V. P. MOHAN KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH several facts have been exposed in this case, the dispute lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner-worker was working as a Traffic Assistant with the Indian Airlines. He was appointed on September 27, 1979 and was confirmed on March 27, 1980. On the particular day,. e. , on november 18, 1984, he was working as a Traffic Assistant at Bangalore Airport incharge of. C. 525, a Flight taking off from Bangalore to Hyderabad. The allegation is that at that time two persons namely M/s. Ahamed and Ramdas came to the Airport without tickets and after paying rs. 800/- to the petitioner, they were allowed to travel to Hyderabad clandestinely after collecting the Boarding Passes from the petitioner. These Boarding Passes used for. C. 525 flight from Bangalore to Hyderabad were intended to be used by two other passengers, namely, mr. Amrith Thakkur and Mr. Y. K. Goel for Flight. C. 404 operating on the same day. Annexure-C is the charge-sheet framed against the petitioner and Annexure -C 1 is the order of suspension following the charge-sheet. Annexure-D is the explanation submitted by the petitioner in response to the charge-sheet. In the explanation offered by the petitioner, he submitted, inter alia, that the charge-sheet did not contain the particulars of the allegations, the statements of Imputation were not furnished and the list of witnesses was not made available. The copies of the documents relied on were also not furnished. By Annexure-E the Enquiry officer was appointed and Annexure-F is the show- cause-notice issued thereafter. Annexure-G is the reply submitted by the petitioner. A domestic enquiry was conducted and after detailed enquiry where all material witnesses were examined vis-a- vis the charges, the worker was found guilty of the charges. Annexure-H is the order of punishment, issued by the Commercial manager, Indian Airlines, Southern Region, Bangalore. The worker preferred an appeal before the statutory Board and pending the appeal, he raised a dispute which was referred under Section 10 (1) (C) of the. D. Act to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Annexure-J is the claim statement made by the worker and that Annexure-K is the statement of objections. A preliminary issue was raised regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry and after hearing the respective sides, the Tribunal found that the domestic enquiry is proper and valid. D. Act to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Annexure-J is the claim statement made by the worker and that Annexure-K is the statement of objections. A preliminary issue was raised regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry and after hearing the respective sides, the Tribunal found that the domestic enquiry is proper and valid. The only question for consideration thereafter was as to whether, on the basis of the evidence tendered before the domestic enquiry, the charges framed against the worker can be found and whether in the light of Section 11a of the. D. Act, the punishment imposed is proportionate to the charges. After considering these aspects, the Tribunal held that the findings are not perverse and that the punishment imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. It hence rejected the reference. That award Annexure-B is challenged in these proceedings by the petitioner-worker. ( 2 ) I have heard Mr. Narayanaswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent Corporation. ( 3 ) THE prime contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner are as follows: (1) The disciplinary proceedings were not initiated by the competent authority and under the model Standing Orders as required under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 in view of the circum stances that the Air Corporation Act, 1953 and the Standing Orders framed thereunder are inapplicable; (2) The domestic enquiry is invalid; (3) The statements of persons, who were available for cross- examination, had not been tendered; (4) The copies of M-16 and M-17 relied on by Management were not made available; (5) The show -cause notice issued by the Management was vague and lacking particulars and that there are no reasons given in the enquiry as to why the Management statements can be accepted. ( 4 ) AS regards the first contention concerned, I should state at the outset that this contention was not urged before the Tribunal or in the Writ Petition at the first instance. This contention is sought to be raised by the petitioner by way of filing an. A. in the Writ Petition. That apart, it is to be noted that the Officer concerned who initiated the proceedings is the authority who had the power to dismiss the worker at the end of the disciplinary action initiated. This contention is sought to be raised by the petitioner by way of filing an. A. in the Writ Petition. That apart, it is to be noted that the Officer concerned who initiated the proceedings is the authority who had the power to dismiss the worker at the end of the disciplinary action initiated. Besides, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR1989 SC 1854 , [1990 ]67 Compcas195 (SC ), (1989 )3 Complj70 (SC ), 1989 (25 )ECR6 (NULL ), [1989 (59 )FLR220 ], JT1989 (3 )SC 133 , 1989 Lablc1941 , (1990 )I LLJ32 SC , 1989 (2 )SCALE59 , (1989 )3 SCC448 , [1989 ]3 SCR428 , 1989 (3 ) SLJ1 (SC ), 1989 (2 )UJ526 (SC ), I feel this contention is not to be countenanced seriously. In this behalf, the following passage may be adverted to: " 19. We may now take up the third point. Sharma was appointed as Chemical Engineer by the board of Directors. The powers of the Board of Directors to appoint officers of Sharma's category were delegated to the Managing Director on September 12, 1974 and as such from that date the Managing Director became the appointing authority. Needless to say that employees of the company are not civil servants and as such they can neither claim the protection of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India nor the extension of that guarantee on parity. There is no provision in the Articles of Association or the regulations of the