JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above writ petition has been filed by the Chamba District Co-operative Marketing and Supplies Federation Limited against the order of the 3rd respondent dated 17.8.1994 and that of the second respondent dated 24.4.1998 rejecting the claim of the petitioner society to order the eviction of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act., 1971. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner society owns the property in question and that one Chet Ram s/o Sant Ram was holding two shops belonging to the petitioner society comprised in Khasra Nos. 1295, 1297, 1297, 1298 and 1299, Kitas 4 measuring 71 sq. yards and 1 sq. foot as per the Jamabandi record for the year 1975-76 on lease at monthly rent of Rs. 14/- per shop. He expired on 10.2.1983 and on the assertion of its claim that the respondents No. 4 and 5 are in unathorised occupation of the shops in question on and from the date of expiry of lessee Chet Ram, the application was filed by the petitioner society before the 3rd respondent. The contesting respondents contended that they are the sons of the original tenant Chet Ram and they are continuing in possession of the respective shops paying the rent, that they have not entered the premises unathorisedly and inasmuch as there is no agreement or term in the conditions of tenancy that what was granted in favour of Chet Ram was a tenancy during his life time and in the absence of any provision in the Act in question rendering the heirs of the tenants who have been lawfully inducted into possession as persons in unauthorised occupation there is no scope for initiating action under the Act of 1971. The contesting respondents also claimed that they are entitled to protection I under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 and that the said Act has a over-riding effect on the Public Premises Act, 1971 and J consequently the claim for eviction is liable to be rejected. 2. On the above claims and counter claims the 3rd respondent after hearing the learned counsel appearing on either side held that the contesting respondents are entitled to the benefits of the Rent Control Act and that consequently the Public Premises Act will not apply to the case on hand. 2. On the above claims and counter claims the 3rd respondent after hearing the learned counsel appearing on either side held that the contesting respondents are entitled to the benefits of the Rent Control Act and that consequently the Public Premises Act will not apply to the case on hand. Aggrieved, the petitioner society pursued the matter in further appeal before the 2nd respondent. The second respondent was of the view that in view of the amendment introduced in 1983 to be Public Premises Act, the premises belonging to a registered co-operative society constituted public premises as provided under the said Act, but at the same time since the contesting respondents are entitled to the benefit of the Rent Control Act, the tenancy can be terminated only in accordance with the terms as provided in Section 3 of the Public Premises Act and in the absence of any proof of such termination of the tenancy, there is no scope for allowing the claim of the petitioner society and consequently dismissed the appeal. Not satisfied, the petitioner society has filed the above writ petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the appellate authority having held that the premises in question constituted "public premises" within the meaning of the Public Premises Act what ought to have countenanced the claim for eviction in the absence of any proof by the contesting respondents that they owe their possession to any allotment, lease or grant in their favour and that in adjudging the rights of the parties under the Public Premises Act, the principle contained in the Rent Control Act will have no application. In any event, according to the learned Counsel, the definition of tenant under Section 2(j) would furnish sufficient indication to show that the son would not automatically become a tenant unless the ingredients envisaged under the Explanation I to sub-section (2) (j) are proved to exist to justify such a claim by the contesting respondents and the authorities below committed an error in summarily rejecting the claim without under taking any such inquiry. It may be pointed out at this stage that even on an earlier occasion when the matter was taken up for hearing, for orders regarding admission, the same contentions were reiterated and time was taken to get instructions as to whether to pursue this proceeding I or to pursue proceeding in accordance with law otherwise for eviction of the tenants, the contesting respondents, and on the instructions of the petitioner to pursue this writ petition, the matter has been once again argued before us today. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Section 2(e) defines what a public premises means for the purpose of Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971, and it is said to mean any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government and includes any premises belonging to, among other things, any co-operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under the H.P. Co -operative Societies Act, 1968. It is in the context of the said definition the appellate authority came to the conclusion that the premises in question answers the description of public premises for the purpose of the said Act. That by itself is not sufficient to entitle the petitioner to have an order of eviction in its favour of the contesting respondents unless it is further proved by the petitioner that the contesting respondents are in unauthorised possession of the premises in question. That by itself is not sufficient to entitle the petitioner to have an order of eviction in its favour of the contesting respondents unless it is further proved by the petitioner that the contesting respondents are in unauthorised possession of the premises in question. Section 3 provides that for the purpose of the Act a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised possession of any public premises where he has, whether before or after the commencement of the said Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant, or where he being an allottee, lessee or grantee or has by reason of the determination or cancellation of allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf therein contained ceased, whether before or after the commencement of the Act to be entitled to occupy or hold such public premises or where any person authorised to occupy the public premises, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, sub-let in contravention of the allotment, lease or grant without the permission