Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, in A.S. No. 386 of ‘ 1983 confirming the judgment of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, in O.S. No. 2652 of 1979. The plaintiffs in the suit are the appellants in the present Second Appeal. 2. The suit was fried by the plaintiffs praying for a declaration that the plaint Schedule urban land owned by the plaintiffs does not attract the assessment of Urban Land Tax and a consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendant from demanding or collecting the Urban Land Tax relating to the plaint schedule property on the basis that it is not exempted. According to the plaintiffs, they are independent persons having their separate and exclusive sources of income and as such assessed to Income-tax and they were united for the purpose of a joint enterprise to put up a multi-storeyed building in a good non-residential locality and thus own at least one good rent yielding property. With the said intent, they had purchased the suit property from Archbishop of Madras under a registered sale deed dated 23.1.1976. The price paid was Rs. 4,04,000/-exclusive of stamp duty, registration charges and other expenses and with the result the plaintiffs are the joint owners of the said land of an extent of four grounds and 204 square feet and the building thereon. Except the said property, the plaintiffs do not own any other immovable property. The plaintiffs would further contend that under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act XXIV of 1978 (Sic for T.N.U.L. Tax Act, 1966, hereinafter called “the Act”) every person owning urban land is entitled to an exemption limit of two grounds and the plaintiffs being four such persons owning urban land, each of them is entitled to the exemption of two grounds, and jointly 8 grounds. The suit property being only a little over four grounds, falls far below the exemption limit of 8 grounds. But the Urban Land Tax Department did not recognise this method of computation and instead treated the plaintiffs jointly as one legal person entitled to the exemption of only two grounds. The suit property being only a little over four grounds, falls far below the exemption limit of 8 grounds. But the Urban Land Tax Department did not recognise this method of computation and instead treated the plaintiffs jointly as one legal person entitled to the exemption of only two grounds. The respondent has treated the suit land as one unit on the ground that the land is not divided by metes and bounds and sub-divided by the recognition of the Revenue Department. According to the plaintiffs, the said assumption was incorrect and the plaintiffs could not be treated as one unit collectively entitled to exemption limit of only two grounds. The plaintiffs further contended that this Court in a recent judgment has held that notwithstanding the joint - ownership of two or more persons of any urban land, each of them jointly owning it, was entitled to the exemption limit of two grounds, wnen the suit Iand did not exceed the extent thus calculated, according to the plaintiffs, they could not have been assessed at all. However, the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax granted exemption only to the extent of two grounds and assessed the remaining excess land at Rs. 70,000/- per ground as on 1.7.1971 and levied Urban Land Tax of Rs. 1021.70 for the period from 1.7.1975 to 30.6.1976. The plaintiffs would further stated that due to ignorance and acceptable reasons, the plaintiffs were not able to file an appeal in time and they were forced to pay the tax for the years 1975-76 and 1977-78. The defendant was demanding the tax for all the subsequent years under the threat of coercive process and strictly speaking the plaintiffs were entitled to a refund of the tax for the two years already paid under mistake and they reserve their right to file a suit after giving a valid notice under Section 80 C.P.C. Hence the suit. 3. Contesting the said pleadings, the defendant contended that the claim of the plaintiffs that they are independent persons was incorrect. The defendant would also deny that the plaintiffs were separately assessed to income-tax and a perusal of the sale deed did not disclose such a position. It was also stated that the sale deed in their favour by the Archbishop of Madras had also not been produced. The defendant would also deny that the plaintiffs were separately assessed to income-tax and a perusal of the sale deed did not disclose such a position. It was also stated that the sale deed in their favour by the Archbishop of Madras had also not been produced. The defendant further contended that every person owning two grounds of land was exempt from the payment of urban land tax. But it was not correct to say that four independent persons can form an association of persons to gam exemption jointly. The Plaintiffs were therefore, entitled to exemption only to the extent of two grounds and nothing more. The plaintiffs were, jointly one legal person and they cannot claim exemption over and above two grounds especially when the land had not been divided by metes and bounds nor sub-divided for recognition by the Revenue Department. Therefore, the exemption was not available to the extent over and above the two grounds. The defendant also contended that since the plaintiffs did not file any appeal for the years 1975-76 and 1977 78, the plaintiffs were not entitled for any refund. The suit has been filed to avoid and postpone the payment of urban land tax due to the defendant. It was also contended that the plaintiffs had failed to issue notice under Section 80 C.P.C. and the suit was, therefore, not maintainable in the absence of statutory notice. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings and the evidence both oral and documentary, the trial Court while rejecting the claim of the defendant that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of notice under Section 80 C.P.C, however, held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief since the trial Court agreed with the interpretation by the Defendant of the rights of the plaintiffs as joint owners of the property. The trial Court held that consequently the plaintiffs’ claim could not be sustained and that in respect of the assessment years 1975-76 and 1977-78 the plaintiffs not having filed an appeal, were not entitled to claim any refund. On appeal also, the learned appellate Judge agreed with the findings of the trial Court on the issue of the rights of the individual plaintiffs to be treated as separate owners. The Appellate Court agreed with the interpretation given by the trial Court. On appeal also, the learned appellate Judge agreed with the findings of the trial Court on the issue of the rights of the individual plaintiffs to be treated as separate owners. The Appellate Court agreed with the interpretation given by the trial Court. With the result the appeal was dismissed and hence the present Second Appeal by the plaintiffs. 5. Counsel for the appellants has raised the following points for consideration:— (1) The bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court as contained in Section 38 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Tax Act, 1966 will not be applicable to the present case. (2) The decision of the Courts below upholding the order of assessment by treating all the four claimants as constituting a single unit is not valid in law. (3) Non-availing of the appellate remedy cannot be a bar for filing the suit in view of the fundamental error committed by the Assessing Authority. 6. As regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the said objection had not been taken in the written statement. Both the Courts below have also not framed any issue for consideration in the said context. Yet, learned counsel for the appellants anticipating the objection from the respondent, had made elaborate submissions in this context. As apprehended by him, learned Government Advocate had also referred to Section 38 of the Act which is as follows:— “38. (1) No suit shall lie in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any assessment made under this Act. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the decision of any authority or office under this Act shall be final and no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which by or under this Act is required to be decided or dealt with by the authorities or officers under this Act.” 7. Learned Government Advocate also relies on the judgment of K. Sampth, J. in S.A. Nos. 693, 698 and 1224 of 1984 dated 22.12.1997, holding that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try any suit claiming a decree for declaration that the plaintiff were not liable to pay any Urban Land Tax. 8. Learned Government Advocate also relies on the judgment of K. Sampth, J. in S.A. Nos. 693, 698 and 1224 of 1984 dated 22.12.1997, holding that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try any suit claiming a decree for declaration that the plaintiff were not liable to pay any Urban Land Tax. 8. But according to learned counsel for the appellants, the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court cannot extend to cases where the statutory authority acts without jurisdiction or acts contrary to settled principles of law on any issue which would render the authority incompetent to initiate any action under the provisions of the Act. He would also refer to a later judgment of K. Sampath, J. dated 19.3.1998 in S.A. No. 1260 of 1984 holding that since the assessed institution was entitled to exemption under Section 29(k) of the Act as a charitable institution, the assessment cannot be sustained and hence there was no bar on the Civil Court to declare that the plaintiff was entitled to be exempted from the Act. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, in the sale deed under which the property was purchased, the plaintiffs have been individually shown as purchasers and that there was nothing to show that the purchase was for and on behalf of any single entity. The fact that all the purchasers had paid the sale consideration is also established by the recitals in the document as follows:— “Now this Deed of Absolute Sale Witnesseth That in pursuance of the said agreement and the decree dated 10.11.1975 in C.S. No. 193 of 1975 (O.S.) on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Madras and in consideration of the said sum of Rs. 4,04,000/- (Rupees Four lakhs and four thousands only) paid by the Purchasers to the Vendor” 10. He would also further submit that among Muslims, there was no question of any joint family and the respondent administering the provisions of the Act ought to have known the binding precedent of this Court in the very context of the Act. Reference is made to a judgment of S. Natarajan, J. as he then was, reported in 92 L.W. 103 (Ameena Bi Alias Sahebzadi v. Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Tiruchirapalli). Reference is made to a judgment of S. Natarajan, J. as he then was, reported in 92 L.W. 103 (Ameena Bi Alias Sahebzadi v. Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Tiruchirapalli). That was a case of inheritance by the heirs of the original owner on his death holding the heirs only as tenants-in-common and it was also held that the absence of division by metes and bounds would be of no consequence. With the result it was held that the joint assessment under the Urban Land Tax Act was not legal. In the same judgment, the learned Judge also relied on another judgment of this Court rendered by Ramanujam, J. in W.P. No. 2853 of 1977 (Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. Urban Land Tax Tribunal, Commissioner) holding that the absence of division by metes and bounds cannot be a ground for the Assessing Officer to tax the holding as one unit, when the property was actually owned by two individuals. 