JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above writ petition has been filed seeking for a declaration that the definition of the ward of the Freedom-Fighters as contained in Annexure P-5 be declared unconstitutional, arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory and while quashing the same direct the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for admission to the MBBS/BDS course as against the seat reserved for a ward of a freedom-fighter. The petitioner claims to be the son of one Tek Ram Sharma and Smt. Sunita Sharma and the said Sunita Sharma, the mother of the petitioner, is said to be the daughter of Shri Sita Ram a resident of village Dhalaya, PO Jabri, Tehsil and District Shimla who is also said to be a freedom fighter. For the admission to entrance test conducted on behalf of the Himachal Pradesh State Government by the Himachal Pradesh University to the professional course of MBBS/ BDS in different colleges located in Himachal Pradesh State for the academic sessioni998-99, applications were invited and they were required to be submitted to the Deputy Registrar (Entrance-test) Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla. The petitioner claimed to fulfil the requisite qualifications. The relevant portion of the prospectus indicated that seats have been reserved for the wards of freedom fighters, one seat each in each of the medical colleges, namely, Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, Dr. R.P. G.M. College, Kangra, H.P. Dental College, Shimla and Himachal Pradesh Dental College, Sundernagar. The prospectus also contained the definition of the wards of freedom fighters to mean and include the children/grand-children (only from paternal side) of the freedom fighters, the freedom fighter being a person who is declared as such by the Himachal Pradesh Government. R.P. G.M. College, Kangra, H.P. Dental College, Shimla and Himachal Pradesh Dental College, Sundernagar. The prospectus also contained the definition of the wards of freedom fighters to mean and include the children/grand-children (only from paternal side) of the freedom fighters, the freedom fighter being a person who is declared as such by the Himachal Pradesh Government. The prospectus obliged the furnishing of a certificate to be issued by the District Magistrate of the district concerned and when the petitioner applied to the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate on 4.6.1998 for the issue of a requisite certificate in his favour that he is a ward of a freedom fighter, the said authority conveyed to the petitioner by a letter dated 14.7.1998 that the petitioner is not entitled to be issued with such a certificate and that such facility could be availed of only by the children/grand children of a freedom fighter in the State of Himachal Pradesh who are grandsons and grand-daughters from daughters side in case the freedom fighter concerned has no son and since the petitioner himself in the application for the purpose clarified that his mother had three sisters and one brother, the petitioner is not entitled to be issued with a certificate as ward of a freedom fighter, the freedom fighter himself having indisputably a son. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition as noticed earlier for the relief indicated supra. 2. The respondents No. 1 and 4 filed a reply contesting the claim of the petitioner contending that the petitioner being the son of a daughter of Sita Ram freedom fighter, keeping in view the provisions contained in the decision of the Government communicated in the letter No. GAD-F-6(F) 4-12/87-111 dated 11.4.1991, the daughters son/daughters of a freedom fighter are entitled for the benefit envisaged for the ward of the freedom fighters only subject to the condition that the freedom fighter himself had no son, that the application of the petitioner was sent to the Joint Secretary to the Government for clarification and the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (GAD) to the Government affirmed the instructions already issued as noticed supra and that, therefore, the rejection of the claim of the petitioner for being issued with a certificate for availing the benefit extended to a ward of a freedom fighter was quite in accordance with law and that no exception could be taken to the same. The second respondent in its counter-affidavit stated that the petitioner cannot claim himself to be the ward of a freedom fighter since he does not satisfy the definition of the ward of a freedom fighter as given by the Government to be satisfied by any one who seeks to avail the benefit of reservation as against that category. 3. Mr. G.D. Verma, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the definition of the ward of a freedom fighter incorporated in the prospectus which is said to have been as a sequal to the policy decision taken by the State Government is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and it perpetuates discrimination on the basis of sex by making an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between the wards of a freedom fighter by confining the benefit of reservation to only in favour of the wards on the paternal side and that therefore, it is liable to be struck down. The learned Counsel further contended that in any event the ward on the paternal side has to be construed so as to comprise within it the children of the daughter of the freedom fighter also and there was no justification to restrict it to the children of the son of the freedom fighter. The learned Counsel also contended that humen rights for women including girl