Judgment :- S. Marimuthu, J. The Second Appeal arises questioning the judgment delivered by the District Judge, Thodupuzha in A.S.No. 68/90 dated 13.11.1992. The first defendant is the appellant and the plaintiff is the Respondent in this appeal. 2. The respondent as plaintiff, filed O.S. No. 291/87 before the Court of Munsiff, Thodupuzha seeking for a decree of perpetual injunction against the Appellant from committing trespass into the plaint schedule room or from dispossessing the respondent and disturb his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. It is admitted case of both the appellant, w ho is the first defendant and the respondent, plaintiff that the suit property, a building bearing Door No. 9/66 situate in Thodupuzha Municipality was jointly taken by the appellant and respondent on lease from the owner of the building, who is the second defendant in the suit on a monthly rental of Rs. 80/- out of which, the appellant and the respondent each has to pay a sum of Rs. 40/- per mensum to the landlady. The respondent is possessing two licences, one for writing the documents and the other for preparing the copies of the written documents as scribe. The appellant is in possession of only a licence of scribe. Both the appellant and the respondent were doing their above said evocations in the suit property peacefully till the year 1986. In that year, there arose ill-feeling and misunderstanding between the appellant and the respondent on the ground that the appellant was gaining over the clients or customers of the respondent. On account of the ill-feeling, the appellant happened to lodge a complaint to the local police, who made an attempt to make a compromise, but it ended in vain. Since the friction between the appellant and the respondent had been enlarging day by day, the appellant approached the branch of Kerala Documentary Writers and Scribe Association, at Thodupuzha. The complaint given by the appellant to the branch of the said association at Thodupuzha is marked as Ext. X2 dated 8.7.87. On the day itself, there was a conciliation talk in the presence of the members of the Association and finally, Ext. XI(b) agreement was entered into, as per which, the appellant has to pay a sum of Rs. The complaint given by the appellant to the branch of the said association at Thodupuzha is marked as Ext. X2 dated 8.7.87. On the day itself, there was a conciliation talk in the presence of the members of the Association and finally, Ext. XI(b) agreement was entered into, as per which, the appellant has to pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the respondent, within a period of three months and on payment of the said amount, the respondent would vacate the premises by handing over the possession of the same, to the appellant. In case of default, in the payment of Rs. 15,000/- by the appellant to the respondent within the stipulated period, the respondent could occupy the entire building without paying any amounts to the appellant. 3. Apart from the above, common case of both the sides it is contention of the respondent that as the appellant had not complied with the conditions imposed in the agreement, by paying a sum of Rs. 15,000/- the respondent took possession of the entire building and he has been in continuous possession of the same. However, the appellant was attempting to trespass into the premises and to disturb the peaceful possession of the respondent over the same. Therefore, the respondent was constrained to file the suit for the purposes stated supra. 4. The first defendant/ appellant would resist the above contentions of the respondent, on the ground that the Agreement itself is void as there is no reciprocal clause in the said agreement, that is to say, in case of the failure on the part of the appellant in the payment of Rs. 15,000/- to the respondent, the respondent could occupy the entire building, on paying the same amount to him. The landlady who is the second defendant, in the suit (not a respondent before this court), was not a party to the agreement and without her knowledge and consent the agreement had been entered into and therefore it is ab initio void as per law and hence it is not an enforceable one. The Applicant, being a co-tenant with the respondent, against whom no injunction can be granted in favour of the respondent. He never disturbed the enjoyment and possession of the respondent, over his enjoyment of the suit building in accordance with the original lease agreement with the landlady. 5. The Applicant, being a co-tenant with the respondent, against whom no injunction can be granted in favour of the respondent. He never disturbed the enjoyment and possession of the respondent, over his enjoyment of the suit building in accordance with the original lease agreement with the landlady. 5. The second defendant is the landlady of the suit building and she filed a written statement, contending that the suit itself is not maintainable, since she has leased out the building jointly in favour of both the appellant and the respondents. They also paid the rent jointly till 30.10.1997. Thereafter they have committed default in the payment of rent. To determine anything as to possession, in respect of the building, she is the only competent lady and the joint lessees among themselves could not make any arrangement in respect of possession detrimental to her interest and without her knowledge and consent. 