Judgment : A. RAMAN, J. For the This revision is directed against the order passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-EOI, Madras-8, on February 28, 1996, in Crl. M.P. No. 656 of 1994. The respondent-company herein made an advertisement in The Express on May 24, 1993, inviting deposits from public. Since this advertisement was made without obtaining the permission of the Central Government, a complaint has been lodged. The only reason given in the petition is that the petitioner could not initiate action against the accused, as the application filed by the respondent for exemption was pending before the competent authority. The complaint has to be given within the period of six months from the date of knowledge which was on May 24, 1993, when the insertion was made, it is not the case that the department was not aware of the insertion made in the daily, dated May 24, 1993, and that they came to know about that after a long period. Therefore, the complaint ought to have been filed on or before November 24, 1993. It is seen that the respondent filed an application seeking exemption under section 58A of the Companies Act on September 24, 1993. The application was dismissed on February 24, 1994, whereas the complaint has been filed only on September 27, 1994. If at least the complaint has been filed on February 24, 1994, or February 25, 1994, immediately on the date of dismissal of the application filed by the company, one can understand it. But it is not so. The petition filed seeking condonation does not give any reason for the delay from February 25, 1994, to September 27, 1994. The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. Here, in this case, the nature of allegation is only technical and even that defect was sought to be set right by the respondent by filing application. Therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. There is no warrant for according step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. Here, in this case, the nature of allegation is only technical and even that defect was sought to be set right by the respondent by filing application. Therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. Here, the delay is deliberate. It is not accompanied by an explanation. The offence alleged is technical in nature. The Supreme Court has held in Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. that the fact that the Government being impersonal taking longer time in filing the appeals/petitions than the private bodies or the individuals even giving that latitude there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay. When there is no attempt to explain what legal problems in filing the special leave petition, the application for condonation of delay is not to be entertained. Here, we find that there is absolutely no explanation for the delay found in the application filed. Therefore, in such circumstances, the order of the lower court dismissing the application cannot be questioned, as it is a proper exercise of discretion by the lower court. The petitioner just because a Government department, cannot claim any special privilege or a kid glove treatment at the hands of this court. When the applicant has no explanation to offer, the offence alleged being a technical one, the ends of justice require that this application be dismissed and accordingly this revision shall stand dismissed.In the result, this revision is dismissed confirming the order of the lower court. Since the application was filed to condone the delay against the first accused alone and as there is no bar of limitation to proceed against the other accused, the lower court is at liberty to proceed with the complaint if any preferred as against accused Nos. 2 to 6 in accordance with law.