( 1 ) THESE five matters were taken up together as common points of fact and law were raised in these writ petitions. All these matters are being disposed of by this single judgment. ( 2 ) THE petitioner Mohammad Rafiq has been detained under the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the act) by an order dated 20-5-1997 recorded by the District Magistrate Bulandshahr, for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. On the date of detention, he was already in custody in connection with case Crime No. 26 of 1997 relating to Police Station Khurja Dehat, District Bulandshahr. The detention order was served along with the grounds as required under Section 8 of the Act and it spoke of involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities along with his associates, viz. Liyaqat, Saniullah, Mauji, Jakiullah and Ahmad Saeed. It spoke of murder of one Wahid Khan by then and in that incident the miscreants had cut off the head of the victim and removed it. The incident created a reign of terror in the locality affecting maintenance of public order. Police were after them and certain miscreants surrendered in Court on 17-4-1997 and 24-4-1997, while other associates went on threatening the witnesses. It was stated further in the grounds that the son of the deceased, Wahid Khan was kidnapped by Saleem, Ahmad Ali and Anil Kumar, all associates of the petitioner, and this was done with a view to put pressure on the second wife of Wahid, on whom Liyaqat had a lustful eye. Mohammad Rafiq, Liyaqat, Saniullah, Mauji, Jakiullah and Ahmad Saeed were taken into police custody after their surrender and upon intensive interrogation a clue was found for recovery of the weapons with which Wahid Khan was murdered. His mother had made a report to the police about threats given to her and others. It was stated further in the grounds that the criminal activities of the petitioner and his associates had badly affected the maintenance of public order in the locality, Liyaqat and Saniullah were proceeded against under the provisions of the Goonda Act as also under Sections 107/116, Cr. It was stated further in the grounds that the criminal activities of the petitioner and his associates had badly affected the maintenance of public order in the locality, Liyaqat and Saniullah were proceeded against under the provisions of the Goonda Act as also under Sections 107/116, Cr. P. C. It was stated that bail applications on behalf of these persons had been filed in Court and there was likelihood of their getting bail and once they were out on bail, they would surely commit serious offences against the complainant and the witnesses and would tamper with evidence. ( 3 ) FOR Jakiullah, the order of detention was dated 21-5-1997 and on that date he was already in custody. The grounds were almost the same as were indicated for Mohammad Rafiq and the grounds basically related with the murder of Wahid Khan, cutting off his head and taking it away. ( 4 ) FOR Mauji, the detention order is dated 20-5-1997. He too was already in custody in the substantive case of murder of Wahid Khan and for him also the grounds are more or less the same as for the other two. ( 5 ) FOR Saniullah, the detention order is dated 20-5-1997 and for Ahmad Saeed it is dated 21-5-1997. Both of them were in custody on the respective dates and the grounds upon which the detention orders were passed were the same as for others, although couched in different language. ( 6 ) ON behalf of all these petitioners, Sri Prem Prakash urged that the detention order was passed on the basis of one single incident and there were no materials before the detaining authority to presume that any of the petitioners was likely to repeat similar acts after they are released on bail. On this point, the learned State Counsel submitted that the reports of the sponsoring officers would justify such a conclusion. It was further stated on behalf of Sri Prem Prakash that necessary documents were not supplied to the petitioners. In answer to this the learned A. G. A. submitted that documents are given, primarily, for the purpose of enabling the detenus to make proper representations. In fact, the representations were made but no grievance was set up regarding absence of supply of papers. In answer to this the learned A. G. A. submitted that documents are given, primarily, for the purpose of enabling the detenus to make proper representations. In fact, the representations were made but no grievance was set up regarding absence of supply of papers. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel also contended that the detaining authority had not applied his mind at all and he simply reproduced the allegations of the sponsoring authorities by paraphrasing their reports and when there was non-application of mind, it could not be inferred, according to the learned counsel, that there was a subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which was a must for any order under the Act. ( 8 ) IT was hotly argued on behalf of the petitioners that the allegations could, at the worst, make out a case of disturbance of law and order and in no case there could be any prejudice to maintainance of public order. Sri Prem Prakash argued that preventive detention is a law that goes against the right of liberty guaranteed to the citizen and, as such, the procedural safeguards for making a detention order and for continued detention are the only checks for the protection of the valuable right of liberty guaranteed to the citizens. A point was also raised on his behalf, to say, that Beena was shown as wife of Wahid Khan in the grounds of detention, although, in fact, Beena was forcibly kidnapped/abducted and a criminal case was pending against Wahid and the papers concerning this criminal case were relevant to the issue, but these papers were also not supplied to the petitioners. ( 9 ) WE are, therefore, confronted with the points if the averments make out a case of prejudice to the maintenance of public order or it was only a question of law and order. We are further to see if the documents were really supplied to the petitioner and if the documents, said to have been withheld, were relevant to the question of subjective satisfiaction of the District Magistrate. We are further to see if the District Magistrate had applied his mind or had only paraphrased the report