company giving same protection to the employees of the company as is given to the civil servants under Article 311 (1) of the constitution of India. An employee of the company cannot, therefore, claim that he cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Since on the date of termination of Sharma's services the Managing Director had the powers of appointing authority, he was legally competent to terminate Sharma's services. " ( 5 ) IN the light of what is stated above, the complaint that the authority who initiated disciplinary proceeding has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings is not available. If, on the date of the disciplinary proceedings, he had the power to impose punishment, necessarily the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings can be treated as invalid. " ( 5 ) IN the light of what is stated above, the complaint that the authority who initiated disciplinary proceeding has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings is not available. If, on the date of the disciplinary proceedings, he had the power to impose punishment, necessarily the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings can be treated as invalid. There is nothing in the Standing Orders in this behalf unlike Article 311 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) THE next contention urged was that in the light of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) act, 1946, no proceedings can be proceeded under the Regulations framed under the Air corporation Act. This contention is also not sustainable in the light of Section 13b of the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Section 13b of the Act reads thus: " 13-B. Act not to apply to certain Industrial establishments- Nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom the fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service regulations, Civilians in Defence Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette, apply. '" (Italics supplied for emphasis) in this case, it is shown that there is the notification by the appropriate Government making the application of the Regulation framed under the Air Corporation Act, 1946. (Vide Notification no. GS. 45/160 dt. November 23, 1961 ). 2 As such this contention does not stand. ( 7 ) THE validity of the domestic enquiry has been upheld. It is not shown on what count it is urged that the same is vitiated. The finding on this issue also does not call for any interference. The invalidity raised in this behalf would be considered while discussing other issues urged by the learned counsel. ( 8 ) THE challenge on the question of merits of the case has also to fail. The fundamental point was as to whether the petitioner, who was in-charge as Traffic Assistant, had permitted two persons to travel without purchasing tickets using the Boarding Passes meant for another Flight from bangalore to Hyderabad. ( 8 ) THE challenge on the question of merits of the case has also to fail. The fundamental point was as to whether the petitioner, who was in-charge as Traffic Assistant, had permitted two persons to travel without purchasing tickets using the Boarding Passes meant for another Flight from bangalore to Hyderabad. It is not in dispute that the two individuals, namely, M/s. Ahamed and ramdas had travelled from Bangalore to Hyderabad. It is also established that they did not have any valid travel documents to travel. It is also proved that the petitioner collected Rs. 800/- from these passengers. These persons were castaways in the flight. It is also established that they were not included in the passengers list of Flight No.. C. 525. It is also clearly established that they did use two Boarding Passes which were meant for use of two other passengers travelling in flight No. IC 404. It is also established that they used the Boarding Passes meant for the passengers of. C. 404, namely, M/s Y. K. Goel and Thakkur. It is also in evidence that these persons did travel in the Flight. C. 404. From these findings, it clearly follows that the petitioner had committed the misconduct imputed in allowing two passengers to travel by. C. 525 without tickets. It is admitted that the petitioner was in-charge of the Airport Counter for the Flight. C. 525. If this is a fact, necessarily, a serious misconduct had been committed by him. The question then would be, whether on reappreciation of evidence, a different finding can be entered. Even if the evidence is reviewed, and it is possible to find out certain defects in the appreciation of evidence, that would not lead to a totally different conclusion to be arrived at to replace the findings arrived at the domestic enquiry. I am afraid, this is not within the jurisdiction of this court. The finding of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer which is reappreciated by the industrial Tribunal cannot be interfered with by this Court at this stage. All that need be examined is as to whether the appreciation of evidence is so perverse that no reasonable man would hold that the charge against the worker on the basis of the evidence tendered could not have been established. This certainly cannot be held in this case. ( 9 ) MR. All that need be examined is as to whether the appreciation of evidence is so perverse that no reasonable man would hold that the charge against the worker on the basis of the evidence tendered could not have been established. This certainly cannot be held in this case. ( 9 ) MR. Narayanaswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the identity of the persons travelled as castaways has not been established. According to him, the identity of one of the passengers described as "r. Das" has not been established. He relied on the principles of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR1969 SC 983 , [1969 (19 )FLR191 ], (1969 )II LLJ377 SC , [1969 ]1 SCR735 in this behalf. His contention was that the letter written by Ahamed is no proof to establish the identity of the person. I do not think this contention can be accepted. As noticed in the judgment referred to above, if the petitioner had ample opportunity to demolish the respondent's case, then such an