6. On account of the divergent contentions raised by the parties before the trial court, the respondent, to establish his case, he has given evidence as PW1 and he has also examined two more witnesses on his side. In addition to the oral evidence, he has marked Exts. Al to A4 on his side. The contesting defendant, namely, the first defendant, who is the appellant herein, has given evidence as DW1 and he has also marked three exhibits on his side. Ext. XI, Ext. XI(a) and Ext. XI(b) and Ext. X2 have been marked as court exhibits. The trial court after scrutinising the evidence, both oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the respondent as plaintiff has failed to establish his case to obtain an order of permanent injunction and ultimately it dismissed the suit. The above judgment of dismissal of the trial court was challenged in the first appeal as adverted to above, before the District Judge, Thodupuzha who, by reversing the judgment of the Munsiff, granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent. Now, that judgment of the lower appellate court is challenged in this Second Appeal. Now the point is whether the respondent/ plaintiff is entitled to obtain a decree of perpetual injunction against the appellant, as prayed for, in the plaint. Now, that judgment of the lower appellate court is challenged in this Second Appeal. Now the point is whether the respondent/ plaintiff is entitled to obtain a decree of perpetual injunction against the appellant, as prayed for, in the plaint. 3RLQW No. 1: It is needless to say that the High Court in the Second Appeal shall not interfere into the concurrent judgments or divergent judgments of the courts below unless there arises a substantial question of law. So far as factual aspects in the judgments of the Courts below are also concerned, the High Court shall not interfere unless those judgments are concluded on inconsequential and immaterial evidence omitting to consider credible veracity or on the foot of perversity. 7. In. the instant case, at the outset I have no hesitation to say that question of law is involved. Therefore, this Court can rightly interfere into the judgments of both the Courts below. It is admitted ground that both the appellant and the respondent are the co-tenants of the suit building where they were doing their advocations separately. The landlady, (the second defendant) was receiving the rent from both the appellant and the respondent at the rate of Rs. 40/- per mensum from each of them. When once the respondents sent the entire rent of Rs. 80/- by way of money order, it was refused by the landlady, to receive as borne out in Ext. Al and A2. That act of the landlady is quite obvious that she let out her premises to both the appellant and the respondent on their equal payment of rent per mensum. 8. There arose some ill-feeling due to professional competition between the appellant and the respondent in the year 1986 and that compelled both of them to approach the branch of their Association located in Thodupuzha where a mediation was held as per which, Ext. XI(b) dated 8.7.87 came into existence. Now the material issue before deciding the main point in this case is whether Ext. XI(b) agreement is valid in law. 9. It is submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that since there is no reciprocal clause in Ext. XI(b) agreement, and also since the Government or Quasi-Government is not a party to the Agreement, the respondent could not take advantage on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel which is one given in Chapter VIII (Estoppel of Indian Evidence Act). It is submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that since there is no reciprocal clause in Ext. XI(b) agreement, and also since the Government or Quasi-Government is not a party to the Agreement, the respondent could not take advantage on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel which is one given in Chapter VIII (Estoppel of Indian Evidence Act). In the support of his argument, he brought to my notice, a few rulings wherein no doubt the concerned Governments are parties to the agreements. Those judgments did not show that in an agreement, where the Government is not a party, the plea of estoppel cannot be invoked. The Chapter VIII of the Indian Evidence Act, relating to estoppel is a common law, applicable to all. It will not make any distinction in a document where the Government is a party and in a document where Government is not a party. Therefore, that submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, I am not able to appreciate. 10. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the above said agreement will bind both the appellant and respondent and in pursuance of the agreement, the sum of Rs. 15,000/-was not paid to respondent and therefore the respondent has taken possession of the building and he has been in possession of the entire building and since his possession is being threatened by the appellant, the respondent was compelled to file the suit in the trial court. 11. It is the definite contention of the second defendant landlady in her written statement, though not appearing in this Second Appeal, that the co-tenants namely, the appellant and the respondent could not enter into such agreement marked as Ext. XI(b) without her knowledge in respect of the possession of the building. According to her, the building was let out by her to both the appellant and respondent to carry on their evocations separately and to pay the rent in equal shares, namely, at the rate of Rs.40/- per mensum by each of them. 12. It is very unfortunate that the case of the second defendant was not considered by both the Courts below and instead, they have concentrated their attention only in the mediation said to have been taken place before the branch of the said association. 13. 12. It is very unfortunate that the case of the second defendant was not considered by both the Courts below and instead, they have concentrated their attention only in the mediation said to have been taken place before the branch of the said association. 