Judgment :- R. JAYASIMHA BABU, J. The assessee had omitted to file all the tax deduction certificates along with the return for the asst. yr. 1985-86. The certificate that should have been enclosed was for Rs. 379, while the tax deducted at source amount was Rs. 30, 579. The assessee filed an appeal against the order of the AO in respect of other matters and after the disposal of that appeal, had approached the CIT to revise the order of the AO so as to take into account TDS certificate produced by the assessee before the CIT. The CIT did not hold that the certificate was not genuine or that the deduction could not, for any other reason, be allowed. He declined to examine the matter on the short ground that the assessee had preferred an appeal against the order of assessment and, therefore, he could not avail of the remedy provided under s. 264 of the IT Act, 1961 ('the Act'). The assessee, thereafter, applied to the CBDT on 31st May, 1990 invoking the Board's power under s. 119(2)(b) of the said Act. What it elicited was a two line order informing the assessee that his application is rejected by the board. This petition is directed against that order of the Board dated 23rd April, 1991. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Board was in error in rejecting the application as under s. 237 of the said Act, the amount paid by the assessee or paid on his behalf of any assessment year as tax, if it exceeds the amount with which he is properly chargeable in the year, the excess is required to be refunded to the assessee. The assessee, in this case, admittedly as per the assessment order, was not liable to pay tax in a sum equal to or in excess of amount paid. The refund claimed was for the excess paid, that amount being the amount of tax deducted at sourceThe income in respect of such deduction had been effected was disclosed and formed part of the return. The Revenue had received the amount set out in the tax deduction at source certificates. The Revenue is not entitled to unjustly enrich itself at the cost of the assessee. The Revenue had received the amount set out in the tax deduction at source certificates. The Revenue is not entitled to unjustly enrich itself at the cost of the assessee. The learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that s. 119(2)(b) of the Act does not have any application so far as the petitioner herein is concerned. It is his submission that the power of the Board to extend the time under this provision is only in respect of matters, for the doing of which, specific time-limits are laid down in one or the other provision of the Act, such as s. 239 of the Act which fixes a time-limit within which refund may be claimed. The learned counsel submitted that the Board is not required to give any reason for the rejection of the application under s. 119(2)(b), which vests power in the Board to admit an application or claim for any exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under the said Act after the period specified under the said Act for such application or claim, if it is considered by the Board to be desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases. The power, therefore, is to be exercised in cases where genuine hardship will result if the assessee is not granted the relief sought in respect of a matter covered by that provision. The time for filing a return of income is specified in s. 139(1) of the said Act. The time, in certain cases, extended as in the situation covered by s. 139(4). The limits are prescribed in the Act for filing loss returns. Time-limit is prescribed for claiming refunds. The right of the assessee to claim refund of the amounts paid in excess of the tax found to be lawfully payable is recognised in s. 237 of the said ActSec. 237 embodied a very salutary principle that the right of the Revenue to receive and collect tax under the said Act is limited to what is properly due and payable as tax. The amounts collected in excess thereof are not to be treated as tax and retained by the State. That amount is required to be refunded to the person from whom or on whose behalf it had been collected. The amounts collected in excess thereof are not to be treated as tax and retained by the State. That amount is required to be refunded to the person from whom or on whose behalf it had been collected. It was, therefore, incumbent on the part of the Board to examine the genuineness of the claim and to consider the prayer of the petitioner in the background of those provisions of the said Act. The impugned order does not disclose that it has taken note of any of those provisions. The order does not disclose any reason at all. The mere communication of a decision unsupported by the reasons cannot, on the facts of this case, be regarded as proper compliance with the requirements of s. 119(2)(b). It is well-settled that vesting of power in an authority results in the imposition of duties on that authority to exercise that powers in a manner which is consistent with requirements of and will advance the purpose of the provision under which the powers is vested. Such power is required to be exercised consistent with the principles of natural justice, unless such principles are excludible in law, having regard to the context in which the power is exercised. A person, who invokes the jurisdiction which is available to the authority, and which jurisdiction is to be exercised for the purpose of relieving a person who has genuine hardship according to his plea, is entitled to the consideration of his claim in a manner which can be regarded as lawful. The impugned order which is a bald refusal, in the circumstances, cannot be sustained. That order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the CBDT for reconsideration in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the course of this orderThe writ petition is allowed. No costs.