Judgment : 1. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the fair order and decretal order dated 8. 1997 passed in I.A.No.471 of 1995 in O.S.No.215 of 1988 on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur. 2. The petitioner is the first defendant in the suit filed by the respondent herein in O.S. No.214 of 1988 for recovery of Rs. 3,52,8855. Ten defendants were set ex parte. The petitioner/first defendant alone contested the suit by filing a written statement. On 2. 1993 the petitioner also was set ex parte and preliminary decree has been passed. 3. Thereafter, the respondent herein filed I.A.No.1146 for passing a final decree in the above said suit. On coming to know about the ex parte decree passed in the above suit, on receipt of notice in the above said application, the petitioner filed an application in I.A.No.471 of 1995 to condone the delay of 410 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree on the ground that the counsel for the petitioner did not inform him the date of trial of the suit. 4. This application was resisted by the plaintiff, the respondent herein, contending, that earlier the petitioner was set ex parte and the ex parte decree so passed was set aside on the application filed by the petitioner and that he knew about the date of the trial and as such he did not incline to appear before the Court, despite several opportunities having been given to the petitioner for his appearance for the trial. 5. On considering the submissions made by the counsel on either side and on going through the affidavit and the counter filed by the counsel, the lower Court has passed the impugned order rejecting the application to condone the delay. Aggrieved over this order, the present revision has been filed before this Court. 6. Mr. Sundaragopal, counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the authorities of this Court and the Apex Court contended that the Courts while considering the application for condoning the delay should take a liberal view, so that the parties concerned could be given opportunities to put forth their case in the main suit. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and also gone through the impugned order, grounds and the affidavit. 8. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and also gone through the impugned order, grounds and the affidavit. 8. Admittedly, the suit has been filed in July, 1988. On 30.12.1988 the defendants 2 to 10 were set ex parte. On 3. 1989 the defendant No.1 1 was also set ex parte. Thereafter, the petitioner the first defendant alone contested the suit by filing a written statement. 9. After framing of issues, the case was listed for trial on 18. 1992. On 9. 1992 when the case was taken for trial the first defendant, the petitioner herein did not appear and so, the suit was decreed by setting the petitioner as ex parte. 10. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application in I.A.No.687 of 1992 to set exide the ex parte decree. Accordingly, after hearing the parties concerned, the trial court allowed the application. Again, the suit was posted for trial on 210. 1992. On that date also the petitioner did not appear. In order to give one more opportunity, the suit was adjourned to 211. 1992. Even on that date he was absent. Finally, it was posted on 12. 1992. On the said date, the counsel for the petitioner one Mr. Renga Ramanujam made an endorsement reporting no instructions. So, on the basis of this endorsement, the trial Court passed the exparte decree on 12. 1992.@BT-SMALL = 11. Now, the petitioner, after a delay of 410 days, had filed the application in I.A.No.471 of 1995 to condone the delay. The only reason given in the said application was that he was not intimated about the date of trial by the counsel. The trial Court, on consideration of the submissions, petition and counter, correctly dismissed the said application by its impugned order, holding that the reason given in the petition to condone the delay of 410 days was not sufficient and was not a bona fide one. 12. Mr. Sundaragopal, the counsel for the petitioner cited several authorities in support of his contention. The following are the citations:- .(1) Malkiat Singh and Another v. Joginder Singh and others, 1998 (1) L.W. 9; (2) Sagayam Engineering Works v. M/S. Srivat-satube Corporation, A.I.R.1989 Mad. 12. Mr. Sundaragopal, the counsel for the petitioner cited several authorities in support of his contention. The following are the citations:- .(1) Malkiat Singh and Another v. Joginder Singh and others, 1998 (1) L.W. 9; (2) Sagayam Engineering Works v. M/S. Srivat-satube Corporation, A.I.R.1989 Mad. 237; .(3) G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, A.I.R.1988 S.C.897; (4) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, A.I.R.1987 S.C.1353; (5) State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, 1996 AIR SCW 1672; (6) Muthammal v. Thamburati, 1997 .(II) CTC 12. 13. The principles, while entertaining the petition to condone the delay, have been elaborately dealt with in the above decisions. The gist of the guidelines are given below:- "The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of parties in toto and not to punish them for their mistake. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. It is common knowledge that the Apex Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in the Apex Court. The expression sufficient cause in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Once it is accepted that the petitioner has come forward with some bona fide reasons and that he should be given an opportunity to defend the suit, certainly, the court can exercise its discretion to condone the delay". 14. The reading of the judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner would itself show that when the petitioner has come forward to condone the delay, he must establish some bona fide reasons for such delay. No doubt it is true that the discretion of condonation of delay is with the Court and the Court should be liberal in the matter of condoning delay in the interest of justice. 15. It is settled law that the judicial discretion vested with the Court in considering the question of delay however small or however large and enormous it may be, rests in the Courts discretion and it is that discretion that matters at the end. 15. It is settled law that the judicial discretion vested with the Court in considering the question of delay however small or however large and enormous it may be, rests in the Courts discretion and it is that discretion that matters at the end. In order to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner, it is needless to state that the applicant shall plead and establish that he was neither careless nor negligent in defending the suit. 16. It cannot be debated that when a party has willingly come forward to prosecute the case, it is always just and fair to give a chance to exhaust his remedy. But however, as pointed out in Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 156 and Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, A.I.R.1969 S.C. 575, the true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 of Limitation Act is whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the case and the application to condone delay shall not be thrown out, unless there is want of bona fide of inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5. 