A. LALA, J. ( 1 ) - This is an application of the petitioner under sections 5,11,12 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. ( 2 ) BY making this application the petitioner wanted a direction for stay of the arbitration proceedings and consequential reliefs. ( 3 ) IN an earlier occasion the petitioner moved an application seeking the similar relief in addition to revocation of authority of the Umpire wherein consequentially a question arose as to whether the petitioner company is falling under the category of Sick Industrial Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 as amended up-to-date and if so, as to whether the arbitration proceedings can be proceeded before the Umpire. But such point was not stressed taking the plea that the petitioner made a special leave petition before the Supreme court of India for a decision on such point and sought for adjournments. However, during the course of the proceedings Mr. R. M. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner informed this court that the special leave petition was dismissed. Since I have not formally called upon to adjudicate such point, the earlier application was disposed of without making any reference as to the subject-matter stated hereinabove. ( 4 ) TAKING that plea the petitioner made this application calling upon this court to adjudicate as to the applicability of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 as amended up-to-date in the arbitration proceedings. ( 5 ) SIMILAR question arose before two Single Benches of this Hon'ble Court on two different occasions. In an earlier decision a Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court held that section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is applicable in case of arbitration proceedings while in a latter decision another Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court held that section 22 as above is not applicable in the case of arbitration proceedings. From the later judgment a special leave petition was moved when the Supreme Court of India was pleased to direct that the said question should be decided by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court. From the later judgment a special leave petition was moved when the Supreme Court of India was pleased to direct that the said question should be decided by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENTLY a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court decided the issue considering both the judgments of the Single Benches of this court which is reported in 1997 (2) CLJ 1 (Burn Standard Company Ltd. v. MCDermott International Inc and Ors.) wherein later decision on the Single Bench of this court was accepted. ( 7 ) THE guiding principle of the Division Bench judgment is that the arbitration proceedings is not a coercive proceeding at all, nor it is a suit for recovery of money to include such a proceeding within the fold of section 22 (1) of the said Act. It is only a proceeding started by consent of the parties before the Judge or Judges appointed by themselves, for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedings. Even if, it is found by the Arbitrators at the end of such proceedings that certain amounts are due from the company by its creditor, and the Arbitrators pass an award accordingly, even then straightway the said award cannot be executed. The award is to be presented in a court, and a decree is to be passed upon such award, which can only be executed, and if such execution proceedings is initiated, then it may amount to a coercive proceeding and not prior to that, and that stage admittedly has not come as yet, so far as the present case is concerned. ( 8 ) FROM the judgment and order of the Division Bench of this court again a Special Leave Petition was moved when the Supreme Court of India held that the grievance of the petitioner can adequately be met in the strong framework of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. No relief under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is available to the petitioner. The SLP is, therefore, dismissed. No relief under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is available to the petitioner. The SLP is, therefore, dismissed. ( 9 ) IN an earlier occasion in disposing the matter in G. A. No. 274 of 1995 AP No. 12 of 1995 (Cycle Corporation of India Ltd. v. Biswanath Dhandhania) this court allowed the arbitration proceeding to continue but there contesting parties have accepted the decision of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court. ( 10 ) THE petitioner wanted an interpretation of the order of the Supreme Court of India by this court. The reason for taking such plea is the one line observation of the Supreme Court of India that the grievance of the petitioner can adequately be met in the strong framework of section 22 of the Act. As per the petitioner such observation indicated mind of the Supreme Court of India as against Division Bench of this court. Therefore by applying doctrine of merger, the Division Bench judgment cannot be existed. Secondly judgment cannot overreach the statute which was exactly done by the Division Bench of this court. Since the Supreme Court of India used the words strong framework'about the statute, overreaching of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in its judgment cannot have any face value. ( 11 ) THEREFORE two if not three courses are