objection is not sustainable (vide para 11 thereof ). The petitioner had been given an opportunity to cross-check the evidentiary value of the statement. The statement of the above said R. Das was made available to the delinquent employee and before R. Das was examined and as such the delinquent employee had all the opportunity to cross-examine the witness to ascertain as to whether R. Das mentioned in the letter of Ahamed is the very same person who was examined. The delinquent having failed to take advantage of the situation, cannot now turn round to say that R. Das, referred to in the letter of Ahamed, is not the witness who was examined. He cannot also rely on the dictum of AIR1969 SC 983 , [1969 (19 )FLR191 ], (1969 )II LLJ377 SC , [1969 ]1 SCR735 (supra) which itself contemplates the exclusion of the rule, if the aggrieved had an opportunity to cross- check the statement. Therefore, it follows that the charges stand proved and as such it does not call for interference. ( 10 ) THE next question urged by the petitioner is with regard to the exercise of power under section 11a of the. D. Act. As regards the application of Section 11a of the. Therefore, it follows that the charges stand proved and as such it does not call for interference. ( 10 ) THE next question urged by the petitioner is with regard to the exercise of power under section 11a of the. D. Act. As regards the application of Section 11a of the. D. Act is concerned, it is to be noted that even if the domestic enquiry reported is held valid, the Tribunal has power to examine as to whether the finding of guilt entered in the domestic enquiry is sufficient to sustain the punishment imposed. The evidence produced in the domestic enquiry are "materials on record" within the meaning of Section 11a of the Act and relevant documents to be examined for the exercise of the said power; the Tribunal can always examine as to whether, on the basis of the evidence tendered by the Management, the punishment imposed on the worker is proper or excessive. (See; the decision in Workmen of F. T. V. and R. Co. v. The management (1973-I-LLJ-278) (SC ). ( 11 ) AGAIN, if we advert to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Manche gowda AIR1964 SC 506 , [1964 ]4 SCR540 , it is to be noted that while weighing the proportionality of the punishment, the Tribunal has always the power to examine as to whether a reasonable opportunity had been given to the delinquent employee as regards the punishment being imposed and whether the Management has disclosed to the employee what are all the circumstances that prevailed in their mind in quantifying the nature of the punishment to be imposed. It is relevant to note that it is only then that the worker can effectively explain the circumstances put against him for imposing the punishment and plead every circumstance to mitigate the punishment to be imposed. The delequent employees should be in a position to know the mind of the Disciplinary Authority which influenced the quantum of punishment to be awarded and set out the circumstances to enable him to reduce the punishment. Without that, the employee will not be in a position to effectively explain the show cause notice. ( 12 ) IN the present case, it may be noticed that Annexure-F notice, issued by the employer, shows the various circumstances which influenced the Management the particular punishment intended to be imposed on the worker. Without that, the employee will not be in a position to effectively explain the show cause notice. ( 12 ) IN the present case, it may be noticed that Annexure-F notice, issued by the employer, shows the various circumstances which influenced the Management the particular punishment intended to be imposed on the worker. In this behalf, Annexure-F. states thus: "your past record reveals the following punishments: 1. Warned by Station Manager, Bangalore for rude behaviour vide letter No. BG/ 1-6/453/2632 dated January 30, 1982. 2. Warned by Station Manager, Bangalore for late submission of TA bill vide letter no. BG/1-6/68 dated September 22, 1982. 3. Warned by Station Manager, Bangalore for unauthorised absence vide letter No. BG/1-6/361 dated December 17, 1982. 4. Reduction in time scale by one stage for one year by Commercial Manager, Southern Region vide letter No. MAA:cm: ADMN:1- 6:13459 dated October 22,25,1984 for neglect of work. 5. Reduction in basic pay by three incremental stages with cumulative effect, with effect from april 1, 1986, for illegal gratification. It is evident from the above that you have been maintaining an unsatisfactory record of service in the past. The charges now established against you, warrant extreme punishment and I, therefore, propose to award you the following punishment: "removal From the Services of the Corporation. " The same has been replied by the employee by Annexure-G. In Annexure-G, the petitioner in this behalf stated as follows: "7. While the two cases against me, namely : (A) Case of reduction in time-scale; and (B) Case of reduction of basic pay are still pending consideration before the Appellate Authority, awarding the proposed punishment in the instant case, would prejudice the entire proceedings and hence the decision taking will have to be deterred in the ends of equity and fair play. " it may be noted, past misconduct relied as items (1) to (5) relates to rude behaviour, late submission of T. A. Bill, unauthorised absence, neglect of work and alleged illegal gratification. Of this, the last two are subject matter of appeal. But, in the order of punishment, the competent authority states thus: " I have carefully gone through your reply and do not find any merit in the contentions and pleadings raised therein. Of this, the last two are subject matter of appeal. But, in the order of punishment, the competent authority states thus: " I have carefully gone through your reply and do not find any merit in the contentions and pleadings raised therein. As regards paras 4 to 7 of your aforementioned reply, it may be stated that, mere pendency of appeals against the orders of other punishments awarded to you does not mean that the punishments do not exit. The pending appeals against