Judgement MOHAMMED, J. The husband in a proceeding under Section 13(1)((b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is the appellant before us. He was the petitioner in O.P. No. 7 of 1988 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Badagara for dissolution of the marriage with the respondent on the ground of desertion. The Court below found that there was no legal evidence for desertion and hence the petition was dismissed. It is against the said order this appeal has been filed by the petitioner under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'). 2. The relevant portion of Section 13 of the Act is extracted hereunder : 13. Divorce. (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party - (i) and (ia) ..... ...... ....... ....... (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (ii) ...... ....... ......... .......... ........ Explanation - In this sub-section the expression 'desertion' means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variation and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. As per the above provision, any marriage solemnized should be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. In order to attract Section 13(1) the following requirements shall be satisfied. (1) There shall be a solemnized marriage between the parties, (2) The party seeking a decree for divorce shall present a petition for dissolution of marriage, (3) There shall be any one or more of the grounds specified in clauses (i) to (iii). What is pleaded in this case is that the marriage shall be dissolved on the ground of desertion. In order to attract the ground of desertion ingredients provided in the Explanation shall be satisfied. What is pleaded in this case is that the marriage shall be dissolved on the ground of desertion. In order to attract the ground of desertion ingredients provided in the Explanation shall be satisfied. Desertion of one party by the other to the marriage shall be without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party. When one party wilfully neglects the other party to the marriage it will constitute desertion. In this legal premise, we will examine the evidence available in this case in order to decide whether the marriage between the appellant and respondent can be dissolved on the ground of desertion. There was no dispute between the parties as to the existence of the legal marriage between them. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place in the year 1966 and in that lawful wedlock there were four children. Till March 1981 appellant and respondent were living together and the difference started when the respondent left the house of the appellant. The appellant pleads that the respondent went home on her own accord and she never came back to his house. On the other hand the case of the respondent was that she was beaten by the appellant in the presence of her father and the uncle of the appellant and on seeing this uncle of the appellant advised her to go with her father to his residence. What we have to decide is which of the stories put forth by the rival parties is true in the facts available in this case. 3. Respondent was examined before the court below as RW 1. In chief-examination she stated the background of departure to the house of her father on 5-6-1981. She has been thoroughly cross-examined on behalf of the appellant and in the course of cross-examination it has been sufficienlty brought out that she was beaten by the appellant in the presence of her father and his uncle. It was in view of the above situation the uncle of the appellant advised her go along with her father. The question now required to be examined is whether the respondent has left the house of the appellant without any reasonable cause as envisaged in the Explanation referred to above. It is for the court to infer whether the circumstances brought out in evidence would constitute 'reasonable cause'. 4. The question now required to be examined is whether the respondent has left the house of the appellant without any reasonable cause as envisaged in the Explanation referred to above. It is for the court to infer whether the circumstances brought out in evidence would constitute 'reasonable cause'. 4. Whatever may be the plea advanced by the appellant, we cannot reject the oral evidence tendered by the respondent in her cross-examination. The circumstances narrated above will definitely come within the purview of 'reasonable cause'. Therefore we are of the view that the respondent left the house of appellant with a reasonable cause and hence her continued residence with her father cannot be said to be desertion. 5. We are fortified in coming to the above conclusion because the appellant has very candidly admitted that he did not go to the house of the father of the respondent since she left the house in March 1981. This itself indicates the conduct of the appellant in gauging to find out the genuineness of his claims. His case is that he had employed some mediators for the purpose of finding out a settlement. Though he had sent some mediators the attempt was not fruitful. In this context it would be apposite to observe that none of the mediators were examined before the trial Court to prove the case pleaded by the appellant. He particularly mentioned the name of one Sankaran Namboodiri who was employed as a mediator to go to the house of the respondent. However, this Sankaran Namboodiri was not examined. That means there is no legal evidence to prove that he made an honest attempt to bring the respondent back to his house for her residence with him. 6. In this context it is apt to mention that this Court had made certain attempts to have some sort of reconciliation between the parties. No doubt the marriage between the parties is practically dead and it has broken irretrievably. In order to end this perpetual agony we asked the counsel on either sides to have some sort of agreement. But to our dismay the counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is not prepared to take the respondent to his home for residence. On the other hand counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent is even now ready and willing to go and reside with the appellant. But to our dismay the counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is not prepared to take the respondent to his home for residence. On the other hand counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent is even now ready and willing to go and reside with the appellant. Anyway we do not propose to refer on this situation for holding that there was no ground for dissolution on the ground of desertion. 7. The Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena alias Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40, a case arising under the Hindu Marriage Act, observed that it is settled law that the burden of proving desertion - the factum as well as the 'animus deserendi' - is on the petitioner, and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. What emerges from the above decision is that the factum as well as the 'animus deserendi' shall be established by the person who is moving the court for dissolution. The party who prefers to file the petition has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that desertion throughout the entire period was without just cause. From the discussion herein before, it is abundantly clear that the respondent was living with her father for a reasonable cause and the appellant had never attempted to visit the house of the respondent to take her back to his house since March 1981. In view of what is said above, the order passed by the Court below refusing to order divorce is perfectly justified. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.