D. P. KUNDU, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ application the writ petitioner, (hereinafter referred to as the company) has challenged an order passed by the First Labour Court, West Bengal on December 19, 1996 in case No. COMP. 39/92 and COMP. 115/92, ( 2 ) THE respondent No. 3 (hereinafter referred to as the workman) preferred application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) against his employer, the company for computation of monetary benefits. It further appears that consequent upon the applications made by the workman under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act two cases being COMP. 39/92 and COMP. 115/92 were initiated. ( 3 ) IT appears that in Case No. COMP. 39/92 workman in his application before the First Labour Court, West Bengal stated that he was entitled to receive money benefit as detailed in the enclosed annexure. The annexure enclosed with the said application is quoted hereinbelow: annexure 'a' (Transferred to Behala Works of the Company on 4. 4. 1992) (By letter No. PER/tfr/4106/91 dt. 3. 4. 1991) Overtime Duty June, 1991 3. 6. 1991 2 hours 6. 6. 1991 1 hr. 30 mts. 24. 6. 1991 1 hr. 15 mts. 30. 6. 1991 0 hr. 45mts. 5 hrs. 30 mts. Sept. 1991 29. 9. 1991 0 hr. 45 mts 0-45 mts Nov. 1991 4. 11. 1991 0-45 mts 22. 11. 1991 1-30 mts. 2 hrs 15 mts. Dec. 1991 12. 12. 1991 2 hours 2 hours January, 1992 16. 1. 1992 0-20 mts. 0-20 mts. February, 1992 3. 2. 1992 0-20 mts. 13. 2. 1992 0-10 mts. 14. 2. 1992 0-20 mts 28. 2. 1992 1-00 hr Page 2 of 9 1 hr. 50 mts May, 1992 8. 5. 1992 1 hr. 30 mts Total 27 Hours 20 minutes O. T. due for 27 hours 20 mts. Rate of wages per hour @ 11. 55 Total Due. . . . Rs . 315. 20 (Rupees three hundred fifteen and paise twenty only) Company in its written statement before the First Labour Court in connection with Case No. COMP. 39/92 in paragraphs 8,9,14 and 16 stated as follows:"8. That the application is completely vague in as much as it has not been disclosed in theapplication that on which date after his scheduled duty hours how many hours he has worked and by whose order. 39/92 in paragraphs 8,9,14 and 16 stated as follows:"8. That the application is completely vague in as much as it has not been disclosed in theapplication that on which date after his scheduled duty hours how many hours he has worked and by whose order. Unless those details are there the application suffers from the mischief of vagueness and the learned Court should refuse to compute on such vague application. 9. That the present application has been filed on an abstract claim which cannot be decided on an application under Section 33- C (2 ). 14. That on receiving the application the, opposite party has checked its record and it is found that no overtime work has been done by the Applicant on those days mentioned in the application and no order of doing overtime work was given to him. 16. That during the alleged dates as claimed in Annexure 'a' the applicant has not been ordered to do any overtime and actually he has not done any work beyond the scheduled hours. " ( 4 ) IT further appears that the workman in Case No. COMP. 115/92 filed an application and stated that he was entitled to receive money benefit as detailed in the enclosed annexure. The said enclosed annexure is quoted hereinbelow. Annexure A Details of Claim Overtime Duties 2 hours per day (working day) during the period from May 14, 1992 to December 14, 1992 May, 1992 32 hours June, 1992 48 hours July, 1992 54 hours August, 1992 52 hours September, 1992 44 hours October, 1992 38 hours 52 hours December, 1992 (14. 12. 1992) 24 hours Total November, 1992 346 hours Rate of wages per hour (approximately) - Rs. 12. 26 Paise. Total overtime due - Rs. 12. 26 x 346 Rs. 4,581. 56 p. (Rupees Four Thousand Five Hundred Eighty One and Paise Fifty-Six only) ( 5 ) THE company in its written statement before the First Labour Court in connection with Case No. COMP. 115/92 in paragraphs 8,9,13 and 15 stated as follows:"8. That the application is completely vague inasmuch as it has not been disclosed in the application that on which date after the scheduled duty hours he has worked overtime and by whose order. Unless those details are stated in the application itself it suffers from mischief of vagueness and the learned Court should refuse to compute on such application. 9. That the application is completely vague inasmuch as it has not been disclosed in the application that on which date after the scheduled duty hours he has worked overtime and by whose order. Unless those details are stated in the application itself it suffers from mischief of vagueness and the learned Court should refuse to compute on such application. 9. That the application has not been made in accordance with the form prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, and Rule which is mandatory and any application filed without complying the mandatory requirement should be rejected. 13. That on receiving the application the opposite party has checked its record and it is found that no overtime work has been done by the applicant on the days and period mentioned in the application and he was not given order to do overtime work. 15. That during the alleged claim in annexure 'a' the applicant has not been ordered to do any overtime and actually he has not done any work beyond the schedule hours. Unless it is shown that in a particular week the applicant has worked more than 48 hours question of paying any overtime does notarise". ( 6 ) THE First Labour Court by its Order dated December 19, 1996 allowed the applications under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act on contest. The order passed by the First Labour Court is quoted hereinbelow. "ordered that the applications under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act are allowed on contest. The applicant do get an order for a sum of Rs. 3956. 46 p (Rs. 143. 52+ Rs. 3812. 94= Rs. 3956. 46) as stated on the body of this order. The O. P. company is directed to pay off this computed amount to the applicant by February 28, 1997, in default the applicant shall have the liberty to resort to law to realise the said amount. This is my order which will govern both the cases. " ( 7 ) THE relevant portion of the reasons given by the First Labour Court justifying that it had jurisdiction to try the matter is given hereinbelow:" It is his definite case that he performed over time duty but was not paid for the same and hence the instant cases have cropped up. " ( 7 ) THE relevant portion of the reasons given by the First Labour Court justifying that it had jurisdiction to try the matter is given hereinbelow:" It is his definite case that he performed over time duty but was not paid for the same and hence the instant cases have cropped up. On the other hand in the pleadings it was the case of the O. P. company that the applicant did not perform any overtime duty and nor was he asked to do that. But from evidence of the O. P. W. 1 it becomes crystal clear that the applicant and others were paid for their overtime duty (Ext. A series ). So performance of overtime duty by the applicant and others is a fact. Hence the story of non-performance of overtime duty by the applicant as stated in the O. P. 