the State to appoint any Special Public Prosecutor for a case, but that is not the prayer in the petition. On the other hand, the petitioner insists on a particular person to replace the Public Prosecutor and to conduct the prosecution. Such insistence is wholly unwarranted. 11. Again, there is one safeguard in the shape of Sub-section (2) of Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where it is provided that any private counsel could, under the instructions of the Public Prosecutor, help the Public Prosecutor to conduct the proceedings. 12. Last but not the least, Mr. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has not also been able to show any prejudice having been caused to the petitioner on account of the Government Counsel conducting the prosecution. There is not even a single piece of material lodged before this Court on the count. The writ petition has no merit and must be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed without any orders as to costs. V.S. Sirpurkar, J. 13. At this stage, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner expresses that in view of the long pendency of the matter before the trial Court, the Members of the Union are suffering great prejudice. He points out that the subject covered under the case is of extreme importance to the workmen, as it concerns their work conditions. In that view of the matter, learhed counsel urges that a direction should be given to dispose of the complaint case pending before the Court within a particular time frame. Now, that may not be possible in these proceedings. However the Court expresses the fervent hope that the matter pending before the trial Court is disposed of without any delay and as far as possible within six months from today.