JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J.—This judgment will dispose of RFAs No. 72 and 73 of 1989, Eastern Impex Corporation and another v. State Bank of Patiala and another and S. W. Rubber Works Pvt Ltd. v. State Bank of Patiala and another, respectively, as they arise out of the same judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge of this Court passed in Civil Suit No. 72 of 1979 dated 27.6.1989 titled State Bank of Patiala v. Hypine Carbons Ltd. and others. 2. The facts giving rise to these appeals are that defendant No.1 Hypine Carbons Ltd. (in liquidation) was set up at Nalagarh, District Solan, for the purpose of producing and processing of activated carbon and bye-products thereof. It had applied for loan to the State Bank of Patiala, plaintiff-respondent herein, which was duly sanctioned by the latter in the form of granting some credit limits to defendant No.1 in pursuance of an agreement dated December 18, 1972. This agreement was reviewed and the necessary documents were also renewed from time to time. 3. The said defendant No.1 Hypine Carbons Ltd. had been supplying its manufactured products, already hypothecated with the plaintiff-bank to various parties with a stipulation that payment should be made for the said product directly to the plaintiff-bank. For this purpose, hundis used to be drawn up by the said parties which, in turn, used to be discounted to the plaintiff-bank. 4. A petition for winding up of defendant No.1 i.e. Hypine Carbons Ltd. (Coy. Petition No. 1 of 1977) was filed in this Court by M/s. Kuldip Industrial Corporation. This Court, while admitting the said petition, appointed a Provisional Liquidator in respect of the assets of the said defendant No.1 under Section 450 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. 5. Since defendant No.1 had made default regarding repayments to the plaintiff-bank provided under various agreements between the parties, its manufacturing operations came to a standstill. There followed the action of re-calling the loan by the plaintiff-bank from defendant No. 1, by issuing notices to the latter, and requiring repayment of the loan amount. Moreover, the Provisional Liquidator appointed by this Court could also not make suitable arrangement for the discharge of liability of defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff-bank. 6. A Company Application No. 4 of 1978 was filed by the plaintiff-bank in the main case i.e., Coy. Moreover, the Provisional Liquidator appointed by this Court could also not make suitable arrangement for the discharge of liability of defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff-bank. 6. A Company Application No. 4 of 1978 was filed by the plaintiff-bank in the main case i.e., Coy. Petition No. 1 of 1977 containing the prayers, inter alia, (a) that it should be directed to sell the pledged/hypothecated goods immediately and in case the amount realised by their sale is more than the amount due to the plaintiff-bank, the balance may be allowed to be paid to respondent No.2, i.e. National Traders, New Delhi so that the employees of the Company are paid their wages as directed by an order of this Court dated 24.8.1977; (b) that in case the amount realised from the sale of the pledged/hypothecated goods falls short of the amount due to the plaintiff-bank, it may be permitted to file a suit for recovery of the balance amount with interest and costs by enforcing the personal guarantee of respondents N6. 3 to 5, namely, S. Sahai, Eastern Impex Corporation and K.B. Sharma all from Delhi; and (c) that a suit may be permitted to be filed against respondent No.1, i.e. Hypine Carbons Ltd. (in liquidation) as also respondents No. 6 to 12 for recovering the amount, as detailed in the said application, along with interest and costs. 7. In the above-mentioned application, M/s. Hypine Carbons Ltd. was respondent No.1 while defendants No. 2,4,6,8,10,12 and 13 were arrayed as respondents No. 6 to 12. 8. Company Application No. 4/78 was ultimately allowed by this Court by an order dated 30.5.1979. The operative part of that order reads as follows: "As such, the application is allowed and the petitioner is permitted to sell the goods pledged/hypothecated to it on behalf of respondent No.1 Company in collaboration with the Official Liquidator. Proper accounts of the goods sold and price fetched would be maintained by the Bank and the Official Liquidator. The sale would be subject to the confirmation by this Court. The petitioner is also permitted to file a suit against respondent No.1 and respondents No. 3 to 5 to recover the amount due with interest and costs. The petitioner is also allowed to file a separate suit for the recovery of the amount due from respondent No.1 and respondents No. 6 to 12 to the petitioner-bank with interest and costs." 9. The petitioner is also allowed to file a separate suit for the recovery of the amount due from respondent No.1 and respondents No. 6 to 12 to the petitioner-bank with interest and costs." 9. The suit giving rise to these appeals was ultimately filed on 15.10.1979 by the plaintiff-bank in which the respondents were M/s. Hypine Carbons Ltd. (ill liquidation) i.e. respondent No.1 and defendants No. 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13, being the corresponding parties as respondents No. 6 to 12 in the Company Petition No. 4 of 1978. Permission was also granted to the plaintiff-bank to file a separate suit for recovery of the amount due from the first defendant and the said respondents. 10. By way of the suit giving rise to these appeals, the plaintiff-bank had asked for recovery of different amounts from Hypine Carbons Ltd. along with other defendants. The case of the plaintiff-bank was against various sets of defendants, as set out in paragraph 7 of the plaint. 11. The suit was contested only by defendants No 4, 5, 10, 11 and 13. It was directed and ordered to be proceeded ex-parte against the remaining defendants by an order dated 29.5.1980, because the said defendants did not appear despite service. 12. Four separate written statements were filed, namely, one by defendant No.1, second by defendants No. 4 and 5, 3rd by defendants No.10 and 11 and the fourth by defendant No.13. 