P. VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) SINCE the questions of law urged in these petitions are common and the facts are fairly similar, all these petitions are taken up together for hearing and disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) THE petitioners, in these petitions, are the owners of various items of lands/sites situated at hyderali road, nazarbad mbhalla, chamundi vihar, mysore. ( 3 ) IN these petitions, they have prayed for quashing the notification dated 29th of April 1997 issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 read with sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the act" ). A copy of the said notification has been produced as Annexure-H in writ petition nos. 14745 to 14747 of 1997. ( 4 ) LANDS in all measuring 8130. 62 sq. Mtrs. , are sought to be acquired by the respondents for the purpose of 'sports complex' known as 'chamundi vihar sports complex' situated at mysore. It is not in dispute that a sports complex has already been established and the lands in question are situated adjacent to the said complex. It is the case of the petitioners in these petitions, that the lands in question are not required for the purpose of the sports complex; and when the lands of other landowners, which are adjoining the sports complex and which were proposed to be acquired, are dropped from acquisition, there is absolutely no justification to acquire the lands in question for the purpose of the sports complex. It is also their case that at any event of the matter, this is not a case where an enquiry contemplated under Section 5-a of the act could be dispensed with by invoking the Provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the act. ( 5 ) THE respondents have filed their statement of objections in writ petition No. 13975 of 1997. The learned government advocate, at the stage of hearing, submitted that the statement of objections filed in the said writ petition may be read as statement of objections common in all the writ petitions. ( 6 ) I have heard Sri shanthesh gureddy and Sri vyasa rao, learned counsels appearing for the petitioners, and Sri a. s. mahesh, learned government Advocate appearing for the respondents. ( 6 ) I have heard Sri shanthesh gureddy and Sri vyasa rao, learned counsels appearing for the petitioners, and Sri a. s. mahesh, learned government Advocate appearing for the respondents. ( 7 ) SRI gureddy submitted that the impugned notification is liable to be quashed on two grounds. Firstly, he submitted that when the respondents had taken a decision not to proceed with the acquisition of the lands belonging to various other land owners, which are situated very close to the lands in question, there is absolutely no justification for them to initiate proceedings for acquisition of the lands belonging to the petitioners. Secondly, he submitted that since the construction of the 'sports complex' takes considerable time, the state could not have invoked the power conferred on it under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the act and dispensed with an enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-a of the act. Therefore, he submits that the impugned notification at least to the extent it dispenses with an enquiry under Section 5-a of the Act, is liable to be quashed. ( 8 ) SRI vyasa rao, while strongly supporting the submissions made by Sri gureddy, further submitted that in so far as the preliminary notification concerning the land of the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 is concerned, the name of the petitioner was not shown in the preliminary notification, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-A in the said writ petition though his name was entered in the municipal register, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-D ; and, therefore, the preliminary notification insofar as the land of this petitioner is concerned, is liable to be quashed. Supporting the first submission of Sri gureddy, referred to above, Sri vyasa rao referred to me the communication dated 1st of february, 1996, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-F , which is a letter written in response to the letter dated 5th of august, 1997 written by the director for youth services informing him that on account of the paucity of funds, the proposal made for acquisition of the lands for the purpose of sports complex is rejected. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsels for the petitioners, in support of their submissions, relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) farid ahmed abdul samad and another v the municipal corporation of the city of ahmedabad and another ; narayan govind gavate v state of maharashtra and others ; and jai narain and others v union of India and others. ( 10 ) SRI mahesh, learned government Advocate appearing for the respondents, submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned notification and the same is not liable to be quashed by this court. He submitted that it cannot be disputed that the acquisition of land for the formation of sports complex is a public purpose. In this background, he submitted that conducting of an enquiry as contemplated under section 5-a of the act is only an empty formality. He further, submitted that since the approach road for the sports complex has to be formed and other developmental activities in the sports complex have to be undertaken immediately, the state, in its discretion, having regard to the urgency of the matter, after considering the relevant matters, had taken the decision that the acquisition of the lands in question must be made by invoking the Provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the act dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-a of the act; and the decision taken by the state being an administrative decision based on the subjective satisfaction, is not liable to be interfered with by this