Judgment :- 1. On 26.6.1998 while ordering notice of motion an interim order was passed to the following effect: “Notice of motion returnable in four weeks. There will be an interim stay if the petitioner has not already been relieved”. 2. Alleging that he had not been relieved and that after expiry of the leave he had applied for, he reported for duty at 10.30 a.m. on 6.7.1998 at the Erode Branch of the respondent bank, that the second respondent refused to allow him to join duty, that he went over to Chennai on 8.7.1998 and met the first respondent and that after making him wait for two days, the first respondent told him that he had been relieved from 17.6.1998 itself, the applicant/writ petitioner has taken out the present Contempt Application. 3. Notice was ordered in the Contempt Application on 29.7.1998. The contemners appeared on 27.8.1998 further appearance was dispensed with, with a direction that if and when required they would have to appear before court. 4. A counter was filed. At the hearing of the Contempt Application Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Advocate representing Mr. D. Mukundan for the contemners/respondents in the writ petition referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. (1) State of J & K v. Mohd. Yaqeeb Khan and others (1992 2 SCC 167) and (2) Hari Nath Sharma v. Jaipur Development Authority ( 1995 4 SCC 252 ). and submitted that the main writ petition and the Contempt Application could be heard together and disposed of, to which course the petitioners counsel also had no objection. Accordingly, arguments in both the writ petition and the contempt application were heard. 5. The prayer in the Writ Petition is as follows: “For the reasons set out in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that mis Honble court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction in the nature of a writ calling for the records of the respondent pertaining to his proceedings-vide letter No. 26/31/SF/General, dated 17.6.1998 and quash the same in so far as the petitioner is concerned” The order sought to be quashed is as follows: (The entire letter is extracted). “Ref: No. 26/31/SF/GENL. Date: 17.6.1998. UCO Bank, Zonal Office, 169, Thambu Chetty Street, Chennai-600 001. To V. Ramesh, Assistant Manager, UCO Bank, Mettu Road, Erode. “Ref: No. 26/31/SF/GENL. Date: 17.6.1998. UCO Bank, Zonal Office, 169, Thambu Chetty Street, Chennai-600 001. To V. Ramesh, Assistant Manager, UCO Bank, Mettu Road, Erode. Sir, Ref: Your service in our bank as an Officer not yet confirmed. You were appointed as an officer - vide appointment letter dated 1.12.1989 under reserved category as S.T. Candidate. The Community in the Caste Certificate provided by you at the time of joining the bank service was proved that certificate was false. This was confirmed by order dated 23.1.1998 passed by the High Court, Madras, in W.P. No. 6007/93 filed by you. The above amounts to violation of clause 10 of your appointment order. You are hereby discharged during Probation from the Bank Service with immediate effect. Enclosed managers cheque towards one month salary in lieu of one month notice. Sd./(K.V. Ramachandran) Zonal Manager. 6. The sheet anchor of the Banks case is the order in W.P. No. 6007/93 filed by the writ petitioner. It is necessary at this Juncture to refer to the case, the prayer and the order in the said writ petition. The writ petition was filed on the following allegations: “The petitioner belonged to Kattu Naicken Community, which had been recognized as a Schedule Tribe as per G.O. Ms. No. 1564/SWD, dated 30.7.1985, Schedule Castes, Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976, vide serial No. 287. The petitioner was born and brought up at Karaikudi. His father was an Ex-Servicemen who had served in the Indian Air Force from 1960 to 1981. His parents migrated to Karaikudi several years back and ever since the petitioner had been living at Karaikudi with his parents. His forefathers were natives of Srivilliputhur though they did not have any property at Srivilliputhur nor did they have any relatives of the father residing there at the time of the filing of the writ petition. After graduating in Commerce from Alagappa Arts College, Karaikudi, the petitioner appeared for competitive examination conducted by the Banking Service Recruitment Board and was selected on the quota reserved for Scheduled Tribes. He was appointed as Probationary Officer at the Calcutta Branch Office of the Bank and after completion of the probationary period, he was posted as Assistant Manager at the Ernakulam Branch. He was appointed as Probationary Officer at the Calcutta Branch Office of the Bank and after completion of the probationary period, he was posted as Assistant Manager at the Ernakulam Branch. At the time of his appointment, as required by the bank the petitioner produced the community certificate in original issued to him by the Tahsildar, Karakudi on 21.6.1988 as also his transfer certificate wherein his community was shown as Kattu Naicken. The bank by its letter dated 26.4.1991 directed the petitioner during the probationary period to submit the caste certificate in the prescribed proforma issued by it. The petitioner requested the Sub Collector, Devakottai, PMT District, the first respondent in that writ petition, who was the competent authority as per the revised Government Order to issue the community certificate afresh in the banks prescribed proforma, notwithstanding that the petitioner had furnished the community certificate issued by the then competent authority, viz., the Tahsildar, Karaikudi, as early as in 1988 as per the old G.O.Ms. 1564/SWD, dated 10.7.1985. The Sub Collector instead of issuing the certificate in the proforma as required by the bank, conducted a fresh enquiry in camera and without affording any opportunity to the petitioner, had passed an order dated 22.12.1992 vide No. ROC-A4/10717/91 holding that the petitioner did not belong to Kattu Naicken Community. There was no proper enquiry conducted and the finding had been made without any basis. The Sub Collector kept the application pending for more than fifteen months, though the Government Circular No. 2/87017/91 dated 12.12.1991 insisted that the application for community certificate in the case of Scheduled Tribes should be disposed of within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the application. The finding had been arrived at without any notice to the petitioner. The basic rules and regulations had not been followed. There had been flagrant violation of principles of natural justice under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. At the time the Tahsildar, Karaikudi, issued the certificate to the petitioner, he had taken into consideration several documents like the Military Discharge Certificate of the petitioners father of the year 1960, the Community Certificate issued to the petitioners paternal uncle by the Deputy Collector and the city First Class Magistrate, Madurai, dated 11.7.1950 and the Transfer Certificate of the Petitioner. The Tahsildar conducted a through enquiry before arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner belonged to Kattu Naicken Community and only thereafter, the certificate was issued. The subsequent G.O. issued by the Government on 11.11.99 only stated that after the said date community certificate could be issued only by the Revenue Divisional Officer. It was not stated in the said G.O. that Community Certificate issued prior to that date were not valid. There was no proper enquiry as already stated. The Sub Collector had shirked his responsibility. The finding of the Sub Collector was likely to visit the petitioner with severe consequences. Even though the petitioner had completed three years of service at the bank, his services had not been regularised in spite of the successful completion of the probationary period for the simple reason that the Sub Collector had made a report cancelling the certificate already issued by the competent authority as per the then extant G.O. Since the bank was taking effective steps to terminate the services of the petitioner, the writ petition was filed for the issue of a certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the Sub Collector, Devakottai, pertaining to his proceedings R.O.C. No. A4/10717/91 dated 22.12.1992, quash the same in so far as the petitioner was concerned and further direct the Sub Collector to issue the community certificate in the prescribed proforma of the Bank”. 7. This writ petition was filed on 28.3.1993. It came up for final hearing before Y. Venkatachalam, J. on 23.1.1998. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition. The relevant paragraph relating to the dismissal of the writ petition is paragraph 7 and it is as follows: — “Having examined the entire material available on record, it is proved beyond doubt with the documentary evidence that the impugned order is passed by the Sub Collector, Devakottai after enquiry on the direction of the Collector, Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar District, Sivaganga. It is significant to note that it is the confidential letter addressed to the Collector concerned. It is not addressed either to the writ petitioner or to the father of the writ petitioner. It is another significant aspect to note that the copy of the same is not marked to any one else. It is significant to note that it is the confidential letter addressed to the Collector concerned. It is not addressed either to the writ petitioner or to the father of the writ petitioner. It is another significant aspect to note that the copy of the same is not marked to any one else. It is purely a confidential letter in between the Sub Collector and the Collector of the District concerned with regard to the validity of the caste certificate of the candidate in question. How the confidential letter came into picture and how the writ petitioner has obtained this document is not known. When the confidential letter is from Sub Collector to Collector concerned, when it is obtained by others, it is punishable under law. The State Government should decide whether to file a chargesheet against the concerned for delivering the confidential documents outside the purview of the law. However, I have decided this matter with reference to the merits of the case on hand. Having seen the entire material available on record, the petitioner has no locus standi to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of writ challenging the letter addressed to the Collector by the Sub Collector in R.O.C. No. A4/10717/91 dated 22.12.1992 .1 see no merit in the case and accordingly it is dismissed. No Costs.” 8. Mr. G. Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel, relied on the following two judgments: (1) Mohanlal v. Benoy Krishnan ( AIR 1953 SC. 65 ) and (2) ManonmaniamSundaranar Universityand others v. Kumaragurubara Swamigal Art College and Others (AIR 1997 Madras 386). and contended that no appeal had been filed against the order in the said writ petition and that the order had become final and would operate as res judicata. 9. It is therefore now necessary to refer to all the relevant facts as could be culled out from the pleadings and typed sets of papers. The Community certificate bearing date 11.7.1950 had been issued to one E. Veerasami, son of V. Essakky Muthu to the effect that Veerasami belonged to Kattu Naicken Community under scheduled tribes. This certificate had been issued by the Deputy Collector and City First Class Magistrate, Madurai. This Veerasami is claimed by the petitioner to be his paternal uncle. On 14.8.1961 the Indian Air Force had issued a certificate of discharge or transfer to the reserve to E. Vidyasagaran s/o V. Esakkimuthu. This certificate had been issued by the Deputy Collector and City First Class Magistrate, Madurai. This Veerasami is claimed by the petitioner to be his paternal uncle. On 14.8.1961 the Indian Air Force had issued a certificate of discharge or transfer to the reserve to E. Vidyasagaran s/o V. Esakkimuthu. In the Civil Service particulars, the caste of Vidyasagaran is shown as Kattu Naicken. It is stated that it had been issued to Master Warrant Officers Warrant Officers and Enrolled Persons in accordance with Section 23 Air Force Act 1950 and other then (Current) regulations. It is further stated that the certificate might be used by the persons to whom it was issued in support of the facts stated therein for any subsequent employment. This Vidyasagaran is the petitioners father. On 2.6.1984 a Transfer Certificate had been issued to the petitioner by the Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya, Madurai. In column 4 of the said certifi cate, it is stated that the pupil, viz. the petitioner belonged to Schedule Tribe (Kattu Naicken). On 21.6.1988 the Tahsildar, Karaikudi, had issued a community certificate to the petitioner showing him as belonging to Kattu Naicken Community. This is followed by a certificate dated 10.8.1998 issued by the Head Quarters Deputy Tahsildar, Karaikudi, and it is as follows: — “This is to certify that the community certificate issued to Thiru V. Ramesh s/o. E. Vidyasagaran o Karikudi Town in Pasumpon Thevar Thirmugan District. “Tamil Nadu State, in No. 198508 dated 21.6.1988 is the form of community certificate authorised by the Tamil Nadu State Government on permanent basis, as per G.O. No. 781, Revenue Department dated 2.5.1988 and that community Certificate are not issued in any other form in Tamil Nadu State.” 10. On 11.6.1989 the Tahsildar, Karaikudi, gives a certificate to the petitioner in the proforma of the Bank to the effect that the petitioner belonged to Kattu Naicken Community. On 11.11.1989 G.O.M.S. No. 2137 was issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu and it is to the following effect: “The Government directs that community certificate in respect of all communities included in the list of scheduled tribes for the purpose of appointments in Public services under Central and State Governments, Public Sector Undertakings, Quasi-government institutions, banks, etc. On 11.11.1989 G.O.M.S. No. 2137 was issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu and it is to the following effect: “The Government directs that community certificate in respect of all communities included in the list of scheduled tribes for the purpose of appointments in Public services under Central and State Governments, Public Sector Undertakings, Quasi-government institutions, banks, etc. shall hereinafter be issued only by the Revenue Divisional Officer.” A clarificatory letter was issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government to the District Collectors of the State stating as follows: “The permanent community certificate issued to Scheduled Tribes by Tahsildars upto 11.11.1989 is valid.” 11. On 1.12.1989 the petitioner was appointed as Officer in the Banks Junior Management Grade, Scale-I. The terms of appointment relevant for the purpose of our discussion are paragraphs 2, 9 and 10, Paragraph 2 runs as follows: “You will be on probation for 2 (two) years (which may be extended by the bank in its sole discretion) and you will be confirmed in the banks service thereafter, subject to the bank being fully satisfied with your service record and conduct and (i) Your obtaining a certificate of at satisfactory completion of training, from the Principal of our Staff College, where you will undertake such training: (ii) completion of your in-service training to the satisfaction of the officer to whom you will report during such training”. Paragraph 9 runs as follows: “During Probation, your employment is terminable at any time by a months notice or by payment of one months emoluments in lieu thereof on either side”. Paragraph 10 runs as follows: “If any information/particulars furnished by you to the Bank regarding your age, educational qualification, experience, etc. is found to be incorrect at any time, your services shall be liable to be terminated by the bank forthwith”. 12. Even at this stage, it has to be pointed out that Mr. G. Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank, very fairly conceded that the service record of the petitioner is good and his conduct had been excellent. It may be necessary to refer to this at some later point of time. 13. 12. Even at this stage, it has to be pointed out that Mr. G. Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank, very fairly conceded that the service record of the petitioner is good and his conduct had been excellent. It may be necessary to refer to this at some later point of time. 13. On 16.5.1990 an administrative circular in circular No. CHO/PMG/14/90 had been issued by the banks Head Office to all Branch Offices on the subject of issuance of castes/tribes certificate by the competent certificate issuing authorities in the revised format and in the enclosure to the said circular in the list of authorities empowerd to issue certificate of verification, serial No. 3 is given as Revenue Officer and below the rank of Tahsildar. Based on this circular the bank addressed a communication to the petitioner on 20.4.1991. The letter shows the petitioner as a Probationary Officer and it is to the following effect: “Dear Sir, Sub: Submission of Caste Certificate. You are hereby advised to submit the caste certificate as per H.O. circular No. CHO/PMG/14/90 dated 16.5.1990 as per Proforma enclosed on or before..1991, for our reference and records.” It has to be pointed out that this requirement was superfluous, particularly having regard to the fact that it is mentioned in the Proforma that the authority empowered to issue certificate of verification is the Tahsildar and the petitioner had already given a certificate in the earlier proforma showing his community as “Kattu Naicken Community”. 