13. In their joint written statement, defendants No.4 and 5 pleaded that no goods were supplied to them and thus, no amount is due from them nor are they liable to pay any such amount to the plaintiff. 14. As is clear from the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, during the pendency of the suit, on 22.9.1981, as statement under Order X, Rule 2, C.P.C. was made by the learned Counsel appearing for defendants No. 4 and 5 on their behalf, which was as under: "Hundi Ex. P-3 for the amount of Rs. 86,037.60 was accepted by defendants No. 4 and 5 for payment to the plaintiff-bank. Defendants No. 4 and 5, however, have not made any payment against this Hundi. They made no such payment because no goods were received by them pertaining to this Hundi" 15. P-3 for the amount of Rs. 86,037.60 was accepted by defendants No. 4 and 5 for payment to the plaintiff-bank. Defendants No. 4 and 5, however, have not made any payment against this Hundi. They made no such payment because no goods were received by them pertaining to this Hundi" 15. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No.13, it was pleaded that the goods supplied by defendant No.1 were sub-standard and unfit for use. This fact had been intimated to him a number of times and subsequently to the plaintiff-bank. The goods were neither exchanged by defendant No.1 nor taken away by him or the plaintiff-bank. On these pleadings, defendant No. 13 sought to absolve himself of any liability to make any account of payment for the goods in question. 16. The case, as set up in the written statement by defendant No.1 was that the plaintiff-bank was a secured creditor of the Company i.e. Defendant No.1, according to its balance-sheet as it obtained on 30.4.1976, according to which a sum of Rs. 4,31,398/- was due to the plaintiff-bank against hypothecation of raw materials, consumable stores and spares, chemicals, packing materials and goods-in-process, as also further guaranted by the three Directors of the Company Defendant No. 1. Further, another sum of Rs. 2,61,935/ had been shown as due against pledge of finished goods and also guaranteed by three Directors. In this way, a sum of Rs. 6,93,234/ was admitted to be due from defendant No.1 Company to the plaintiff-bank as on 30.4.1976, which also stood guaranted by the three Directors of the Company. 17. In reply to paras 10 and 11 of the plaint/suit, it was averred in the written statement by defendant No.1 that all the defendants are not liable for interest on the date of the suit till the date of payment. It was stated that even if defendant No.1 Company was held to be liable, because of the fact that it was in liquidation, it would be liable for interest only up to the date of winding up at the rate not exceeding 4% per annum from the time when the debt or sum was payable by it, as provided under Rule 156 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. 18. 18. In their joint written statement, defendants No. 10 and 11 took up the preliminary objections that the suit is barred by limitation; that as framed neither lies nor maintainable nor can proceed on account of misjoinder of parties and causes of action, which is thus liable to be dismissed. 19. On merits, in reply to para 7(v) of the plaint, it was stated that the claim on account of the Hundi dated 23.8.1976 was misconceived and not maintainable on account of want of notice of dishonour and also because of non-compliance with the statutory provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was denied on their behalf that Hundi was discounted with the plaintiff-bank. 20. Subsequently, an amended written statement on behalf of defendants No. 10 and 11 was filed in which preliminary objections were taken that the suit is barred by limitation, that it is bad on account of mis-joinder of parties and cause of action, etc. More or less, the same pleas were taken on merits as were taken in the original statement. 21. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: "1. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder? 2. Whether the suit is within time? 3. Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit? 4. Whether defendants No.10 and 11 are not liable to pay the amount of Hundi Ex. P-17? 5. If Issue No. 4 is found against defendants No.10 and 11, to what amount of interest is the plaintiff entitled on the amount of this Hundi? 6. Whether the letter Ex. P-2 written by defendants No.10 and 11 to the plaintiff Bank was without consideration and the defendants are not liable to pay the amount of the sale proceeds of the goods mentioned in this letter to defendant No.1? 7. If issue No.6 is found against defendants No.10 and 11, to what amount is the plaintiff entitled to on account of the sale proceeds of the goods and interest, as mentioned in letter Ex. P-3 ? 8. Whether the acceptance of Hundi Ex. P-3 for payment by defendants No. 4 and 5 was without consideration and as such they are not liable to pay the amount thereof ? 9. If issue No. S is found against defendants No. 4 and 5, to what amount the plaintiff is entitled on account of interest on the amount of Hundi Ex. P-3 for payment by defendants No. 4 and 5 was without consideration and as such they are not liable to pay the amount thereof ? 9. If issue No. S is found against defendants No. 4 and 5, to what amount the plaintiff is entitled on account of interest on the amount of Hundi Ex. P-3 ? 10. Whether and if so to what relief is the plaintiff entitled against the other defendants ?” 22. As is apparent from the judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge, on the prayer made by the Counsel appearing before him for the contesting defendants (appellants herein) treated Issue No.1 as a preliminary Issue and decided it in the first instance vide his order dated November 8, 1988. As a result of the same, he came to the conclusion that the suit is not bad for mis-joinder and thus decided Issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 in both these appeals, i.e. the State Bank of Patiala. 