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1998 DIGILAW 203 (MAD)

The Union of India represented by the Chief Secretary to Government of Pondicherry Secretariat and Another v. Apparsamy

1998-02-18

S.JAGADEESAN

body1998
Judgment : The unsuccessful defendants before the courts below are the appellants herein. The respondent herein filed the suit, O.S.No.731 of 1982 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry for recovery of a sum of Rs.4,750 with interest by way of damages. It is the ease of the plaintiff that the appellants herein are the tenants in respect of the suit property and on 21. 1979 during the anti-merger movement, the building was subjected to attack by a man which was agitating against the merger movement. The doors, fans, tube lights, bulbs, etc., in the building were damaged and immediately thereafter, the appellants have deserted the house without even informing the plaintiff. Since the defendants did not take proper care, they are liable to pay the damages and hence the suit. 2. The appellants herein filed the written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiff stating that subsequent to the damages to the building, the defendants are not in occupation of the building, but, however, the plaintiff filed a petition before the Rent controller in H.R.C.O.P. No.9 of 1981 for eviction on the ground of wilful default. On 22. 1981 the second defendant paid the rents till that date and handed over vacant possession on the understanding that the plaintiff will not claim any damages. The trial court, after considering the evidence, has decreed the suit on the ground that clause 8 of the lease deed does not prevent the plaintiff for asking for damages. As against the said judgment and decree, the defendants preferred an appeal in A.S.No.205 of 1983 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Pondicherry. The II Additional District Judge, Pondicherry has also concurred with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. The present second appeal has been filed by the defendants. 3. It is the contention of the learned Government Pleader, that clause 8 of the lease deed specifies that the landlord is not entitled for any rent if the building has become unfit for habitation due to the damage by fire, storm, flood or violence or an army or any other irresistible force. Admittedly the building has been damaged due to the anti-merger movement and the defendant have nothing to do with the damage to the building. Hence, the defendants have not paid the rent subsequent to the date of damage. Admittedly the building has been damaged due to the anti-merger movement and the defendant have nothing to do with the damage to the building. Hence, the defendants have not paid the rent subsequent to the date of damage. However, the plaintiff filed H.R.C.O.P. referred to above for eviction and the rents have been paid and possession has also been handed over to the plaintiff. The courts below have decreed the suit for damages on the ground that clause 8 does not prevent the plaintiff from claiming damages. When clause 8 of the lease deed does not enable the plaintiff to claim any damages, the suit ought to have been dismissed. On the contrary, Mrs.R. Kamala Rani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, contended that it is true that the suit property has been damaged by the anti-merger movement, and had the defendants taken proper care the damage could have been avoided. Both the courts below have held that the Government has failed to take proper steps to prevent the anti-merger movement from causing any damage to the private properties and on that ground, the damages have been awarded. Since clause 8 of the lease deed does not prohibit the plaintiff from claiming damages, the courts below have rightly decreed the suit. 4. I have carefully considered the contentions of both the counsel. The short question is whether in the absence of any prohibition to claim damages under clause 8 of the lease deed, the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages? 5. Admittedly, the defendants have nothing to do with the damage and they have not damaged the building and the damage had been caused by anti-merger movement and there has been absolutely no evidence to show that the Government authorities have not taken proper care to prevent the agitation or prevent the mob from damaging the properties of the private individuals. It is a well known factor that whenever a mob has assembled, then it goes beyond control and sometimes the police authorities also have to act in a restricted manner in order to save the lives of human-beings. Hence, there is absolutely no material to show that the defendants had any role to play in the damage caused to the property. .6. Hence, there is absolutely no material to show that the defendants had any role to play in the damage caused to the property. .6. However, the courts below have decreed the suit only on the ground that there is no prohibition in clause 8 of the lease deed which is as follows: .“If a portion of the said building is destroyed or damaged by fire, storm, flood, or violence or an army or any other irresistible force so as to become unfit for habitation, the lessee shall not be hound to pay the rent except the outstanding arrears up to the said destruction or damage. In such case only a fair and proportionate fraction of rent shall alone be payable during the period of reconstruction or repairs.” The above clause clearly specifies that if the building is destroyed or damaged by fire, storm, flood or violence or an army or any other irresistible force so as to become unfit for habitation, the lessee shall not be bound to pay the rent except the outstanding arrears up to the date of destruction. .7. Admittedly, the plaintiff had vacated the premises after the date of incident viz., on 21. 1978. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the building is fit for habitation and in spite of that the defendants had vacated the building or deserted the building. The only grievance of the plaintiff is that he has not been informed about the damage to the building immediately thereafter by the defendants. Because of the failure on the part of the defendants to inform the plaintiff, it may not be proper to ask them to pay the damages. 8. Clause 8 of the lease deed as I have already discussed, relates to the payment of rent till the date of destruction, in case the building is destroyed. This has nothing to do with the claim of damages by the lessor. If a party wants to claim any right under a deed of agreement, in such cases, the deed should confer a right on the party who claims it. It cannot be said that merely because the document does not prevent a party from claiming any right, such party is entitled to put forth such right. If a party wants to claim any right under a deed of agreement, in such cases, the deed should confer a right on the party who claims it. It cannot be said that merely because the document does not prevent a party from claiming any right, such party is entitled to put forth such right. In the absence of any specific clauses in the lease deed in respect of payment of damages, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is entitled for the same. 9. But, however, the damages have been awarded on the ground that the Government has not taken any steps to prevent the agitation or safeguard the interest of the private properties. Even in this aspect, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had established that the defendants have totally failed to take any measure to safeguard the properties of the individuals. The plaintiff has already been paid 50% of the decree amount. 1 am of the view that interest of Justice would be better served if the suit is decreed to that extent. Hence, the plaintiff is entitled for a sum of Rs.2,375 with interest from the date of the suit till the date of payment. The second appeal is partly allowed in the above terms. C.M.P.Nos.16619 of 1984 and 4887 of 1985 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.