Order B.P. Singh & B.P. Sharma, JJ. The petitioner herein who was a member of the Bihar Judicial Service bas impugned the order of compulsory retirement passed by the Governor of Bihar under Section 74 (kha) (11) of the Bihar Service Code. The aforesaid order was paned on 4th of September, 1996. It is not in dispute that the impugned order was passed on the recommendation of the High Court. 2. The facts of the case, in so far as they are relevant for the disposal of the writ petition are that the petitioner joined tae Bihar Judicial Service and was appointed as Munsif on probation on 12.4.1975. On account of certain adverse comments in his confidential reports, the High Court on 23/24th March, 1982 decided not to confirm the petitioner as a Munsif. He was only later confirmed as a Munsif from a subsequent date vide decision of the court dated 31.3.1984. It appears from the record that on 30th April, 1937, the petitioner was promoted as Sub-Ordinate Judge, but by order dated 28.7.1988 he was again reverted to his substantive post of Munsif and posed as Additional Munsif. This was in view of the report of the Inspecting Judge who mace a detailed inquiry into certain allegations against the petitioner while he was posted at Naugachia. With a view to satisfy ourselves, we called for the original record from the registry of this Court, which has been placed before us and from which it appears that the Inspecting Judge examined several files and found that the petitioner's integrity was doubtful. The report of the Inspecting Judge is a detailed report and it can not be said that the conclusion reached by him was his mere ipse dixit. It is not disputed by the petitioner that he did not represent against the adverse comments made against him by the Inspecting Judge, but he has given his reasons for not doing so, as his father was murdered and he was busy in that connection. Be that as it may, when the question arose of the promotion of the petitioner as subordinate Judge on 30th March, 1990, he was superseded in view of the adverse Comments appearing in his service record, particularly the years 1984-85 and 1987-88. Be that as it may, when the question arose of the promotion of the petitioner as subordinate Judge on 30th March, 1990, he was superseded in view of the adverse Comments appearing in his service record, particularly the years 1984-85 and 1987-88. Two years later, in May, 1992, the petitioner was promoted as a Sub-ordinate Judge, but he has yet to be confirmed as a Sub-ordinate Judge. These facts would disclose that initially the petitioner was not confirmed in normal course and was subsequently confirmed from a subsequent date. In the matter of promotion, though he was promoted as Sub-Judge he was reverted on account of the adverse findings against him. He was superseded in the matter of promotion in May, 1990 and was subsequently promoted in May, 1992 to the post of Sub ordinate Judge, find was never confirmed as Sub-ordinate Judge. 3. The service record of the petitioner is also not very satisfactory. In 1987-88, 1992-93 and 1995-96, adverse comments were made about his reputation and integrity. There are some remarks about his low out turn as well and most of the entries in the service record would show that he was only considered an officer of average merit. Having regard to the service record of the petitioner, the High Court decided to compulsorily retire him. This decision was taken by the Standing Committee of the Court and was approved by the Full Court on 9.5.1996. Pursuant to the aforesaid commendation, the Governor of Bihar issued the impugned notification compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service. 4. It was submitted before us by counsel for the petitioner that adverse entries in the service record which were state in nature naught not to have been taken into account. It is not disputed before us that the entire service record of the petitioner was placed before the High Court and on a consideration of the entire service record the aforesaid decision to compulsorily retire the petitioner was taken. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 948 (Brij Mohan Singh Chopra Vs. State of Punjab), has laid down that adverse entries which related to the remote past should not be taken into account. It was also submitted that any adverse entry awarded to an employee loses its significance on of after his promotion to a higher post. State of Punjab), has laid down that adverse entries which related to the remote past should not be taken into account. It was also submitted that any adverse entry awarded to an employee loses its significance on of after his promotion to a higher post. He, therefore, submitted that since the petitioner was promoted in May, 1992 to the post of Sub-ordinate Judge any adverse entry before that date should be ignored. 5. The Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra's case held that old and stale entries should not be taken into account while considering the question of premature retirement instead the entries of recent past of five to ten years should be considered in forming the requisite opinion to retire a Government employee in public interest, it would be unreasonable and unjust to consider adverse entries of remote past and to ignore the good entries of recent past. The Court, therefore, expressed the opinion that if entries for a period of more than 10 years past are taken into account, it would be an act of digging out the past to get some material to make an order against the employee. We understand the judgment of the Supreme Court to mean that if there is no material against the concerned Officer in the recent past, say 10 years, the mere fact that in the distant past some entries have been made in the service record would not furnish a Justifiable ground to compulsorily retire the officer. If there is material in the recent past to Justify the action for compulsory retirement of an employee, that is an end of the matter. If there is none, reliance cannot be placed upon stale material provided by entries recorded in the