open to this court in disposing of this application, namely: (I)dismissal of this application in view of Division Bench judgment of this Hon'ble Court; (ii)referring the matter directly to the Supreme Court of India for its illustration visualising the circumstances cropped up herein; (iii)holding in favour of the petitioner in spite of having Division Bench judgment of this Hon'ble Court on this point. ( 12 ) THIRD course cannot be applicable at the threshold to maintain the judicial property. Therefore, out of earlier two courses which one would be acceptable is depending upon the situation as to whether there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority or the situation is otherwise. ( 13 ) THERE is no doubt the Supreme Court clearly observed that the grievance of the petitioner can adequately be met in the strong framework of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. But there is also no doubt that no relief is granted to the petitioner and the SLP was dismissed. ( 13 ) THERE is no doubt the Supreme Court clearly observed that the grievance of the petitioner can adequately be met in the strong framework of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. But there is also no doubt that no relief is granted to the petitioner and the SLP was dismissed. Neither there is any illustration nor any indication of relief has given in the order so that it can be evaluate that the Judgment and order of the Division Bench of this court is merged with such observation. Even the Supreme Court did not dispose of the SLP with such observation but dismissed the same which goes against the petitioner. It appears that the Supreme Court made a passing comments in dismissing the SLP which cannot be construed to have reversal effect over and above the judgment and order of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court. ( 14 ) SO far the Division Bench judgment is concerned it is true that Division Bench relied upon the several Supreme Court judgments which were delivered before the amendment of the Act came into force in 1994 but while disposing the matter Division Bench took note of the amendment. Therefore let me consider the amendment of the section 22 of the Act and applicability in the Arbitration proceeding with the aid of the Division Bench of this court. ( 15 ) BY amendment in 1994 suits were incorporated under section 22 of the Act but such suits does not necessarily mean all suits but few suits which are as follows: (I) suit for recovery of money; (ii)suit for enforcement of any Security against the industrial company; (iii)suit of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to an industrial company. ( 16 ) IT is well-known that suits includes 'proceedings' in any court of civil jurisdiction but there is a thinner line in between proceedings arising out of a suit and proceedings arising in an Arbitration. Arbitration proceedings can be initiated with the intervention of the court or without the intervention of the court but as soon as subject-matter is referred to an Arbitrator or Arbitrators, court cannot have any seisin over the proceedings before the Arbitrator or Arbitrators. Such Arbitrator or Arbitrators again become functus officio as and when award is made and published. Arbitration proceedings can be initiated with the intervention of the court or without the intervention of the court but as soon as subject-matter is referred to an Arbitrator or Arbitrators, court cannot have any seisin over the proceedings before the Arbitrator or Arbitrators. Such Arbitrator or Arbitrators again become functus officio as and when award is made and published. Even thereafter intervention of judicial administrative functions continue as to filing of the award in the court and service of notice of the court upon an objector giving a minimum one month period to file his objection challenging the award. Thereafter the award put up before the Arbitration Court for its disposal either the award may be set aside or remitted or a decree can be passed. Then and then alone it is becoming Rule of court. Such Rule of court when goes in favour of an award holder and put for an execution it may become compelling but not before. Therefore there cannot be any departure from the judgment of the Division Bench to that score. ( 17 ) BEFORE coming into the conclusion let us see what is the normal sickness of a company. The sickness is no better than financial sickness. Therefore intention of the legislature is to introduce such Act to give breathe to a sick company from its financial crisis. There the question of suspension of legal proceedings, contract etc. lies, suspension cannot be an absolute remedy but a temporary remedy. Therefore, a temporary bar for such remedy can only be imposed when the circumstances are compelling the company to incur further financial crisis which, in other words, coercive in nature. Therefore stage of the proceeding is much more vital incoming to a conclusion, otherwise in the garb of protection one can take undue advantage which is not the desire of the legislature. ( 18 ) TAKING into totality of the circumstances, this application is liable to be dismissed and dismissed but no order is passed as to costs. Since the respondent did not use any affidavit allegations made in the petition are not admitted by them. All parties are to act on a signed copy minute of the operative part of the order. Application dismissed