of the sponsoring authority as a plea of making the preliminary order. We are further to see if the District Magistrate had applied his mind or had only paraphrased the report of the sponsoring authority as a plea of making the preliminary order. It would also be necessary for us to determine, if for the failure of one ground of detention, the order would still be saved under Section 5-A of the Act. To press his grounds, the learned counsel relied on certain case laws. In the case of Subhash Bhandari v. District Magistrate, Lucknow, AIR 1988 SC 74 : (1988 Cri LJ 190) the question of distinction between law and order and public order was taken up. It was held herein that a solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisifed by the detaining authority to pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs public tranquility by creating terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of people in a specified locality where the act is alleged to have been committed. It was the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which was vital for considering the question whether a man had committed only a breach of law and order or had acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order. Reference was made to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulab Mehra v. State of U. P. , AIR 1987 SC 2332 : (1988 Cri LJ 165) to point out that public order was the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. In the case before the Supreme Court (Subhash Bhandari v. District Magistrate, Lucknow), the Supreme Court found that the alleged act of assault by fire-arms was confined to the complainant Surya Kumar and not to others and it was held to be an act infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act was not so extensive as to affect considerable members of the society. In other words, the act did not disturb public tranquillity nor did it create any terror or panic in the minds of the people of the locality. In other words, the act did not disturb public tranquillity nor did it create any terror or panic in the minds of the people of the locality. A similar view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ghanshyam Nishad v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad, 1988 All LJ 1003. The Divisin Bench of this Court relied on the case of Subhash Bhandari (supra) and held, on the peculiar facts of that case, that the alleged act of assault by fire-arm was confined to Raj Kumar (deceased) only and not to others and, as such, it was an act infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act was not so extensive as to affect the considerable members of the society. The writ petition was allowed and the petitioner was directed to be set at liberty forthwith. ( 10 ) IN the instant case it was indicated in the grounds that Wahid Khan was murdered in a ghastly manner and his head was separated from the trunk and was taken away in presence of public in general and the witnesses were also subsequently threatened. The people, who had assembled nearby, were stunned with an impact of such a daring and gruesome incident and a panic gripped the whole locality. It was indicated that prior to this incident the son of Wahid Khan was kidnapped with a view to pressurise one Beena to come under the lustful clutches of an associate of the present petitioners. Applications were filed before the police by the mother of Wahid regarding further threats being given to her. It was stated that against Liyaqat and Saniullah proceedings under the Goonda Act had been started. It is true that the offence was committed against Wahid Khan, who was done to death, but the background is also relevant and Subhash Bhandaris case followed by Ghanshyam Nishads case (supra) dictates that the criminal act itself is not the real thing to be seen for the detention order, but the Court is to see the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The Court is further to see if the act had created terror and panic in the minds of the people of the locality. It is not a case of mere shoot and run. The Court is further to see if the act had created terror and panic in the minds of the people of the locality. It is not a case of mere shoot and run. The petitioners and others had not only killed Wahid but had cut off his head and taken away the head leaving the headless trunk and while going they had weilded their guns to threaten the local people. This, by itself, suggests that it had surpassed the limits of individual vengeance and had disturbed the even tempo of the society. Also there are allegations that panic had engulfed the whole locality. By this single act itself, there is, thus, a potentiality of repetition of daring acts at the instance of the petitioners, as they had exhibited the least regard for the law and for the norms of the society. ( 11 ) IT was stated, further, that although the grounds spoke of proceedings under the Goonda Act against Liyaqat and Saniullah, these papers wre not supplied to the petitioners and this was certainly a gross violation of the provisions of law as the petitioners, due to non-supply of these papers, were prevented from making proper representations. The learned A. G. A. had stated that if one of several grounds falls due to some reason or the other, or is found to be invalid, the detention order could still be sustained if the other grounds were valid. He made a reference to Section 5a of the Act. A reading of the grounds indicate that in several paragraphs different allegations were levelled touching the alleged past activities of the petitioners and one of the paragraphs only spoke of the proceeding under the Goonda Act. Section 5a of the Act clearly postulates that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under the National Security Act on two or more grounds, the order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or invalid for any other reason whatsoever. This section directs that it would be presumed that the detaining authority was satisfied with reference to the remaining gounds to make the order of detention. On this point, the learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that Section 5a of the Act speaks of the grounds of detention and is an exception on the point of validity of all the grounds. It could not, according to the learned counsel, be read as an exception