D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiffs Second Appeal. ( 2 ) THE brief facts giving rise to this Appeal are as under: ( 3 ) THE plaintiff-appellant is sole proprietor of the concern named as M/s National electro Mechanical Co. , Rajkot. The respondent-defendant granted cash credit facility to the plaintiff-appellant for Rs. 80,000/- in respect of accounts opened by the appellant in security of cash credit facility. The Bank-defendant wanted certain goods to be pledged by the plaintiff-appellant with the defendant-Bank as security. Accordingly, the plaintiff pledged goods viz. , copper wire, strips, stamping ball, bearing, leather rell, electric meter etc. A deed of pledge was also executed and cash credit facilities were utilised by the appellant and demand promissory note was also executed on 10. 8. 1966 by the appellant in favour of the respondent. The defendant-respondent filed Special Suit No. 40 of 1969 against the plaintiff-appellant for the recovery of amount due to his account. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff-appellant of this appeal on 6. 5. 1970 and 12. 5. 1970 paid the entire outstanding balance due against him and the defendant had returned the pledged goods to the plaintiff except 319 kgs of copper strips entrusted with the defendant-Bank. Since this quantity of copperstrips was not returned to the plaintiff the suit for recovery of this quantity of copper strips and in the alternative to pay its market price with interest was filed. ( 4 ) THE suit was contested by the defendant-respondent taking plea of bar of limitation, bar of resjudicata and other factual pleas. On the factual side it was admitted that the items mentioned in the plaint were pledged but at the time of pledge, items were not weighed and that correct number was also not given of the items pledged. On making full payment in Suit No. 40/79 the defendant-Bank returned pledged articles to the plaintiff- appellant and now nothing is due to the plaintiff-appellant. It was also pleaded that goods were accepted from the plaintiff in trust and were not weighed or counted at the time of pledge and that the physical actual verification of the pledged goods was made on 3. 12. 1968 and certain discrepancies in weighment were noticed. It was also pleaded that goods were accepted from the plaintiff in trust and were not weighed or counted at the time of pledge and that the physical actual verification of the pledged goods was made on 3. 12. 1968 and certain discrepancies in weighment were noticed. That the entry in the stock register was made on the basis of the information given by the plaintiff but the entry of stock register did not tally with the actual weighment made on 3. 12. 1968. Comparative position was taken on physical verification and it was found that some goods were more in the godown and some goods were less. As such it was pleaded that there was no question of not delivering 391 kgs. copper strips to the plaintiff. It was also pleaded that in view of the agreement in the deed the result of weighment as verified by the Bank shall be conclusive and the Bank is not responsible for the goods which were found short. ( 5 ) THE Trial Court repelled the defence plea and decreed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. In the appeal the judgment and decree of the, Trial Court was reversed. Hence, this Second Appeal. ( 6 ) AFTER going through the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, I find that it is not properly written judgment and the approach of the lower Appellate Court is totally unwarranted and findings are based on surmises and conjectures overlooking the weight of evidence and it also failed to consider which side was required to prove whether the goods pledged were returned to the plaintiff-appellant or not. In other words, the question of onus of proof was also not properly considered. Further the lower Appellate Court has misunderstood and misinterpreted clause 9 of the agreement, exhibit 83. ( 7 ) NORMALLY the findings of fact are not interfered in Second Appeal but where the findings are based in improper interpretation of the pledge agreement and also over looking the weight of evidence it can be said that the judgment is perverse and interference in Second Appeal is justified. ( 8 ) FROM the respective contentions of the parties certain facts are admitted. Granting cash credit facility to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 80,000/- is admitted. It is also admitted that copper wire, strips, stamping ball, bearing, leather rell, electric meter etc. ( 8 ) FROM the respective contentions of the parties certain facts are admitted. Granting cash credit facility to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 80,000/- is admitted. It is also admitted that copper wire, strips, stamping ball, bearing, leather rell, electric meter etc. were pledged by the appellant with the respondent. At the time of pledge necessary entries were made in the stock register of the respondent bank. It is also admitted that demand promissory note was executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent. Likewise it is admitted that on the basis of demand promissory note Suit No. 40/69 was filed against the plaintiff for recovery of amount due under this account. It is equally admitted that during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff in this suit as defendant made entire payment on 6. 5. 1970 and 12. 5. 1970. According to the plaintiff after this payment the defendant returned the pledged goods except 391 kgs. of copper strips. The suit was filed for return of this quantity of copper strips, and in the alternative for its price together with the interest. ( 9 ) POINT of contest was that at the time of pledge neither items pledged were counted nor weighed and physical verification was made only on 3. 12. 1968, when it was found that the goods entered in the stock register of the Bank did not tally with the actual quantity kept in the godown of defendant Bank. It is also a case of the defendant-respondent that at the time of physical verification some goods were found in excess than noted in the register, some were short and there was also short weighment of some of the goods pledged. For this discrepancy, the Bank relied upon the condition of agreement and it was the case that the weighment as certified by the Bank shall be conclusive. Presuming that such certificate of weighment was issued subsequently on 3. 12. 1968 but admittedly it was done before the institution of the suit which was filed in 1971. ( 10 ) FROM the side of the defendant, it is obvious that it was a case that all the pledged goods were returned to the plaintiff after he made payment of the entire dues during the pendency of earlier Suit No. 40/89. 