Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. All the three petitioners have been arrayed as accused along with one M.A. Rahman in Complaint Case No. C (iii) 132/88 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Ranchi. Out of aforesaid four accused persons, three of them have moved this Court invoking the jurisdiction of this under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the entire prosecution against them on the ground of inordinate delay and also that the allegations alleged do not constitute may offence. 2. It appears that on 28.3.1988, the Employment Officer, Enforcement Machinery, filed a complaint against the said four accused persons alleging, inter alia, that during the course of inspection it was found that the accused persons had failed to furnish quarterly returns ending December, 1996, March, 1987 and June, 1987 and September, 1987 which was in contravention of Sec. 5(1) of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act 1959. It is alleged that these persons (names have been given in complaint) were appointed on 2.11.1987 without notifying any vacancy of that post to the local employment Exchange or Central Employment Exchange which is also in contravention of Sub-section (1) of Sec. 4 of the said Act as well as other Rules of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Rules, 1960. Apart from this, one vacancy of librarian was filled up by the accused by appointing one C.K. Das on 30.11.1987 without notifying the vacancy to the Employment Exchange in utter violation of the Act and the Rules. Show cause notice was issued by the complainant to the accused but no satisfactory reply could be given. It is said that the accused have committed offence punishable under Sec. 7(2)(a)(i) of the said Act and the Rules. 3. There is no denial of the fact that cognizance was taken in the year, 1991, and thereafter, the case was adjourned from time to time for appearance of the accused persons. 4. Pursuant to order dated 29.9.1997 the learned Magistrate has sent a report dated 8.10.1997 explaining the circumstances under which the trial could not be concluded expeditiously. However, before dealing with the same, I will consider the submissions of the parties. 5. Mr. 4. Pursuant to order dated 29.9.1997 the learned Magistrate has sent a report dated 8.10.1997 explaining the circumstances under which the trial could not be concluded expeditiously. However, before dealing with the same, I will consider the submissions of the parties. 5. Mr. Prasad, with reference to Sec. 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code), submits that it was statutory duty of the Magistrate to explain the substance of accusation to the petitioners as soon as they appeared before the Court and this having not been done, according to him, the whole trial is vitiated causing prejudice to the petitioners in attending Court for the last 10 years. Second submission of Mr. Prasad is that the complainant having admitted that the petitioners are the employees of the Silk Board, as will appear from Annexure-1 attached to the complaint, the responsibility of either issuing appointment letters or making advertisement of the posts rests on the Central Silk Board and not the petitioners and, as such, they cannot be held responsible for not making any advertisement before appointing the said persons. Thirdly, it is contended that the Silk Board is the establishment and not the Central Tasar Research department of the Board. Lastly he contended that the complainant himself has suggested for withdrawal of the case against the petitioners and the Deputy Commissioner Ranchi had no business to interfere with the same by objecting withdrawal of the case. 6. Mr. Agrawal, on the contrary, has contended that it is not necessary that in all circumstance the Prosecution has to be quashed merely on the ground of delay in its disposal. According to him, the facts and circumstances which led the trial to be delayed, must be looked into. Secondly, learned counsel continues, the complaint petition does disclose offence against the petitioners and as such, the same cannot be quashed at this stage and the point as to whether the petitioners work employment or the Central Silk Board was required to issue advertisement, is a question of fact which can be gone into by the trial Court at an appropriate stage. 7. As noticed above, four accused persons named in the complaint petition are (1) Central Tasar Research Training Institute, Hehal Ranchi (2) Sri S.S. Sinha, Director Incharge, (3) Sri D.V. Prasad, Deputy Director and; (4) Sri M.A. Rahamn, Administrative and Finance Officer of the said Institute. 7. As noticed above, four accused persons named in the complaint petition are (1) Central Tasar Research Training Institute, Hehal Ranchi (2) Sri S.S. Sinha, Director Incharge, (3) Sri D.V. Prasad, Deputy Director and; (4) Sri M.A. Rahamn, Administrative and Finance Officer of the said Institute. Annexure 1 to the complaint petition is a letter to the Joint Director of the said Training Institute dated 2.11.1987 which shows that for filling up the posts of Sr. Research Assistant in the establishment six names were approved for appointment. 8. According to Mr. Prasad Annexure-1 clearly shows that those persons were appointed as per the order of the Board and not by the petitioners. The allegation, however, shows that without the order of the Board those persons were appointed, rather the allegation is that without notifying the vacancies to the local employment exchange or Central Employment Exchange he said posts were filled up. Thus, whether the aforesaid six persons were appointed by the Board on the presumption that the vacancies were notified by the petitioners as required under law, is to be decided at an appropriate stage of the case and this Court will not embark upon a roving inquiry. 9. It is true that under Sec. 251 of the Code in a summons case, on appearance of the accused before the Magistrate the particulars of offence shall be stated to him and he shall be asked as to whether he pleads his guilty or has any defence to make. It is not necessary to frame a formal charge. The argument of Mr Prasad that though the petitioners appeared before the Court on 13.7.1992 but the particulars of offence were not stated and, as such, the whole trial is vitiated, has to be considered along with the points raised on behalf of the petitioners that the whole proceeding should be quashed on the ground of delay. 