court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india. He also submitted that individual notices need not be served on the parties. The learned government Advocate further submitted that the grievance of the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 that the impugned notification is liable to be quashed on the ground that the name of the petitioner was not shown in the preliminary notification and that he was not served with a copy of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1) of the Act, is without substance. According to him, since the name of the petitioner was not entered in the revenue records, there was no obligation cast on the authorities to show his name in the preliminary notification and also get the notice served on him. According to him, since the name of the petitioner was not entered in the revenue records, there was no obligation cast on the authorities to show his name in the preliminary notification and also get the notice served on him. He also further pointed out that Annexure-D relied upon by the petitioner cannot be of any assistance to him as the entry in the municipal register is made only for the purpose of collecting tax; and in so far as the title to the property in question is concerned, only the entry made in the revenue records has to be looked into by the authorities before initiating proceedings for the acquisition of lands for the public purpose. ( 11 ) IN the light of the rival submission made by learned counsels for the parties, the two questions that would fall for my consideration, are the following: (1) whether the respondent-land acquisition officer has, in the circumstances of the case, erred in dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-a of the act by invoking Section 17 (4) of the act? (2) whether the impugned notification is liable to be quashed since the name of the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 was not shown in the preliminary notification?re: question (1): ( 12 ) IT is not in dispute that in the impugned notification, the state has dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-a of the act by invoking Section 17 (4) of the act. The lands in question are acquired for the purpose of extension of sports complex. In the statement of objections filed in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997, at paragraphs 5 and 6, it is stated as follows:"5. There is a need for swimming pool, football ground, hockey ground, hostel, dormitory and small courts like kabaddi, basketball, kho kho etc. Keeping all these facts in mind, the government is proposing to acquire the land in question for constructing a swimming pool of international standard. The lands of the petitioners and others are required for the purpose of construction of sports complex in Mysore city. The petitioner has produced the sketch Annexure-D which is incomplete. The land attached to the petitioner's land which is marked as 4' is being used for parking of vehicles. 6. As regards para 8 of the writ petition, the state government has released Rs. 65 lakhs for payment of compensation. The petitioner has produced the sketch Annexure-D which is incomplete. The land attached to the petitioner's land which is marked as 4' is being used for parking of vehicles. 6. As regards para 8 of the writ petition, the state government has released Rs. 65 lakhs for payment of compensation. As there is dire necessity of swimming pool, parking area, football ground, it has become just and expedient to invoke Provisions of section 17 (1) to (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, as the acquisition proceedings has to be completed urgently and the government is spending crores of rupees in order to construct the sports complex. The government has earmarked Rs. 3. 00 crores for the purpose of swimming pool. The swimming pool, football ground and parking area come under the lands of the petitioner and the government land attached to the land of the petitioner. It is not only the land of the petitioner that is being acquired; in addition to the lands of the petitioner the lands belonging to other persons are also being acquired". it is the case of the government that it has spent more than Rs. 13 crores for the construction of the stadium and it has only one approach road, which is insufficient; and, therefore, with a view to provide additional roads in the interest of general public, the land in question is sought to be acquired. It is also stated in the statement of objections that some other land owners had even relinquished their title in about 6 acres of land in favour of the state without claiming compensation. In the statement of objections, the respondents have set out as to how the land sought to be acquired will be used and the dire necessity of providing a swimming pool, parking area and football ground in the stadium and the government is spending huge money for the purpose of construction of the sports complex. According to the learned government advocate, the government has earmarked Rs. 3 crores for the purpose of swimming pool; and the swimming pool, football ground and the parking area fall under the petitioners' lands and the government land situated adjacent to the petitioners' lands. It is further asserted in the statement of objections that apart from the lands of the petitioners, lands belonging to various other persons have been acquired. 