's pleadings has no leg to stand upon. As the performance of overtime duty is a recognised fact it stands as a basis of right on the part of the applicant and the cases come clearly under the mischief of Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act and are clearly maintainable. It is needless to say that this being the position this Court has got jurisdiction to try the matter. "it is evident from the above quoted reasons of the First Labour Court that the Labour Court understood that in the pleadings it was the case of the company that the applicant did not perform any overtime duty nor was he asked to do that. The paragraphs from the written statement of the company quoted hereinabove clearly show that was not the stand taken by the company. The case of the company in the pleading was that the applications were completely vague inasmuch as it had not been disclosed in the applications that on which dates, after the scheduled duty hours, the workman had worked overtime and by whose order. It was further case of the company that the workman filed the applications on an abstract claim which cannot be decided in an application under Section 33-C (2 ). It was further case of the company that the workman filed the applications on an abstract claim which cannot be decided in an application under Section 33-C (2 ). The company without any ambiguity pleaded that on receiving application the company had checked its records and it was found that no overtime work had been done by the workman on the days and period mentioned in the application and he was not given order to do overtime work. It was further stated in the pleadings of the company that during the period of alleged claim in Annexure 'a' the workman had not been ordered to do any overtime and actually he had not done any work beyond the schedule hours. The company categorically stated that unless it is shown that in a particular week the applicant had worked more than 48 hours, question of paying any overtime does not arise. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate for the workman in course of his argument drew the attention of the Court to Section 51 and Section 59 (1) of Factories Act, 1948 and argued that these sections created a right in favour of the workman which can be computed by the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act. Section 51 and Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 read as follows:"57. Weekly hours.- No adult worker shall be required or allowed to work in a factory for more than forty-eight hours in any week. 59 (1) Extra wages for overtime. (1) Where a worker works in a factory for more than nine hours in any day or for more than forty-eight hours in any week, he shall, in respect of overtime work, be entitled to 'wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages. " ( 9 ) NO doubt that Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 has entitled a worker who works in a factory for more than nine hours in any day or for more than 48 hours in any week to get wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages in respect of overtime work. Only when it is proved that the worker has done overtime work as contemplated in Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 he acquires right to get the wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages. Only when it is proved that the worker has done overtime work as contemplated in Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 he acquires right to get the wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages. When the company stated that the workman did not perform any overtime work as claimed by him in his applications under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act, the question which had to be decided first was whether the workman infact performed overtime work as contemplated under Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948. Unless it is established that the workman had performed overtime work as contemplated under Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948, the workman is not entitled to get any wages for overtime work. ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate for the company referred to Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The workmen. In that case the Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that a proceeding under Section 33-C (2) is a proceeding generally in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceed to compute the benefit in terms of money. Supreme Court observed that this calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefits, in view of its being previously adjudged or otherwise, duly provided for. It was observed that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. In paragraph 13 of the Reported decision Supreme Court observed as follows:"in a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiffs right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant's liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii ). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under Section 33-C (2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding under Section 33-C (2), as necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely 'incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'incidental' to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) that Court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions - say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as 'incidental' to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not 'incidental' to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R. L. Khandelwal, 1968-I-LLJ-589 (SC), that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under Section 33-C (2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an industrial dispute which requires a reference under Section 10 of the Act. " ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate for the Company also referred to Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr. reported in 1995-I-LLJ-395 (SC ). In that case Supreme Court held that where the very basis of the claim of the entitlement of the workman to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claim and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act. It was further decided that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workman's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act. It was held that it is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof. Some ambiguity requires interpretation then that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33-C (2) like that of Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. It was held that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests. Paragraph 12 of the reported decision is quoted hereinbelow. "the High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claim and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of the proceeding under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33-C (2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. " ( 12 ) THE Learned Advocate for the workman referred to R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Nagpur reported in 1972-I-LLJ-231 (SC ). Learned Advocate referred to paragraph 24 of the reported decision which reads as follows:"in substance the point urged by the appellants was that if a claim is made on the basis of a lay-off and the employer contends that there was no lay-off but closure, it is not open to a Labour Court to entertain an application under Section 33-C (2 ). The more so it was stated, when the dispute was not between a solitary workman on the one hand and the employer on the other hand but a whole body of workmen ranged against their employer who was faced with numerous applications before the Labour Court for computation of benefit in terms of money. As has been said already, the Labour Court must go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was really a closure or a lay-off. If it took the view that there was really a closure or a lay-off without any closure of the business, it would be acting within its jurisdiction if it awarded compensation in terms of the provisions of Chapter V-A. In our opinion the High Court's conclusion that: in fact the business of this company was continuing. They in fact continued to employ several employees. Their notices say that some portions of the mills would continue to work. " was unexceptionable. The notices which we have referred to can only lead to the above conclusion. They in fact continued to employ several employees. Their notices say that some portions of the mills would continue to work. " was unexceptionable. The notices which we have referred to can only lead to the above conclusion. The Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workmen's claim to the computation of the benefit in terms of money; the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether on the facts, it had jurisdiction to make the computation. It could not, however, give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional plea. " ( 13 ) IN that case a point was raised that if a claim is made on the basis of a lay-off and the employer contends that there was no lay-off but closure, it is not upon the Labour Court to entertain an application under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act. It was held that the Labour Court must go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was really a closure or lay-off. If it took the view that there was really a closure or a lay-off without any closure of the business it would be acting within its jurisdiction if it awarded compensation in terms of provision of Chapter V-A of the said Act. It was held that the Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be decided by a mere plea denying the workmen's claim to the computation of the benefit in terms of money. It was further held that the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether on the facts it had jurisdiction to make the computation. It is important to note that Supreme Court held that the Labour Court could not, however, give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional plea. ( 14 ) THE learned Advocate for the workman referred to Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The workman (supra ). This case has already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. ( 15 ) THE learned Advocate for the workman referred to A. P. S. E. Board Hyderabad v. Ikram Ahmed reported in 1979 LIC 915. This is a Full Bench decision of. Andhra Pradesh High Court. This case has already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. ( 15 ) THE learned Advocate for the workman referred to A. P. S. E. Board Hyderabad v. Ikram Ahmed reported in 1979 LIC 915. This is a Full Bench decision of. Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Full Bench in paragraph 37 of the reported decision observed, interalia, as follows:"it is contended that this latter decision in Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. v. Labour Court, Nagpur (supra), did not specifically overrule the judgment in U. P. Electricity Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla 1969-II-LLJ-728 (SC ). But whether it specifically overruled the earlier judgment or not, when a larger Bench of the Supreme Court itself has observed that all the aspects were not brought to the notice of the Court in its earlier judgment anything contrary to the latter judgment in Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Nagpur, (supra), contained in the earlier judgment, cannot be taken on the correct position of law or binding on this Court. In view of the latter judgment, merely because the factum of retrenchment is disputed the Labour Court's jurisdiction to determine the compensation under Section 33-C (2) cannot be held to have been ousted. In that view of the matter, the judgment of our High Court in Swastik Manufacturers v. Labour Court 1977 LIC 1725 (Andhra Pradesh), wherein the employees' claim for retrenchment compensation, leave salary, minimum bonus, etc. was held to be not maintainable under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be held to be laying down the correct position of law. The right to retrenchment compensation and minimum bonus having been conferred by a statute, it constitutes an existing right and the employees in making an application under Section 33-C (2) for awarding the money due to them under the said heads, merely seek the