child, are inalienable being an integral and indivisible part of universal rights and ali forms of discrimination on account of gender is violative of fundamental freedom and human rights and, therefore, the definition of ward of a freedom fighter deserves to be struck down and relief granted to the petitioner as prayed for. 4. Per contra, the learned Advocate-General with equal force contended that the reservation itself engrafts only a concession and having regard to the object and purpose of such reservation no exception can be taken to the benefit of reservation being conferred in favour of the sons of the freedom fighter and the grand children through sons of such freedom fighter and the alleged discrimination has no merit whatsoever since it is based on a reasonable basis. The learned Advocate-General also, while reiterating the stand taken in the reply filed, invited our attention to the clarification issued by the Government to the decision earlier taken in the matter of reservation in favour of the ward of a freedom fighter wherein it has been made known by the said clarification issued on 11.4.1991 that the benefit given to the sons/grand-sons of a freedom-fighter should be given to the daughters son/daughter subject to the condition that the freedom fighter may not have a son and that though there is some lapse on the part of the authorities which published the prospectus in engrafting the clarification as part of the definition of the ward of freedom fighter for the purpose of availing the reservation, in appreciating the reasonableness of the categorisation and the classification, the same has to be taken into account and thus the scheme of reservation in respect of this category is such that the giving of benefit to the sons/daughters or grand-sons/daughters through sons of the freedom fighters merely incorporates only a rule of preference and wherever there is no son of a freedom fighter or a grandson through such son of a freedom fighter, the grand-children through the daughters would also be entitled to avail of the concession, and therefore, the definition as contained does not suffer any discrimination in contravention of either Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it is valid and unassailable. The learned Advocate-General also submitted that what Article 15 prohibits is discrimination being made only on the ground of sex and there is no prohibition therein for the State for making discrimination on the ground of sex coupled with other considerations and the provisions under challenge, therefore, cannot be said to suffer the vice of Article 15 of the Constitution of India to call for any interference. In traversing the claim on behalf of the petitioner that once the restrictive classification is set aside the petitioner should be directed to be admitted and given a seat to the course applied for, the learned Advocate-General submitted that even if this court is so pleased to strike down the categorisation, there is no scope for according relief as prayed for by ordering the admission of the petitioner and if at all the direction could be issued to the authorities for redoing the classification as it deem fit in accordance with the direction or declaration of law as made by the Court and consequently the relief as prayed for directing the admission of the petitioner cannot be accorded in this writ petition. 5. The learned Counsel appearing on either side invited our attention to several decisions wherein the principles governing th test laid down for adjudging the plea of discrimination, reasonableness of a classification and discrimination against women on the basis of sex came to be elucidated by the apex court, it is inappropriate as also unnecessary to refer to several of those decisions except referring to a few of them only for the purpose of this case. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel appearing on either side on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 1829, Air India v. Nergesh Meerze and others. That was a case wherein the service regulations of the employees of Air India came in for challenge with reference to the differential ages of retirement fixed for Air Hostesses. Though the apex Court declared that sex cannot be the basis of discirmination and differential treatment as pointed out earlier, their Lordships of the apex Court also made it clear that the prohibition contained in Article 15(1) of the Constitution would be attracted only when a classification or differentiation is made solely on the ground of sex and that the said provision in the Constitution did not prohibit the State from making discrimination on the ground of sex coupled with other considerations. In 1996 (8) SCC 525, C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoh, the apex Court dealt with the rights of women in the context of the stipulation contained in Sections 14 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In 1996 (8) SCC 525, C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoh, the apex Court dealt with the rights of women in the context of the stipulation contained in Sections 14 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In the context of said consideration, the apex Court observed as follows: "Human rights are derived from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person. Human rights and fundamental freedom have been reiterated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom are interdependent and have mutual reinforcement. The human rights for women, including girl child are, therefore, inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full development of personality and fundamental freedoms and equal participation by women in political, social, economic and cultural life are concomitants for national development, social and family stability and growth, culturally, socially and economically. All forms of discrimination on grounds of gender is violative of fundamental freedoms and human rights." 