13. When the second defendant has raised such a contention in her written statement, now the main issue or question to be decided or answered is whether the agreement marked as Ext. XI(b) is valid in law. In case, if it is found that the agreement is valid, then the question of estoppel will arise for consideration. When the agreement is found to be void, then the question of estoppel need not be gone into. For, the estoppel is insisted upon only on the contents of the above said agreement as a genuine one. Both the appellant and the respondent are admittedly, the tenants of the second defendant and therefore they are bound by S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act, wherein their liabilities have been prescribed. As per the liabilities of the lessees, coming under B of the S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the co-tenants among themselves cannot make any arrangement in respect of possession detrimental to the interest of the landlord and without the knowledge and consent of the landlord. To put it clear, to make such arrangement, among the co-tenants, there is no provision in S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act, though they are entitled to sublease or mortgage the entire property or any portion of the same to a third party. In view of the above statutory provision, enjoined in S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement Ext. XI(b) becomes unenforceable in law and in fact it is invalid, which has no legal effect. 14. S.10 of the Indian Contract Act provides as follows: "All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in India, are not hereby expressly repealed, by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses, or any law relating to the registration of documents". Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in India, are not hereby expressly repealed, by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses, or any law relating to the registration of documents". The agreements will become a contract which can be enforceable under law only if it is entered into by the competent person. In the instant case, the landlady is the competent person to enter into any agreement as provided under S.10 of the Indian Contract Act. Any violation of the same makes agreement as void, which cannot be cured under any of the law in force. One of the provisions of S.23 of the Indian Contract makes it clear that no contract can be entered into making an injury to a person or property of another. S.42 of the Indian Contract would provide that the joint promissors must perform their co-promises. In the instant case as per the agreement between the landlady on one hand and the appellant and respondent, on the other hand, both the appellant and respondent must enjoy the property as co-tenants. When they make an arrangement among themselves, permitting one of them to enjoy the entire property, it can be rightly taken that they are not performing their promises as per the original rental agreement between themselves and the landlady. In fact, it is the right of the promissee like second defendant in the present case, to discharge any one of the promissees from the joint promise and in such case also the promissor, who has not been discharged cannot take advantage of the discharge of the other promissor as provided under S.44 of the Indian Contract Act. In this section also, the discretion is given only to the promissee, like the second defendant in the instant case before me. Thus the question of law in this case would go against the alleged agreement Ext. XI(b), which became void-ab initio by which neither the appellant nor the respondent could take advantage. When the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that in pursuance of the impugned agreement, the appellant was in exclusive possession of the suit property for three months. For this submission there is no evidence. XI(b), which became void-ab initio by which neither the appellant nor the respondent could take advantage. When the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that in pursuance of the impugned agreement, the appellant was in exclusive possession of the suit property for three months. For this submission there is no evidence. To establish this contention, the material witness is the landlady who alone could speak that for the alleged period of three months, the appellant alone was in possession of the property, paying the entire rent to her. However, when I have given a verdict above that Ext. XI(b) agreement is void in law, nobody can act on any one of clauses, or entire stipulation of the said agreement. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on a decision reported at page 243 (Ramaswamy Rattamali v. Lakshmi (1962 KLT) and submitted that the principle laid down therein will be applicable to the benefit of the respondent. That decision is relating to estoppel. In the instant case on hand, as I have pointed out above, only in case it is found that Ext. XI(b) agreement is a valid one, then the question of estoppel has come to play and that has to be considered by this Court. But, in the instant case, it is my clear conclusion that the agreement is invalid, unenforceable in law etc. Therefore the principle laid down in the above judgment could not stretch out its hands to help the respondent. On account of my foregoing discussions and findings in detail, particularly my conclusion that the said agreement is void, the respondent cannot ask for a permanent injunction, against the appellant. Therefore, I have to necessarily reverse the judgment of the lower appellate court. Eventually, the point is answered against the respondent. In the result, this Second Appeal stands allowed, dismissing the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Thodupuzha, delivered in A.S.68/87. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.