JUDGMENT This is a writ petition by some 80 workmen who have been engaged in the distribution of Coke Breeze, for obtaining permanent employment as regular employees of the respondent No. 2. 2. The writ application was filed in 1988. 3. By that time these workers had worked for six years. They obtained a favourable interim order on a contested bearing. That order is still operating now. No appeal was preferred therefrom. 4. The workers are, therefore, still in employment. 5. Before the contested hearing which took place on this occasion before me, the writ petitioners had obtained an ex parte order in their favour which was passed by me earlier, giving the shortest of reasons why the workers should be absorbed. Rule was made absolute as prayed for. 6. An application for setting aside of the ex parte order was made but dismissed by me. Appeals were preferred. The appeals succeeded. On the direction given by the Court of appeal the affidavit-in-opposition has at last come 10 years after filing of the writ. 7. An affidavit-in-reply has also been filed. The matter this time has not gone ex parte but long arguments have been made. 8. Although in many decisions the Supreme Court has again and again stressed the extreme desirability of giving reasons for decisions, yet to my knowledge there is no reasoned decision of a Division Bench of this Court or of the Supreme Court yet which lays down that an order passed by a Judge taking a Single Bench of the High Court can be set aside only on the ground that the order is not a reasoned one. But because of the desirability of giving reasons, however short, one or two sentences were said even in my earlier ex parte order. However, that matter is no longer of any importance today. 9. The petitioners prayed for permanent absorption on the principal of law which is, or at least should be, well known by now that, in the case of public employers the principle is that if the job is a permanent one then the employment should also be a permanent one. The Court frowns upon the filling up the permanent job vacancies by public employers on a casual basis, thus giving permanent workers no permanent basis of employment or security. 10. In support of this proposition the writ petitioners relied on certain cases. The Court frowns upon the filling up the permanent job vacancies by public employers on a casual basis, thus giving permanent workers no permanent basis of employment or security. 10. In support of this proposition the writ petitioners relied on certain cases. The first is (1) Hussainbhai's case reported at AIR 1978 SC 1410 . Reference was thereafter made to the cases reported at (2) AIR 1967 SC 512, Jaswant Sugar Mills and in (3) AIR 1987 SC 2342 , Daily Rated Casual Labour. 11. For the respondents these cages were sought to be distinguished on the basis that the workers came to the Court first availing themselves of the remedies provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was said on behalf of the respondents that if no dispute is raised by the State, there is no question of reinstatement decided upon by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal then the Writ Court cannot be approached as the first Court. 12. In my opinion, this is not a point of sound distinction. It has been said in the cases above that "If the livelihood of the workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make believe trappings of attachment from the Management cannot snap the real-live bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off (Hussainbhai-Paragraph 6) :- "The distinction between a permanent workman engaged on work of a permanent nature and a temporary workman engaged on work of a permanent nature is in the fact that a temporary workman is engaged to fill in a temporary need of extra hands of permanent jobs ...By such device it would be possible for the employer to prevent any workman from becoming permanent, even though the work on which he is engaged lasts throughout the year and is in its nature permanent." (Paragraph 4 of Jaswant Sugar Mills) : "It is urged that the State cannot deny at least the minimum pay in the pay scales of regularly employed workmen even though the Government may not be compelled to extend all the benefits enjoyed by regularly recruited employees. We are of the view that such denial amounts to exploitation of labour... We are of the view that such denial amounts to exploitation of labour... It may be that the casual labourer has agreed to work on such low wages that he has done because he has no other choice. It is poverty that has driven him to that state. The Government should be a model employer." (Daily Rated Casual Labour) 13. The power of the Court in appropriate circumstances to grant labour benefiting orders is, therefore, undeniable. Such benefits might in appropriate cases take the shape of granting of permanent employment to the hitherto retained casual workers, or it might take the shape of enforcement of a minimum amount of payment to casual workers even though the casual nature of their work permits the State or other authorities to enforce undignified and low wage condition. 14. Once the power of the writ Court to grant employment to casually retained employer is seen to be present, we have to go on to the facts of this case and see whether the writ petitioners deserve any relief. 15. Until the 31st March, 1982 most of the writ petitioners, or at least quite a good number of them, were working as labour recruited by any labour contractor E.A. Vaz. With the expiry of March 1982 the contract of Vaz was terminated. Several of the workers working under Vaz and many others who came as early as in April 1982 were not thrown out of employment. They continued to render their services. Such service is supply of Coke Breeze, which is the name of almost burnt coke which, however, is still somewhat unable. 16. It is stated in the writ petition that these supplies were made by these erstwhile contract labour to the employees of the respondent No. 2 as well as to outside parties like police authorities and banks. This part of the case of the writ petitioners is not denied in opposition but is actually supported in so far as supplies to employees themselves are concerned. 