Judgment 1. The Civil Revision Petition No.3061 of 1998 is filed by a third party in O.S.No.383 of 1998 on the file of District Munsif Court, Erode, under Art.227 of Constitution of India. While narrating the facts in this revision petition, the facts which necessitated for filing C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998 and contempt application will also be met. 2. O.S.No.383 of 1998 on the file of District Munsif Court, Erode is filed by Sree Amman Matriculation School, represented by its Correspondent one T.Jayalakshmi. That suit was filed by her against seven defendants of whom petitioner is not a party. The suit was filed on 5.8.1998 for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants and their men or agents from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of property by plaintiff and not to evict plaintiff except under due process of law. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that she has taken a lease from defendants 1 to 7 on 31.3.1998 in respect of scheduled property and the property in being used by her as play ground. The monthly rent is Rs.1,500 and an advance of Rs.10,000 has been paid. It is further stated in the plaint that some third party approached the defendants and offered higher rent to the suit property and therefore all the seven defendants have joined together ae intending to take forcible possession from plaintiff. The cause of action also stated that on 4.8.1998 seven defendants attempted to evict plaintiff from the suit property, which necessitated filing of the suit. According to her, she is not liable to be dispossessed, except in accordance with law. 4. Along with the suit, plaintiff filed I.A.No.1146 of 1998 for injunction to restrain defendants from entering into the property. The injunction was moved on the very same date i.e., on 5.8.1998. The court ordered notice to respondents through court and posted the matter on 12.8.1998. On 12.8.1998, it was recorded that all the seven respondents have been served. They were called absent and set ex parte and petition was allowed as prayed for. An injunction was granted against defendants in the suit from interfering with the so called possession of plaintiff in that case. It is that order that is challenged in C.R.P.No.3061 of 1998. 5. Why the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order, needs little more narration of facts. 6. An injunction was granted against defendants in the suit from interfering with the so called possession of plaintiff in that case. It is that order that is challenged in C.R.P.No.3061 of 1998. 5. Why the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order, needs little more narration of facts. 6. The very same defendants in O.S.No.383 of 1998 filed a suit as O.S.No.132 of 1998 on the file of Additional Sub Judge, Erode against petitioner herein for injunction. That was with regard to the very same property. That suit is also for injunction restraining petitioner herein from entering into the same property. That suit was filed on 20.6.1998. An injunction application was also moved in the suit as I.A.No.114 of 1998. The lower court passed order on the same date stating that prima facie case is made out, and the plaintiffs therein are in physical possession of the property and granted ad interim injunction. On 24.3.1998, the very same defendants filed I.A.No.118 of 1998 for getting police protection and to implement the injunction. That application was also allowed by the lower court on 25.3.1998. Even though, petitioner moved an application before lower court to suspend the order of police protection and also counter to injunction application and wanted the matter to be heard by Subordinate Judge, the same was only adjourned. In the meanwhile, the petitioner who was in possession of property and was doing business therein was forcibly dispossessed. Petitioner therefore came to this Court in C.R.P.Nos.997 and 998 of 1998. These revisions were filed under Art.227 of Constitution of India. Even at the time of admission, I suspended the interim order and after respondent i.e., plaintiffs in the suit entered appearance, a detailed order was passed on 14.7.1998. 7. I came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs therein who were the defendants in O.S.No.383 of 1998 have come to court with false case and petitioner herein was forcibly dispossessed. I therefore directed the trial court to restore possession even in case plaintiffs therein do not prosecute the suit. I further directed lower court that necessary police Protection must be given to petitioner to see that injunction already done by the lower court must be remedied. I therefore directed the trial court to restore possession even in case plaintiffs therein do not prosecute the suit. I further directed lower court that necessary police Protection must be given to petitioner to see that injunction already done by the lower court must be remedied. I came to the conclusion that only because the lower court did not hear the objection of petitioner an ex parte injunction order was granted with police help and petitioner was dispossessed and lower court also should take responsibility for the injustice. 8. It is seen that plaintiffs therein filed a special leave petition before Honourable Supreme Court and the same was also dismissed. After dismissal of the special leave petition, petitioner moved for getting possession of property of which he was wrongfully dispossessed. At that time, affidavits were filed by plaintiff in that suit, stating that they have move a review petition and till the review petition is heard, possession should not be delivered back. Lower court granted 7 days time. Thereafter, review petition was also dismissed. The lower court pursuant to my direction ordered delivery of the property. 