11. Learned counsel would further contend that as regards the source of purchase money, the Assessing Officer had chosen to disregard the recitals in the document referred to earlier. Even otherwise, he would contend that assuming that there was no specific material to evidence payment of consideration by each of the purchasers, the provisions of Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act would be attracted, which holds that in the case of joint transfer for consideration, in the absence of evidence as to the share of the interest or as to the shares which they had respectively advanced, such persons shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property. In support of this submission he would also refer to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1976 Madras, 222 ( T.D. Tehrani v. Official Assignee). 12. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the appellants in passing the impugned order of assessment, the respondent had taken into consideration the factors which the officer had no right to do and had not taken into account vital and relevant facts necessary to decide the applicability of the Act as against the plaintiffs. He had also ignored the direct rulings of this Court rendered in the very context of the Act and as such, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not excluded. 13. He had also ignored the direct rulings of this Court rendered in the very context of the Act and as such, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not excluded. 13. The issue of exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court has been considered in several judgments of the Supreme Court. The general trend of the earlier decisions was to strictly adhere to the exclusion clause. Even though it was held that exclusion must be specifically and statutorily spelt out and cannot be left to any inference and that the mere existence of alternate or appellate remedies alone will not mean exclusion of Civil Courts jurisdiction, yet in several rulings, it has been pointed out that when once there was a specific provision excluding the jurisdiction, then no exception can be made to the statutory bar. 14. The Privy Council in the decision in Secretary of State for India v. Mask & Co. (I.L.R. 1940 Madras 599=52 L.W.I), while interpreting Section 188 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act, 1924, held that the decision of the Assistant Collector on the duty leviable on imported goods would be a decision within the meaning of Section 188 and hence with reference to an order made under the Act, the Civil Courts jurisdiction would be barred. But in the same judgment, the Judicial Committee, through Lord Thankerton also expressed that it was well settled that even if the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was statutorily excluded, the jurisdiction to examine the cases to find out whether the provisions of the Act have been complied with or not and whether the principles of natural justice have been complied with or not, was available to the Civil Court. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court also accepted the said view in the case reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 322 (Firm I.S. Chetty & Sons. v. State of Andhra Pradesh), but had cautioned that the expressions of the Judicial Committee will not justify the assumption that the validity of the decision of the Taxing Authority can be challenged in a suit on the ground that it was incorrect on the merits. Non-compliance of the provisions as referred to by the Privy Council should be restricted to the fundamental provisions of the statute which would go to the root of the matter rendering the order without jurisdiction or due to noncompliance of principles of natural justice. 15. Non-compliance of the provisions as referred to by the Privy Council should be restricted to the fundamental provisions of the statute which would go to the root of the matter rendering the order without jurisdiction or due to noncompliance of principles of natural justice. 15. The land mark decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Commission ( 1969 1 All E.R., 208) paved the way for liberally considering the exclusion clause and several exceptions were added to the list of situations which would entitle the Civil Court to entertain disputes notwithstanding the exclusion of jurisdiction. The off quoted observations of Lord Reid which are worthwhile recollection, are extracted below:— “ It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction that its decision is a nullity. But in such cases the word “jurisdiction” has been used in a very wide sense, and I have come to the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the enquiry in question. But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do someth ing in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly.” A careful study of the above extract very often referred to in many of the judgments of the Supreme Court, sounds very liberal enough for upholding the jurisdiction of Civil Court and in the language of Lord Reid, the list of situations was not exhaustive. But nonetheless, such situations would refer only to the fundamental issue of jurisdictional error. In A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1558 ( Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros.) after considering the observations of Lord Reid in Anisminics case, the Supreme Court held as follows:— “The word “jurisdiction” has both a narrow and a wider meaning. In the sense of the former, it means the authority to embark upon an enquiry; in the sense of the latter it is used in several aspects, one of such aspects being that the decision of the tribunal is in non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act, and therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction.” 