6. In (1997) 8 SCC 191, Samatha v. State of A.P. and others, the apex Court, while dealing with the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 emphasised that the Indian socialist society wants the development of each individual but requires this development to be such that it leads to the upliftment of the society as a whole, and placing reliance upon these observations, learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that there was no justification to confine the benefit of reservation in favour of the ward of a freedom fighter to those on the paternal side alone. 7. 7. In (1996) 4 SCC 60, Gujarat University v. Rajiv Gopinath Bhatt and others, a provision stipulating that out of the merit list prepared first preference to candidates belonging to the same university, second preference to candidates from other universities of the same State and any vacancy remaining after this shall remain unfilled, came up for consideration and in that context it was observed that if a rule has been framed that out of the merit list preference is to be given for admission in superspeciality courses to the students of the university in question per se, it cannot be held to be arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and according to the learned Advocate-General, applying the same formula the preference shown in favour of the children or the grand children on the male side among the class of children or grand children as a whole cannot be said to be either unreasonable or discriminatary. 8. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side in the light of the principles noticed supra and also the principle brought to our notice by adverting to the other decisions. It is by now well settled that equality does not mean that every law or provision must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or instances found to be in the same position and wherein needs of different classes of persons invariably require different well separate treatment, all together. It is equally well settled that differential treatment per se does not constitute violation and only when there is no reasonable basis for such differentiation the denial of equal protection can be said to arise and if a law or provision is shown to engraft a classification based on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from other class or group left out of the other group and it is found to have a rational relation and nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the provision concerned, courts will not substitute its views or policy in the matter particularly when it is not shown to be palpably arbitrary. The need for a definition of the wards of a freedom fighter apparently arose on account of a decision of a Division Bench of this court reported in I.L.R. 1982 HP 733, Shekhar Chander v. State of H.P and others, wherein the Division Bench of this Court pointed out the infirmity involved in making reservations in the absence of any definition of freedom fighter for the purpose of availing of the concession shown to the reserved category in respect of admission to professional courses. The State Government while periodically reviewing the reservation policy has resolved to extend the benefit of reservation of one seat in respect of political sufferers to the children and grand children of political sufferers and confining the extension of such benefit to the grand children on the paternal side of the freedom fighter. Keeping in tune with the said decision of the Government, the prospectus reviewing committee which undertook the settlement of prospectus in April 1985, has chosen to adopt a definition in the following terms: "Freedom fighter is a person as declared by the Himachal Pradesh Government. Wards means and includes children/grand children (only from paternal side) of the freedom fighter". As pointed out earlier, though this definition seems to have been adopted and incorporated in all subsequent years there was some omission in carrying out the subsequent decisions taken and the clarification issued to the same which is in the following terms: "Benefits given by the Government to the sons/ grand-sons of a freedom fighter should be given to the daughters sons/daughters subject to the condition that the freedom fighter may not be having a son". Even de hors the clarification issued, the object underlying the reservation in favour of the ward of the freedom fighter seem to be to directly benefit the freedom fighter and his family and in our view there is no difficulty in appreciating or understanding or even comprehending the object and purpose behind such reservation being only to benefit a freedom fighters family. It is common knowledge that a daughter of a freedom fighter, after her marriage, gets herself transplanted in to the family of her husband and cannot, therefore, be claimed to be a part of the family in its real sense of the freedom fighter her father at least for anything relating to her children. It is common knowledge that a daughter of a freedom fighter, after her marriage, gets herself transplanted in to the family of her husband and cannot, therefore, be claimed to be a part of the family in its real sense of the freedom fighter her father at