9. When the bailiff went to property for effective delivery plaintiff in O.S.No.383 of 1998 moved an application before Subordinate Judge, Erode, where O.S.No.132 of 1998 is pending not to dispossess her in view of the ex parte order of injunction which she has obtained in O.S.No.383 of 1998. The lower court dismissed it. Lower court even refused to number the Interlocutory application. It is against that order, plaintiff in O.S.No.383 of 1998 has filed C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998. In that case, even though Caveat had been entered by petitioner, the same was not noted and without notice to petitioner status quo was directed to be maintained. 10. The contempt application is filed by the very same petitioner on the ground that in spite of the orders of the court to give possession the defendants have executed lease deed in favour of plaintiff in O.S.No.383 of 1998 and both of them have joined together in filing subsequent suit and get interim orders. All of them are intentionally disobeying the orders of this Court and consequently they are liable to be proceeded against under the contempt of court. 11. I ordered notice and directed respondents to appear before the court. On 25.11.1998 except respondents 4 and 7 all others entered appearance. All of them are intentionally disobeying the orders of this Court and consequently they are liable to be proceeded against under the contempt of court. 11. I ordered notice and directed respondents to appear before the court. On 25.11.1998 except respondents 4 and 7 all others entered appearance. Respondents 4 and 7 submitted that they are not well and therefore could not attend the court. Both the civil revision petitions as well as contempt application were heard. 12. The parties herein will be referred to in accordance with their rank in O.S.No.132 of 1998 and plaintiff in O.S.No.383 of 1998 will be referred to as lessee. 13. The plaintiffs filed a suit and obtained ex parte order of injunction and the same was also implemented with police help. While narrating the facts I said that two revision petitions have been filed by the defendants. It was found in the petitions that defendants was in possession of the property and plaintiffs have obtained interim order stating a false case. I also found fault with the lower court in passing an order of police help when defendants have moved for staying that order and filed counter. In the meanwhile, the entire building and his belongings were also thrown into the street by Plaintiffs in that case. So whatever mischief could be done by plaintiffs was done with the help of police. 14. When this injustice was brought to the notice of this Court, I wanted defendant to be restored with possession and necessary directions have been given. The suit O.S.No.132 of 1998 was filed on 20.3.1998. After the suit was instituted they seem to have executed a lease deed on 31.3.1998 in favour of the lessee and on that basis she now claims possession of the property making use of the same as play ground. I have also stated that the attempt of plaintiffs challenging my order was also not successful. 15. When the property was about to be taken possession, very same plaintiff filed review application and C.M.P.No.11877 of 1998. Review Application was not numbered. Even at the time of maintainability, it was brought before me and on 31.8.1998. I dismissed the review petition and consequently C.M.P. was also dismissed. The civil miscellaneous petition was filed to stay my order of dispossession. Review Application was not numbered. Even at the time of maintainability, it was brought before me and on 31.8.1998. I dismissed the review petition and consequently C.M.P. was also dismissed. The civil miscellaneous petition was filed to stay my order of dispossession. It was represented at the time of argument that on special leave petition was also taken against that order also and was also dismissed. 16. Long before O.S.No.383 of 1998 was filed. Lessee was aware about O.S.No.132 of 1998 and she herself has issued notice on 28.5.1998, to the petitioner herein. From the typed set of papers filed in this case, it could be seen that the counsel Mr.Venkatachalam who was appearing for plaintiffs 1 to 7 issued notice to the petitioner herein on 25.8.1998 about the very same property. It is also clear from the typed set of papers that the defendant filed a criminal complaint against the lessee in which she has also given statement under Sec.161 of Criminal Procedure Code. It was long thereafter, she filed a suit O.S.No.383 of 1998 without impleading petitioner. The lease deed itself is subsequent to institution of suit O.S.No.132 of 1998 i.e., 10 days after institution of that suit. 17. When lessee filed O.S.No.383 of 1998 she did not implead the petitioner to obtain order of injunction against plaintiff. Why she has not impleaded petitioner is nowhere stated in the plaint. The only allegation is that plaintiffs are attempting to interfere with her possession on the ground that some of the person agreed to pay higher rate of rent. It was really a collusive suit and plaintiffs 1 to 7, after receipt of notice did not participate in the proceedings nor did they enter appearance. It must also be noted, it was subsequent to interim order, the very same plaintiff filed review petition and the connected civil miscellaneous petition alleging that they are in possession and the order of delivery is passed by this Court should not be implemented. 18. On the basis of ad interim, injunction, she wanted the other proceedings passed by this Court to be stayed. Interlocutory application was not even numbered and the same was rejected. It is thereafter, she filed C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998, wherein status quo was ordered. 19. 