Judgment : The second defendant in O.S.No.320 of 1980 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Valangaiman at Kumbakonam, who lost before both the courts below, is the appellant in the above second appeal. 2. The said suit has been filed for recovery of possession of the suit properties on the claim made by the plaintiff that the sale in favour of the second defendant-appellant under a registered sale deed dated 37. 1979 marked as Ex.B-4 is void and non est in the eye of law and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession, the suit having been presented within twelve years from the date of such alienation. The further case of the plaintiff was that on 28. 1968, Lakshmi Ammal, the mother, sold under Ex.B-1 item No.1 of ‘B’ schedule properties to her another son, Venkataraman, which alienation was not for the benefit of the plaintiff or her sister and that it is also hit by Sec. 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and consequently, the subsequent sale by the said purchaser in favour of the second defendant also does not have the consequence of conveying lawful title. 3. Defendants 1 and 3 were absent and set ex parte and the 4th defendant submitted to a decree. It is the second defendant, who filed a written statement contending that the settlement deed dated 15. 1934 is a void document, that the default clause incorporated in the settlement deed is invalid, as also the subsequent partition and if at all, the alienation in question is questionable only by defendants 3 and 4 and not by the plaintiff and that inasmuch as the alienation by the mother was for the purpose of celebrating the marriage of the plaintiff, it was for the necessities of the then minor plaintiff and consequently, the suit not having been filed as envisaged under Art.60 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act within three years from the date of attaining majority the suit claim is barred and that the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act has no application to the case on hand. 4. 4. The learned trial Judge, after conclusion of the trial and considering the respective claim of parties on the basis of the materials placed on record, came to the conclusion that by virtue of Sec. 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, while the 4th defendant, father, was alive, the mother as a de facto guardian, cannot alienate the properties of the minor without the sanction of the court and therefore, the same was void and as such, the plaintiff’s claim was sustained and the suit came to be decreed also holding that the suit has been filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Art.65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which alone applied to the case on hand. Aggrieved, the second defendant filed A.S.No.60 of 1983 before Sub Court, Kumbakonam. The learned Subordinate Judge also concurred with the view expressed as also the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. It may be pointed out here that both the courts below, apart from finding the necessary factual issues in favour of the plaintiff, have applied the principles of law as laid down in several decisions of this Court as indicated in the judgments of the courts below. Not satisfied, the second defendant has pursued the matter before this Court by filing the above second appeal. 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr.T.R. Chandramouli, while elaborating substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of the, appeal, contended that the sale under Ex.B-1 is not a void document and that in any event inasmuch as the said sale was effected by the de facto guardian, namely, the mother in the absence of any active interests shown by the further in the affairs after family or to administer the estate of the minor, and by his father participation in the sale transaction by attesting the document the transaction stood rendered legal for all purposes and the provisions contained in the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, particularly Sec. 11 will have no application to such a transaction. Argued the learned Senior counsel further that the period of limitation applicable to vindicate the rights of the plaintiff only, in such circumstances, would be as provided under Art.60 and not Art.65 as held by the Courts below and consequently, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are liable to be set aside. 6. Per contra, Mr.N. Varadarajan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent-plaintiff, while adopting the reasons assigned by the courts below, urged that there are any number of subsequent decisions of this Court as also of the Apex Court, approving the principles of law applied by the courts below in this case and consequently, no patent error of law or perversity of approach can be attributed to vitiate the concurrent judgments of the courts below to warrant interference in this second appeal and that the appeal does not merit acceptance in my hands. 7. The question as to whether the alienation by a de facto guardian of the minor’s property without the prior permission of the competent court is void transaction and the period of limitation within which the minor, in such circumstances, could seek for relief, was not a matter, which was res integra even before the latest pronouncement relied upon for the first respondent-plaintiff, came to be rendered. The decisions in Mayilswami Chettiyar v. Kaliammal, (1969) 1 M.L.J. 177 , Angammal v. Balasubramanian, (1980)1 M.L.J. 242, Sundaramoorthy v. Shanmugam Nadar, (1980)1 M.L.J. 486 and Muthalu Ammal v. A. V. Amudham, (1977)2 M.L.J. 215 , which were relied upon by the courts below bear ample testimony to the same. Subsequent to the above series of judgments, the Apex Court in Pannilal v. Rajinder Singh and another, (1994)1 L.W. 40 and Kallathil Sreedharan v. Komath Pandyala Prasanna, (1997)1 M.L.J. 61 (S.C.) and Govindaraju Padyyachi, P. and another v. V.V.O.Malavaraya Nayanar and others, (1997)3 L. W. 586 rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court, though reiterated the same principles, would indicate that there was no scope for even entertaining any doubts about the correctness of the legal principles applied to the case on hand by the learned Judges, who decided the cases in the courts below. Realising the series of hostile decisions staring against the plea of the appellant, the learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Jijabai v. Pathankhan, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 315 and Mayilswami Chettiar’s case, (1969)1 M.L.J. 177 of a learned single Judge of this Court and tried to urge that on the facts found in this case, the other series of judgments will have no application and the present case would very much deserve the application of the principles laid down in those two decisions. 