14. A Nativity Certificate had been issued to V. Valarmathi, the petitioners sister, on 14.8.1991 by the Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Karaikudi, to the effect that she was a native of Karaikudi Taluk, P.M. District, Tamil Nadu State. On 22.12.1992 the Sub Collector, Devakottai, had submitted a report to the District Collector, Sivaganga, in substance stating that the petitioner did not belong to Kattu Naicken Community. The material portion of the Sub Collectors report is as follows: “My confidential enquiry reveals that he may be a Naidu by caste. Hence in these circumstances, it is very difficult to issue community certificate to his children as Kattu Naicken only on the basis of discharge certificate issued by Indian Air Force.” This report of the Sub Collector was sought to be challenged in W.P. 6007/93, which has already been referred to. 15. Hence in these circumstances, it is very difficult to issue community certificate to his children as Kattu Naicken only on the basis of discharge certificate issued by Indian Air Force.” This report of the Sub Collector was sought to be challenged in W.P. 6007/93, which has already been referred to. 15. The petitioners father filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 9554/93 before this Court impleading the Sub Collector, Devakottai, and the Central Electrical Chemical Institution. Karaikudi to call for the records of the Sub Collector pertaining to his proceedings Letter No. ROC.A-4/39/93, dated 25.3.1993 and quash the same. The Central Electrical Chemical Institution had referred to the sub Collector, Devakottai, for verification of the petitioners fathers social status. The Sub Collector had sent a communication, which was the subject matter of the said writ petition and it was as follows: Sub: Caste Certificate - Thiru E. Vidyasagaran - Regarding. Ref: Your letter PF/SIR/1467. dt. 25.7.90. From recent inquires it has been revealed that Thiru E. Vidyasagaran, Senior Technical Assistant of your Office belongs to the Kavara Naidu Community and not Kattu Naicken Community as made out in his service records. I enclose a copy of the service register extract of his brother E. Navaneethakrishnan and connected records for your reference and necessary action”. E. Padmanabhan, J. by order dated 21.3.1997 quashed the said communication holding that the minimum requirement of the basic principles of natural justice had not been followed and the Sub Collector had merely stated that the petitioner did not belong td Kattu Naicken S.T. Community but belonged to Kavara Naidu Community. The learned Judge observed that either to issue a certificate or to cancel a certificate of social status, the competent authority had to afford an opportunity to the individual concerned and in as mach as it had not been done in that case, the communication impugned was liable to be quashed. 16. The final order passed in the writ petition in W.P. No. 6007/93 has already been referred to as also the order terminating the services of the writ petitioner. 17. Let us now examine the implications of the order in W.P. No. 6007/93. 16. The final order passed in the writ petition in W.P. No. 6007/93 has already been referred to as also the order terminating the services of the writ petitioner. 17. Let us now examine the implications of the order in W.P. No. 6007/93. The decisions relied on by the learned Senior counsel (1) Mohanlal v. Benoy Krishna ( AIR 1953 SC 65 ) and (2) Manonmaniam Sundaranar University and others v. Kumaragarubara Swamigal Arts College and others (AIR 1997 Madras 386) would apply if it is found that the order in W.P. No. 6007/93 is an order adverse to the petitioner. The prayer in the writ petition was to call for the records of the Sub Collector pertaining to his proceedings dated 22.12.1992, quash the same in so far as the petitioner was concerned and further direct to issue the community certificate in the prescribed proforma of the bank. The learned Judge did not call for the records because, according to the learned Judge, the report was a confidential communication from the Sub Collector, Devakottai, to the District Collector, PMT District, and the learned Judge was agitated as to how the confidential letter came into the picture and how the writ petitioner had obtained the said document and in that view, the learned Judge held that petitioner had no locus standi to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the letter addressed to the Collector by the Sub Collector. The fact remains that the petitioner had not himself received any communication or order from the Collector cancelling the certicate. It was the report of the Sub Collector to the Collector that was challenged, (sic).I am afraid that the decision in the said writ petition will not operate as res judicata and the authorities cited by the learned Senior counsel will not apply. 18. In Sakthi Devi v. Collector of Salem and others (1985 I MLJ 182 = 98 L.W. 105) a Division Bench of this Court set out the guidelines to all courts and authorities and it is worth while to reproduce those directions here: (1) A caste/community certificate issued by an empowered public authority under seal continues to be a valid document till it is cancelled by the said authority or by his superior authority. (2) Their contents are to be treated as correct and every public authority undertaking, bodies, institutions, etc. (2) Their contents are to be treated as correct and every public authority undertaking, bodies, institutions, etc. which are bound by instructions relating to such certificates, are bound to act upon them so long as they are not cancelled. (3) In no disciplinary proceedings, their genuineness or correctness of their contents can be gone into. It is open to the department or employer or organization, to ask the issuing authority or district collector, as the case may be to verify whether the certificate as issued could be still valid, on materials which have since come to their knowledge. They can appear in the verification enquiry and place the materials. (4) If the certificate is cancelled, then disciplinary proceedings can be initiated for having furnished false information. (5) Appointing authorities have the right to verify the genuineness of the certificates by approaching the District Magistrate-collector of the District or such other constituted authority, and once the report is received that the certificate is genuine, thereafter the certificate - holder cannot be further harassed to his caste-community in any other manner. (6) In causing verification, the Collector is bound to follow the procedure laid down in letter dated 7.7.1983 of Government of Tamil “Nadu. (7) In view of what is stated in chapter XIX of Brochure on Reservation for Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in services, 6th edition (1982). the Instructions issued by the Central Government from time to time relating to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, pertaining to issue of caste certificates are binding upon public and voluntary agencies receiving grands-in-aid from the Central Government, as provided therein”. 19. In Illamaran v. Government of India and others (1996 Writ L.R. 482) and R.K. Sekar v. The District Collector Chengai-MGR. District, Kancheepuram and others (1996 Writ L.R. 484) a Division Bench of this court has held that it is only the collector, who is the competent authority to cancel community certificate issued to individuals. Before embarking upon such cancellation the Collector is to furnish the reports of enquiry conducted by his subordinate officers to the individuals and there should be a further opportunity given to the individuals before passing orders cancelling the certificate. A Caste/Community Certificate issued by an empowered Public authority under seal continues to be a valid document till it is cancelled by the said authority or by his superior authority. 20. A Caste/Community Certificate issued by an empowered Public authority under seal continues to be a valid document till it is cancelled by the said authority or by his superior authority. 20. In Valsamma Paul v. CochinUniversityand others ( 1996 3 SCC 545 ) it has been held by the Supreme Court that, “a wife of marriage, becomes an integral part of her husbands marital home entitled to equal status of husband as a member of the family, that she becomes a member of the caste to which she moves and the caste rigidity breaks down”. More so in the case of offspring, when the father belongs to a particular caste, his issue also belongs to the same caste. I have already referred to the decision of in W.P. No. 9554/93 E. Padmanabhan, J. relating to the petitioners father. The community certificate issued to the petitioners father was sought to be cancelled by the Sub Collector and the order of cancellation was quashed. 