18. On the basis of ad interim, injunction, she wanted the other proceedings passed by this Court to be stayed. Interlocutory application was not even numbered and the same was rejected. It is thereafter, she filed C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998, wherein status quo was ordered. 19. From these facts it is clear that the order of this Court was not allowed to be implemented by filing one application or another or by filing a separate suit. 20. A person who has been illegally dispossessed in spite of the orders of this Court, cannot be given his possession only because of applications filed one after the other. The lessee, who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.383 of 1998 is only a puppet of the plaintiff in the earlier suit. The suit itself was filed collusively without making petitioner as party, fully knowing about the order of this Court. Plaintiff therein i.e., the lessee did not come to the court with any bona fides and the intention was only to prevent petitioner from getting possession of the property. The only person who is affected by the order of injunction was the petitioner herein. 21. In this connection it must be understood that O.S.No.132 of 1998 was filed before Subordinate Judge, Erode, which is also for injunction and now lessee filed suit changing the jurisdiction and filed the same before the Munsif Court, Erode. The intention is very clear. If only the suit filed before Sub Court, the Presiding Officer may not entertain the same since he is aware of the earlier suit and orders of this Court. To circumvent, another suit was filed before the Munsif Court only for the purpose of getting interim order. 22. As was held in K.K.Modi v. K.N.Modi K.K.Modi v. K.N.Modi K.K.Modi v. K.N.Modi , A.I.R. 1998 S.C.W. 1166 which is a case of pure abuse of process of court, if suit is not instituted with bona fide, but with oblique motive, such suit are liable to be struck off the file is clear. In paragraphs 43 to 46 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus: “43, The Supreme Court Practice, 1995 published by Sweet and Maxwell in paragraph 18/19/33 (page 344) explains the phrase ‘abuse’ of the ‘process of the court’ thus: This terms connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. In paragraphs 43 to 46 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus: “43, The Supreme Court Practice, 1995 published by Sweet and Maxwell in paragraph 18/19/33 (page 344) explains the phrase ‘abuse’ of the ‘process of the court’ thus: This terms connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation…. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material.” 44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. Proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of courts’ discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The court should also be justified that there is no chance of the suit succeeding. 45. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard, (1947)2 All E.R. 255thecourt had to consider different proceedings on the same cause of action for conspiracy, but supported by different averments. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The court should also be justified that there is no chance of the suit succeeding. 45. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard, (1947)2 All E.R. 255thecourt had to consider different proceedings on the same cause of action for conspiracy, but supported by different averments. The court held that if the plaintiff has chosen to put his case in one way, he cannot thereafter bring the same transaction before the court, put his case in another way and say that he is relying on a new cause of action. In such circumstances he can be met with the plea of res judicata or the statement or plaint may be struck out on the ground that the action is frivolous and vexations and an abuse of the process of the court. 46. In Mcllkenyy v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force (1980)2 AllE.R. 227 the Court of Appeal in England struck out the pleading on theground that the action was an abuse of the process of the court since it raised an issued identical to what which had been finally determined at the plaintiffs earlier criminal trial. The court said even when it is not possible to strike out the plaint on the ground of issue estoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court because it is an abuse for a party to re-litigate a question or issue which has already been decided against him even though the other party cannot satisfy the strick rule of res judicata or the requirement of issue estoppel.” [Italics supplied] Their Lordships also took note of the fact that this power also could be exercised under Sec.115 of Code of Civil Procedure and the same is clear from paragraph 42 of the Judgment. 23. Once it is found that O.S.No.383 of 1998 is filed without any bona fide and is vexatious the same is liable to be struck off the file. 24. Next question that arise for consideration is what should be the order in regard to C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998. As I said the lease came into existence only after institution of earlier suit therefore the lessee is also bound by the order against plaintiffs 1 to 7. 24. Next question that arise for consideration is what should be the order in regard to C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998. As I said the lease came into existence only after institution of earlier suit therefore the lessee is also bound by the order against plaintiffs 1 to 7. She is not competent to file an application seeking direction that the possession shall not be delivered. The order as against plaintiffs, 1 to 7 has become final and the same binds the lessee also. Consequently, the order of the trial court refusing to entertain the application is only to be upheld and hence the C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998 is only to be dismissed. 