Judgment :- P.A. Mohammed, J. Both these appeals arise from the judgment of the learned single judge in O.P. No. 3286 of 1998. The writ petitioner is the appellant in W. A. No. 508 of 1992 whereas the first respondent, Kerala State Electricity Board is the appellant in W.A. No. 599 of 1992. 2. Ext. P3 order issued by the second respondent, the Deputy Chief Engineer, Electrical Circle, Ernakulam was challenged in the Writ Petition. By the said order, the second respondent directed to restore the electrical connection to the writ petitioner on remittance of the amount of Rs. 29,244.73 towards the arrears of electricity charges and reconnection fee. It was passed by the second respondent pursuant to the judgment of this Court in O.P. No. 7447/85 filed by the Writ Petitioner on an earlier occasion. The learned single judge while disposing of the present writ petition ordered in so far as the disconnection of the power supply thus: "It has to be held that after disconnecting power supply in February 1984, the Minimum Guarantee Agreement stood terminated by the Electricity Board. Thereafter, it could not have demanded cost of energy in terms of the agreement." The Electricity Board is aggrieved by the aforesaid finding and hence it filed the Writ Appeal No. 599 of 1992. 3. On the other hand, the writ petitioner has filed W.A. No. 508 of 1992 being aggrieved by the following finding of the learned judge in so far as the use of electrical energy for the industrial lighting. "It follows that petitioner is entitled to use energy for industrial lighting only to the extent of five percent of the actual consumption at the rates under the Mill mum Guarantee Agreement" 4. Counsel for the writ petitioner submits that what is required to be taken note of is not the 'actual consumption' but the 'deemed consumption' available under the Minimum Guarantee Agreement. In this context, the counsel has brought to our notice the provision contained in the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy. Note (iv) to Clause 32 is as follows: "A concession for lighting at power tariff will be allowed for power consumers, their factory, workshop or other premises to which power supply is made. The concession is 5 % and 10% of their power consumption for consumers under tariff IV and V respectively. Note (iv) to Clause 32 is as follows: "A concession for lighting at power tariff will be allowed for power consumers, their factory, workshop or other premises to which power supply is made. The concession is 5 % and 10% of their power consumption for consumers under tariff IV and V respectively. All consumption for lights and fans within the limits of concession will be added to power consumption and treated as power for billing purposes. All consumption for lights and fans in excess of this connection will be charged at lighting tariff 1(b). Residential quarters, shops etc. attached to the factory, workshop or other premises are not eligible for this lighting concession, To get the concession for lighting at power tariff, all lighting loads should be separately wired and metered". What is revealed from the above Note is that the concession for lighting available to the consumers under tariff IV is 5% of the 'power consumption'. The question is whether the 'power consumption' referred to in this note is the 'actual consumption' or the 'deemed consumption' in the case of a consumer who executed a Minimum Guarantee Agreement. On behalf of the Electricity Board, it is submitted that what is intended by this provision is only the actual consumption. On the other hand, the counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that what is meant by power consumption is the consumption on the basis of the Minimum Guarantee Agreement. In this case, even though the writ petitioner has regularly remitted electricity charges as per the Minimum Guarantee Agreement he has been directed to pay the electricity charges used for lighting at the rate applicable to commercial tariff. This has been done on the basis that there was no power consumption by the petitioner even though electricity charges as per the Minimum Guarantee Agreement was paid. According to the Board, the concession of 5% for lighting can be fixed only when there is actual power consumption. In the case of the petitioner there was no actual 'power consumption' but that will not disqualify him for cl aiming 5% of the total electrical energy for which he is entitled under the agreement towards the lighting purposes. In other words, the power consumption referred to in Note (iv) of Clause 32 shall be treated to be deemed consumption under the agreement and not 'actual consumption'. In other words, the power consumption referred to in Note (iv) of Clause 32 shall be treated to be deemed consumption under the agreement and not 'actual consumption'. In a case where a consumer does not consume the electricity but pays electricity charges under the agreement the demand for payment of electricity charges used for lighting purpose at commercial rate, though 5% concession is available, appears to be unfair. The petitioner is compelled to pay the electricity charges in respect of electrical energy used by him for the lighting purposes despite the availability of 5% concession for lighting purposes under the agreement. Therefore, the observation of the learned judge that the writ petitioner is entitled to use energy for industrial lighting only to the extent of five per cent of the actual consumption does not appear to be correct. We therefore, set aside the above finding of the learned judge and accordingly direct the Board to examine this question afresh and pass orders in view of what we have said above. 