21. N.V. Subramanian v. The Additional Collector, Salem District, and another (1997 Writ L.R. 508) is another case on paint. The petitioners father in the case belonged to Kurumban (S.T.) and the mother to Sreekaruneegar, not S.T. show cause notice was issued by the Additional Collector. A detailed explanation was sent. Not with standing the explanation, the certificate was cancelled. It was held by E. Padmanabhan J. that the Additional Collector who only a District Revenue Officer. He could not exercise the powers of the District Collector and the cancellation also had been ordered without furnishing the copy of the report to the individual concerned. The order of cancellation was quashed and it was held that the petitioner in that case belonged to his fathers community. The decision in Valasamma Pauls case was referred to and followed by the learned Judge. 22. In the instant case, certain indisputable facts have been noticed They are: The petitioner produced a certificate issued by the then competent authority viz., the Tahsildar of the concerned thaluk at the time he joined the bank services. This was followed by a certificate in the proforma issued by the bank. The bank circulated a new proforma in the year 1990/1991 and the new proforma also showed only the Tahsildar as one of the authorities empowered to issue community certificates. What was required by the bank was wholly superfluous. This was followed by a certificate in the proforma issued by the bank. The bank circulated a new proforma in the year 1990/1991 and the new proforma also showed only the Tahsildar as one of the authorities empowered to issue community certificates. What was required by the bank was wholly superfluous. The least they could have done was to attach the certificates already furnished by the petitioner and keep them in their records as stated in their letter dated 20.4.1991. 23. In R. Kandasamy v. The Chief Engineer, Madras Port Trust (1997 Writ L.R. 806 = 1997 (8) Supreme 127 ) dealing with the validity of the community certificate issued by Tahsildars prior to G.O.Ms. No. 2137 dated 11.11.1989 the Supreme court observed as follows: — “In our opinion the community certificate issued to a scheduled tribe candidate by the Tahsildar prior to 11.11.1989 is a good and valid community certificate for all purposes so long as such a certificate is not cancelled the authorities cannot decline to take that into consideration and insist upon a fresh community certificate on the Revenue Divisional Officer.” 24. Though Mr. G. Subramanian, learned senior counsel, submitted that the question regarding the community certificate is not before court, we cannot close our eyes to the apparent injustice meted out to the petitioner in the case. 25. It has been held in several Supreme Courts decitions starting from (1) Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairana ( AIR 1950 SC 163 ) = 1950 SCR 566 ) (2) Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1975 SC 2226 = 1975 11 SCC 649 and a host of other cases that. “the power under Article 226 of the Constitution exists to the issuance of direction, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari or any of them. The use of the expression ‘nature’ indicates that the scope of the prerogative writs is wider in India. The High Courts are also enabled to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. The High Court cannot function arbitrarily, but must exercise the jurisdiction in accordance with judicial consideration and well-established principles for doing justice and correcting injustice.” 26. I am on the larger question of justice. This Court is not precluded from going into whether the petitioner belongs to Kattu Naicken Community. The High Court cannot function arbitrarily, but must exercise the jurisdiction in accordance with judicial consideration and well-established principles for doing justice and correcting injustice.” 26. I am on the larger question of justice. This Court is not precluded from going into whether the petitioner belongs to Kattu Naicken Community. I have already referred to the materials on record which clearly point to the fact that the petitioner belongs to Kattu Naicken Community. In any event, till date the certificate issued to the petitioner has not been cancelled in a manner known to law and in the manner enjoined by the several decisions already referred to. For all practical purposes, it is clearly established, that the petitioner belongs to Kattu Naicken Community. The thing standing in the way is the order in W.R No. 6007/93 and which has formed the basis for issuing the order of termination. It has already been held that the decision in W.R No. 6007/93 does not debar the petitioner from projecting his rights in the present writ petition. 27. The next question would be in respect of the probation of the writ petitioner. It is contended by the learned senior counsel Mr. G. Subramanian that the petitioner had not been confirmed in the bank services and as per the terms of appointment, he continued to be on probation and the bank is well within its rights to terminate his services. 28. Let us have a look at the relevant terms of appointment relating to this question. Great stress is said on the contents of paragraph 10 of the appointment order, which though already extracted is worthwhile to extract once again. “If any information/particulars furnished by you to the Bank regarding your age, educational qualification, experience, etc. is found to be incorrect at any time, your services shall be liable to be terminated by the bank forthwith”. The order of termination as already stated is based on the judgment of this Court in W.R No. 6007/93. It is also stated in the termination order that the investigation into the caste certificate produced by the petitioner at the time of his joining the bank service proved that the certificate was false. The alleged investigation can refer to only the report from the Sub Collector to the Collector, which was the subject matter of the writ petition W.R No. 6007/93. The alleged investigation can refer to only the report from the Sub Collector to the Collector, which was the subject matter of the writ petition W.R No. 6007/93. The certificate issued to the writ petitioner is yet to be cancelled. It has not yet been proved to be false. The only document dubbing the certificate as false is the report of the Sub Collector. No final order cancelling the certificate has yet been passed. In the circumstances, the Bank erroneously assumed that the investigation had proved that the certificate was false. After saying this, the bank invokes clause 10 of the appointment order. A stress in also placed on the word ‘etc.’ Conceding that it would include the furnishing of false community certificate, still as already stated, community certificate has not yet been proved to be false. I have very serious doubts whether it is open to the bank to embark on any further enquiry with regard to the community of the writ petitioner, particularly when the report of the sub collector stating that the petitioners father did not belong to Kattu Naicken Community and that he was a Kavara Naidu, had been quashed by this court in the writ petition-filed by the petitioners father in W.R No. 9554/93. When the father belongs to a particular community. There can be no second opinion that the son also belongs to the same community. We have already noticed that the bank was indulging in an unnecessary exercise in requiring the petitioner to furnish community certificate in a new format. In these circumstances, I am of the view that it is not open to the bank to invoke clause 10 of the appointment order. The other relevant clauses are clause 2 and clause 9, So far as clause 2 is concerned, it stated that the petitioner/appointee would be on probation for two years, which might be extended by the bank in its own discretion and he would be confirmed in the bank services there after subject to the bank being fully satisfied with his service record and conduct and his obtaining from the Principal of the banks Staff College, where he undertook such training to the satisfaction of the officer to whom he would report during such training. The service record and conduct have been found to be fully satisfactory and this has been conceded by the learned senior counsel in the course of his arguments. The point therefore, to be decided is whether the petitioner continued to be on probation and therefore the bank would be well within its rights in invoking clause 9 of the appointment order and terminating his services by a months notice of by payment of a months emoluments in lieu there of. 29.Mr. T.K. Kulasekaran, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1210 = 1968 3 SCR 1 ) and submitted that after the probation period fixed under the appointment order, it must be deemed that the petitioner had been confirmed in the job. According to the learned counsel, the bank did not pass any order extending the probation period and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court it should be taken the petitioner had been confirmed. 