16. Instead of referring to a series of judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in this context, it should be sufficient to refer to a latest judgment of the Supreme Court by nine Honble Judges reported in 1997 (5) S.C.C., 536 (Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India). Instead of referring to a series of judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in this context, it should be sufficient to refer to a latest judgment of the Supreme Court by nine Honble Judges reported in 1997 (5) S.C.C., 536 (Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India). While dealing with the maintainability of a suit under Section 72 of the Contract Act or a writ petition under Article 226 or under Article 32 touching the issue of right to claim refund of customs/excise duty under a provision held to be unconstitutional, the majority of five Honble Judges held that though a writ may be maintainable, the claim for refund can be maintained only under the provisions of Central Excise Act or Customs Act and not under Section 72 of the Contract Act by filing a suit. A.M. Ahmadi, Chief Justice, while concurring on the main issue, held that a suit as well as a writ will lie even for claim for refund on grounds of unconstitutionality or the levy being without jurisdiction. The judgment of K.S. Paripooranan, J. agreed by B.L. Hansaria and Sen., JJ. sought to expand the horizon of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and held that a writ petition as well as a suit will be maintainable where the levy or the order was unconstitutional, illegal, void, unauthorised or without jurisdiction or where the levy was based on misconstruction or wrong and erroneous interpretation of the relevant provision. Though the judgment rendered by Ahmadi, C.J. and Paripooranan, J. separately would appear not to be strictly consistent with some of the observations in the majority judgment delivered by Jeevan Reddy, J., the rigour of the majority judgment holding that neither a writ nor a suit would lie for a claim for refund, has to be viewed in the context of the issue which arose for consideration in the said decision. That was a case in which refund was sought for in a suit notwithstanding a specific statutory provision namely Section 11-B of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, prescribing a separate machinary for claiming refund. That was a case in which refund was sought for in a suit notwithstanding a specific statutory provision namely Section 11-B of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, prescribing a separate machinary for claiming refund. Jeevan Reddy, J. after taking note of the tenor of the sweeping non-obstante clause in Section 11-B of the said Act disentitling the claim of refund under any circumstances including of any law for the time being in force and except as provided under the Section, held that a suit on the basis of Section 72 of the Contract Act was not maintainable. The learned Judge held that the language of the Section could not have been more specific and emphatic and the exclusivity of the provisions relating to refund was express and unambiguous. Even so, the learned Judge went on further to hold that there was however, one exception namely where a provision of the Act where-under the duty was levied was found to be unconstitutional for violation of any of the constitutional limitations. In fact, Paripoornan, J. agreed with the conclusions of Jeevan Reddy, J. to the extent in that instant case no claim for refund can be based on Section 72 of the Contract Act being a case of a person to whom no prejudice was caused, but went on to express his own views on the issue of maintainability of an action either by way of a suit or a writ petition and the extent to which there would be ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. 17. Therefore, the majority judgment in Mafatlal‘s case (supra) should be understood in the context of the special issue which arose for consideration. The said judgment cannot be said to’ be a departure from the principles laid down by the House of Lords in Anisminic‘s case and later adopted by the Supreme Court in several of its judgments. In a judgment in 1974 (3) S.C.C. 415 ) (Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court recognised that after Anisminics case it has become difficult to decide the issue of error of jurisdiction arising out of lack of power and arising out of erroneous exercise of power. In a judgment in 1974 (3) S.C.C. 415 ) (Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court recognised that after Anisminics case it has become difficult to decide the issue of error of jurisdiction arising out of lack of power and arising out of erroneous exercise of power. Mathew, J. who had expressed so in that judgment, had in another earlier case also reported 1972 (2) S.C.C. 427 (M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, expressed his views on same terms, though on facts of that case he held otherwise. Agreeing with the views of House of Lords, His Lordships has held as follows:— “The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords in the above case would show the extent to which ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent, to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of “jurisdiction”. The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdiction error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction if the decision is right in law out none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as “basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal”, “imposing an unwarranted condition” or “addressing themselves to a wrong question”. The majority opinion in the case leaves a Court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the Court is prepared to allow.” 18. The sum and substance of the above discussion would lead to the following conclusion:— ‘Not all erroneous legal decisions would amount to jurisdictional errors, but such of those decisions which concern or pertain to the very root of the jurisdiction of the administrative authority or the power of the administrative authority to deal with an issue or to exercise its power under the statute or applicability of the provision of the Act would amount to jurisdictional error. It is true that the very same, administrative authority or hierarchy of appellate 6r revisional authorities also do have the power to examine the jurisdictional issue. So also the Civil Court will have the power to examine as to whether an issue raised before it was within its competence to decide or not and whether the administrative authority had the jurisdiction to deal with the disputed issue or not. A misconstruction or misapplication of the statute by the administrative authority resulting in the authority exercising its power over a situation which it could not have dealt with would be an example of jurisdictional error and the Civil Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to intervene at the instance of the aggrieved party and to hold that the decision of the administrative authority suffers from a jurisdictional error and the provisions of the Act do not apply as against the aggrieved party. 