distant past. Counsel for the High Court submitted that the law has been clearly said down in several decisions of the Supreme Court recently, and in particular he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1996 (V) Supreme Court Cases 331 (State of Orissa and others Vs. Ram Chandra Das). He submitted that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that merely because a promotion has been given even after adverse entries were made, cannot be a ground to hold that compulsory retirement of the government servant could not be ordered. The evidence does not become inadmissible or irrelevant. Ram Chandra Das). He submitted that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that merely because a promotion has been given even after adverse entries were made, cannot be a ground to hold that compulsory retirement of the government servant could not be ordered. The evidence does not become inadmissible or irrelevant. What would be relevant is whether upon that state of record as a reasonable prudent man would the Government or competent officer reach that decision. The Court found that selfsame material after promotion may not be taken into consideration only to deny him further promotion. But that material undoubtedly would be available to the Government to consider the overall expediency or necessity to continue the government servant in service after he attained the required length of service or qualified period of service for pension relied Counsel for the respondents relied upon several decisions of the supreme court including 1995 (VI) supreme court cases 442 (Union of India Vs. Ajoy Kumar Patnaik) 1996 (III) Supreme Court Cases 672 (Union of India Vs. P.S. Daillon) 1996 (V) Supreme Court Cases 111 (U.P. State Mineral development Corporation and another) to emphasis that the power of compulsorily retire a government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure. The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in the service and also to dispense with the service of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration. It is by now well settled that in the matter of compulsory retirement a satisfaction has to be reached by the competent authority that the continuance of the concerned employee in service is not in public interest. It is also well settled that where an action can be taken on the basis of subjective satisfaction, the sufficience of the material is not subject to judicial scrutiny but the facts on the basis of which the satisfaction is reached must be objectively established and must be shown to relevant. In the instant case we shall ignore the adverse remarks against the petitioner which were and, prior to the year 1986 i.e. 10 years before the decision was taken to compulsory retire the petitioner. In the instant case we shall ignore the adverse remarks against the petitioner which were and, prior to the year 1986 i.e. 10 years before the decision was taken to compulsory retire the petitioner. Even so in March 1990 the petitioner was superseded in the matter of promotion to the post of sub ordinate judge in view of his unsatisfactory record of service. It also appears that though he was promoted in April, 1987, he was again reverted in view of the adverse findings recorded by the Inspecting Judge who made a detailed inquiry into certain allegations made against the petitioner while he was at Naugachia. The Inspecting Judge found after a close scouting of the orders passed by the petitioner in several cases that there was serious doubt about the integrity of the petitioner, and that he should not be entrusted with any criminal work and should be under constant watch of the District and Sessions Judge under whom he was posted. This report was submitted pursuant to inspection held on 6th of November, 1987 and is dated 21st January, 1988. 6. In the year 1992-93, the District Judge again recorded that the Officer must maintain integrity and take care of his reputation. In June, 1995, the Inspecting Judge rated the petitioner under category C (below average) and recorded that the "Members of the Bar and other sections of people spoke about his doubtful integrity. He is an officer of bad reputation. Details are given in my Inspection Note." 7. It would thus appear that apart from being superseded in the matter of promotion to the rank of Sub-ordinate Judge, the petitioner has earned adverse remarks against his integrity and honesty. Apart from the adverse remark recorded in respect of the year 1992-93, there are, at least, two inspection notes by Inspecting Judges which have cast a serious doubt on the integrity of the petitioner. These inspection notes relate to the years 1987-88 and 1993-96. 8. Council for the petitioner submitted that against the adverse report made in the year 1995 the petitioner had no opportunity to represent before the impugned order was passed. Assuming it to be so, we do not consider that to be very material because the action taken is not punitive in character. Moreover that is not the only material on the basis or which the decision has been taken. 9. Assuming it to be so, we do not consider that to be very material because the action taken is not punitive in character. Moreover that is not the only material on the basis or which the decision has been taken. 9. It cannot be said that there was no material on the basis of which the High Court could have recorded the necessary satisfaction. Even though, sufficiency of material is not within the pale of judicial scrutiny, to any reasonable person, the material on record in the instant case must appear to the sufficient. There can be no doubt that the material disclosed was also relevant for the purpose of recording the necessary satisfaction that the continuance of the petitioner in service is not in public interest. We are therefore, satisfied that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, and the satisfaction reached by the competent authority is on the basis of relevant and admissible material. 10. There is no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Petition Dismissed.