Judgment N.N.Singh, J. 1. This criminal revision application has been filed for setting aside the judgment and order dated 12.3.1993 passed by 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan in Sessions Trial No. 85 of 1990 by which he had acquitted all the four accused persons (opposite party Nos. 2 to 5). 2. The facts leading to filing of this criminal revision was that an FIR was lodged on 22.11.89 at 8.00 a.m. in Guthani police station by the informant Manorma Devi, alleging that on 21.11.89 at 8.00 a.m. when she was cleaning her drain, opposite party Surendra Rai objected claiming that drain to be his, whereupon there was an altercation and other opposite parties and the husband of informant Rajbanshi Rai came there. It was alleged that opposite party Surendra Rai gave a Farsa blow on the head of informants husband and other opposite parties assaulted him with lathi and that opposite party Anil Rai gave Farsa blow on the head of the informant and her mother-in-law and father-in-law were also assaulted with lathi by opposite party Jai Karan Rai and Chandra Ketu Rai. The injured were taken to Guthani hospital for treatment where the FIR of this case was recorded and injured Rajbanshi Rai was taken to BHU Hospital at Varanasi where he succumbed to his injures. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against these opposite parties who were put on trial and the learned trial Court allowing benefit of doubt to the accused persons, acquitted them, against which this criminal revision has been filed. 3. Sri Vyas Muni Singh, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the trial Court passed the judgment of acquittal on flimsy ground. According to him, the trial Court disbelieved the witnesses on the ground that they belonged to one khandan and that FIR (Ext. 5) was wrongly mentioned as hit by Section 162 of the Cr PC (perhaps, the trial Court by mistake mentioned under Section 162, Cr PC in place of Section 161 of Cr PC). Sri Singh further contended that there were four injures and there was no finding to show as to how the other injured sustained injuries and that even no suggestion was given to injured Chhedi Rai (PW 3) and Nageshwari Devi (PW 6) that their injures were manufactured. Sri Singh further contended that there were four injures and there was no finding to show as to how the other injured sustained injuries and that even no suggestion was given to injured Chhedi Rai (PW 3) and Nageshwari Devi (PW 6) that their injures were manufactured. Quoting different portions of the judgment of the trial Court, Sri Singh pointed out the following defects in the prosecution case mentioned by the trial Court for recording the judgment of acquittal. (i) PWs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 were of one khandan. (ii) Injury reports showing examination of injured between 11.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. was noted down on the back of the injury slip issued by the I.O. but the FIR was lodged at 8.00 p.m. after delay. (iii) The D.D. slip should have been treated as FIR. (iv) Medical evidence is not incon-sonance with the evidence led by prosecution as PW 5 Dr. K. M. P. Srivastava, who examined the injuries of Rajbanshi Rai (deceased) to claim it to be lacerated and categorically opined that injury No. 1 may not be caused by a Farsa. (v) That PW 2 in his further cross-examination introduced a different story of brick-batting and scuffle between the deceased and Surendra Rai and that PWs 9 & 10 who were tendered and not declared hostile, supported the defence version of brick-batting by lady members of both the families causing injuries. (vi) Delay in lodging in FIR. 4. Sri Vyas Muni Singh, the learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that he is conscious of the legal position that ordinarily, the High Court does not interfere in criminal revision filed against the judgment of acquittal unless some manifest error of law or lack of jurisdiction and defective procedure is not brought before the Court. He cited decision of Mahabir Mistry V/s. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1990 (6) PLJR 555 in which different decisions on this point were discussed. Sri Singh relied upon the observation made in the case of K. Chinna Swamy Reddy V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1962 SC 1788 : "We only wish to say that the Criminal Justice System does not admit of pigeonholing Life and the law do not fall neatly into slots. Sri Singh relied upon the observation made in the case of K. Chinna Swamy Reddy V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1962 SC 1788 : "We only wish to say that the Criminal Justice System does not admit of pigeonholing Life and the law do not fall neatly into slots. When a Court starts laying down rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4) or (a), (b), (c), (d), it is arranging for itself traps and pitfall, categories, classification and compartments, which statute does not mention, all tend to make law less flexible, less sensible and less just." 5. Obviously, this criminal revision has been filed by the informant under sub-section 4 of Section 401, Cr PC and which the Government failed to exercise right of appeal. The legal position is that in face of prohibition under sub-section (3) of Section 401, Cr PC finding of acquittal given by the trial Court cannot be converted by this Court into a finding of conviction. It has been well settled that only in case of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principle of law by the trial Court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of acquittal and direct a re-trial of acquitted accused. Obviously, this power should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution and this can be done in exceptional cases to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice or to set aside a patent wrong or error. In case of K. Chinna Swamy Reddi (supra), it was held that this jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court in exceptional cases when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is manifest error on the point of law and consequently, there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. In another decision in the case of Logen-dranath Jha V/s. Shri Polailal Biswas reported in AIR 1958 SC 316, it was held that this does not mean that in dealing with the revision petition by a private party against the order of acquittal, the High Court can, in absence of any error on the point of law reappraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, by resorting to the device of stopping to short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him. 6. 6. The learned Advocate for the petitioner put reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in the case of Ayodhya Dube V/s. Ram Sumer Singh reported in AIR 1981 SC 1415 where the High Courts order of interference in the revision in the case of acquittal made by the trial Court was found justified in the case where Sessions Judge had acquitted the accused by ignoring the probative value of FIR and reliable testimony of eye-witnesses and also in view of inconsistencies of faulty reasoning given by the trial Court. It has been held in number of decisions by the Supreme Court that this jurisdiction is not ordinarily to be invoked or used merely which the lower Court has taken wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record (AIR 1951 SC, 196). In the case of Bansilal reported in AIR 1986 SC 1721 : 1986 East CrC 785 (SC) it was held that mere circumstance, that a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify setting aside acquittal and directing re-trial. The difficulty in reappraisal of the evidence in such revision was discussed in the decision of the case of Aklu Ahir and others V/s. Ramdeo Ram reported in AIR 1973 SC 2145 where it was held that "in the face of prohibition in sub-section (3) for the High Court to convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of the acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. Accordingly, the High Court is not entitled to re-appraise evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and order re-trial." It was further held in the same decision that normally re-trial should not be ordered unless there is some infirmity rendering the trial defective. The reason is that the impression of the opinion by the High Court on the evidence before it with reference to the commission of alleged offences, though not binding on the Court, holding fresh trial, may nevertheless leave unconscious impression on the Court holding such trial. 7. The reason is that the impression of the opinion by the High Court on the evidence before it with reference to the commission of alleged offences, though not binding on the Court, holding fresh trial, may nevertheless leave unconscious impression on the Court holding such trial. 7. In view of the fact that no manifest illegality or violation of fundamental principle of law was shown to have been committed by the trial Court merely on the ground that the trial Court has misappreciated the evidence and has recorded a wrong finding of fact as held in the decisions discussed above, this jurisdiction cannot be invoked and this Court cannot reappraise the evidence, for the reasons discussed in Alaku Ahirs case (supra). 8. In the result, as no case for interference by this Court in this criminal revision has been made out, this criminal revision application is dismissed.