30. Per contra, Mr. G. Subramanian, learned senior counsel for the bank, relied on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and submitted that there was no express order by the bank confirming the services of the writ petitioner and therefore it must be deemed that the probationary period continued and the bank was perfectly justified in invoking clause 9 of the appointment order. The several decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel are as follows: (1) Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another ( 1974 2 SCC 831 = 1974 SCC L & S 550) = AIR SC 2192). (2) Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (IT 1991 2 SC 599 = 1991 3 SCC 325 ). (3) Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. & Another ( AIR 1997 SC 3269 = 1997 7 SCC 443 =JT 1997 (7) SC 520 = 1997 SCC (L & S) 1797). (4) Tarasem Lal Verma v. Union of India and Others ( 1997 9 SCC 243 ). (5) A. Jayaraman v. Registrar, H.C. Madras (1997 Writ L.R. 252). (6) Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad v. Presiding Officer and another (JT 1998 (2) SC 256). (4) Tarasem Lal Verma v. Union of India and Others ( 1997 9 SCC 243 ). (5) A. Jayaraman v. Registrar, H.C. Madras (1997 Writ L.R. 252). (6) Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad v. Presiding Officer and another (JT 1998 (2) SC 256). (7) Wasim Beg v. State of U.P. and Others ( 1998 3 SCC 321 ) and (8) Birla VSL Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Others ( 1998 5 SCC 632 ). 31. The Supreme Court has classified the question whether completion of probation period culminates in automatic confirmation under different heads depending as it does upon the provisions in the relevant rules. The first head is: “Where the rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, then “at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless the rules provide to the contrary”. The Supreme Court cases falling under this category are: (1) The State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 = 1968 3 SCR 1 ). (2) M.K. Agarwal v. Gurugaon Garam in Bank and Others (1987 (Supp.) SCC 643 - 1988 SCC (L & S) 347). (3) Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow and Others (1986 (Supp.) SCC 95 = 1986 SCC (L & S) 421 - 1986 1 ATC 95) and (4) State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav and others ( 1987 4 SCC 482 - 1987 SCC (L & S) 460 = 1987 5 ATC 167). 32. The second head of classification is where even when the rules prescribed a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the rules for continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period. The courts have made an exception and laid down that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. The Supreme Court cases under this head are: (1) Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 = 1974 2 SCC 831 = 1974 SCC (L & S) 550). The Supreme Court cases under this head are: (1) Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 = 1974 2 SCC 831 = 1974 SCC (L & S) 550). (2) Muncipal Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Misra ( 1991 3 SCC 325 = 1991 SCC (L & S) 1046 = 1991 =16 ATC 927) and (3) Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P. and another (1996 I SCC 560 = 1991 SCC (L & S) 338). In Samsher Singhs case the principle that probation was not to go beyond the period was reiterated, but on the rules in that case it was held that probation was deemed to have been extended. In Municipal Corporation case the same principle was followed. In Satya Narayana Athyas case where it was provided that the probationary period was not to exceed three years, it was held that an order of confirmation was necessary. 33. The third type relates to cases where rules did not prescribe a maximum period of probation and either there was a rule providing for extension of probation or there was a rule requiring a specific act on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) it would result in confirmation of employee. In these cases unless there was such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. The cases under this classification are: (1) Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1962 SC 1711 = 1963 I SCR 416 = 1963 I LLJ 671). (2) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan ( AIR 1996 SC 1842 = 1966 3 SCR 821 = 1967 I LLJ 708). (3) Kodar Nath Bahi v. State of Punjab and others ( 1974 3 SCC 21 ). (4) Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat ( 1985 2 SCC 5 ) = 1985 SCC (L & S) 379. (5) Rarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India and others ( 1997 9 SCC 243 = 1997 SCC (L & S) 1149). (6) Municipal Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Misra ( 1991 3 SCC 325 ) (which also came under the second classification and (7) State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla ( 1996 9 SCC 190 = 1996 SCC L & S 1210. 34. (6) Municipal Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Misra ( 1991 3 SCC 325 ) (which also came under the second classification and (7) State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla ( 1996 9 SCC 190 = 1996 SCC L & S 1210. 34. Even at this stage it has to be stated that the Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 = 1974 2 SCC 831 = 1974 SCC (L & S) 550 seven Judges Constitution Bench has held that, “Whether a probationer is deemed to be confirmed on completion of the maximum period of probation is an inference to be drawn from the facts of each case and any confirmation by implication is negatived when the show cause notice is given during or at the end of the probation period”. 35. Bearing the above principles in mind let us have a look at the case on hand. Clause 2 of the appointment order, which is worth reproducing once again, is as follows: “Appointment order dated 1.12.1989: You will be on probation for two years (which may be extended by the Bank in its sole discretion) and you will be confirmed in the banks service there after, subject to the bank being fully satisfied with your service record and conduct, and, (i) Your obtaining a certificate of satisfactory completion of training, from the Principal of our staff College, where you will undertake such training: (ii) Completion of your in-service training to the satisfaction of the officer to whom you will report during such training”. Clause 2 on the one hand and clause 10 on the other are mutually exclusive clause 10 runs as follows: “If any information, particulars furnished by you to the Bank regarding your age, educational qualification, experience, etc. is found to be incorrect at any time, your services shall be liable to terminated by the Bank forthwith.” The service record and the conduct of the petitioner have been conceded to be impeccable. It is also not stated by the Bank that sub clause (1) and (ii) of clause (2) are not satisfied. When once the conditions laid down in clause (2) are satisfied the Bank has no option whatsoever but to confirm the appointment, though it is stated that the bank in its own discretion may extend the period of probation. It is also not stated by the Bank that sub clause (1) and (ii) of clause (2) are not satisfied. When once the conditions laid down in clause (2) are satisfied the Bank has no option whatsoever but to confirm the appointment, though it is stated that the bank in its own discretion may extend the period of probation. Clause (2) does not say about production of community certificate in the format as a condition for confirmation. So far as clause (10) is concerned, it has to be stated that it is not restricted to the probation period alone, but it applies even after confirmation. Clause 9, which runs as follows: “During probation your employment is terminable at any time by a months notice or by payment of one months emoluments in lieu there of on either side”. can be invoked only during probation and in the instant case, the petitioner having satisfied the requirements set out in clause, 2 it is not possible to hold that his probation continued indefinitely. 36. It has been held in R.L. Gupta and another v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1988 SC 968 = JT 1988 1 SC 556 = 1988 2 SLJ 164) that to keep a person on probation indefinitely is a mere farce. 37. In the instant case, the appointment order does not say that a confirmation order will be passed. It merely says that the appointee will be confirmed in the Banks services after the period of probation including the extended period of probation if the bank is satisfied with the service record and conduct and subject to conditions (i) and (ii) of clause (2) being fulfilled. This is no doubt, a case where no maximum period of extension of probation is fixed. It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was never informed after the initial period that his probation was being extended for any further period. He was also never informed that since he had not produced the community certificate, his probation was being extended. We should not also forget that the bank asked the petitioner for the community certificate in the new format for reference and records and not for bringing the probation period to an end. He was also never informed that since he had not produced the community certificate, his probation was being extended. We should not also forget that the bank asked the petitioner for the community certificate in the new format for reference and records and not for bringing the probation period to an end. There is no clause in the present appointment order as was there in Samsher Singhs case already referred to that the period of probation shall be deemed to be extended if the concerned officer is not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. 