8. The decisions in Jijabai’s case, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 315 is one where the Apex Court specifically found as a fact that though the father was alive, he had fallen out with the mother of the minor daughter and was separately for several years without taking any interest in the affairs of the minor, who was in the keeping and care of the mother and therefore, in such peculiar circumstances, the father should be treated “as if nonexistent and therefore, the mother could be considered as the natural guardian of the minor’s person as well as property” and consequently had power to bind the minor by granting lease of her land in the course of proper management of the property. In Mayilswami Chettiar’s case, (1969)1 M.L.J. 177 , a learned single Judge of this court expressed the view that even where there is a father for the minors alive, the mother can, acting as de facto guardian, of the minors alienate their property for necessity and that the father having attested the mortgage deed, should be deemed to have acquiesced in the mortgage and the alienation would be valid, if it is for necessity. Such decision came to be rendered by the learned single Judge, as could be seen from a perusal of the judgment, without any reference to the embargo placed on the powers of the de facto guardian under the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, apparently influenced by the principles governing such a question under the old Hindu Law and that too prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and therefore can be of no assistance for the appellants in this case. The decisions of this Court in Angammal’s case, (1980)1 M.L.J. 242 and Sundaramorthy’s case, (1980)1 M.L.J. 486, brought about the distinctions between the law governing a case prior to and after the coming into force of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and there is no scope for applying cases decided without specific reference to the 1956 Act. The observation made in that context on the impact of participation by the father could not be availed of in a case, where there is absolutely no possibility for a de facto guardian to convey or alienate the rights or interests of a minor without prior sanction obtained from a competent court. 9. The decision in Jijabai’s case, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 315 on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant had been considered by the Apex Court in Panni Lal’s case, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40 and the application of the principles to the restricted situation in respect of which it was rendered, has been pointed out subsequently by the Supreme Court itself. On facts the case on hand cannot be said to be one, where the natural guardian father, had abandoned the minor’s interest or left the family once and for all to lead to a presumption as to the natural guardian became non-existent and the mother could be elevated and placed on the pedestal of a natural guardian to deal with the minor’s property. That the father was also in the family very much and it is only by nomination, the mother became the de facto guardian, and that, therefore, the mother could not be raised to the level of natural guardian is obvious from the facts found in this case, which renders, in my view, the ratio of the decision in Jijabai’s case, A.I.R. 1971 S.C.315 wholly inapplicable to the case on hand. 10. The next question that looms large for consideration as to the impact and legal effect of attestation by the father. 10. The next question that looms large for consideration as to the impact and legal effect of attestation by the father. In my view, the factum of attestation by the father to a transaction, which is otherwise void in law, has no legal consequence at all for the reason that such attestation does not have the effect of rendering the alienation indisputably made by the de facto guardian to be really that of the natural guardian in the course of proper and due exercise of the powers of such natural guardian. In any event, in my view, the significance of attestation in law is only to estop the attestor to the document from denying the contents of the document, that too, if the contents of the same and the legal implication of the attestation are shown to have been well within the knowledge of the attestor at the time of making such attestation and not help to make the attestor the real execution of the document itself. Consequently, in my view, the factum of attestation by the father does not give any sanctity to the transaction so as to make it his own document and so as to dispense with the statutory requirement of obtaining sanction from the competent court before alienation by the de facto guardian and to take the transaction outside the purview of the mandatory prohibition contained in Sec. 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. 11. The further question that requires to be considered is about the period of limitation within which the plaintiff should have instituted the suit whether Art.60 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies or Art.65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act enures to the benefit of the plaintiff to seek for recovery of possession. Art.60 has relevance and application only when a relief to set aside a transfer of the property made by the guardian of a ward is sought for in any proceedings. Indisputably the relief sought for in this case is not one such for the obvious reason that the alienation covered under Ex.B-1 has been held to be a void transaction, which, finding and declaration in law does not require to be disturbed or set aside. Indisputably the relief sought for in this case is not one such for the obvious reason that the alienation covered under Ex.B-1 has been held to be a void transaction, which, finding and declaration in law does not require to be disturbed or set aside. If that be the position the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the properties and as held concurrently by both the courts below, the suit filed within a period of twelve years from the date of possession by the alienee under the void transaction, when only it can be said to become adverse to the plaintiff, is well within the period of limitation provided under Art.65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, and the suit claim cannot be said to have been barred. 12. The second appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.