of the State Government or of any other authority competent to permit such sub-letting the whole or any part of such public premises, or otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such public premises. The explanation to the said provision also makes it clear that a person shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed to be entered in the possession as allottee, lessee or grantee. The stand taken for the petitioner by the learned counsel that inasmuch as the contesting respondents themselves have not proved that they have entered into possession of the premises in question under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant in their favour they cannot take advantage of the lease granted in favour of their deceased father and therefore, they should be treated as persons in unauthorised occupation needs reference to be rejected only since such an absurd construction of the provision cannot be placed to make it read in a manner defeating as also making a mockery of the very purpose of the provision.. As pointed out by the appellate authority, the lease earlier granted in favour of deceased Chet Ram lessee has not been chosen to be terminated also by invoking any of the clauses of Section 3 of the Public Premises Act and merely because a lessee dies it cannot be claimed, unless specifically so provided under the Act in question, that the lease stands automatically terminated on the death of the lessee concerned. The provisions of Public Premises Act of 1971 does not contain any provision to override and destroy the common law principle and rights of the legal representatives of a tenant succeeding to the interest of the original tenant under a lease. As a matter of fact, Section 13 of the said Act would also go to show that the provisions of the Public Premises Act is not averse to or indicate any intention to destroy any such rights in common law. Consequently, in the absence of any provision to the contra the claim of the petitioner society does not merit our acceptance. That apart, ignoring the impact H.P Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 and the rights as also the protection envisaged in respect of a tenant therein, the petitioner society cannot seek for eviction of the contesting respondents under the provisions of the Public Premises Act after the coming into force of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. Section 3 which provides for an exemption clause enacts that the provisions of the said Act shall not apply to any building or rented land owned by the Government and that the State Government may direct that all or any of the provisions of the said Act shall not apply to any particular building or rented land or any class or buildings or rented lands. Indisputably, the property in question is not owned by the Government and there is no exemption granted in favour of the petitioner society in respect of its property or the property now under consideration. There is no controversy also that the provisions of the H.P. Urban Land Control Act, 1987 apply to the area in question. Indisputably, the property in question is not owned by the Government and there is no exemption granted in favour of the petitioner society in respect of its property or the property now under consideration. There is no controversy also that the provisions of the H.P. Urban Land Control Act, 1987 apply to the area in question. If that be the position, the inevitable consequence of the prohibitory clause in Section 14 of the Act is that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall be evicted there from in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of the Act or otherwise, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act. Therefore, the rights of a tenant within the meaning of the Rent Control Act, even if disputed by the petitioner society obviously have got to be adjudicated under the provisions of the Rent Control Act before the competent authorities constituted under the said Act and it is not given to the petitioner society to accept the authorities constituted under the Public Premises Act to adjudicate issues which otherwise are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Rent Control Act. Consequently, we see no merit in the submissions that the appellate authority exercising powers under the Public. Premises Act committed any error in not deciding about the entitlement of the contesting respondents as tenants under the Rent Control Act to continue in possession, the Public Premises Act being a special enactment for a limited purpose, the authorities under which also conferred jurisdiction in respect of only adjudicating for the purpose of the Act the issues that arise for consideration under Section 3 of the said special enactment. 5. For all the reasons stated above, we see there is no merit in this writ petition and the writ petition in our view is a frivolous one pursued in this Court vindictively. 6. The petitioner society is an authority constituted and functioning i under the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968. 5. For all the reasons stated above, we see there is no merit in this writ petition and the writ petition in our view is a frivolous one pursued in this Court vindictively. 6. The petitioner society is an authority constituted and functioning i under the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968. When two statutory authorities have pointed out the obvious legal position which does not admit of any-serious doubt or controversy, it does not behave an authority like the petitioner to embark upon frivolous litigations wasting the funds of the society, in spite of an opportunity also having been given to see reason to the petitioner society to mend matters but it has only recklessly exhibited its conduct in pursuing these proceedings vindictively and in a frivolous manner. In our view such wasteful and thoughtless and available litigation by public institutions must be severely curbed in future and, therefore, we would direct that the expenses of this litigation shall be borne by the Manager by name Shri Lekh Raj, out of his personal funds and not from the funds of the society without any right for him to get reimbursement from the funds of the society. We also direct the Registrar Co-operative Societies for the State to ensure appropriate action to recover the litigation expense atleast incurred for filing this writ petition in the High Court from him personally and reimburse the same to the funds of the society and send a report of having done so to this court within three months from the receipt of a copy of this order. A copy of this order is directed to be sent to the Registrar Co-operative Societies for the State. Petition dismissed.