38. It would be useful in this context of extract a few paragraphs from Samsher Singhs case ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 = 1974 2 SCC 831 = 1974 SCC (L & G) 550). “Paragraphs 60 to 72: 68. The appellant I was chard Agarwal contended that he completed his initial period of two years probation on November 11, 1967 and the maximum period of three years probation of November 11, 1968 and by reason of the fact that he continued in service after the expiry of the maximum period of probation he become confirmed and there was a permanent vacancy it the cadre of the service of September 17, 1969 and the same should have been allotted to him. 69. Rule 7(1) states that every subordinate Judge, in the first instance, be appointed on probation for two years but this period may be extended from time to time expressly or implied by so that the total period of probation including extension, if any, does not exceed three years. The explanation to Rule 7(1) is that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended if a subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. 70. Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of this court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh ( 1968 3 SCR 1 = AIR 1968 SC 1210 = 1969 I SC J 243) where this court drew an inference that an employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation is confirmed in the post by implication. In Dharam Singhs case (supra) the relevant rule stated that the probation in the first instance is for one year with the proviso that the total period of probation including extension shall not exceed three years. In Dharam Singhs case (supra) the relevant rule stated that the probation in the first instance is for one year with the proviso that the total period of probation including extension shall not exceed three years. In Dharam Singhs case he was allowed to continue without an order of confirmation and therefore the only possible view in the absence of anything to the contrary in the Services Rules was that by necessary implication he must be regarded as having been confirmed. 71. Any confirmation by implication is negatived in the present case because before the completion of three years the High Court found prima facie that the work as well as the conduct of the appellant was unsatisfactory and a notice was given to the appellant on October 4, 1968 to show cause as to why his service should not be terminated. Further more, Rule 9 shows that the employment of a probationer can be proposed to be terminated whether during or at the end of the period of probation. This indicates that where the notice is given at the end of the probation the period of probation gets extended till the inquiry proceedings commenced by the notice under Rule 9 come to an end. In this background the explanation to Rule 7(1) shows that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended impliedly if a subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of this period of probation. This implied extension where a subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of the period of probation is not found in Dharam Singhs case (supra). This explanation in the present case does not mean that the implied extention of the probationary period is only between two and three years. The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singhs case and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. 72. In this context reference any be made to the proviso to Rule 7(3). The proviso to the rule states that the completion of the maximum period of three years probation would not confer on him the right to be confirmed till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. Rule 7(3) states that an express order of confirmation is necessary. In this context reference any be made to the proviso to Rule 7(3). The proviso to the rule states that the completion of the maximum period of three years probation would not confer on him the right to be confirmed till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. Rule 7(3) states that an express order of confirmation is necessary. The proviso to Rule 7(3) is in the negative form that the completion of the maximum period of three years would not confer a right of confirmation till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. The period of probation is therefore extended by implication till the proceedings commenced against a probationer like the appellant are concluded to enable the Government to decide whether a probationer should be confirmed or his services should be terminated. No confirmation by implication can arise in the present case in the facts and circumstances as also by the meaning and operation of Rules 7(1) and 7(3) as aforesaid.” 39. In Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra ( 1991 3 SCC 325 ) already referred to, there was a special note attached to the relevant Rule saying that, “a probationer whose period of probation is not extended under this sub-rule, but who has neither been confirmed not discharged from service at the end of the period of probation shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side.” It was held by the Supreme Court that, “under the note to sub rule (2) if the probationer is neither confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation, he shall be deemed to have been continued in service as probationer subject to the condition of his service being terminated on the expirty of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side.” The Supreme Court explained the sequence of the said note in the following terms: “As per sub rule (6) on passing the prescribed departmental examination and on successful competion of the period of probation, the probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed. Then he becomes an approved probationer. Then he becomes an approved probationer. Therefore, after the expiry of the period of probation and before its confirmation of probation would be subject to satisfactory completion of the probation and to pass in the prescribed examinations. Expiry to the period of probation, therefore, does not entitle him with a right to a deemed confirmation, the rule contemplates to pass an express order of confirmation in that regard. By issue of notice of one calendar month in writing by either side, the tenure could be put to an end, which was done in this case.” The decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. 40. In Rarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India and others already referred to, the work and the conduct of the appointee were found to be not satisfactory and consequently probation was extended by a further period of more than one year and it was held that there was no automatic confirmation. 41. In Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad v. Presiding Officer and another (JT 1998 (2) SC 256) services were terminated at the end of the probation with remarks “not found fit to confirm”. There was evidence of unsatisfactory work adduced. The case will not apply to the facts of the present case. 42. In A. Jayaraman v. The Registrar, High Court, Madras, etc. (1997 Writ L.R. 252 P. Sathasivam, J.) had occasion to consider the termination of the services of a night watchman who completed the prescribed probation period of one year, after issue of show cause notice. In that case the learned Judge held that, “the petitioner was continued under probation, even though there was no specific order extending the period of probation.” It was held that the concerned authority was well within his power by discharging the petitioner under Rule 27 (c) of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules, General Rules and Special Rules and Madras Last Grade Service Rules. It was further held in that case by the learned Judge, that, “Whenever the services of an employee was terminated or discharged during the period of probation or while his appointment was on a temporary basis by an order of termination after some preliminary enquiry, it could not be held that some enquiry, had been made against him before the issuance of order of termination and it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge and as such termination was penal in nature.” This case also has no application to the facts of the present case. 43. In Birla VXL Ltd. v. State of Punjab and others ( 1998 5 SCC 632 ) the appointment order stated as follows: “This is purely a temporary appointment for a period of two years upto 31.12.1984. During or at the expiry of this period if your work or conduct is not found satisfactory or your services