5. Now we will deal with appeal, W. A. No. 599 of 1992, filed by the Board. The learned judge found that the Board should not have demanded the cost of energy in terms of agreement inasmuch. ammonium. guarantee agreement stood on disconnection of electrical supply in February 1984. However, the Board endeavored to sustain its action placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihar State Electricity Board v. M/s. Green Rubber Industries (AIR 1990 SC 699). In this decision the Supreme Court held that the agreement for supply of electricity by the Board with the stipulation to pay minimum guaranteed charges, irrespective of whether energy was consumed or not would be valid and it cannot be determined with the disconnection of supply to the consumer by the Board but only according to the stipulations in the agreement. The counsel for the Board reiterates that in the above decision the Supreme Court has held categorically that the Minimum Guarantee charges are payable even when the consumer's electric connection stands disconnected. In this context, the counsel for the writ petitioner has brought to our notice a specific clause in the agreement involved in the case before the Supreme Court, namely, sub-clause (b) of Cl. 5. In this context, the counsel for the writ petitioner has brought to our notice a specific clause in the agreement involved in the case before the Supreme Court, namely, sub-clause (b) of Cl. 5. The above provision as revealed from the judgment of the Supreme Court is as follows: "If the consumer fails to pay the amount of any bill due under this agreement within the due date specified in the bill referred to in clause 5(a) above, he shall pay a surcharge at the rate given in the tariffs framed by the Board and enforced from time to time. If the amount of such a bill remains unpaid after the due date specified in the bill, the Board may discontinue the supply after giving the consumer not less than sever clear days' notice. The service will be reconnected only on receipt of full payment for all obligations outstanding upto the date of reconnection and charges for the work of disconnection and reconnection of service". In view of the above provision, the Supreme Court held that i f the amount of a bill submitted according to law remains unpaid after the due date specified in the bill, the Board may discontinue the supply after giving the consumer not less than seven days' notice. 6. It may be noted that the facts of the present case are not similar to the one involved in the Supreme Court case discussed herein before. Ext. P1 is the copy of the Minimum Guarantee Agreement in Form No. 7. The counsel asserts that there is provision in Ext. P1 similar to clause 5(b) extracted above. Clause 7 of Ext. P1 only authorises the revenue recovery proceedings in the case of default in payment of dues and not the disconnection of service. In the absence of a provision authorising the disconnection in the agreement, the Board has no power to disconnect the supply. In this context it is brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Amalgamate Electricity Co. v. Jalgaon Municipality (AIR 1975 SC 2235) wherein the Court held thus: "Moreover it is obvious that if the plaintiff company was to give bulk supply of electricity at a concessional rate of 0.5 anna per unit it had to lay down lines and to keep the power ready for being supplied as and when required. v. Jalgaon Municipality (AIR 1975 SC 2235) wherein the Court held thus: "Moreover it is obvious that if the plaintiff company was to give bulk supply of electricity at a concessional rate of 0.5 anna per unit it had to lay down lines and to keep the power ready for being supplied as and when required. The consumers could put their switches on whenever they liked and therefore, the plaintiff had to keep everything ready so that power is supplied the moment the switch was put on. In these circumstances, it was absolutely essential that the plaintiff should have been ensured the payment of the minimum charges for the supply of electrical energy whether consumed or not so that it may be able to meet the bare maintenance expenses". (emphasis supplied) In this case the disconnection was made in the year 1984. There is no dispute on this point in view of the statement contained in the counter affidavit. Therefore, the finding of the learned judge that after disconnecting the power supply in February, 1984, the Minimum Guarantee Agreement stood terminated by the Electricity Board is unassailable. 7. In the result, the appeal filed by the Electricity Board, W.A. No. 599 of 1992 is dismissed. The appeal filed by the writ petitioner, W.A. No. 508 of 1992 is allowed to the extent indicated above.