JUDGMENT Gupta, J. -- 1. This appeal, at the behest of appellant Bhagwandas, is directed against the judgment dated 15.3.1989, passed by VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur in Sessions Trial No. 365/87, whereby the appellant was convicted under section 302, of the Indian Penal Code -- (for short the IPC), and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in a narrow compass, is that one daughter Saroj was born out of the wedlock of accused Bhagwandas and his first wife, Vidya Bai. Thereafter, as Vidya Bai started living with one Ratan Singh, accused Bhagwandas brought Kusum Bai (since deceased) as his second wife. In the fateful night of 19.7.87, when accused Bhagwandas came back to his house at about 9.00 p.m. Kusum Bai at that time was busy in the kitchen, cooking meals, and Saroj was inside the room. Accused Bhagwandas, immediately on his arrival, inquired from Kusum Bai about her 'payal'. Kusum Bai, out of fun, told him that the 'payal' has been pledged by her. Enraged Bhagwandas, at once started assaulting Kusum Bai. Kusum Bai rushed out of the kitchen and came in the room. Accused Bhagwandas, following her, also came in the room and after pouring kerosene on her, touched her to fire. Kusum Bai raised hue and cry and in her anxiety to save herself, put off all her clothes. Her shrieks attracted her neighbours. Kusum Bai thereafter was taken to the Hospital, where the Doctor on duty recorded her dying declaration. Her another dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. In the meantime, D.D. Paigwar, S.I. of Police Station Ranjhi, on getting the information about the incident, reached the Hospital and recorded 'Dehati Nalishi' on the information of Kusum Bai, on the basis of which First Information Report was registered, giving rise to the registration of a case at Crime No. 292/87 for the offences under sections 498-A and 307, of the IPC. Later on, Kusum Bai succumbed to her injuries and after observing the necessary formalities, her body was sent for post-mortem examination. The Autopsy Surgeon, vide post-mortem report (Ex. P-14), found 95% burns on her body and in his opinion, the cause of her death was shock as a result of the extensive bums on her body. Later on, Kusum Bai succumbed to her injuries and after observing the necessary formalities, her body was sent for post-mortem examination. The Autopsy Surgeon, vide post-mortem report (Ex. P-14), found 95% burns on her body and in his opinion, the cause of her death was shock as a result of the extensive bums on her body. After completing the investigation, Police Ranjhi filed charge-sheet against accused Bhagwandas for the commission of the offence under section 302, of the Indian Penal Code. 3. At the trial, accused Bhagwandas abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication to the charge, framed against him, under section 302, of the IPC. 4. Though there was no eye-witness account available in the case for establishing the complicity of accused Bhagwandas, in the offence of commission of murder of his wife Kusum Bai, but the prosecution sought to establish the above charge of murder on the strength of the .circumstantial evidence against him, and in its bid of doing so, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses at the trial. Accused Bhagwandas also examined one witness Umakant Chouksey (DW-1), a reader in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur for establishing the non-compliance of section 157, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. The trial Court, on a close scrutiny of the ocular and medical evidence on record, held it proved that deceased Kusum Bai had sustained extensive burns in the night of 19.7.87, and the resultant death was homicidal in nature. Relying upon the three dying declarations of deceased Kusum Bai and the other circumstantial evidence, on record, the trial Court held accused Bhagwandas guilty of commission of murder of his wife Kusum Bai and, therefore, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above: 6. Relying upon the three dying declarations of deceased Kusum Bai and the other circumstantial evidence, on record, the trial Court held accused Bhagwandas guilty of commission of murder of his wife Kusum Bai and, therefore, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above: 6. Shri R.N. Roy, the learned counsel for the appellant, assailed the appellant's conviction on the grounds that there is no eye-witness account available in the case for connecting the appellant with the offence of commission of murder of his wife, the two dying declarations, recorded by the Doctor and the Executive Magistrate, do not bear the certificate from the Doctor, certifying that the declarant was in fit mental and physical condition to make declaration the First Information Report (FIR), alleged to have been recorded on the information of deceased Kusum Bai, is not a reliable piece of evidence, as deceased Kusum Bai could not have been in a position to make any narration about the incident; and, the conduct of the appellant in taking deceased Kusum Bai to the Hospital, for her treatment, cuts through the prosecution case and speaks volumes about his innocence. 