10. On 29.9.1997, on submissions being made on behalf of the petitioners that no effective step had been taken for disposal of the case tough the case is pending for last nine years, the learned Single Judge called for a report, as aforesaid, which is kept at flag K. This report clearly indicates that sufficient grounds were there for delay in disposal of the trial. From the report it appears that cognizance of the offence was taken on 22.4.1988 and case was transferred to Sri Reyasat Hussain, J.M. 1st class, Ranchi for disposal. Summons were issued from that Court and in the meantime, the case was again transferred to the Court of Sri S.P. Srivastava, Judicial Magistrate. Again the case was transferred to the Court of Sri B. Ram where on 13.7.1992 Petitioner No. 2 surrendered and was released on bail. On 14.7.1992 Petitioner No. 3, D.N. Prasad got bail on surrender before the Court below. However, the third accused, M.A. Rahman did not appear and, as such the matter remained pending. No step was taken on 19.3.1993 in the case on behalf of Petitioner No. 3 and, as such, his bail bond was cancelled and non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued. Similarly on 25.8.1994 when Petitioner No. 2 did not take any step, his bail bond was also cancelled and non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued. Petitioner No. 2 again appeared before the court on 20.9.1995 and was released on bail. On 22.9.1995 Petitioner No. 3, in the same manner appeared before the Court and was released on bail. As till that date another accused, M.A. Rahman did not appears, processes under Secs. 82 and 82 of the Code was issued. Thereafter, the case transferred to the Court of the present officer. Mr. Kumar Dinesh Judicial Magistrate, 2nd class, Ranchi for the first time on 3.1.1997. But as Mr. Rahman did not appear till that date, and service report was not received, the case remained pending. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were required to be personally present before the Court but they were allowed to be represented by lawyer. On 14.7.1997 the case of accused, Rahman was separated because the Court found that there was no chance of appearance in near future of the said accused. Both these petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were directed to be present physiceilly for explaining the particulars of offence to them. However, on 30.1,1997 these two Petitioner filed a petition before the Court that the Director, Employment and Training, had directed the A.P.P. to withdraw the said case and the proposal was sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. On this ground time was prayed which was allowed with a direction that on the next date both the accused will be physically present in Court. On this ground time was prayed which was allowed with a direction that on the next date both the accused will be physically present in Court. On 1.9.1997 again a petition was filed stating that in view of the direction of this Court in CWJC No. 1128/96 these two petitioners should be discharged or acquitted. 11. The learned Magistrate, however, was of the view that this Court specially directed that if the trial is being delayed due to the fault of the accused, the said direction should not be followed. Thus, the prayer of these petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 either to discharge of acquit them was refused and then the petitioners prayed for time to move this Court against the said order. On 22.9.1997 the petitioners informed the Court that because they have approached this Court in the instant application, further proceedings of the case be stayed. The Court directed to produce the order of the High Court forthwith. 12. In this background, the Magistrate has stated that since the date of taking of cognizance in 1988 these petitioners 2 and 3 first time appeared in 1992 and when they did not take any step in 1993 and 1994 respectively, their bail bonds were cancelled, as aforesaid. Even after separation of the case of accused, Rahman, the Court tried to proceed with the trial but repeately by filing petitions the petitioners delayed the disposal of the trial. Thus, the Court has expressed its view that as because the case of Rahman has been separated, the trial of these petitioners 2 and 3, can be disposed of within six months. 13. From the said report of the learned Magistrate it appears that it is not that the delay was caused at the end of the Court, rather it were the petitioners 2 and 3 who, due to their non-co-operation, delayed the trial for such a long time. It is true that the department of Labour, Employment and Training, has taken a decision to withdraw the prosecution against these petitioners and the same was communicated to the A.P.P. Ranchi by the Director but it has been stated in para 8 of the counter affidavit that the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi has protested against the said decision of the department of Labour and has requested for obtaining approval of the department of law as provided under Sec. 285 of the Bihar Police Manual. 14. In this background the argument of Mr Prasad that in the circumstances of this case, the provision of Sec. 285 of the Bihar Police Manual is not applicable, in my view, is too early to be decided. Even if the Director of Employment and Training has directed the A.P.P. to withdraw the case, but admittedly, the same was objected to by the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, now the decision rests on the prosecution, meaning thereby the Director and the Deputy Commissioner. If ultimately the A.P.P. files a petition before the learned Magistrate for withdrawal of the case, the Magistrate is required to pass an order in accordance with law and the decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court. The High Court in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is not expected to pass an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the case because that discretion entirely rests on the Prosecution. 15. As far as the allegations made against the petitioners in the petition of complaint are concerned, I am of the view, that prima facie, a case has been made out and at this stage the High Court will not embark upon a roving inquiry considering the defence of the petitioners. 16. In the result, I find no merit in this application which is, accordingly, dismissed.