3 crores for the purpose of swimming pool; and the swimming pool, football ground and the parking area fall under the petitioners' lands and the government land situated adjacent to the petitioners' lands. It is further asserted in the statement of objections that apart from the lands of the petitioners, lands belonging to various other persons have been acquired. ( 13 ) IN the light of the stand taken by the respondents and also the materials on record, at the very outset, i must state that I am unable to accede to the submission of the learned counsels for the petitioners that the respondents were unjustified in dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-a of the act by invoking Section 17 (4) of the act. In the case of rqjasthan housing board and others v Shri kishan and others, the Supreme Court has repelled the contention that dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-a of the act was not justified when a land was sought to be acquired for the purpose of construction of houses by the housing board and in that context, has held that the satisfaction under section 17 (4) of the act is a subjective one and so long as there is material upon which the government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. It is useful to refer to the observations made by Supreme Court at paragraph 14 of the judgment, which read as hereunder:"shri thakur further argued that the construction of houses by housing board is not of such urgency as to call for the invocation of the said power. We are not satisfied. Firstly, on this question the decision of the Rajasthan high court is against the writ petitioners. The learned single judge negatived it as well as the division bench following the opinion of the third judge. Secondly, we are satisfied that there was material before the government in this case upon which it could have and did form the requisite opinion that it was a case calling for exercise of power under Section 17 (4 ). The learned single judge has referred to the material upon which the government had formed the said opinion. Secondly, we are satisfied that there was material before the government in this case upon which it could have and did form the requisite opinion that it was a case calling for exercise of power under Section 17 (4 ). The learned single judge has referred to the material upon which the government had formed the said opinion. The material placed before the court disclosed that the government found, on due verification, that there was an acute scarcity of land and there was heavy pressure for construction of houses for weaker sections and middle income group people; that the housing board had obtained a loan of Rs. 16 crores under a time-bound programme to construct and utilise the said amount by March 31,1983; that in the circumstances the government was satisfied that unless possession was taken immediately, and the housing board permitted to proceed with the construction, the board will not be able to adhere to the time-bound programme. In addition to the said fact, the division bench referred to certain other material also upon which the government had formed the said satisfaction viz. , that in view of the time-bound programme stipulated by the lender, hudco, the board had already appointed a large number of engineers and other subordinate staff for carrying out the said work and that holding an inquiry under Section 5-a would have resulted in uncalled for delay endangering the entire scheme and time-schedule of the housing board. It must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) is a subjective one and that so long as there is material upon which the government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. This is the principle affirmed by decisions of this court not under Section 17 (4) but also generally with respect to subjective satisfaction". in my view, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of rajashthan housing board, supra, would fully apply to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, the land has been acquired for the purpose of the sports complex etc. It is needless to mention that the sports complex has to be constructed with utmost expedition and urgency. There cannot be any dispute that the purpose of acquisition for the sports complex is a public purpose. Admittedly, the land has been acquired for the purpose of the sports complex etc. It is needless to mention that the sports complex has to be constructed with utmost expedition and urgency. There cannot be any dispute that the purpose of acquisition for the sports complex is a public purpose. As observed by me earlier, it is the case of the respondents that the government has earmarked Rs. 3 crores for the purpose of swimming pool alone. The learned government advocate submits that the swimming pool is required to be constructed maintaining international standards; and, therefore, such a huge money is being spent for the construction of swimming pool alone. Under these circumstances, if the authorities have felt that with a view to avoid undue delay and overcome procedural compliance, the provision contained in Section 5-a of the act is dispensed with, in my view, the said decision can never be termed as either arbitrary or unreasonable. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan housing board, supra, the decision taken is an administrative decision based on subjective satisfaction. further, the Supreme Court, in the case of chameli singh and others v state of Uttar Pradesh and another1, has again reiterated the earlier view expressed by it in the case of Rajasthan housing board, supra, and at paragraph 4 of the judgment, held that the opinion of urgency formed by the appropriate government to take immediate possession, is a subjective conclusion based on the material before it and it is entitled to great weight unless it is vitiated by mala fides or colourable exercise of power. Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of union of India v praveen gupta and others, has also held that the dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-a of the act by invoking Section 17 (4) of the act for the purpose of acquiring land required to shift timber business from walled city of Delhi was justified. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has also considered its decision in the case of narayan govind gavate, supra. