S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) BY this special civil application the petitioner workman, who was in service of respondent No. 1, challenges the order of the Labour Court, Rajkot, dated 28th november, 1986 passed below Exh. 1 in Misc. Application No. 45/83 under which the application filed by him for setting aside the order of dismissal of the reference for default was rejected. The petitioner was dismissed from service of the respondents. He raised industrial dispute through the Union in the matter of his dismissal from service. That dispute was referred by Govrnment to the Labour Court, Rajkot, where it was registered as Reference (LCR) No. 799/81. Even after service of notice of the aforesaid reference on chemical Kamdar Sangh, Mithapur-the Union through which that dispute was raised 1 the Union did not file statement of claim. Ultimately the reference came to be dismissed for default on 8. 3. 1982. In the application filed by the petitioner he has given out the date of dismissal of the reference as 8. 7. 1982, but subsequently he has admitted that it was dismissed on 8. 3. 1982. The application for setting aside the order of dismissal of the reference for default has been filed on 17th November, 1983, that is, more than 16 months from 8. 7. 1982 and about 20 months from the 8. 3. 1982. That application came to be dismissed under the impugned order on the ground of bar by limitation. Hence this special civil application before this Court. ( 2 ) MR. H. K. Rathod, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Labour court has no power to dismiss the reference for default. It has next been contended that under Rule 26 (A) of the Gujarat Industrial Disputes Rules the Labour Court has power to condone delay, but despite this fact though the petitioner has made out sufficient cause for delay in filing the application, the same has not been condoned and the application has been dismissed. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the Labour Court has recorded the finding of fact on the basis of evidence produced by both the parties and as such this Court sitting under Art. 227 of the Constitution may not interfere in the matter. Finding of fact which has been recorded by the Labour Court cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary. Finding of fact which has been recorded by the Labour Court cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary. It has next been contended that the Labour court has all the powers to dismiss the reference for default, where the workman or his representative Union has not put appearance. In the present case the Union has even not filed statement of claim and in absence of statement of claim and evidence, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 contended that the only course which could have been followed is to dismiss the reference for default. ( 3 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the counsel for the parites. ( 4 ) IN the case which was before the Karnataka High Court the facts were as under: the petitioner therein was working at the relevant time as conductor in Karnataka state Road Transport Corporation. He was dismissed from service for proved misconduct pursuant to the domestic inquiry held in that regard. He raised industrial dispute, which was referred to the Labour Court at Hubly. The reference was dismissed for nonprosecution on the part of the petitioner workman, by award of the Labour Court dated 1. 8. 1998. The petitioner therein filed application before the Labour Court raising the very same dispute under Sec. 10 (4) (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that is under the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act as amended by the State of Karnataka. That application came to be rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that the earlier dispute raised has already been dismissed. Before the Karnataka High Court point has been raised whether the order passed for dismissal or the reference for default could be called an award. The Court held that it cannot be called an award. In the case in hand, the reference has been dismissed for default. The learned counsal for the petitioner has been asked by the Court to satisfy the Court as to what other course would have been open to the Labour Court in the matter, when from the side of the petitioner workmen even statement of claim has not been filed. In such matter possibly two courses would have been open to the Labour Court. The first course would have been to send, the reference for adjudication and after hearing, the other side "no dispute award" could have been passed. In such matter possibly two courses would have been open to the Labour Court. The first course would have been to send, the reference for adjudication and after hearing, the other side "no dispute award" could have been passed. The second course would have been to dismiss the reference for default. The second course would have been the proper course in the case where the workmen has not produced any statement of claim or evidence, as the decision given therein will not operate as resjudicata or a final adjudication of the dispute. This is exactly what the Labour Court has done in the present case. ( 5 ) I do not-find any error in the approach of the Labour Court in passing the order for dismissal of the reference for default. Moreover, on this question I do not consider it necessary to go further as this point has not been reaised by the petitioner before the labour Court. For the first time this point has been raised during the course of argument in this special civil application. Even in the grounds taken by the petitioner in the petition i do not find that any such point has been raised. ( 6 ) THE petitioner filed application for setting aside the order of the Labour Court dismissing the reference for default. Learned counsel for the parties are not at variance that under Rule 26 (A) of the relevant rules, limitation of 30 days is prescribed for filing such application. However, power has been given to the Labour Court in appropriate cases to entertain the application even if it is filed beyond 30 days. Thus the real question in the present case is whether the petitioner has made out any cause, much less sufficient cause, for condonation of delay in filing the application under Rule 26 (A) of the Rules. ( 7 ) THE Labour Court after considering the material produced on record by both the parties, has rightly reached the conclusion that the petitioner is unable to make out any case for condonation of the delay in filing the application. The petitioner has come out with the case that the representative of the Union had given out to him that the matter was pending till 1984. The petitioner has come out with the case that the representative of the Union had given out to him that the matter was pending till 1984. But this very statement made by the petitioner before the Labour was contrary to his own pleadings, and the Labour Court has rightly not believed that statement, as the application under Rule 26 (A) of the Rules has admittedly been filed on 17th November, 1983. From the facts which have come on record, it is born out that the petitioner had knowledge of dismissal of the reference for dafault much earlier to the filing of the application. The factum of dismissal of the reference by the Labour Court was notified by the Company on its notice Board. If we go by the dates given by the petitioner, then the date of dismissal of reference will come around 9. 4. 1983. Thereafter the petitioner has come up with the case that he saw Devjibhai who tole him that he had nothing to worry it the reference was dismissed at Rajkot, as other case of the petitioner was pending at Ahmedabad and they would contest the same. Then the petitioner was informed by Devjibhai that the case has been transferred to Rajkot. Then comes the statement of the petitioner that Bachubhai Shukla declared in the meeting at Mithapur that the matter would be settled with the Company and so he filed the application late. If we go by these dates the application was filed after about 8 months from the date of publication of dismissal of reference by the Company on its notice Board. The petitioner very conveniently has not given the date when Bachubhai Shukla had declared that the matter would be settled with the company. The petitioner himself is responsible for the delay in filing the application. It is not the case that he was not knowing the date of dismissal of the reference for default. He knew about the date of dismissal of reference well within the time and still he has chosen to file the application after considerable delay. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited certain decisions before this Court and tried to convince that in such matter liberal view has to be taken, more so when the labour Court itself has held that the workman has a good case on merits. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited certain decisions before this Court and tried to convince that in such matter liberal view has to be taken, more so when the labour Court itself has held that the workman has a good case on merits. However, the case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts. ( 8 ) IN the facts of this case the view that has been taken by the Labourt Court cannot be said to be arbitrary or perverse, which calls for interference of this Court. When limitation is prescribed for filing of the application under Rule 26 (A), the delay has to be explained. Though stricter view may not be taken, still the petitioner has to make out sufficient cause which prevented him from filing the application within the limitation. In the present case he has failed to make out any such case. On the other hand it comes out from the facts on record of the case that he was taking chance of compromise in the matter, and when the compromise could not take place, he thought of filing of the application. He has also not disclosed facts fairly, truly and honestly. ( 9 ) IN the result this special civil application fails and the same is dismissed, rule discharged. No order as to costs. .