Judgment : The petitioner is the tenant under the respondent. The respondent filed R.C.O.P.No.62 of 1986 on the file of the Rent Controller, Tuticorin to evict the petitioner herein on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and for owner’s occupation. The Rent Controller by his order dated 3. 1989 ordered eviction only on the ground of wilful default. So far as the requirement of the landlord for owner occupation is concerned, the Rent Controller negatived the claim of the respondent. As against this order of the Rent Controller, the petitioner preferred an appeal in R.C.A.No.15 of 1989 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Tuticorin who confirmed the order of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal in and by his judgment dated 22. 1992. Aggrieved by the same the present revision has been filed. 2. Mr.T.R. Rajagopalan, the learned senior counsel and Additional Advocate General on behalf of the petitioner contended that the respondent has stated in the petition that the petitioner has committed default in paying the rent from February, 1985 to June, 1986. But however admittedly the arrears had been paid before the first hearing of the petition that is on 18. 1986. Hence in view of the judgment reported in Jabbar v. Abdul Bari, (1997)2 M.L.J. 181 , the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any wilful default. Hence, the eviction petition ought to have been dismissed. But both the authorities below have concurrently found that the petitioner committed default in the payment of rents, subsequently to the filing of the petition, for ten months and on 16. 1987 the arrears of rent for 10 months had been paid to the respondent herein and this will amount to wilful default and ordered eviction. Both the authorities are not correct in finding that the default committed by the petitioner during the pendency of the proceedings would amount to wilful default. Further the learned senior counsel contended that the door No.143 is not in existence and as such the petition is liable to be dismissed. 3. On the contrary Mr.K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent contended that admittedly on the date of the filing of the petition for eviction the petitioner was in arrears. Further the learned senior counsel contended that the door No.143 is not in existence and as such the petition is liable to be dismissed. 3. On the contrary Mr.K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent contended that admittedly on the date of the filing of the petition for eviction the petitioner was in arrears. The payment of the arrears either on the date of the first hearing of the petition or earlier to that, cannot be construed as if it will not amount to wilful default. Further there is nothing wrong on the part of the authorities below in taking into consideration of the subsequent conduct of the petitioner in the non-payment of the rent regularly. The finding of the authorities below being a concurrent finding and factual one, the civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. I carefully considered the contentions of both the counsels. The contention of the learned senior counsel and Additional Advocate General is two fold. One is that the payment of arrears of rent before the first hearing of the petition will amount to that there is no wilful default on the part of the petitioner. The next argument is that the door No.143 for which the petition has been filed is not in existence and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed. One other argument advanced by the learned Additional Advocate General is that the non-payment of rent during the pendency of the proceedings ought not to have been construed as wilful default and the authorities below have found that the same will amount to wilful default without considering the explanation given by the petitioner that the rent is being usually collected by the agent of the landlord at periodical intervals and hence the finding based on the subsequent conduct of the petitioner is liable to be set aside. 5. 5. So far as the first question is concerned the learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the judgment reported in Jabbar v. Abdul Bari, (1997)2 M.L.J. 181 , wherein the learned Judge has held as follows: “Therefore, applying the proviso to Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the judgment of the Supreme Court and that of this Court referred to supra, I hold that since the tenant has paid the entire arrears before the effective date of the first hearing, there is no wilful default committed by him. This Court has to reconsider its judgment dated 8. 1996 since the tenant has paid the entice arrears before the date of the effective hearing on 10. 1985 and the proof of the same is filed only now along with the review application as additional evidence.” The learned Additional Advocate General also relied upon two other judgments reported in V. Krishna Mudaliar v. Lakshmi Ammal, (1996)2 L.W. 467. This case may not be of any help for the petitioner because the facts are entirely different. In this case, the tenant did not pay the rent because the landlord has filed the suit for eviction and the landlord has refused to receive the rent till the disposal of the suit and hence the conduct of the tenant in not paying the rent will not amount to wilful default. The another case relied upon on behalf of the petitioner is reported in Dakaya alias Dakaian v. Anjani, (1996)1 L.W. 25. This case also may not be of any help because on facts in this case the landlord issued a notice to the tenant and the tenant has paid the arrears of rent before ever the eviction petition was filed. But however after receipt of the arrears of rent, the landlord filed the petition for eviction and it was held that there is no occasion to proceed against the tenant on the ground of wilful default. But however the judgment of Justice AR.Lakshmanan, reported in Jabbar v. Abdul Bari, (1997)2 M.L.J. 181 , makes it clear that the payment of rent before the first hearing will absolve the tenant from wilful default and the eviction petition cannot be proceeded with. But however the judgment of Justice AR.Lakshmanan, reported in