17. It is observed in Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, A.I.R.1970 S.C. 1953 that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay and it is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a devise to cover an ulterior purpose. 18. In Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, 1993 AIR SCW 475 : 1993 (1) SCC 572 , the Apex Court holds that when the party has come with a false plea to get rid of the bar of limitation, the Court should not encourage such person by condoning the delay. 19. So in the light of these observations, this Court finds, as correctly pointed out in the impugned order, that the petitioner has not come with the bona fide reasons to condone the delay. The circumstances to arrive at such a conclusion, are given below. 20. In July, 1988 the Indian Overseas Bank, the respondent herein, filed the suit in O.S.No.214 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Srivilliputhur against 11 defendants. The petitioner is the first defendant. The other 10 defendants did not appear before the Court. The circumstances to arrive at such a conclusion, are given below. 20. In July, 1988 the Indian Overseas Bank, the respondent herein, filed the suit in O.S.No.214 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Srivilliputhur against 11 defendants. The petitioner is the first defendant. The other 10 defendants did not appear before the Court. So, they were set ex parte. 21. In June 1989, the petitioner/the first defendant filed the written statement. In the said written statement he admitted that on behalf of the industry, for constructing the industry and purchase of materials, he obtained the loan. However, it is stated that since the plaintiff did not comply with certain terms, the first defendant had to suffer a huge loss and that therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the suit amount. 22. After framing of the issues, the suit was listed for trial in the year 1992. On 9. 1992 the petitioner did not appear before the Court. Therefore, he was set exparte and ex parte decree was passed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree narrating the circumstances under which he was not able to appear on the said date. 23. After hearing the parties, on 9. 1993 the trial Court set aside the exparte decree and posted the suit for trial on 210. 1993 in order to give an opportunity by taking a liberal view. Since he did not appear on that date, again to give an opportunity it was posted on 211. 1993. Even on that date he did not appear. So, it was adjourned to 12. 1993 to give further opportunity. Unfortunately, on that date also he did not appear. The counsel Mr. Ranga Ramanujam also made endorsement that he had not received instructions. However, the juniors of the said Ranga Ramanujam filed vakalat on behalf of the petitioner. Since the opportunities had not been availed of by the petitioner, on 12. 1993 again exparte decree was passed. 24. The above would show that the first defendant, the petitioner herein did not care to present himself in the Court on 210. 1993, 211. 1993 and 12. 1993. It is also clear that he had not even given any instructions to the counsel as to why he was absent. 25. 1993 again exparte decree was passed. 24. The above would show that the first defendant, the petitioner herein did not care to present himself in the Court on 210. 1993, 211. 1993 and 12. 1993. It is also clear that he had not even given any instructions to the counsel as to why he was absent. 25. The petitioner is stated to have approached this Court by filing an application to set aside the exparte decree passed on 12. 1993. According to this petition, the petitioner received the notice from the Court for final decree in I.A.No.1146 of 1994 in the main suit on 11. 1995, only thereafter he came to know about the ex parte decree passed on 12. 1993 and immediately within 30 days, that is, on 12. 1995 he filed the petition to set aside the exparte decree. 26. However, later, the petitioner himself filed another application in I.A.No.471 of 1995 stating that his statement in the earlier petition that he received the Court notice on 1. 1995 was not correct and that he received the notice in December 1994 itself and as such, there is a delay of 410 days in filing the application to set aside the exparte decree. 127. There are two factors to be taken note of in this context. .(1) The first exparte decree that was passed on 9. 1992 was set aside on his application on 9. 1993. Therefore, he must have been known the next date on which the case was posted for trial. The next date is 210. 1993. To give further opportunity, again it was adjourned to 211. 1993 and thereafter to 12. 1993. For all these three dates he did not appear. There is no reason given for the non-appearance on these dates. Moreover, there is no explanation as to why he had to keep quiet by not enquiring the senior counsel or his junior counsel till the second notice from the Court was received by him. .(2) Even according to the petitioner, he received the notice in December 1994 itself, but he had given a false date to his counsel as if he had received the notice on 11. 1995 in order to enable the Advocate to file an application to set aside the ex parte decree on 12. .(2) Even according to the petitioner, he received the notice in December 1994 itself, but he had given a false date to his counsel as if he had received the notice on 11. 1995 in order to enable the Advocate to file an application to set aside the ex parte decree on 12. 1995 under the impression that it would be within the period of limitation, namely, 30 days from the date of knowledge. This he himself admitted in the application to condone the delay subsequently filed in I.A.No.471 of 1995, that is, actually he received the notice in December 1994 itself. So, not only the petitioner had made a false statement in the Court in the first application regarding the date of service of notice but also he had not given any explanation as to why he filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree on 12. 1995, though he received the notice in December, 1994 itself. This also would make it clear that the petitioner has not come forward with clean hands with bona fide reasons. 28. In the light of the observation made by the Supreme Court that the Court should not encourage the person by condoning delay when he came with the false plea to get rid of the bar of limitation as laid down in Binod Bihari v. Union of India, 1993 AIR SCW 475 : 1993 (1) SCC 572 , the petitioner who has not come with bona fide reasons to condone the delay, is not entitled to be shown any indulgence. 29. In view of the foregoing discussion, none of the grounds urged by the counsel for the petitioner does appeal to me. Therefore, I am constrained to dismiss the application at the admission stage itself. 30. In the result, the revision is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P.No.25 of 1998 stands dismissed.