25. Now I come to the contempt application I have already held while discussing order in C.R.P.No.3061 of 1998, that the action of the plaintiffs is really abuse of process of court. They came to court with false case suppressing facts, obtained interim order on the basis of falsity and have been filing applications after applications to see that the order of this Court is not implemented. Against my order, special leave petition was filed and the same was dismissed and when the property was about to be taken delivery. review petition was filed. Even before that was admitted they moved application before trial court that the order of this Court should not be implemented. The court gave seven days time. They moved an application along with review petition. Both of them were dismissed. That order was also taken before Honourable Supreme Court, but without success. In between lessee also played her part in preventing petitioner from getting possession. In such cases, what should be the action that the court has to take. 26. A similar question came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in T.Arivandanam v. T.V.Satyapal T.Arivandanam v. T.V.Satyapal T.Arivandanam v. T.V.Satyapal , (1977)4 S.C.C. 467 . In that case an eviction order was passed against the father which has become final. The Honorable High Court of Karnataka while disposing of the revision against the order granted six months time to surrender vacant possession, By that time was to expire, son filed a suit for declaration that the order of eviction confirmed by High Court was collusive decree and the same is liable to be set aside. The Honorable High Court of Karnataka while disposing of the revision against the order granted six months time to surrender vacant possession, By that time was to expire, son filed a suit for declaration that the order of eviction confirmed by High Court was collusive decree and the same is liable to be set aside. When this fact was brought to the notice of High Court which granted six months time, the Honourable High Court persuaded the landlord to give 5 months time and that was also enjoyed by the tenant. When the time was about to expire, the son filed a suit and moved for injunction. And ad interim injunction was granted though subsequently vacated. An appeal was also filed without success. The matter also came before Honourable High Court and the same was also dismissed. On the basis of these facts Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer in the above cited case held in paragraph 2 of the judgment held thus: “Here is an audacious application by a determined engineer of fake litigations asking for special leave to appeal against an order of the High court on an interlocutory application for injunction. The sharp practice or legal legerdemain of the petitioner, who is the son of the 2nd respondent. stultifies the court process and makes a decree with judicial seals brutum fulmen. The long arm of the law must throttle such litigative caricatures if the confidence and creditability of the community in the judicature is to survie. The contempt power of the court is meant for such persons as the present petitioner. We desist from taking action because of the sweet reasonableness of counsel Sri.Ramasesh.” [Italics supplied] 27. More or less the same principle is followed in the decision reported in Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries , (1980)3 S.C.C. 311 . In that case, the Industry was directed to deposit a sum of rupees before the court to permit them to remove the forest produce. When the amount was not paid, the State of Bihar filed a suit and moved for attachment and the order was passed under O.38, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure. They did not furnish security nor the order of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court was obeyed. When the amount was not paid, the State of Bihar filed a suit and moved for attachment and the order was passed under O.38, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure. They did not furnish security nor the order of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court was obeyed. They moved before the Subordinate Judge and obtained an order wherein they were directed to pay lesser amount than directed by the High Court. The matter was taken before the High Court and that was also not obeyed. Again, making use of some other purposes, similar applications were filed and the matter was dragged on for some time and it is in those circumstances, application was moved before Patna High Court to take immediate action for criminal contempt on the ground that the orders of the court are not obeyed. In that case, their Lordships considered that in certain circumstances, abuse of process of court may amount to contempt and in such cases, contempt proceedings will have to be taken. After taking into consideration the definition of criminal contempt, their Lordships held thus: “While we are conscious that every abuse of the process of the court may not necessarily amount to contempt of court, abuse of the process of the court calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceedings or the orderly administration of justice, we must, say, is a contempt of court. It may be that certain minor abuse of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of O.6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on the other hand, It may be necessary to punish as a contempt. A course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and effects the interest of the public in the administration of Justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and ordinary administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court. Not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression ‘Contempt of Court’ may seek to suggest, but, to protect and to indicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of Law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and courage. ‘The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lost hope.” [Italics supplied] 28. On the basis of these decisions I feel it is a fit case where respondents in contempt application are liable to be proceeded against. In this connection, it is also worthwhile to note that even respondents except 4 and 7 were present on 25.11.1998. they did not file any counter and both the senior counsel appearing for them only submitted that they have nothing to submit before this Court. These respondents also did not think of even tendering apology before this Court. They did not even think of filing counter or seek time for filing counter. 