to the procedure as laid down in Section 8 of the Act and it was argued that the substantive law of detention has the inbuilt checks through the procedural safeguards for the protection of liberty of citizens. It was stated that Section 5a simply saved an order under Section 3 (2) based on several grounds including an invalid one, but it did not save a deviation from Section 8 of the Act which requires communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu and to afford him an earliest opportunity of making representation against the order to the appropriate Government. In our view, the legislative right of making a detention law springs from the provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution and any law of detention must always be subject to the safeguards guaranteed under that Article. Detention cannot be made without the procedure laid down by law and the provisions of one section or the other in the Act speaks of procedure only under which a detention is to be made. In the absence of Section 5a, a ground of detention may be challenged for n non-fulfilment of the procedural safeguards as indicated in Sections 8, 10, and 14 of the Act. Section 5a must, therefore, be read as a provision which saves a detention order based on several grounds even though one of such grounds become invalid "any other reasons whatsoever. " This clause would include invalidity of a ground of detention for non-compliance of the procedural aspects as well. Thus, Section 5a of the Act could always be read to exclude the invalid piece of ground and to see if the rest of the grounds could sustain a detention order. The non supply of papers concerning the proceeding under the Goonda Act against Liyaqat and Saniullah could, at the best, make that ground invalid but could not affect the other grounds, if otherwise valid. The non supply of papers concerning the proceeding under the Goonda Act against Liyaqat and Saniullah could, at the best, make that ground invalid but could not affect the other grounds, if otherwise valid. Concerning non supply of papers, it was further stated that in the grounds a lady named Beena, was described as the second wife of Wahid Khan and this fact was seriously challenged. It was stated that Beena was forcibly abducted by Wahid Khan, for which a F. I. R. was lodged against Wahid and the petitioner had demanded copies of that F. I. R. , but was not supplied the same. Even if, it is accepted that Beena was not the second wife of Wahid Khan but was just a woman forcibly dragged into his harem, the act of the petitioners in killing Wahid Khan and to cut off his head and take it away could never be justified under any pretext of law. The relationship betwen Beena and Wahid Khan has been quoted in the grounds only to indicate that Liyaqat had a lustful eye towards this woman and to put pressure on her or on Wahid Khan, the son of Wahid Khan was kidnapped. ( 12 ) ON the question of supply of documents, reliance was placed on a number of cases. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dharam Pal Yadav v. Union of India, 1992 All CR R 70 was also confronted with this question. The discussions in paragrpah 9 of the judgment indicate that materials were brought before the Court to show that apart from the various informations which had been asked for, the petitioner also demanded at least 32 other documents to be furnished to him to enable him to make an effective representation and there was no factual dispute before the Court that none of these documents was furnished to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention or at any time prior to making of the application or thereafter. The Division Bench relied on the decision of the Supreme Court to hold that the detaining authority could not decline to furnish copies of the documents to the petitioner once the same were demanded. The Division Bench relied on the decision of the Supreme Court to hold that the detaining authority could not decline to furnish copies of the documents to the petitioner once the same were demanded. The view of the Supreme Court was also quoted in paragraph 14 of this judgment, which reads as under :"it may not be necessary for the detaining authority to supply copies of all the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention at the time when the grounds of detention are furnished to the detenu but once the detenu states that for effective representation it is necessary that he should have copies of the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention, it is the duty of the detaining authority to furnish them with reasonable expedition. The detaining authority cannot decline to furnish copies of the documents on the ground that the grounds were sufficiently detailed to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation. "the moot words for supply of copies at the demand of the detenu are "once the detenu states that for effective representation it is necessary that he should have copies of the statements and documents referred to in the ground of detention. " We are, thereafter, to see, in the instant case if the alleged F. I. R. against Wahid Khan was a document referred to in the grounds of detention. The Supreme Court dealt with the question of supply of documents in the case of Mohd. Zakir v. Delhi Administration , AIR 1982 SC 696 : (1982 Cri LJ 641 ). It was observed herein that the question of demanding the documents was wholly irrrelevant and it was the constitutional mandate that the detaining authority was to give the documents relied on or referred to in the order of detention pari passu the grounds of detention in order that the detenu may make an effective representation immediately instead of waiting for the documents to be supplied with. The case relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court, as quoted above, was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India, which stands reported in AIR 1980 SC 765 . The case relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court, as quoted above, was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India, which stands reported in AIR 1980 SC 765 . The Supreme Court had observed in this case that the detenu was entitled to ask for copies of the statements and documents, referred to in the grounds of detention, to enable him to make an effective representation. The