7. Shri R.A. Robertson, the learned Panel Lawyer, in his attempt to make the sharp edge of the attack, of the learned counsel for the appellant, blunt, strenuously argued that the three dying declarations relied upon by the trial Court are consistent in material particulars and the mere omission of a certificate, in these dying declarations, about the fitness -- mental and physical, of the declarant to make a declaration is, by itself, not sufficient to discard this valuable piece of evidence altogether. 8. Admittedly, there is no eye-witness account available in the case in support of the allegation against the appellant of his having burnt his wife Kusum Bai @ Vidya Bai. The entire prosecution case against the appellant rests on three dying declarations. Of these, one Ex. P-12 is said to have been recorded by S.P. Meshram (PW 11), Naib Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate, on 19.7.87. On perusing this dying-declaration (Ex. P-12), we find that it does not bear any certificate from the Doctor, that the declarant was in a fit mental and physical condition to make the statement. It is not in the question and answer form, but is in narrative form. Though it bears a thumb impression, but there is no indication as to whose thumb impression it was. P-12), we find that it does not bear any certificate from the Doctor, that the declarant was in a fit mental and physical condition to make the statement. It is not in the question and answer form, but is in narrative form. Though it bears a thumb impression, but there is no indication as to whose thumb impression it was. S.P. Meshram (PW 11), in his deposition in the Court, has not given any explanation about the above mentioned serious infirmities. 9. The Apex Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, while considering the effect of the absence of a certificate from the Doctor about the fit mental and physical condition of the declarant and the thumb impression/signature of the declarant in the dying declaration itself, in the case of Maniram v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1994 SC 840 , observed in para 3 : "3. ........ That apart, in a case of this nature, particularly when the declarant was in the hospital itself, it was the duty of the person who recorded the dying declaration to do so in the presence of the doctor after duly being certified by the doctor that the declarant was conscious and in senses and was in a fit condition to make the declaration. These are some of the important requirements which have to be observed. "The Apex Court, on account of the above infirmities, discarded the evidence of dying declaration altogether and the accused was acquitted of the charge of commission of murder of his wife. 10. Now, reverting back to the facts of the present case, dying declaration (Ex. P-12) is also impregnated with the infirmities which were noticed by the Apex Court, in Maniram' s case i.e., absence of a certificate from the Doctor, certifying about the fit mental and physical condition of the declarant and the thumb impression/signature of the declarant in the dying declaration itself. Merely because dying declaration - Ex. P-12 bears a thumb impression of someone, it cannot be presumed that the same must have been put by the deceased. There is yet another circumstance which creates serious doubt about this thumb impression being of the deceased. Dr. R.R. Ahirwar (PW 5), who claims to have recorded another dying declaration (Ex. Merely because dying declaration - Ex. P-12 bears a thumb impression of someone, it cannot be presumed that the same must have been put by the deceased. There is yet another circumstance which creates serious doubt about this thumb impression being of the deceased. Dr. R.R. Ahirwar (PW 5), who claims to have recorded another dying declaration (Ex. P-11) of the deceased in the night of 19.7.87, had categorically admitted in para 10, of his cross-examination, that he did not obtain thumb impression of the declarant on dying declaration (Ex P-11), because she had sustained bum injuries to such extent that it was not possible for her to put her thumb impression on the dying declaration. The above circumstances create a serious doubt about the genuineness of the dying declaration Ex. P-12. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that this dying declaration Ex. P-12, being impregnated with the above serious infirmities, is unworthy of any credence. 