29. The narration of facts makes it clear that every action of them was a daring raid on the court and each was an abuse of process of court. Their every action in application show that they were intent upon laying the course of proceedings and also to obstruct the administration of justice by abuse of process of court. By one application after another, the order of this Court could not be implemented and they were successful enough in prolonging the agony of the petitioner herein for the last few months who has been dispossessed forcibly and that too on the basis of false case. They have misused the machinery of court to obtain unlawful gain. If these respondents are allowed to go free for having obstructed implementation of court order, the aggrieved persons, who is the petitioner and the public at large will lose faith in judiciary. In such cases, as was held in the decision cited supra, The law should not be seen to sit limply while those who defy it go free. If these respondents are allowed to go free for having obstructed implementation of court order, the aggrieved persons, who is the petitioner and the public at large will lose faith in judiciary. In such cases, as was held in the decision cited supra, The law should not be seen to sit limply while those who defy it go free. When none of the respondents did not even repent for their action and have not expressed regrets, this Court also should not show any sympathy to them. By this statement, it should not be understood that if they have shown their regrets, and letter of apology, they should be set at free. I only say even at this late stage respondents did not tender their apology. That shows how intentionally they have done the mischief. 30. In view of the above, I feel that this is a fit case where action has to be taken against respondents. The lessee who has also colluded with plaintiff 1 to 7, is also a party to the abuse of process of court and causing obstruction to the administration of justice. 31. In the result, all the respondents are found guilty of contempt of court and they are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 14 days from to-day. 32. The Civil Revision Petition No.3061 of 1998 is allowed with costs. O.S.No.383 of 1998, on the file of District Munisifs Court, Erode is struck off the file. Advocate fees Rs.3,000 (three thousand only). 33. C.R.P.No.2489 of 1998 is dismissed with costs. Advocate fee Rs.3,000 (Rupees three thousand only), 34. Contempt Application is allowed as above. 35. I direct the petitioner in C.R.P.No.3061 of 1998 to produce a copy of this order before Subordinate Judge, Erode where O.S.No.132 of 1998 is pending, and on production of the same, the Subordinate Judge will see that the subject matter of that suit is handed over to the petitioner herein within 48 hours therefrom. I also direct the Subordinate Judge to provide adequate and necessary police protection to the bailiff while he delivers possession to the petitioner herein, who is the defendant in that suit. I also direct the Subordinate Judge to provide adequate and necessary police protection to the bailiff while he delivers possession to the petitioner herein, who is the defendant in that suit. I also make it clear that if there is any interim order from any subordinate court restraining the petitioner herein from taking possession, or, even if any other person claims possession and has obtained an interim order of any kind, this order will have to be implemented and possession should be handed over to the petitioner. On obtaining possession, the petitioners possession shall not be disturbed by any one except by due process of law. Compliance of the above directions should be reported to this Court on 4.12.1998. 36. All the connected C.M.Ps., in the C.R.Ps. are closed. After pronouncing the order, the learned Senior Counsel for respondents 1 to 7 and 8 have submitted that they are tendering unconditional apology and they also assure before the court that such acts will not be repeated by their clients hereafter. They have further submitted that they will unconditionally hand over possession, even without the necessity of bailiff going to the property with the help of police. Both the learned Senior counsel requested that being a contempt matter, the court can reconsider in what way the contemners can be punished. 37. Taking into consideration the submissions of the learned senior counsel and giving due respect to what they have assured, the sentence which I have imposed for a period of fourteen days will stand deleted and instead, all these contemners will deposit Rs.2,000 (Rupees two thousand only) each as fine within a period of one week from to-day. In case of default in deposit, simple imprisonment for fourteen days will follow. It is also submitted by the learned senior counsel that they will hand over possession to the petitioner even without the intervention of the petitioner. That is not the concern of this Court. This Court is only bound to see as to that the petitioner in C.R.P.No.3061 of 1998 gets possession. The matter will have to be reported to this Court on 8.12.1998. call on 8.12.1998.