other observations of the Supreme Court have been referred to while indicating the decision of this Court in Dharam Pal Yadavs case (supra ). On the question of supply of documents the Supreme Court had also observed in the case of Kamla Kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 814 : (1981 Cri LJ 353) that documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention formed integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenu pari passu the grounds of detention. There is yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Daya Shanker Singh v. Union of India as reported in 1990 Cri LJ 1647. In this case the detenu demanded the proposal/recommendation of the Customs department, the copy of the statement of the petitioners matter, copy of the letter sent by the Customs Commissioner forwarding the proposal, the copy of memo arrest to know about the time and date shown therein the copy of the original order passed by the detaining authority, the copy of the statement of the brother of the petitioner , the copy of the bail application of that brother, to know the stand taken by him, the copy of the report submitted before the screening committee and copies of the documents and particulars collected during investigation against Ganesh Prasad as the petitioner thought that on the strength of these papers he would demonstrate that he was not involved in the alleged episode. The Court found from the facts sworn before it that certain documents of the above list were not supplied to the detenu. The Court found from the facts sworn before it that certain documents of the above list were not supplied to the detenu. Reference was made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawar Lal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1979 SC 541 : (1979 Cri LJ 462) and passage from the Supreme Court judgment was quoted as under at page 545 (of AIR):-"we agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that in order to make a representation against the order of detention and thus to exercise fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution, a detenu is entitled to be furnished with all essential particulars forming the basis of the grounds of detention. So it is that where insufficient particulars are meantioned in the grounds the detenu is entitled to call for better particulars. This is a right which flows from the constitutional right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make representation. "we are again confronted with the question if the alleged F. I. R. against Wahid Khan would be a document at all connected with the ground of detention. It is true that to give a proper opportunity to the detenu of making an effective representation he should have before him all the relevant materials upon which the grounds of detention are based. It may not be open, in our view, for the petitioner to ask for any paper in the name of relevancy with the matter at issue and then take a plea of invalidity of the order on the ground of non-supply of such paper. Here a claim has been made that Wahid Khan had abducted Beena and copy of the F. I. R. in that respect was sought for. It is not a defence and cannot be one that killing of Wahid Khan was made as a result of that alleged abduction rather grounds are there to indicate that Liyaqat had desired that girl and Wahid Khan was murdered as a result of that desire by the present petitioners and others. If at all Wahid Khan himself was accused of another case that would not be a mitigating circumstance in favour of the petitioners and as such would not be a relevant fact and the non-supply of that document may not affect the validity of detention, if otherwise sustainable. If at all Wahid Khan himself was accused of another case that would not be a mitigating circumstance in favour of the petitioners and as such would not be a relevant fact and the non-supply of that document may not affect the validity of detention, if otherwise sustainable. ( 13 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioners that there was absolute lack of application of mind by the District Magistrate as he had simply paraphrased the words of the sponsoring authorities as used in their report. The learned counsel read out these orders. It is true that the allegations are couched in the same language so far the reports of the sponsoring authorities and the orders of the District Magistrate in respect of these petitioners are concerned, but when it is a question of allegation of involvement of certain persons in a particular crime, it is always necessary and desirable that the words of the reporting authority are quoted. Further reading of the grounds and the report of the sponsoring authority indcates that there were variations at relevant points and it may not, therefore, be stated that the District Magistrate to merely paraphrase the report of the Superintendent of Police. Paragraph 1 of the grounds speaks of the incident concerning Wahid Khan and so does paragraph 1 in the report. Paragraph 2 of the grounds speaks of recovery of certain materials and these allegations were there in paragraph 2 of the report also. Paragraph 3 in the grounds, however, is very short while paragraph 3 of the report is a long one. Paragraph 4 of the grounds indicates further activities alleged against the petitioners and further lines of the grounds show how they were trying for bail and what they were likely to do after release on bail. These must be based on information from the sponsoring authorities. It may not be concluded, therefore, that there was non-application of mind by the District Magistrate. It was his subjective satisfaction that gives rise to his jurisdiction to proceed under the Act and when materials were there before him the sufficiency of those materials may not be looked into in this writ petition and at times repetition of the allegations made in the report must find place in the grounds as the District Magistrate was expected to realy on the materials placed before him and not to discover new grounds. These objections must also fail. ( 14 ) FOR the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that there is no reason to interfere with the detention orders passed against these five petitioners in the aforesaid five cases. The writ petitions, accordingly, stand dismissed. Petitions dismissed. .