P. K. SAMANTA, J. ( 1 ) THE applicability of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in respect of a Flat Owner's Society in a building or in other words the employees engaged by such society namely electrician, durwan, liftman, sweeper etc. for providing services to the flat owners are whether workmen under the said society within the ambit of the said Act are the questions raised in this writ petition. ( 2 ) THE Respondent No. 1 is the Co-operative Society Building Worker's Union. The Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 are the employees under the petitioner/society which is a society registered under Societies Registration Act formed by the occupants of premises No. 12-B Lord Sinha Road, Calcutta - 700 071. The Respondent No. 7 is the tribunal which made the impugned award dated July 31, 1987 in case No. VIII-289/1983 upon reference of the Dispute by the State of West Bengal under Section 10 of the said Act. The State of the West Bengal is the Respondent No. 8. ( 3 ) THERE is no dispute that the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 are under employment of the petitioner society either as Liftman or as Durwan or Electrician or Sweeper. Disputes broadly related to the fixation of grades and scales of pay for each class of employees, annual leave, duty hours and uniforms of the employees. ( 4 ) CONCILIATION proceeding having failed such disputes were referred for adjudication by the Tribunal. The Tribunal made an award in favour of the employees on all the issues under reference by fixing grades and scales of pay for different class of employees and annual leave, casual leaves, working and/or duty hours and also by making provisions for uniforms. ( 5 ) IT is not necessary to deal with the terms of the said award as the same are not made the subject matter of controversy in course of hearing of this writ petition. ( 6 ) ONE factual aspect, which is also not in dispute, is made relevant by the petitioner society in this case is that the building was originally owned by an individual under whom the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were employed and the management of the building was handed over by the landlord to the petitioner/society on November 1, 1987. The employees, the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were employed and the management of the building was handed over by the landlord to the petitioner/society on November 1, 1987. The employees, the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 who were working under the landlord were given employment by the society on compassionate grounds. ( 7 ) ON the basis of such facts Mr. Partha Sengupta, Senior advocate and in the later part Mr. Arunava Ghosh, learned Advocate contended that when a sole proprietary industry concept cannot be imported in respect of a big house owner in relation to his domestic helps, then it cannot be made so applicable only in the event of sole ownership if such house is converted into a multiple ownership keeping in tact all other incidents of ownership as it is. ( 8 ) THIS contention is catchy no doubt, but has inherent lacuna. The question is not of ownership of the house but of the nature of employment and that too in relation to the employer. When the ownership of the house vests either in single individual or in plurality the services rendered by the employees is a service directed towards the owner and/or the owners, i. e. , personal service but when the ownership vests in a Society it no longer remains a personal service to each of the members of the Society but a service to such Society. Because none of the members of such Society has full and absolute control over such employees either to get service at his command or over affairs of such employees. This kind of service by the employee of a Society could be characterised as personal service to the Society only for the purpose of master and servant relationship between the employer and employee and not otherwise. ( 9 ) ONCE the basic concept of personal service to one individual or individuals ceases and by virtue of employment personal services by a set of employees to a group of individuals are transferred into services by the same set to a Society or to an establishment it no longer remains the same. This is so because in a personal service to an individual or to a group of individuals there cannot be any systematic activity both by the employer and the employees. Therefore, it cannot be said that by such transformation of employment the incidents of employment remained the same as before. This is so because in a personal service to an individual or to a group of individuals there cannot be any systematic activity both by the employer and the employees. Therefore, it cannot be said that by such transformation of employment the incidents of employment remained the same as before. Upon such transformation of employment, service by the employees to the members of the society is being organised by few for the benefit of others who have no direct say over the employees in respect of anything except to the body which now organises such services. Therefore, it became an organised activity under a society irrespective of the nature of work performed by the employees. ( 10 ) MR. Joydeep Kar, learned. Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, holding the field, reported in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Rajappa and Ors. which stresses the focus in functional activity, the decisive test laid down therein being the nature of activity with special emphasis on the employer/employee relation and profit motive was considered as being not relevant, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner society which carries oft the organised activity as above in a systematic manner is an industry within meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 11 ) TRUE the wide scope of definition of 'industry' propounded in the above decision may encompass the petitioner society and the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Physical Research laboratory v. K. G. Sharma cited on behalf of the petitioner may not come in aid of the petitioner society. In the above cited case the Labour Court though recorded a