computation of the said amount. In such a case even if the employer contends that there was no retrenchment and that the workmen had left service of their own accord and consequently were not entitled to retrenchment compensation and minimum bonus, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide the incidental question as to which of the assertions is correct. The mere denial of the workmen's assertion by the employer that there was retrenchment does not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the petition. The mere denial of the workmen's assertion by the employer that there was retrenchment does not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the petition. " ( 16 ) RELYING on this decision the learned Advocate for the workman argued that the workman has an existing right under Section 59 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 and, therefore, the Labour Court has jurisdiction under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act to compute and award the overtime wages to the workman. ( 17 ) THE learned Advocate for the workman referred to Municipal Board, Merta v. , Labour Commissioner, Rajasthan reported in 1977 LIC 497. This is a single Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court. In that decision it was held that on a plain reading of Section 33-C (l) if any money is due to a workman under the provisions of Chapter V-A he can apply to the appropriate Government under Section 33-C (l ). The Single Bench of Rajasthan High Court held that it is clear that Section 33-C is a provision in the nature of execution proceeding and that the scope of Section 33-C (2) is wider than that of Section 33-C (l ). It was further held by the Single Bench of Rajasthan High Court that in fact it was only question of deciding whether in view of the regulations and clear provision of Section 25-FF the petitioner was liable or not. It was held that such a case cannot be said to be outside the jurisdiction under Section 33-C (l) of the Act. This decision, I am of the view, has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 18 ) THE learned Advocate for the workmen referred to N. A. Chowdhury v. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. reported in 1978 (36) FLR 99. In the said decision High Court observed, inter alia, as follows:"there are two parts of sub-section as it stands after its amendment by Act 36 of 1964. The first part is concerned with the money claim simpliciter and the second part speaks about computation in terms of money of any benefit to which the workman is entitled. Although for appreciation of the point at issue there is no substantial difference between the two, we shall confine our discussion to the money claim pure and simple. The first part is concerned with the money claim simpliciter and the second part speaks about computation in terms of money of any benefit to which the workman is entitled. Although for appreciation of the point at issue there is no substantial difference between the two, we shall confine our discussion to the money claim pure and simple. On a plain reading of the wordings of the statute it would be found that where any workman is entitled to receive from employer any money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due, then the question may be decided by the Labour Court. The expression "if any question arises as to the amount of money due" embraces within its ambit any one or more of the following kinds of disputes: (1) Whether there is any settlement or award as alleged? (2) Whether any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money at all under any settlement or an award etc. ? (3) If so, what will be the rate or quantum of such amount? (4) Whether the amount claimed is due or not? broadly speaking, there will be the disputes which will be referable to the question as to the amount of money due. If the right to get money on the basis of the settlement or the award is not established no amount of money will be due. If it is established, then it has to be found out, albeit, it may be by mere calculation, as to what is the amount due. For finding it out, it is not necessary that there should be a dispute as to the amount of money due also. The fourth kind of dispute which we have indicated obviously and literally will be covered by the phrase "amount of money due". A dispute as to all such questions or any of them would attract the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the Act and make the remedy available to the workman concerned. It is necessary to elaborately discuss the various authorities of this Court on the point. To our mind the view we have expressed above is plainly and squarely covered by the principles of law enunciated by this Court in several decisions; to wit, The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan Etc. (supra); R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. To our mind the view we have expressed above is plainly and squarely covered by the principles of law enunciated by this Court in several decisions; to wit, The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan Etc. (supra); R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court Nagpur and Ors. (supra) and Sahu Minerals and Properties Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, and Ors. (supra ). " ( 19 ) I am of the view that this case does not help the workman rather it supports the argument made by the learned Advocate for the company. ( 20 ) IN view of the discussions made hereinabove I am of the view that the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workman to the overtime wages has been disputed by the company and there being no earlier adjudication or recognition of such right of the workman by the company, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is therefore, clearly outside the scope of proceeding under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act. I am of the view that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to first decide the workman's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act. I am of the view that the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the said Act cannot determine the workman's right to overtime wages and the corresponding liability of the company including whether the company is, at all, liable or not. Under these circumstances I quash and set aside the order passed by the First Labour Court dated December 19, 1996 which is under challenge in the instant writ proceeding. The writ application is thus allowed. However, there shall not be any order as to costs.