least for anything relating to her children. The family of the son is normally and invariably in the well accepted notion or concept of a family1 in vogue is treated for all purpose as the family of a person concerned particularly when the grand children are concerned. In this case, we find there is no unreasonableness or arbitrariness involved in the Government resolving or intending to primarily benefit the children on the male side of the freedom fighter, namely, the grand children on the paternal side. We are unable to appreciate or accept the stand taken for the petitioner that the grand children on the paternal side comprehend within it and should be so construed as to include the grand children though the daughter of the freedom fighter also. The fallacy underlying such a plea is the attempt to trace the paternal relationship not in relation to the candidate of the ward concerned but to the freedom fighter. In the matter of availing the benefit of reservation, the paternal side has to be viewed from the aspect of the candidate concerned and not from the angle of the mother of the candidate whose parents may be the freedom fighters. Therefore, we are of the view that the reservation in respect of the ward of a freedom fighter with the definition incorporated, therefor, cannot be said to be solely and strictly based on a discrimination on the basis of sex but on the other hand it purports to give effect to the laudable object of benefiting the freedom fighters family when it comes to the question of extending the benefit to the grand children on the paternal side through the sons of the freedom fighter concerned. 9. 9. That apart, though there has been some omission on the part of the prospectus reviewing committee to make the prospectus for the current year in tune with the subsequent decision taken by the State Government in this behalf and as a consequence thereof some lapse on the part of the University in properly incorporating the definition of the ward of a freedom fighter in the prospectus, the clarification issued cannot be totally ignored. If the clarification subsequently issued by the State Government in this behalf is also taken into account, the so-called plea of discrimination also appears to be insignificant inasmuch as in case where-ever the freedom fighter has no son the benefit is extended to the children of the daughters also and viewed thus, as rightly contended for the respondents by the learned Advocate-General, the scheme of reservation as engrafted with the definition of the ward of freedom fighter with the subsequent clarification thereto makes it as a provision which more shows a preference among the grand children of a freedom fighter first in favour of the grand children through the son and only in the absence of the son the benefit is extended to the grand children of the daughter. In our view, the, said classification made among the grand children of a freedom fighter cannot be said to be either palpably unreasonable or so arbitrary or wholly irrelevant for the object of reservation as to shock the conscience of the Court in dealing with the same in exercise of its powers of judicial review, particularly when the object of such reservation is obvious and it is meant to directly and primarily benefit the family as such of the freedom fighter. 10. Mr. Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner also while placing reliance upon the reservation made as shown to be disclosed in the prospectus and Instructions for candidates seeking nomination from Government of Himachal Pradesh for undergraduate course in Engineering/Architecture and Pharmacy against seats allotted by Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India in various Engineering Colleges/other technical institutions in the country, 1998-99 contended that there is no such further classification among the wards or children of a freedom fighter. First of all the classification for the purpose of reservation in respect of said courses is found to be in respect of the wards or children of political suffers and in our view the reasonableness of classification in a given case or set of circumstances are to be viewed from the totality of the class or classification and the area or range of persons who may fall under such classification and there could be no comparison in our view between the two. Even that apart, such classification has not been made by the State Government with reference to the selection by the State Government as such and the classification adopted for the purpose of reservation in respect of other institutions at the all-India level by a totally different Authority cannot be compared and contrasted with the one made by a different Authority altogether in adjudging the reasonables of the classification and, therefore, this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not merit our acceptance. 11. For all the reasons stated above, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the definition of the ward of freedom fighters and consequently the District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner in this case cannot be found fault with for declining to issue a certificate in the prescribed form in favour of the petitioner on the undisputed facts noticed above and inasmuch as the freedom fighter in this case had a son and as such the benefit of reservation in favour of the ward of a freedom fighter cannot be availed of by the petitioner in this case. The writ petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. CMP. No. 1031 of 1998. This application shall stand dismissed. Application dismissed.