11. The other dying declaration (Ex. P-11) is said to have been recorded by Dr. R.R. Ahirwar (PW 5) at 1.20 a.m., on 19.7.87. On a bare perusal of this dying declaration, we find that this dying declaration also suffers from the same infirmities, as mentioned hereinabove in regard to the other dying declaration (Ex. P-12) i.e., it has not been recorded in the question and answer form, it does not bear either the thumb impression, or the signature of the declarant; it does not bear any certificate from the Doctor, certifying that the declarant was in fit mental and physical condition to make the statement. As such, this dying declaration (Ex. P-11) is also bound to meet the same fate as that of the other dying declaration (Ex. P-12), and no reliance can be placed on this piece of evidence also. 12. Now remains the evidence of the third dying declaration, recorded in the form of 'Dehati Nalishi' by Sub-Inspector of Police, D.D. Paigwar (PW 12), who is the Investigating Officer of the case too. In para 3, he has stated that this 'Dehati Nalishi' was recorded by him in the Hospital. This witness could not give any explanation as to why no certificate was obtained from the Doctor on duty about the fit mental and physical condition of the deceased, prior to the recording of the 'Dehati Nalishi'. In para 3, he has stated that this 'Dehati Nalishi' was recorded by him in the Hospital. This witness could not give any explanation as to why no certificate was obtained from the Doctor on duty about the fit mental and physical condition of the deceased, prior to the recording of the 'Dehati Nalishi'. Though in para 6 of his cross-examination he claimed to have sent a copy of the First Information Report (FIR), recorded on the basis of the above 'Dehati Nalishi' (intimation under section 157, of the Criminal Procedure Code) to the concerning Magistrate next day through the Moharrir and an endorsement to that effect was made in the case diary, but on being confronted with the case diary, he had to admit that there was no such endorsement in the case diary about the above despatch of the copy of the FIR to the concerning Magistrate. No other material was produced in the Court for proving the compliance of section 157, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The above weaknesses, in our considered view, renders 'Dehati Nalishi' (Ex. P-20), as dying declaration of deceased Kusum Bai, unworthy of credence. 13. The proved conduct of appellant Bhagwandas during and after the incident runs counter to the guilty mind and speaks volumes about his innocence. Dr. R.R. Ahirwar (PW 5) had categorically stated in para 1 of his statement that deceased Kusum Bai @ Vidya Bai was brought by her husband, appellant Bhagwandas, to the Vehicle Factory Hospital, Jabalpur for her treatment. This fact finds a specific mention in the initial medical report (Ex. P-10), of the deceased. Saroj (PW 1), daughter of appellant Bhagwandas and deceased Kusum Bai @ Vidya Bai, had categorically stated that her father appellant Bhagwandas had put a blanket on her ablaze mother. Basanti Bai (PW 2) also supports the above version of Saroj (PW 1). Vinod Kumar (PW 8), a neighbour, has also stated that appellant Bhagwandas was trying to save his wife by covering her with a blanket. Thus, it is established that the appellant had done his best to save his wife and had rushed immediately to the Hospital, in his anxiety to make the medical treatment available to his wife as early as possible. Thus, it is established that the appellant had done his best to save his wife and had rushed immediately to the Hospital, in his anxiety to make the medical treatment available to his wife as early as possible. The normal human conduct of a person with a guilty mind would have been to run away from the place of occurrence, with a view to escape from the consequences of his misdeeds. The facts that appellant Bhagwandas remained present all along with his wife; had made all possible efforts to extenguish the fire; took his injured wife to the hospital immediately, no doubt tilt the scale in favour of the innocence of the appellant. 14. On the above re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it emerges out that none of the three recorded dying declarations (Ex. P-11, P-12 and P-20) bear certificate from the Doctor, about the fit mental and physical condition of the declarant; such a certificate was necessary even in the case of 'Dehati Nalishi' (Ex. P-20), as admittedly it was recorded in the hospital; the two dying declarations, Ex. P-11 -- recorded by' the Doctor and Ex. P-12 -- recorded by Naib Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate, do not bear either the thumb impression or the signature of the deceased; these dying declarations were not recorded in the question and answer form; the conduct of the appellant during and after the incident does not indicate his guilty mind, but on the contrary points towards his innocence; there is no material on record suggesting any reason or motive for the appellant for committing the murder of his own wife. Thus, the evidence on record, in our considered view, falls short of establishing the charge of murder against appellant Bhagwandas. At any rate, appellant Bhagwandas is entitled to benefit of doubt. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal, filed by appellant Bhagwandas, deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. His conviction under section 302, of the Indian Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life, are hereby set aside. He is acquitted of the charge under section 302, of the Indian Penal Code. 16. Appellant Bhagwandas is in jail. He be set at liberty forthwith, if not wanted in connection with any other case.