N. S. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) BY means of this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Ravi Singh has challenged the validity of the order of detention dated 26/06/1997 passed against him by Sri Hari Ram, the then District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, whereby the petitioner was directed to be detained under Sec. 3 (2) of the National Security Act. ( 2 ) IT appears that the petitioner was a resident of Mohalla Kalikutti, Shastri Nagar, P. S. Kotwali District Jaunpur. He came to Sonbhadra under the garb of contractor and started indulging himself into the criminal activities. As per grounds of detention stated by the District Magistrate, upon which he based his subjective satisfaction regarding the detention of the petitioner were as follows : (1) In the first instance, the petitioner was involved in case crime No. 277 of 96 punishable under Sec. 307, I. P. C. P. S. Anapara District Sonbhadra, in which the petitioner had assaulted one Uma Shankar Gupta on 23-7-96 by means of a knife with an intention to commit his murder. (2) The second instance was the involvement of the petitioner in the matter of robbery of Tata Sumo bearing registration No. UMT-2927, Chasis No. 385 003, C. S. Q.- 400934 Engine No. 483, D. I. U. I. M. B. S. Q. 722663 which car was got registered under fictitious registration No. G. J. /c. I.-3165 and which car was being driven openly by the petitioner and his associates for creating terror in the locality of the industrial town like Sonbhadra. (3) In the third instance, the petitioner was involved in case crime No. 142 of 97 punishable under Sec. 302/506, I. P. C. in which a young boy named Pawan Kumar Sharma aged about 32 years was done to death by the applicant and his associate Munna Singh on 3-6-1997 at about 10. 45 p. m. in Qasba Pipri near Turra Chauraha. The said incident of the murder of P. K. Sharma in which the aforesaid Tata Sumo car was used by the pettitioner and his associates for running away from the spot created terror in the locality so much so that all the shops of the locality were closed and the vehicles which were coming towards the petrol pump, the scene of occurrence, took turn and went back and the workers of the factories started feeling insecured. This incident had the effect of lowering down the production of the factory and the entire public order was disturbed because of the terror created by the petitioner. The petitioner was, therefore, detained by the impugned order, which was served upon him inside District Jail Mirzapur on 27-6-1997. The petitioner was called upon to submit a representation under Sec. 8 of the National Security Act, which he did submit on 7-7-97. After consideration of the petitioners representation by the Advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the detention order and rejected the representation made by the petitioner, the communication of which was made to the petitioner on 23-7-1997, that is, just within one month from the passing of the impugned order of detention; hence this petition. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the counter-affidavits and rejoinder affidavits which were exchanged in between the parties. ( 4 ) IT was argued on behalf of the petitioner that three incidents regarding involvement of the petitioner related to certain individuals and the involvement of the petitioner in all or in any of those incidents would not amount to disturbance of the public order. ( 5 ) IT was further argued that the District Magistrate passed the impugned order of detention in a mechanical manner without application of his mind. The said order was discriminatory and arbitrary and was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as no detention order against co-accused Munna Singh, to whom actual role of shooting by means of rifle was assigned in case crime No. 142 of 97 under Secs. 302/506, I. P. C. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited a ruling of the Honble Supreme Court in re; Smt. Victoria Fernandes v. Lal Mal Sawma, 1992 All Cri C 143 : ( AIR 1992 SC 687 ), in which their lordships of the Supreme Court had observed as follows (at p. 689 of AIR) :"the distinction between law and order and public order has been explained by this Court time and again. It has been pointed out that while the expression law and order is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, while public order has a narrower ambit and public order would be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. It has been pointed out that while the expression law and order is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, while public order has a narrower ambit and public order would be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise the problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleased by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning, law and order. The question to ask is; does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community, so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed. This question has to be faced in every case on its facts (See Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar) ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ); Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ); 4; Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 . " ( 6 ) ON the other hand, Sri Mahendra Pratap learned A. G. A. supported the validity of the impugned order of detention relying upon the ruling of Smt. Kamlabai v. Commr. of Police Nagar, reported in 1993 UP Cri R 568 : (1993 AIR SCW 2305), in which only one incident of catching a sub-inspector and threatening him with dire consequences at a public place was considered as an act of Gundaism and was considered sufficient ground for the detention of the petitioner. 6a. of Police Nagar, reported in 1993 UP Cri R 568 : (1993 AIR SCW 2305), in which only one incident of catching a sub-inspector and threatening him with dire consequences at a public place was considered as an act of Gundaism and was considered sufficient ground for the detention of the petitioner. 6a. Basically the question as to whether a particular incident is a matter of law and order and public order is a question of fact and not a question of law. ( 7 ) COMING to the facts of the present case and the material against the petitioner, we find that the satisfaction of the detaining authority, viz. the District Magistrate was based upon an earlier involvement of the petitioner in as many as three cases, one of which was that of Tata Sumo which was looted away, the other was an attempt to commit murder and the third was the murder itself. All these three incidents had happened one after the other within a span of one year prior to the date of passing the impugned detention order. It is clear from the order passed by the District Magistrate that the petitioner was originally a resident of Jaunpur. He came to Sonbhadra in connection with contract business and under the garb of being contractor, he started indulging himself in criminal activities. The very fact that a Tata Sumo motor car was looted away; the fact that the petitioner was openly roaming about in the said vehicle along with his associates and was involving himself in criminal activities of assaulting a man by means of knife and assisting the murder of another man for no rhyme or reason and for no enmity with the victim obviously are the instances of his high handedness and daring and devil activities, which were bound to affect peaceful tempo of the society of the industrial town like Sonbhadra. It was clearly mentioned by the District Magistrate in the impugned order that the petitioner was trying to be bailed out in the various cases in which he was involved and was likely to repeat his criminal activities if he was bailed out. It was clearly mentioned by the District Magistrate in the impugned order that the petitioner was trying to be bailed out in the various cases in which he was involved and was likely to repeat his criminal activities if he was bailed out. The petitioner himself filed bail orders of the Court regarding his bail in case punishable under Sec. 307, I. P. C. and another case punishable under Sec. 302, I. P. C. As such it is clear that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that the petitioner would get himself released on bail in those cases of heinous nature and would again indulge into unlawful activities was not a baseless one. Rather it was a subjective one. ( 8 ) IT was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order passed by the detaining authority against the petitioner was discriminatory on the ground that the detaining authority had not taken any action under National Security Act as against co-accused Munna, to whom the actual role of shooting the victim P. K. Sharma was assigned. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf, for the reason that whereas the petitioner had his involvement in as many as other two cases, there was nothing on record to suggest that co-accused Munna was also arrayed in rest of the other two cases, on the basis of which the detaining authority had based his satisfaction for the detention of the petitioner. ( 9 ) THE contention of the petitioner that the delay was caused in the disposal of his representation has got no legs to stand for the obvious reason that the representation made by the petitioner on 8-7-1997 was finally disposed of on 21-7-97 and the petitioner was communicated about the rejection of his representation on 23-7-1997, which fact has been stated by the petitioner himself in synopsis of the petition. ( 10 ) THUS to sum up, we find that the incidents complained against the petitioner were sufficient for the District Magistrate to arrive at a conclusion that by his activities, the petitioner was disturbing the peaceful tempo of the society and the public order. Sonbhadra being a small township, we are of the opinion that the petitioner was rightly proceeded against and was rightly detained under the provisions of National Security Act. Sonbhadra being a small township, we are of the opinion that the petitioner was rightly proceeded against and was rightly detained under the provisions of National Security Act. ( 11 ) WE find no force in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.