JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above writ petition has been filed seeking for the relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents particularly the third respondent to issue a Bus Pass to the petitioner without delay. Though the relief to quash the impugned action of the respondent is also prayed for in general terms, in the absence of any challenge to any orders or proceedings passed by any of the authorities, there is no scope for granting any relief to quash. 2. The petitioner is said to be a school going kid studying in Army School, Yol Cantonment, and the school is stated to be at a distance of 2 Kms. from the residence of the petitioner The father of the petitioner, admittedly retired as No/Sub. from Army Medical Corps after rendering 26 years of meritorious service on 30th April, 1988 and it is claimed that for all purposes the father of the petitioner is an ex-serviceman. The further claim of the petitioner is that Army Buses are being plied under the Control of respondent No. 3 for school going kids and those buses carry the kids to the Army school and back to their homes. The petitioner was earlier said to have been taken to the Army school by these buses but now the persons plying the buses have completely refused to carry the petitioner on the view that the wards of ex-servicemen cannot be allowed to travel in the said buses. After issuing legal notice dated 29.7.1998 and in the absence of positive response or reply from the respondents, the above writ petition came to be filed and the petitioner in the petition filed before this Court also has given certain instances of persons said to be similarly situated who have been extended, according to the petitioner, such concessional facility. 3. On notice being ordered, the respondents have filed a reply contending that in view of Army Instruction No. 15/87 the facility of service transport for the school-going children of officers, JCOs, OR and civilians of certain specified categories alone are available and permissible and the petitioner does not fall in any of those illustrated categories to claim such benefit. In other respects, they denied the receipt application said to have been made earlier on 27.7.1998 and they have annexed a copy of the Army Instruction in respect of their claim. In other respects, they denied the receipt application said to have been made earlier on 27.7.1998 and they have annexed a copy of the Army Instruction in respect of their claim. While explaining the cases of persons illustrated by the petitioner to whom the facility was said to have been extended, it has been stated as follows, :— “(i) Miss Aditi Katoch daughter and Master Akshay Katoch son are children of Mrs. Sanjana Katoch w/o Late Hav KC Katoch being a war widow in receipt of special pensionary benefits up to year 2001 AD have been given Bus Pass in terms of para I (g) of Army Instruction 15/87. (ii) No. 1374450A L/NK Horn Dutt was issued Bus Passes for his wards while in serivce. Being ignorant of rules, he continued availing the facility. As soon as Respondent No. 3 detected the same, Bus passes were cancelled and he has been asked to pay charges for the entire period (copy of letter No. 617/SCG/R/Q2 dated 3 September, 98 enclosed as Annexure R-II). (e) Denied, the petitioner may be asked to produce the details of 130-140 unauthorised wards utilising the facility." 4. The petitioner has filed rejoinder wherein while reiterating their stand taken in the main writ petition, it has been asserted for the petitioner that Ms. Sanjana Katoch, wife of late Hab. K.C. Katoch cannot be treated as war-widow at all and, therefore, the concession could not have been otherwise extended to her children and therefore, she is also entitled to the benefit extended to others as pointed out by the petitioner. 5. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner while reiterating the stand taken in the writ petition as also the rejoinder vehemently contended that the stand taken by the respondents is not tenable in law for the reasons already stated in their pleadings and that at any rate by virtue of Clause (h) of the Army Instruction 15/87, the petitioner would be entitled to a pass on payment basis, atleast, and this Court may be pleased to issue direction to the respondents accordingly. Clause (h) of the Army Instruction 15/87, insofar as it is relevant for the purpose of adjudicating on the right claimed, reads as follows:— "School-going children of Civilians paid from the Defence Services Estimates and DAD Staff, on payment basis subject to availability of space in the service vehicles already detailed for children otherwise eligible." The other part of the said clause is not relevant for the present consideration. 6. Mr. S.S. Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondents while reiterating the stand taken in the reply and relying upon the Army instruction, with equal force, has contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the case of the petitioner cannot be brought under Clause (h) of the Army Instruction 15/87. 7. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on either side. In our view, the petitioner is not entitled, as a matter of right, to have the use of the service transport meant for school going children of the Army people of the categories specified and in view of the Army Instruction filed before this Court it only demonstrates that unless the claim made by a particular person came within the four corners of the said Army Instruction there is neither scope for such person claiming to assert any such right nor is there any possibility for this Court to accord any relief on the basis of such claim. Concedingly, the case of the petitioner will not fall under other clauses of Para-I of the Army Instruction in question illustrated as (a) to (g). It is only in such circumstances and on that such basis the claim has been sought to be projected visa-vis Clause (h) to which a reference has been made, earlier. Concedingly, the case of the petitioner will not fall under other clauses of Para-I of the Army Instruction in question illustrated as (a) to (g). It is only in such circumstances and on that such basis the claim has been sought to be projected visa-vis Clause (h) to which a reference has been made, earlier. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner after the superannuation/retirement from service, the petitioners father is an ex-serviceman for all purposes and in this respect will be a Civilian and, inasmuch as, his pension is being paid from Defence Services Extimates, he would thereby answer the description of "Civilians paid from the Defence Services Estimates" and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner being a school going children of such person would squarely fall within Clause (h) of the said instruction and subject to the availability of the space in the service vehicles already detailed for children otherwise eligible and on payment basis the petitioner atleast must be accorded permission and consequential direction should issue to the respondents. We are unable to either appreciate or agree with the submissions of the learned Counsel in this regard and in our view the stand taken by the learned Counsel for the respondents is well merited and deserves to be sustained. In the defence service, as against those categories of staff who are in active service in the Army as part of the field or combat staff, the category of civilian staff also are engaged and when the Army Instruction in this case makes a reference to Civilians paid from the Defence Services Estimates, it must, therefore be taken to be such category of Civilian members in service who are paid their emoluments from the Defence Services Estimates. The ex-army personnel cannot claim, after superannuation and retirement from service, to fall in the category of Civilians paid from the Defence Services Estimates. The reliance placed on the factum of payment of pensionary benefit, to contend that it must be taken to be payment from Defence Services Estimates overlooks the further vital condition to be satisfied that he must be a civilian in service too and the word Civilians is not to be construed or understood in the sense of ordinary citizen, in contrast to a person in Army service. Consequnetly, we see no merit in the claim projected for the petitioner on the basis of Clause (h) of the Army Instruction de hors which as indicated earlier there is no right for the petitioner to be vindicated for claiming the relief prayed for in this writ petition before this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. We are satisfied with the reasons assigned by the respondents in their reply filed with reference to the instances pointed out by the petitioner to allege hostile discrimination and in view of the explanation given to traverse the claim projected in this regard, the case of alleged discrimination and denial of equal treatment to the petitioner has no merit for acceptance in our hands. 9. For the reasons stated above, we see no merit whatsoever in the present writ petition, which shall stand dismissed. No costs. CMPs No. 1144 & 1314/93. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the CMPs are also dismissed. Interim stay is vacated. Petition dismissed.