19. Now in this background, the facts of the present case may be examined. 20. As far as the provision of Tamil Nadu Act 12 of 1966 is concerned, Section 5 the charging section, is made subject to other provisions of the Act and seeks to levy tax on urban land from the owner of such urban land. Both the expressions” urban land” and owner” are defined: But Section 29-A of the Act falling Under Chapter VII dealing with exemptions, completely excludes the applicability of the Act to any owner who holds only the prescribed extent of land or less than the said extent mentioned thereunder. Such owners of land not being exigible to tax are kept outside the purview of the Act. A persual of Section 7 of the Act requiring submission of returns will also show that it is only the “owner of the urban land liable to pay urban land tax under this Act” who is required to file a return. Hence the issue as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to be treated as owners exempted under Section 29-A or not, is an issue which goes to the root of the very jurisdiction of the authority to invoke the pro visions of the Act as well as the very applicability of the Act as against the plaintiffs. Hence the issue as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to be treated as owners exempted under Section 29-A or not, is an issue which goes to the root of the very jurisdiction of the authority to invoke the pro visions of the Act as well as the very applicability of the Act as against the plaintiffs. Therefore, any decision of the assessing authority fixing liability be such owners who claim to be outside the purview of the Act, would suffer from jurisdictional error and would amount to erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. As stated earlier, it is true that the assessing authority has the jurisdiction to decide as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim the benefit of the exemption and as to whether the provisions of the Act are applicable to them. It is equally true that the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court will not extend to cases where the authority commits jurisdictional error. 21. As far as facts of the present case are concerned the property has been purchased by four individuals. There is nothing to show that all of them have purchased the property jointly as a single unit. The parties are Muslims and there is no presumption of the existence of a joint family. The decision of this Court referred to above reported in 92 L.W. 103 (Ameena Bi Alias Sahebzadi and others v. Assf. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Tiruchirapalli North) rendered in the context of the very provisions of the Act dealing with the inheritance among Muslims and that of Ramanujan, J. in W.P. No. 2853 of 1977 holding that the mere absence of a division by metes and bounds cannot lead to the presumption that the holding was a joint and a single unit, directly apply to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the appellants has also referred to a judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in A.I.R. 1995 Bombay 65 (Ranchmod Lala v. Union Territory, Dadra & Nagar Haveli). In that case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dealing with Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971, held that tenants-in-common cannot be treated as covered by the expression ‘person’ to mean association or body of individuals. In that case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dealing with Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971, held that tenants-in-common cannot be treated as covered by the expression ‘person’ to mean association or body of individuals. It was held that it was not correct to say that as long as the property was not divided by metes and bounds, it was imperative to consider that the property was held by a single body of the individuals. It was further held that merely because more than one person had jointly purchased the lands in question, it cannot be held that they constituted a body or an association of persons or that they were not entitled to separate holding. 22. I also agree with the contention on behalf of the appellants as regards contribution for sale consideration, that the view of the assessing authority is also opposed to the principles underlying Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act. 23. Therefore, the assessment order holding the plaintiffs as a joint unit and assessable as a single unit, is not only an erroneous interpretation of law, but also amounts to a jurisdictional error arising out of assuming jurisdiction which did not exist and misconstruction of the statutory provisions by the assessing authority granting to itself a power to act when it cannot. Therefore, I hold that the bar of Civil Courts jurisdiction as contemplated under Section 38 of the Act will not disentitle the Civil Court to examine and declare that the property held by the plaintiffs does not attract assessment to urban land tax. 24. One of the reasons given by the Courts below for denying the decree is that the plaintiffs had not availed of the appellate remedies. The mere availing of appellate remedies alone cannot take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, if the impugned order is found to be vitiated by any jurisdictional error. 25. I am therefore, inclined to hold that the judgments of the Courts below cannot be sustained and with the result, the above Second Appeal is allowed and the findings of the Courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed as prayed for. There will be no order as to costs in this Second Appeal.