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has also considered its decision in the case of narayan govind gavate, supra. It is useful to refer to paragraph 7 and relevant portion of paragraph 8 of the said judgment, which read as under:"shri sanghi, learned senior counsel has pointed out that there is no real urgency in this matter and the respondents could have been given an opportunity to contend that land is not needed for any public purpose. In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on the judgments in narayan govind gavate's case, supra, dora phalauli v State of Punjab and State of Punjab v gurdial singh. The decision in narayan govind's case, has been distinguished by this court in several cases. In the light of the ratio in catena of decisions, this court has consistently held that acquisition of the property for the planned development of the housing accommodation is an urgent for acquisition and, therefore, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-a, exercising power under Section 17 (4) has been held to be valid. It is true that in cases of dora phalauli and gurdial singh, the two-judge bench of this court in each of the cases held that enquiry under Section 5-a may not be dispensed with in a cavalier manner unless real urgency is shown, enquiry under Section 5-a would not be dispensed with, denying the opportunity to file the objections under Section 5-a. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. The very object of enquiry under Section 5-a is whether the land proposed to be acquired is needed or is likely to be needed for the public purpose mentioned in the notification and whether any other suitable land other than the acquired land is needed for the said public purpose. In this case, the entire land in two villages was acquired. It is seen that timber business is being carried on in the walled city of old Delhi. It has become a source of traffic congestion and that it requires to be shifted urgently from the existing place to relieve the congestion by acquiring the concerned land for the public purpose, namely, establishment of timber depots. It is true that a mention was also made that unauthorised construction has been made in the area proposed to be acquired. It has become a source of traffic congestion and that it requires to be shifted urgently from the existing place to relieve the congestion by acquiring the concerned land for the public purpose, namely, establishment of timber depots. It is true that a mention was also made that unauthorised construction has been made in the area proposed to be acquired. If the enquiry was conducted, delay would defeat the very public purpose of acquisition for shifting of timber business from the walled city and establishment of the timber depots outside the walled city. Therefore, the urgency mentioned in exercising the power under Section 4 (1) was justified. Shri goswami, learned senior counsel for the union of india, has relied upon the judgment of this court in jai narain's case, supra. it is true, as pointed out by Shri sanghi, that the acquisition in this reported decision was made for the establishment of sewerage plan as per the direction of this court and, therefore, there was urgency. but, as stated earlier, since the acquisition is for shifting of timber business from the walled city to the outskirts of the city, shifting itself is for urgent purpose, viz. , to relieve the traffic congestion in the walled city. Under those circumstances, the exercise of the power under Section 17 (4) cannot be said to be unwarranted in this case". in the light of the discussion made above, I am of the view that there is no infirmity in the impugned notification where the enquiry under Section 5-a of the act is dispensed with. re: question (2): ( 14 ) AS observed by me earlier, it is the contention of Sri vyasa rao that the name of the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 was not notified in the preliminary notification and he was also not served with the notice. This position was not disputed by the learned government advocate. However, the learned government Advocate submitted that since the name of the said petitioner was not entered in the revenue records and the name of the petitioner's vendor-g. Krishna murthy continued in the revenue records even after the sale of the said land stated to have been made on 8th of november, 1990, the name of the said krishna murthy was shown in the impugned notification and he was served with a notice. He further pointed out that the substance of the impugned notification was also published in two local newspapers "mahanandhi" and "aftab-e-karnataka". In the case of k. Rangaswamy v state of Karnataka and others, the full bench of this court has taken the view that service of individual notice is only directory and not mandatory in law. It is useful to refer to paragraph 14 of the said judgment, which reads as hereunder;"in Section 4 (1-a), there is nothing to show that service of individual notice is mandatory. It only states that notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall also specify the date on or before which and the manner in which the objection to the proposed acquisition may be made. In the case on hand such a specification is made as is evident from the notification issued under Section 4 (1) (Annexure-E ). In view of the publication of the notification in the official gazette and publication of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality, the petitioner could have filed objections on or before the date specified in the said notification. We do not think that in the absence of service of individual notice, Section 4 (1-a) cannot be worked out and that the service of individual notice is the only procedural safeguard. Publication of notification under section 4 (1) in the official gazette and publication of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality constitute sufficient procedural safeguards for the owner whose land is sought to be acquired. Once we have reached the conclusion that service of individual notice is not mandatory non-consideration of the effect