finding that PRL (Physical Research laboratory) is purely a research institution and the research work carried on by it was not connected with production, supply or distribution of goods or services, yet it took the view following the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply's case (supra) that PRL is carrying on, in an organised and systematic manner the activity of research in its laboratory by active cooperation between itself and its employees and the discoveries and inventions made would be eligible for sale and therefore falls within the meaning of an 'industry' as per Section 2 (j) of the said Act. The Supreme Court set aside the award by the Labour Court as it was of the opinion that PRL is not an industry even though it is carrying on the activity of research in a systematic manner with the help of its employees as it lacks that element which would make it an organisation carrying on an activity which can be said to be analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business because it is not producing or distributing services which are intended or meant for satisfying human wants and needs as ordinarily understood. Unfortunately, such an opinion cannot be formed in respect of the petitioner/society which is carrying on an activity in a systematic manner with the help of its employees which is analogous to the carrying on of a trade and business of distributing and/or rendering services to its members for satisfaction of their respective wants and needs for decent enjoyment of their respective ownership units. ( 12 ) BUT at the same time it must be remembered that the occupants of premises No. 12-B Lord Sinha Road, Calcutta - 700 071 formed the petitioner society and engaged the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for decent enjoyment of their respective occupation. It is nobody's case that the petitioner/society is engaged in an activity which can be called business, trade or manufacture. It is also not engaged in any commercial activity having economic venture. It has only obligation to see, in the interest of all the occupants, some of whom comprises the petitioner society, that the services necessary for better and decent living in the premises are available. It is a self serving society which does only useful services to its members. Therefore, predominant purpose for which it was set up could not be called an industry. ( 13 ) IN a very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin and Anr. v. Indira Devi P. S. and Ors. issue to reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) has gained a significant momentum. ( 13 ) IN a very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin and Anr. v. Indira Devi P. S. and Ors. issue to reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) has gained a significant momentum. It has been observed therein as under:"looking to the uncertainty prevailing in this area and in the light of the experience of the last two decades in applying the test laid down in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra) it is necessary that the decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra) is re-examined. The experience of the last two decades does not appear to be entirely happy. Instead of leading to industrial peace and welfare of the community (which was the avowed purpose of artificially extending the definition of industry) the application of the Industrial Disputes Act to organisations which were, quite possibly, not intended to be so covered by the machinery set up under the Industrial Disputes Act, might have done more damage than good, not merely to the organizations but also to employees by the curtailment of employment opportunities. Undoubtedly, it is of paramount importance that a proper law is framed to promote the welfare of labour employed in industries. It is equally important that the welfare of labour employed in other kinds of organisations is also promoted and protected. But the kind of measures which may be required for the latter may be different, and may have to be tailored to suit the nature of such organisations, their infrastructure and their financial capacity as also the needs of their employees. *** *** *** Since the difficulty has arisen because of the judicial interpretation given to the definition of 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act, there is no reason why the matter should not be judicially re-examined in the present case, the function of the Coir Board is to promote coir industry, open markets for it and provide facilities to make the coir industry's products more marketable. It is not set up to run any industry itself. Looking to the predominant purpose for which it is set up we would not call it an industry. However, if one were to apply the tests laid down by Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra) it is an organisation where there are employers and employees. It is not set up to run any industry itself. Looking to the predominant purpose for which it is set up we would not call it an industry. However, if one were to apply the tests laid down by Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra) it is an organisation where there are employers and employees. The organisation does some useful work for the benefit of others. Therefore, it will have to be called an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. We do not think that such a sweeping test was contemplated by the Industrial Disputes Act, nor do we think that every organisation which does useful service and employs people can be labelled as industry. We, therefore, direct that the matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India to consider whether a larger Bench should be constituted to re-consider the decision of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra ). ( 14 ) IN the present case also as observed hereinabove because of all embracing scope of definition so propounded in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) the petitioner society could be encompassed as an industry whereas conventional interpretation would not do so. Therefore, in the interest of justice the issue raised in this case should wait till the issue is determined by the Supreme Court. .