17. It is also not in dispute that the writ petitioners are holders of identity cards issued by the respondent No. 2. Payments have been received right from 1982 until now by the writ petitioners both of wages and of house rent allowances. Provident fund deductions have been made by the second respondent and the records of those are also not in dispute. Payments have been received right from 1982 until now by the writ petitioners both of wages and of house rent allowances. Provident fund deductions have been made by the second respondent and the records of those are also not in dispute. The case of the second respondent is not that the writ petitioners are interlopers and nobodies but that they should not be given permanent employment because of the following reasons. 18. The respondent states that the petitioners are no better than contract labour. They say that the contract labourers also get wages paid. They also have provident fund deductions but it is not possible for a contract labour merely for these reasons, or by reason of the possession of identity cards to come to Court and ask to become directly employed by the respondent No. 2. In the much delayed affidavit-in-opposition the respondent's case is that in 1982, after the termination of the contract of E.A. Vaz, the Coke Breeze distribution jobs could have been handed over to any outside party but only with an intention of not throwing the petitioners out of employment, the said Coke Breeze distribution job has been handed over to unregistered association of the petitioners. 19. This is their important point of defence. They also repeat that the workers who are said to be members of the petitioner No. 1 belong to the said unregistered association and were not recruited by the respondent-company ever. 20. Even in submissions, it was said that the petitioners fill the same position of contract labour and their own unregistered association fills the place of the contractor. 21. Before we come to the law of the Contract Labour Regulations and Abolition, it is important to examine this crucial factual aspect. If there is an unregistered association, which can be a contractor then the law regarding the writ petitioners is totally different; but there is no such unregistered association. The Mythical unregistered association has no name, no office premises and no office bearers. Even in identity slips and other cards the respondent No. 2 has had to refer to such vague phrases as Coke Breeze, direct employment, for the purpose of filling gaps of the absent contractor. There is no factual dispute, therefore, which can be seen to be present on this score. Even in identity slips and other cards the respondent No. 2 has had to refer to such vague phrases as Coke Breeze, direct employment, for the purpose of filling gaps of the absent contractor. There is no factual dispute, therefore, which can be seen to be present on this score. The simple fact of the matter is that the contractor walked away in 1982 but the contract labour all remained. They remained and got paid directly by the respondent No. 2 and such payments have been on the basis as if they were still contract labour but they have ceased to be contract labour from 1982 as there ceased to be any contractor who could engage such labour. On the basis of the prevalence of contract labour the main defence of the respondent was sought to be raised. It was said that the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 does not absolutely prevent the employment of labour through a contractor. The prevention, if any, made in an absolute form, must come by way of the appropriate Government’s intervention acting under Section 10 of the said Act. In the instant case there has been no such notification under Section 10. Therefore, contract labour not being absolutely prohibited the writ petitioners are no better than contract labour; and if they are not better than contract labour they cannot ask for direct employment with the respondent No. 2 as it would pave the way to the flood-gates being open to all contract labour seeking direct employment by passing their contractors altogether. 22. In support of this proposition several cases decided by the Supreme Court were relied upon. It is best refer to the Gujarat Electricity Board’s case in this regard which considered most of the earlier decisions also. That case is reported at (4) AIR 1995 SC 1893 . The Supreme Court did indeed emphasize in this case that there remains a lacuna in the matter of abolishion of contract labour, because after such abolishion under Section 10, there is no corresponding obligation created on the principal employer to take on erstwhile contract labour. Thus it is possible that with the abolishion of contract labour the contract labourers lose their jobs altogether. It has been emphasised is this case and others that it is not for the High Court to remove the barrier of the contract labour regulation altogether. Thus it is possible that with the abolishion of contract labour the contract labourers lose their jobs altogether. It has been emphasised is this case and others that it is not for the High Court to remove the barrier of the contract labour regulation altogether. The High Court cannot at the instance of labourers who come before the Court by pass the contractor and the 1970 Act altogether and direct employment of such contract labour by the principal employer as a matter of course. The State Government's abolition under Section 10 is the State Government's prerogative and not the High Court's. The case of (5) Catering Cleaners reported at AIR 1987 SC 777 was referred to in this case. The respondent referred to that case also in support of their case here. They emphasised that here also the Supreme Court emphasised the point that it is for the Government to abolish contract labour and not for the High Court. The respondents referred in this respect also to the case of (6) Dena Nath reported at AIR 1992 SC 457 , alternatively at (7) AIR 1991 SCW 206 . It is true that the Supreme Court here also warned against granting of direct employment by Court, which would, in a manner of speaking, be a violation of the 1970 Act. The next case relied on in this regard by the respondents is that of (8) R.K. Panda reported at 1994 (5) SCC 304 , alternatively (9) AIR 1994 SCW 2406. The Supreme Court here also sounded the warning against giving the status of permanent employment to contract labour but in this case the Court noticed that because of interim orders several contract labour had enjoyed interim protection. Thus such labourers were directed to be directly absorbed. In our case also we must not fail to note that the petitioners have enjoyed the protection of interim orders and it would be very harsh to throw them out of employment after 16 years of status quo. 23. The respondents also relied upon specifically to Section 21 of the Act of 1970 showing therein that payment of wages by the principal employer is not completely ruled out even in the case of contract labour. Thus they argued the payment for the 16 years is not an absolute indication that the contract labour has already become the direct employee of the respondent No. 2. 