Judgment : 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to restore and put back the petitioners bunk shop in the place, from where it was removed on 11. 1998, viz., on the pavement abutting corporation compound wall, near Nirmala Tea Stall, People Park Road near Old Moore Market, Part Town, Chennai-3 and permit the bunk shop to continue to be in the said place till the respondents remove the other four bunk shops situate nearby. 2. The case of he petitioner is that the respondents gave notice directing the petitioner to remove the bunk shop, as the same caused inconvenience to the general public in the use of the platform by them. The petitioner filed O.S.No. 7264 of 1998 on the file of the 13th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, praying for a declaration that the impugned notice issued by the respondents, was not in accordance with the provisions of law and so in conformity with the rulings of this court. Pending suit, the petitioner also moved an application for interim injunction and the respondents took time for filing counter and in the meanwhile, on 11. 1978, the bunk shop of the petitioner was removed. Earlier, the petitioner filed O.S.No.7201 of 1994 on the file of the 12th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, The said suit was decreed ex parte and permanent injunction was granted in favour of the petitioner. Hence, the removal of the bunk shop of the petitioner now is in violation of the said permanent injunction, which is still in force, and as such, it is arbitrary and discriminatory on the ground that the other bunk shops nearby run by Ajitha Bee, Chakrapani, Ganapathy and one Sundar and another bunk stall selling fish and sea food, are not disturbed and they are allowed to run as such. 3. When the writ petition came up for admission, I directed the standing counsel for the respondents to take notice and find out as to why the other four bunk shops are allowed to run and the petitioner alone discriminated. 4. Today, when the matter is taken up, learned counsel for the respondents represented that the bunk stall owned by Ajitha Bee had been removed on 111. 1998, pursuant to the order passed by this court on 11. 1998 in W.P.No. 4823 of 1995. 4. Today, when the matter is taken up, learned counsel for the respondents represented that the bunk stall owned by Ajitha Bee had been removed on 111. 1998, pursuant to the order passed by this court on 11. 1998 in W.P.No. 4823 of 1995. So far as Chakrapani is concerned, it is stated that there is no bunk shop owned by any one by name Chakrapani. So far as the other three shops are concerned, those three persons, viz., Valliammal, Ganapathi and Sundar have filed civil suits before the city civil court, in O.S.No. 5557 of 1996, 7356 of 1998 and 2088 of 1992, respectively of which, O.S.No. 2088 of 1992 had been decreed ex parte in the year 1993 and the other two suits are still pending and hence, the respondents did not take any steps to remove those three bunk shops. .5. Mr. Sridhar, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when the other three bunk shops owned by Valliammal, Ganapathi and Sundar, are allowed to run, the petitioner may also be permitted to run his bunk shop till all the shops are cleared. Moreover, the learned counsel contended that this sort of piecemeal eviction would lead to unnecessary trouble, as the authorities are not empowered to exercise their power in arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that only by virtue of the orders passed by the city civil court, the respondents are prevented from evicting the other shops, that pursuant to the order passed by this Court in W.P.No. 4923 of 1995 on shop had been removed, the removal of the other shop owned by the petitioner would also be in the interest of the public in order to enable the public to use the platform freely as far as possible. So far as the other shops are concerned, steps are being taken to get the interim order as well as the ex parte decree vacated and thereafter, they will be removed and hence, the restoration of the petitioners shop do not arise. 7. I have considered the contentions of both the counsel carefully. So far as the other shops are concerned, steps are being taken to get the interim order as well as the ex parte decree vacated and thereafter, they will be removed and hence, the restoration of the petitioners shop do not arise. 7. I have considered the contentions of both the counsel carefully. So far as the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the respondents having taken time for filing counter before the city civil court in the interim application, ought not to have removed the shop unauthorisedly and they should have waited for the orders of that court, I am unable to agree. When the petitioner had been served with a notice directing him to remove the shop as he had no right to occupy that place, the petitioner is not justified in approaching the civil court. Only those, who have a civil right can approach the civil court when their right is being disturbed, seeking redressal of their grievance and a person, like the petitioner, who has no legal right and is in unauthorised occupation as a trespasser, is not entitled to any relief from the court and as such, the suit itself is not maintainable. When the suit itself is not maintainable, it is unnecessary for the respondents to await for the city civil court to pass orders in the interim application. It has been held in Commissioner Madurai City Municipal Corporation v. Pandy, 1997 (2) M.L.J. 243 that a rank trespasser is not entitled for any indulgence from this Court and hence, their is nothing wrong on the part of the respondents in removing the petitioners bunk shop, as the petitioner did not oblige to do so voluntarily pursuance to the notice issued to him. .8. So far as the other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the authorities have exercised their power in removing the bunk shop of the petitioner alone, which is discriminatory, I am of the view that when the respondents are prevented by way of court order in respect of other three bunk shops, naturally they cannot remove those shops, as it would attract the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. When there is no interim order infavour of the petitioner, the respondents are entitled to remove his shop and rightly they have done so. When there is no interim order infavour of the petitioner, the respondents are entitled to remove his shop and rightly they have done so. Further, there is no need for the respondents to wait for the removal of the other three shops in order to remove the petitioners shop. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. .9. The relief sought for in this writ petition is a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to restore the bunk shop in the same place wherefrom it was removed by the respondents. In a recent judgment, their lordships of a Division Bench in Tiruchirapalli Palporul Virkum Thozhilallar Sangam by its President. v. Commissioner, Corpn. of Tiruchirapalli, 1998 (II) CTC 610 have held that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court has to protect the existing right of an individual, in the event of interference; and it cannot create a right, to a party, in the following terms: "The learned senior counsel submitted that on humanitarian grounds, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with. In this jurisdiction, court has to protect the right in the event of interference; but should not create a right to a party. There is no material to reflect their right to trade in their respective places". .Hence, Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked only to protect the existing right and not to create a right. Admittedly, the petitioner is an encroacher on the pavement having a bunk stall and as such, he has no existing right to be protected and as such, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. 10. The adjacent owner, referred to by the petitioner in his affidavit, Ajitha Bee had been evicted pursuant to the order of this court in W.P.No. 4923 of 1995 wherein this Court had dismissed the writ petition on the ground that when once it is admitted that the petitioner has unauthorisedly occupied a place, which is a platform or a place used by the public, definitely it goes without saying that such occupation would cause hardship as well as hindrance to the users of the platform and the said bunk stall owner has no right to occupy that place. Following the same principle, this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed. 11. Following the same principle, this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed. 11. Since the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the decision referred to above, have categorically held that the court has to protect the existing right in the event of interference, but should not create a right to a party, I am of the view that it is for the respondents to take steps to get the suits now pending before the city civil court dismissed, on the short ground, the plaintiff has no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court. If mere invocation of the jurisdiction of the civil court, by way of interim order, the courts are not expected to create a right in favour of the trespassers; but virtually the subordinate courts are doing the same thing; i.e. creating a right by interim orders in favour of trespassers, which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court. The subordinate courts are bound to follow the judgment of this Court and dispose of those suits in terms of the judgment of the Division Bench, referred to above. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents represented that O.S.No. 2088 of 1992 filed by Sundar was decreed ex parte and the respondents are taking steps to set aside the ex parte decree. I called for the said suit records. The suit had been decreed ex parte as early as 30.4.1993. There is absolutely no reason for the respondents for their not having taken any steps all these days to get the ex parte decree set aside. But however that may not be a ground torestra in the eviction proceedings. From the plaint filed by the said Sundar, it is seen that the relief sought for in the said suit is for a permanent injunction directing the defendants, their men, agents, etc. from demolishing the kiosk situated in the place, Initiaion of proceedings to evict need not be by demolition of kiosk. Hence, the ex parte decree of injunction restraining the corporation authorities from demolishing kiosk will not stand in the way of the corporation authorities from initiating eviction proceedings against Sundar. Hence, it is open to the respondents to initiate eviction proceedings against the said Sundar, if his occupation is unauthorised. .13. Hence, the ex parte decree of injunction restraining the corporation authorities from demolishing kiosk will not stand in the way of the corporation authorities from initiating eviction proceedings against Sundar. Hence, it is open to the respondents to initiate eviction proceedings against the said Sundar, if his occupation is unauthorised. .13. When encroachers are filing suits with innocuous prayers in order to squat on the public properties, as in the case stated supra, the subordinate courts should be cautions while granting interim prayers. Order 39, Rule (1) (c), Code of Civil Procedure, envisages a situation where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff, or, otherwise causes injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. In all the cases of encroachment there is no dispute over the property because it is the admitted case of the encroachers that they are in occupation of the public property and the authorities are trying to interfere or interfering with their possession. They do not claim any title over the property; but claim only a right of occupation till they are evicted under due process of law. Hence, in those cases, the subordinate courts must exercise their discretion of granting interim orders in a much restrained fashion. 14. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.