are no longer required by the Company you would be terminated as per clause 8 above.” On 14.12.1984 the appellant Management wrote to the appointee warning of action for misconduct because he had been assembling and addressing workers inside the factory, premises for trade union or political purposes. The appointee gave a reply thereto on 21.12.1984 denying the allegation. On 28.12.1984, the appellant Management terminated the appointees services’ by writing a letter to him as follows: “The above temporary appointment ends on 31.12.1984 by efflux of time automatically and, therefore, you cease to be in service of factory thereafter. Although you ceasing to be in service does not constitute any action on your part, yet as abundant caution, the following dues are remitted to you. in full and final settlement of your account.” The Supreme Court referred to the clear terms of the appointment order, which had been accepted by the employee and held that the employer was entitled to bring the employment to an end at the conclusion of the period of temporary appointment. The letter terminating the services did not say that it was on account of any misconduct. Apparently, the Supreme Court wanted to say that the probation had not come to an end and the Management was entitled to terminate the services without any reason. In the instant case, as already noticed, the Bank had given the petitioner an excellent certificate for his work, behaviour, service record and conduct. Apparently, the Supreme Court wanted to say that the probation had not come to an end and the Management was entitled to terminate the services without any reason. In the instant case, as already noticed, the Bank had given the petitioner an excellent certificate for his work, behaviour, service record and conduct. In my view, on the facts of this case on the completion of the two year period, confirmation should follow as a matter of course or it must be deemed that the services of the petitioner had been confirmed. It did not depend on the production of the community certificate in the revised format for confirmation of the petitioners appointment. 44. Chief General Manager, State Bank of India and Another v. Bijoy Kumar Mishra ( 1997 7 SCC 550 ) relied on by the learned Senior Councel Mr. G. Subramanian will not also apply to the facts of the present case. In that case, the Probationary Officer remained absent from duty for a long time during the period of probation as well as thereafter. It was held that there was not occasion for the employer Bank to allow him to continue to work after completion of his probation period and in the absence of any express order of his confirmation, it could not be deemed that he had been confirmed and that his termination by one months notice or one months pay in lieu of notice under paragraph 16 (3) of the State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979 was held to be valid by the Supreme Court. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment it is observed as follows: “Deemed confirmation results from the conduct of the employer in permitting continuance in service after the expiry of the maximum period of probation fixed by the rules. When there is no such conduct of the employer, the very foundation for the argument of deemed confirmation and reliance on Dharam Singhs case ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 = 1968 3 SCR 1 ) is not existent.” In view of the above discussion the order of termination cannot therefore stand. It has therefore to be quashed and it is accordingly quashed. 45. What remains to be considered is the Contempt Application. It has therefore to be quashed and it is accordingly quashed. 45. What remains to be considered is the Contempt Application. The decision on the Contempt Application will depend on as to when the termination order must be deemed to have been communicated to the writ petitioner. 46. According to the applicant the order of termination had not been communicated to him till after he filed the writ petition and obtained interim orders. His contention is that inasmuch as he had not been relieved, that after the expiry of the leave he had applied for, he reported for duty on 6.7.1998 at the Erode Branch where he was working, that the second respondent contemner No. 2, refused to allow him to work, that thereafter, he went over to Chennai on 8.7.1998 and the first respondent, Contemner No. 1 after making wait for two days, told him that he had been relieved even on 17.6.1998. 47. The Contempt Application is resisted among other grounds that the applicant knew about the order of termination even on 21.6.1998, that he applied for leave that leave was not granted and that in any event, the applicant had been relieved on 23.6.1998 before the Court passed an order to the effect that there would be interim stay if the petitioner had not already been relieved. 48. Mr. Kulasekaran, learned counsel for the applicant, relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dinanath Shantiram Karekar and others ( 1998 6 Supreme 534 = JT 1998 6 SCI) and submitted that there was no actual service of the termination order on the applicant before the conditional order of stay was granted by this Court. 49. Countering the arguments of the learned Counsel for the applicant, Mr. G. Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel for the contemners, submitted that there is a distinction between a communication of an order of suspension and communication of an order of termination and in support, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Balbir Singh etc. ( AIR 1977 SC 629 ). 50. Before adverting to the decision, I have to refer to certain other aspects. According to the Bank, termination orders were issued on 17.6.1998. The applicant knew about it on 20.6.1998, though it was not served on him. ( AIR 1977 SC 629 ). 50. Before adverting to the decision, I have to refer to certain other aspects. According to the Bank, termination orders were issued on 17.6.1998. The applicant knew about it on 20.6.1998, though it was not served on him. He applied for leave on 21.6.1998, but the Senior Manager, who should have known about the termination of the services of the applicant does not refer to the same, but merely makes an endorsement in the leave application saying that since medical certificate had not been furnished, leave was being refused. It is not the case of the bank that the order of termination was intercepted at any place and at any time by anybody. It should also be pointed out that the counter in the Contempt Application proceeds as if the applicant had worked on 21.6.1998, a Sunday, and slipped out on coming to know about the termination order. The applicant himself overlooks that 21.6.1998 was a Sunday. He says in paragraph 5 of his Contempt Application that he was on leave from 21.6.1998 till 4.7.1998 and that the order of termination had not at all been served on him. 51. Let us now examine the postition as regards the service of the termination order. Shantaram Karekar & Others ( 1998 6 Supreme 534 = JT 1998 6 SC 1) relied on by the learned Counsel for the applicant, in paragraph 10 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Where the disciplinary proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a chargesheet, its actual service is essential as the person to whom the chargesheet is issued is required to submit his reply and, thereafter, to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. So also, when the show-cause notice is issued, the employee is called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be taken against him. Since in both the situations, the employee is given an opportunity to submit his reply, the theory of “Communication” cannot be invoked and “Actual Service” must be proved and established. It has already been found mat neither the chargesheet nor the show cause notice were ever served upon the original respondent, Dinanth Shantaram Karekar. Consequently, the entire proceedings were vitiated.” 51.A. The Supreme Court referred to a number of decisions touching the question and had noticed the essential differences between order of termination and initiation of disciplinary proceedings. It has already been found mat neither the chargesheet nor the show cause notice were ever served upon the original respondent, Dinanth Shantaram Karekar. Consequently, the entire proceedings were vitiated.” 51.A. The Supreme Court referred to a number of decisions touching the question and had noticed the essential differences between order of termination and initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In my view, the decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the applicant does not help the applicant. 