24. Thus they argued the payment for the 16 years is not an absolute indication that the contract labour has already become the direct employee of the respondent No. 2. 24. A look at the facts stated above would immediately convince one that the argument based on the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolishion) Act, 1970 has no basis to operate upon. There has been no contractor for the past 16 years. It is not that the workers under a contractor are seeking to overstep the contractor and come into direct employment of the principal employer. Because of the exit of E.A. Vaz a situation was created when the respondent No. 2 was forced to take a decision whether to continue with the job being done by the contract labourers of E.A. Vaz or to entrust those jobs to somebody else. A decision was taken and the contract labour of E.A. Vaz were retained. They were retained outside the ambit of the Contract Labour Act of 1970 because they were retained without a contractor. None of the many provisions of the 1970 Act would be satisfied if one were to look for the contractor and the other requisites to regard to the writ petitioners, in respect of their employment under the principal employment of the respondent No. 2 from 1982. The second respondent continued with the job of the writ petitioners and if there were no jobs to continue with, they would not and could not have been retained. Supply of Coke Breeze was needed to be made. Such supply of Coke Breeze was made by the writ petitioners. Such supply was accepted from them. They were paid under a contract labour screen but there was no contract labour at that time. The facts, therefore, reveal that the second respondent has retained the employment of the writ petitioners for 16 years and it is a matter of no consequence whatsoever that contract labour has not been abolished in the area and sphere of operation which is filled by the writ petitioners. 25. Simply put, the writ petitioners have worked continuously. Their job is a continuous job. They have worked for 16 years. They have been paid for 16 years. As their job is permanent their employment should also become permanent. 25. Simply put, the writ petitioners have worked continuously. Their job is a continuous job. They have worked for 16 years. They have been paid for 16 years. As their job is permanent their employment should also become permanent. The problem of the writ petitioners trying to overstep the 1970 Act or their employing contractor is absent because there has been none from 1992. 26. The respondents submitted as a second limb of their argument that the writ petition will not succeed unless the second respondent is an Article 12 authority, and also there is involved in the writ, an element of public law. 27. So far as the Article 12 point 15 concerned the ownership and control by the Central Government in this case is so absolute. That question does not really arise. It is not even disputed in the affidavit-in-opposition. 28. However, the element of public law as a necessary ingredient in a writ was pressed. The main case relied on in this regard is that of Anupam Ghosh, a Division Bench judgment of our Court reported at (10) 1991 (2) CHN 451 . 29. That was a case of termination of the Financial Director of Andrew Yule whose contract of service allowed termination at three months’ notice. The Division Bench opined that even in the case of Article 12 authorities not any and every action by it is subject to the writ, jurisdiction. In the termination in issue the public law element was found to be totally absent. 30. Following this case there have been other decisions of this Court, one in the case of (11) Mayurakshi Cotton Mills reported in 1993 (2) CLJ 176 and another an unreported decision given in the case of (12) Tapan Kumar Banerjee & Ors. on 19th May, 1995 in C.O. No. 8502(W) of 1994. 31. I do not see how the absence of the public law element can be pressed into service in this case, private contract here there is none. The parties have proceeded on a completely ad hoc basis. The second respondent is no doubt an Article 12 authority. The writ petitioners invoke the peculiarly public law proposition of permanent job permanent employment in this writ. I would rather opine that here the element of private law is completely absent. The parties have proceeded on a completely ad hoc basis. The second respondent is no doubt an Article 12 authority. The writ petitioners invoke the peculiarly public law proposition of permanent job permanent employment in this writ. I would rather opine that here the element of private law is completely absent. Were we to look at the various sections of the Contract Act, we would be unable to find out a single section on the basis of which the respondent No. 2 could be enforced to enter into a contract of service with the writ petitioners. But to look at the Contract Act in a situation like the present would completely miss the real point. 32. Therefore, I find that the ex parte order which I had passed earlier is to be retained and re-passed after the full length hearing. 33. There shall thus the rule absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the writ petition. There shall also be rule absolute in terms of prayers (d) and (e) and there shall be orders in permanent form in terms of prayers (g) and (h) of the petition. The order will be effective excepting in the case of petitioner Nos. 8, 12, 25, 31 and 36 as they have already retired from service. Compliance to be effected within 4 weeks from date hereof. The orders, however, will be operative in favour of the writ petitioners until they reach the age of superannuation where-after the usual retire meat benefits will be made available. 34. There will be no order as to costs. All parties and all others concerned will act first upon a signed copy of the dictated order upon the usual undertakings of the Advocate-on-Record of the writ petitioner to have the rule perfected and shall thereafter act upon the perfected rule.