Jabbar v. Abdul Bari, (1997)2 M.L.J. 181 , makes it clear that the payment of rent before the first hearing will absolve the tenant from wilful default and the eviction petition cannot be proceeded with. The authorities below have not found that the petitioner has committed wilful default on the basis of the arrears of rent till the filing of the R.C.O.P. Hence, that question will not arise here. 6. However both the authorities below have categorically found that the subsequent conduct of the petitioner in the non-payment of the rent for 10 months during the pendency of the R.C.O.P. proceedings will amount to wilful default. Here the contention of the learned. Additional Advocate General is that the petitioner did not pay the rent as it ‘is the practice that the landlord would send his agent to collect the rent and since the agent did not come for collection, the rent has not been paid. I am of the view that this explanation of the tenant cannot be accepted. For the first occasion the explanation can hold good. But when once the landlord has filed the petition for eviction on the ground of wilful default, the petitioner is fully aware that the is facing the eviction proceedings on the ground of nonpayment of the rent. When by filing the petition the landlord had exposed his mind thereafter it is the duty of the tenant to be careful enough to send the rent regularly every month. The nonpayment of the rent during the pendency of the proceedings will amount to wilful default as held in the judgments of this Court reported in Sundaram Steel Co., etc. v. S.Lakshmi, (1997)1 M.L.J. 476 : (1997)2 L.W. 501 and Poorman’s Depot Registration Firm v. Krishnan, (1997)2 M.L.J. 467 , which I have referred to in unreported judgment in C.R.P.No.1521 of 1997 as follows: “I can have support of judgment of this Court reported in Sundaram Steel Co., etc. v. S.Lakshmi, (1997)2 L.W. 501 , wherein it is held as follows:” “Further, I also find the observation in the impugned order of the Appellate Authority stating that in the petition filed by the landlady under Sec.11 of the Act, the petitioners were directed to deposit on 29. 1989 a sum of Rs.14,700 representing the rental dues as on that date. 1989 a sum of Rs.14,700 representing the rental dues as on that date. I also find that the said sum was subsequently deposited on 30.9.1989. That is why the appellate authority also observes that even after filing of the eviction petition, the tenants did not pay the rental arrears for several months (presumably for as many as 21 months). In the above circumstances, there is no case for admission of this civil revision petition and hence it is dismissed. Consequently C.M.P.Nos.15891 and 15892 of 1996 are dismissed. No costs.” Yet another judgment reported in Poorman’s Depot Registration Firm v. Krishnan, (1997)2 M.L.J. 467 , wherein it has been held as follows: “The fact remains, the tenant continued to be in default in payment of rent. The tenant is bound to pay the rent regularly as agreed. The subsequent conduct of the tenant is taken into account to come to a conclusion whether there was any supine indifference on the part of the tenant in payment of rent during the relevant period. The evidence available on record would prove that the tenant was in the habit of paying the rent irregularly. There is no wrong in taking into consideration of the cumulative effect of the conduct of the tenant in payment of the rent to assess the nature of default. The appellate authority has applied his mind with respect to the documents and evidence to come to the conclusion that the tenant has committed default in payment of rent wilfully. In the circumstances of the case and on the basis of the evidence on record, 1 am not in a position to take a different view.” On the well laid principles in the above judgments 1 find there is nothing wrong on the part of authorities below in taking into consideration the conduct of the petitioner in not paying the rent during the pendency of the proceedings to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed wilful default. Hence I see no ground to interfere with the order of eviction passed by the authorities below. 7. So far as the question of non-existence of the door No.143 is concerned there seems to be some confusion in the door numbers. In the first counter filed on 14. 1987, the petitioner did not raise any objection with regard to the existence of the door number. 7. So far as the question of non-existence of the door No.143 is concerned there seems to be some confusion in the door numbers. In the first counter filed on 14. 1987, the petitioner did not raise any objection with regard to the existence of the door number. But however an additional counter has been filed on 2. 1989 wherein, it is stated that there is no building as door number 143. In the cross-examination of his evidence he admitted that Exs.P-7 to P-14 relates to the receipt issued for payment of rent in respect of door No.143. But however he explained saying that it is a mistake. R.W.2 the Revenue Inspector of the Tuticorin Municipality has also stated in his cross-examination that Exs.P-16 to P-21 relates to the payment of water tax to door Nos.142 to 146. He also admitted that the tax receipts refer to door Nos.142 to 146. The respondent did not produce any lease deed to identify the leased property. It is his case that he has taken a row of shops with vacant site and perhaps that may be the reason for the confusion in the door number. Whatever it may be it is the case of the petitioner that he has paid the rent and there is no arrears on the date of the first hearing of the R.C.O.P. If that be so, he might not have paid the rent for the tenanted property. The lower appellate authority has rightly found in paragraph 8 of his order that the petitioner is the tenant in respect of door No.143 and the door No.143 is in existence in view of the several documents referred to therein and as such the plea of the petitioner that the door number 143 is not in existence cannot be accepted. As there is no illegality or infirmity in the finding of both the trial as well as the lower appellate authority, their orders are confirmed. The civil revision petition is dismissed.