52. In State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram ( AIR 1970 SC 214 ) the question relating to communication of order of suspension while the Government Servant was on leave preparatory to retirement came up for consideration. The Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier decisions in Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1964 SC 72 = 1964 4 SCR 733 ) and State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika ( AIR 1966 SC 1313 ), dealt with the matter in paragraph 16 as follows: “The question then is whether communicating the order means its actual receipt by the concerned Government servant. The order of suspension in question was published in the Gazette though that was after the date when the respondent was to retire. But the point is whether it was communicated to him before that date. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘Communicate’ is to impart, confer or transmit information, (cf. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, P. 352). As already stated telegrams dated July 31, and August 2, 1958, were despatched to the respondent at the address given by him where communications by Government should be despatched. Both the telegrams transmitted or imparted information to the respondent that he was suspended from service with effect from August 2, 1958. it may be that he actually received them in or about the middle of August, 1958 after the date of his retirement. But how can it be said that the information about his having been suspended was not imparted or transmitted to him on July 31, and August 2, 1958. i.e. before August 4, 1958 when he would have retired? it may be that he actually received them in or about the middle of August, 1958 after the date of his retirement. But how can it be said that the information about his having been suspended was not imparted or transmitted to him on July 31, and August 2, 1958. i.e. before August 4, 1958 when he would have retired? It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no mater when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a Government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. An officer against whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away from the address given by him for service of such orders or may deliberately give a wrong address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service on him. Such a meaning of the word ‘communication’ ought not to be given unless the provision in question expressly so provides. Actually knowledge by him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in AIR 1966 SC 1313 (supra) contemplates. Such a meaning of the word ‘communication’ ought not to be given unless the provision in question expressly so provides. Actually knowledge by him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in AIR 1966 SC 1313 (supra) contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and against whom an order of suspension is passed because in his case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any order and such act or order being challenged as invalid.” 53. In State of Punjab and others v. Balbir Singh etc. ( AIR 1977 SC 629 ) the matter arose this way: There were reversion orders passed by the Government against Government Servants. It was contended by the concerned Government Servants that the communication had not been actually received by them. The Supreme Court followed the ratio of the decision in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram ( AIR 1970 SC 214 ) and held that the orders of reversion became effective as soon as they were sent out. It is worthwhile to reproduce paragraph 16 of the judgment: “In the case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika , ( AIR 1966 SC 1313 ) the order of dismissal passed on 3rd June, 1949 was actually communicated to the officer concerned on 2/3rd January, 1953. But before the said date the said officer had come to know on 28th May, 1951 about the dismissal order. This date was taken to be the date of communication. Shelat, J. has considered the earlier cases of this Court including the one in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab ( 1964 4 SCR 733 = AIR 1964 SC 72 ). In paragraph 16 of the judgment the law laid down is: “It will be seen that is all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held, to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and moidify it is it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing it mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it.” Applying the principles of law aforesaid we find in this case that the orders went out of the control of the authority which had passed that order on 29.10.1966 when copies of the orders were forwarded to the Accountant General and the Chief Engineer. In any event, we think that the orders were despatched from the office of the Chief Engineer on 30.10.1966. It is one thing to say that in the case of dismissal or the like the order becomes effective only after it is received by the officer concerned and a different thing to say that an order has no effect at all before it is communicated in the sense of receipt of the order by the concerned officer. In the sense we have said above the orders were communicated to all the respondents before 1.11.1966. They become effective as soon as they were sent out. And for the purposes of Section 83 of the Act the respondents must be deemed to be holding the posts to which they were reverted on 1.11.1966.” 54. So far as the present case is concerned, as per the counter in the contempt application, the petitioner was relieved on 23.6.1998 itself, being the date of despatch of the termination order to the applicant. The Court order of stay dated 26.6.1998 was only conditional and the petitioner himself had produced the order of termination in the writ petition as the impugned order though he had applied for dispensing with the original order on the ground that the same had not been served on him. I therefore hold that the effective date of communication is to be taken as 23.6.1998, if not 17.6.1998. The order by this Court was only after 23.6.1998. Therefore, applying the ratio of the decisions in Khemi Rams case and Balbir Singhs case the applicant had been communicated even on 23.6.1998. I therefore hold that the effective date of communication is to be taken as 23.6.1998, if not 17.6.1998. The order by this Court was only after 23.6.1998. Therefore, applying the ratio of the decisions in Khemi Rams case and Balbir Singhs case the applicant had been communicated even on 23.6.1998. When once it is held that he had been duly communicated, there is no question of its being held that he had not been relieved or that he had not been actually served with the order of termination of his services. 55. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the respondents have not committed any contempt and the Contempt Application will stand dismissed. Consequently, Sub Application No. 165/98 is also dismissed. 56. One other point raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. G. Subramanian is that the order of this Court had been bonafide interpreted and understood by the Bank in a particular manner and there had therefore been no wilful disobedience of this Court. In support of his contention the learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari ( AIR 1961 SC 221 ). The Supreme Court observed as follows: “A party proceeded against under O. 39 R. 2(3) Civil P.C. for disobedience of an order of injunction cannot be held to have wilfully disobeyed the order provided two conditions are satisfied, viz. (1) that the order was ambiguous and was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, (2) that the party being proceeded against in fact did not intend to disobey the order, but conducted himself in accordance with his interpretation of the order. The question whether a party has understood an order in a particular manner and has conducted himself in accordance with such a construction is primarily one of fact, and where the materials before the Court do not support such a State of affairs, the Court cannot attribute an innocent intention based on presumptions for the only reason, that ingenuity of Counsel can discover equivocation in the order which is the subject of enforcement.” Though it is only academic it is to be noted that the respondents had taken legal advice and did not allow the writ petitioner to join duty as he stood relieved already. 57. 57. However, in view of the decision in the writ petition, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and all attendant benefits. There will be no order as to costs. Time to reinstate two weeks. Time to settle monetary benefits six weeks. 58. Mr. G. Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel, in the course of his arguments fairly submitted that the Bank had no axe to grind in the matter and that it would abide by the orders of this Court. It is hoped that the spirit with which the submission by the learned Senior Counsel was made, is maintained by the Bank Authorities in the implementation of the order of this Court. 59. In view of the order passed in the main Writ Petition, no further orders are necessary in W.M.P. Nos. 13197 and 13198 of 1998. Contemners are discharged.