of Section 45 in the decisions mentioned in the order of reference do not have bearing on the question whether the service of individual notice is directory or mandatory, inasmuch as if at all service of individual notice is a must then how such notice is to be served is prescribed under Section 45 of the act. In sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the act with reference to the publication of the notification in the official gazette and the publication of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality the word 'shall' is used and in the latter part of it the word 'may' is used as to causing of a copy of such a notification to be served on the owner or the occupier of the land. This aspect also supports the view that the service of individual notice on the land owner or occupier is only directory". therefore, in the light of the principle laid down by the full bench of this court, referred to above, the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 cannot have any serious grievance on the ground that he was not served with the individual notice. Further, it is also necessary to point out that in the instant case, enquiry under Section 5-a of the act has been dispensed with. There cannot be any dispute that the acquisition of the land is for public purpose. Under these circumstances, i do not find any serious prejudice that has caused to the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 on account of his name not being mentioned in the preliminary notification and also on account of the fact that he has not been served with individual notice. It is also relevant to point out that the site of this petitioner, which is under acquisition, measures only 55' x 50'. The said site is sought to be acquired by the impugned notification along with 8,500 sq. Mtrs. While considering question (1), I have negatived the challenge made to the acquisition of the land in question on the ground that dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-a was not justified. further, apart from the impugned notification, the acquisition of the lands in question has been published in two daily newspapers, referred to above. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that even assuming that there is irregularity committed by the authority in not showing the name of the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997, in the preliminary notification and in not issuing notice to him, the said irregularity would not vitiate the impugned notification. In the light of the view I have taken, the notification impugned cannot be set aside on any ground. In the light of the view I have taken, the notification impugned cannot be set aside on any ground. Even if i quash the impugned notification on the technical ground that the name of the petitioner was not shown in the preliminary notification, in the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired and the land in question being a small site measuring 55' x 50', which is part and parcel of other large extent of land, the state is bound to issue a fresh notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (4) of the act. in that event, the petitioner is entitled for the compensation, which would be determined as on the date of the preliminary notification. In the instant case, it is necessary to notice that the impugned notification was issued on 29th of april, 1997. There cannot be much difference in so far as the market value of the land is concerned. Therefore, looked at from any point of view, i do not find any justification to quash the impugned notification at the instance of the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997. ( 15 ) BEFORE parting with this Order, I am of the view that it is useful to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of ramniklal n. Bhutto and another v state of maharashtra, wherein it has been observed as follows: "before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of allround economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with china economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the asian countries, referred to as "asian tigers" e. g. , south korea, taiwan and singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. these challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in high courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of Justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of Justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under article 226 - indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the high court to direct, in compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings". the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, would fully apply to the facts of the present case. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings". the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, would fully apply to the facts of the present case. ( 16 ) THEREFORE, i do not find any merit in these petitions and they are liable to be dismissed. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, the respondents are directed to issue notice regarding award proceedings to all the petitioners and hear them. Since the petitioner in writ petition No. 13969 of 1997 has asserted that he has purchased the site in question, without considering his claim and without hearing him and other land owners, the compensation payable for the land/site in question should not be disbursed. If there is any rival claim, it is needless to observe that the authorities shall follow the Provisions contained in sections 30 and 31 of the act. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, these petitions are dismissed, however, subject to the observations made in paragraph 17 above. ( 19 ) IN the circumstances of the case, no order is made as to costs. ( 20 ) SRI a. s. mahesh, learned government Advocate is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks from today. --- *** --- .