these punishments will be disposed off on their own merit by the Appellate Authority, in due course. " notwithstanding the past record of your service which is unsatisfactory, the misconduct committed by you, as stated in the show cause notice, warrants an extreme punishment. I, therefore, impose on you the following punishment, as proposed, with effect from June 1, 1986. "removal from the Services of the Corporation. " now, the punishment is independent of the alleged past misconduct. The quantum of punishment as indicated by Annexure-E is arrived at apparently because of the existence of the past misconduct. It is not stated that the proved misconduct is serious enough to deserve the extreme punishment. The extreme punishment is awarded according to the employer in the background of the past misconduct. In such a situation, if the past misconduct is explained, then there can be a variation in the quantum of punishment. But, while awarding punishment, the order shows that none of the circumstances explained by the employee has been borne In mind by the employer and it is not considered whether independent of the previous circumstances relied on, the punishment now imposed can he imposed. In other words, when on the basis of several circumstances, the employer proposes to inflict a particular punishment, and the worker explains all those circumstances, then the Management cannot disown all those circumstances earlier relied on and impose the same punishment nevertheless. This may not be in essence granting a fair opportunity to the employee. ( 13 ) THE only question, therefore, in such circumstance, that survives for consideration would be as to whether there is any illegality committed by the authorities in having imposed the extreme punishment. This may not be in essence granting a fair opportunity to the employee. ( 13 ) THE only question, therefore, in such circumstance, that survives for consideration would be as to whether there is any illegality committed by the authorities in having imposed the extreme punishment. It may be stated that when after the enquiry, the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner after accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it was stated that the petitioner was guilty of certain past misconduct. Therefore, from relying on the past records, the mind of the employer was working so conditioned to impose the particular punishment. It felt that in view of the past misconduct of the petitioner, serious extreme punishment in the nature of dismissal was imposed. In other words, the existence of past misconduct was the motivating factor to impose the extreme punishment of removal from service. To this, Annexure-G was submitted by the petitioner denying the charges whereupon the punishment was imposed. Thereafter by the final order after considering the reply, the employer imposed the following punishment: "removal from the services of the Corporation. " in other words, the employer maintained the punishment to be the same even without reference to the past misconduct. In this behalf, as could be seen from Annexure-F, the past misconduct was the motivating factor for the Management to impose the extreme punishment of removal from service. One does not know how it would have acted if the past misconduct alleged did not exist. When it felt that the past misconduct need not be taken into account, necessarily it means it could have/reduced the punishment. Nowhere it is stated in the order that dehors the past misconduct; the same punishment can be maintained against the petitioner on the basis of the gravity of the charges framed against him. This is a serious aspect which necessitates the award being set aside to the extent of the failure to exercise the power under Section 11a of the. D. Act. It may perhaps need remittal of the matter for fresh disposal. ( 14 ) BUT in view of the long pendency of the disputes and the passage of time, I feel it will not be just and proper to direct the Industrial Tribunal to take back the matter and re-examine in regard to the exercise of the power under Section 11a of the. D. Act. ( 14 ) BUT in view of the long pendency of the disputes and the passage of time, I feel it will not be just and proper to direct the Industrial Tribunal to take back the matter and re-examine in regard to the exercise of the power under Section 11a of the. D. Act. In such circumstances , this Court itself can certainly mould the relief that can be awarded. As laid down by the Supreme Court in d. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1996-I-LLJ-1231), this Court has the power to award appropriate relief to the parties. Therein their Lordships have stated as hereunder at p. 1237: "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High court/tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High court/tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof," Taking into account all the circumstances, I feel the ends of justice will be met if this Court itself decides the issue. ( 15 ) IN this case, at best what would happen in the event the plea of lesser punishment of the worker is upheld is that the punishment imposed would have been declared to be excessive. But certainly this is not a case for setting aside the dismissal and reinstatement of the worker with or without the backwages. The proper relief would, therefore, be that the worker be awarded monetary compensation. The worker had put in nearly 7 years service before termination. In view of that circumstance, the worker is awarded compensation at the rate of wages for one month from 1979 till the date of the judgment. The wages would be reckoned as it obtains each year. The proper relief would, therefore, be that the worker be awarded monetary compensation. The worker had put in nearly 7 years service before termination. In view of that circumstance, the worker is awarded compensation at the rate of wages for one month from 1979 till the date of the judgment. The wages would be reckoned as it obtains each year. The amount so calculated may be paid to the petitioner within a period of 6 weeks from today. With the above direction, the Writ petition is disposed of.