1968 but admittedly it was done before the institution of the suit which was filed in 1971. ( 10 ) FROM the side of the defendant, it is obvious that it was a case that all the pledged goods were returned to the plaintiff after he made payment of the entire dues during the pendency of earlier Suit No. 40/89. Whereas case of the plaintiff is that other pledged goods were returned but not full quantity of copper strips and 391 kgs. copper strips were not returned to the plaintiff. In face of this stand of the parties it was for the defendant bank to prove that the quantity of 391 kgs. of copper strips were also returned to the plaintiff-appellant. For this there is no evidence oral or documentary. On the other hand there is statement of the plaintiff and the plaintiff except by giving negative evidence that he did not receive the above quantity of copper strips from the Bank could not adduce any positive evidence. Positive evidence on the other hand could be adduced by the respondent bank by examining some witness to prove that this quantity was also returned or that actually at the time of weighment copper strips were found short in weight by 391 kgs. No receipt was filed showing that the aforesaid quantity of copper strips was received by the appellant when he made payment. Thus, the initial onus of proof of returning the entire pledged goods which lay upon the defendant was not discharged. On the other hand the plaintiff has discharged the onus of proof and bonafide of the plaintiff cannot be doubted. If the plaintiff could have dishonest intention he could have said that nothing was returned by the Bank. On the other hand the case is specific that all other items were returned except 391 kgs. of copper strips. Since this bonafide of the plaintiff could not be doubted by any evidence from the side of the defendant-respondent the plaintiff was entitled to belief and the lower Appellate Court in disbelieving the plaintiff has committed an error which amounts to perversity in the judgment calling for interference of this court. ( 11 ) THE lower Appellate Court has placed reliance upon Clause 9 of the pledge deed and observed that there was no liability of the defendant Bank for the loss or shortage of copper strips. ( 11 ) THE lower Appellate Court has placed reliance upon Clause 9 of the pledge deed and observed that there was no liability of the defendant Bank for the loss or shortage of copper strips. Here also the lower Appellate Court has totally misinterpreted Clause 9 of the agreement. ( 12 ) CLAUSE 9 of the agreement, exh. 83 reads as under :"that during the continuance of this agreement borrowers shall be responsible for all losses, damage or deterioration of the goods caused by theft, fire, rain, floods, earthquake, lighting, enemy action, internal commotion or any other cause whatsoever". ( 13 ) THE lower Appellate Court has interpreted words"any other cause whatsoever"to include shortage of this type in weight of copper strips. This interpretation is also erroneous. True interpretation of Clause 9 is that the liability of the borrowers shall be for all losses, damage or deterioration of the pledged goods for the cause mentioned in this clause. In the instant case it is not a case of damage or deterioration to the copper strips. It is also not a case of loss of copper strips. Words theft, fire, rain etc. mentioned in this clause indicate the causes which are beyond the control of the Bank. If the goods are lost, damaged or deteriorated on account of these causes then the Bank was not responsible. On the other hand on the happening of such contingency the borrowers shall be responsible for all losses, damage or deterioration. Expression any other cause whatsoever is not to be given wide scope. On the other hand it has to be given restricted meaning and it has to be interpreted as other causes as akin to the causes mentioned in this agreement which were beyond the control of the parties. The shortage of weight was not beyond the control of the Bank. It was the duty of the Bank to make weighment of the goods and also to count the bundles pledges with it. If the officials were negligent and failed to take weight or count number of bundles the responsibility cannot be shifted upon the plaintiff-appellant. Even if some shortage was found at subsequent stage on 3. 12. It was the duty of the Bank to make weighment of the goods and also to count the bundles pledges with it. If the officials were negligent and failed to take weight or count number of bundles the responsibility cannot be shifted upon the plaintiff-appellant. Even if some shortage was found at subsequent stage on 3. 12. 1968 when actual weighment and physical verification was done by the Bank it was the duty of the Bank to come with a specific case and evidence that the stock of copper strips kept in the godown was found short by 391 kgs. Unless it was so pleaded and proved the defendant-respondent cannot escape from the liability of returning the aforesaid quantity of copper strips. On verification discrepancies were found and some items were more in stock and some were less. However, it is not a ground to believe or presume that 391 kgs. of copper strips were actually found short in weight. The lower appellate Court has taken shelter behind the contradictory statement of the plaintiff in the earlier suit and in this suit. The plaintiff-appellant of this appeal stated that copper strips were kept in bundles and that weight of each bundle was about 25 kgs. to 60 kgs. Whereas in this suit it was stated that copper rolls consisted to 60 kgs. to 200 kgs. in each bundle. This contradiction was also no ground to disbelieve the plaintiff because there is no evidence from the side of the Bank that the number of bundles of rolls containing copper strips were short or less than the bundles shown in the memo accompanying pledge deed. Likewise there is no evidence from the respondent that total weighment of the copper strips on 6. 12. 1968 was less by 391 kgs. as shown in the pledge deed and the memo. In the absence of such definite case and evidence the plaintiff was liable to be believed and the approach to the contrary adopted by the lower Appellate Court can certainly be said to be perverse requiring interference in the Second Appeal. Again the view of the lower appellate Court that there is no necessity for the Bank to adduce any evidence is also contrary to law. Again the view of the lower appellate Court that there is no necessity for the Bank to adduce any evidence is also contrary to law. ( 14 ) FINDINGS of the two Courts below that the suit was within limitation and the suit was not barred by resjudicata does not suffer from any illegality. However, in view of the aforesaid discussions the finding if the lower Appellate Court exonerating the respondent of its liability to return 391 kgs. copper strips is not only erroneous but perverse, hence liable to be set aside. The Appeal has therefore merit and deserves to be allowed. ( 15 ) THE Appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and that of the Trial Court passed on 31. 1. 1979 are restored. In the circumstances of the case the parties to bear their own cost of this appeal. .