23. A perusal of the record shows that in continuation of the said order dated November 8, 1988 resulting in decision of Issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff-bank, the learned Single Judge proceeded to record his judgment dated 27.6.1989 in respect of the remaining issues and thereafter proceeded to pass the following decree by the said judgment in favour of the plaintiff-bank: “In sum, a decree for (i) Rs. 94,948.44 jointly and severally as against defendants No.1, 2 and 3 ; (ii) Rs. 86,037.60 against defendants No. 4 and 5 but not to any amount by way of interest; (iii) Rs. 54,394.15 against defendants No.1, 6 and 7 jointly and severally; (iv) Rs. 43,179.22 against defendants No. 8 and 9 jointly and severally with defendant No.1; (v) Rs. 59,592.37 against defendants No.10 and 11 jointly and severally with defendant No.1; and (vi) Rs. 50, 327.25 against defendant No.13 severally and jointly with defendant No.1; is passed in favour of the plaintiff-bank. The defendants, except defendants No. 4 and 5, are also liable to pay interest pendente lite and future till the date of payment at the rate mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint, to the plaintiff-bank. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs." 24. The defendants, except defendants No. 4 and 5, are also liable to pay interest pendente lite and future till the date of payment at the rate mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint, to the plaintiff-bank. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs." 24. Then by a third order dated July 5, 1989, the learned Single Judge proceeded to record his decision as follows:— "By inadvertence, it was not mentioned in the operative portion of the judgment dated June, 27, 1989, under the heading "RELIEF" that the suit stood decreed as also against defendant No.12 jointly and severally with defendant No.1 for a sum of Rs. 15,686.19 in favour of the plaintiff-bank and that it was also entitled to interest, pendente-lite and future till the date of payment as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint, though, in the immediately preceding paragraph the decision to that effect is recorded in the judgment. This inadvertent clerical error is directed to be corrected under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Let the fact of the decree against these defendants be recorded at item No. (v)(A) between item No. (v) relating to defendants No.10 and 11 jointly and severally with defendant No.1, and item No. (vi), relating to defendant No.13 along with defendant No.1." 25. We have heard Ms. Pratima Malhotra, Advocate, learned Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals, Shri D.K. Khanna, Advocate learned Counsel for the common respondent No.1 in both the appeals i.e. State Bank of Patiala (plaintiff in the original suit) and Shri Prem Goel for Hypine Carbons Ltd., the common respondent No.2 in both the appeals (defendant No.1 in the suit). We have also gone through the record of the case with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties. 26. The first submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that under Issue No.1, relating to the suit being bad for mis-joinder has been wrongly decided by the learned Single Judge by holding that the suit giving rise to these appeals is not bad for mis-joinder of parties. 27. The above submission has been elaborated by Ms. Pratima Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellants by submitting that the contracts inter-parties in the present case were made on different dates, and each contract had a different cause of action. 27. The above submission has been elaborated by Ms. Pratima Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellants by submitting that the contracts inter-parties in the present case were made on different dates, and each contract had a different cause of action. Thus, according to her, the decision by the learned Single Judge on several causes of action in one suit vide impugned judgment under appeal is contrary to law. 28. In order to appreciate the above submission of the learned Counsel, we have to advert to Order I, CPC, which deals with parties to suits. According to Rule 3 thereof, all persons may be joined in suit as defendants where any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist against such persons, whether jointly or severally. Further, according to Order I, Rule 3 ibid, in the alternative if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise in such suits. Then again, Order I, Rule 3-A shows that where such joinder of defendants may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may order separate trials or make such other or further order expedient in the interest of justice. Order I, Rule 5 provides that it shall not be necessary that every defendant shall be interested as to all the reliefs claimed in any suit against him. 29. Order I, Rule 6 provides the plaintiff, at his option, join as parties to the same suit all or any of the persons severally, or jointly and severally, liable on any one contract, including parties to bills of exchange, hundis and promissory notes. Under Order I, Rule 9, a suit shall not be defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before it. The proviso to the said Rule shows that nothing in it, i.e. Order I, Rule 9, shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. 30. The proviso to the said Rule shows that nothing in it, i.e. Order I, Rule 9, shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. 30. A perusal of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge insofar as Issue No.1 is concerned (order dated 8.11.1988) shows that on behalf of both the parties to the suit, a number of authorities were cited and have been noticed by him, for and against the respective contentions. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge has given cogent reasons in support of his finding to the effect that the suit is not bad for mis-joinder. We are in respectful agreement with his interpretation, in the light of case law on the subject. All the provisions contained in Order I, Rule 3, C.P.C. and Order XI, Rule 3, C.P.C, which he has rightly held should receive liberal interpretation. To hold otherwise would defeat the ends of justice. 31. In the present suit, a perusal of the pleadings as a whole, clearly goes to show that the basic claim of the plaintiff against the first defendant and where the contesting defendants have rendered themselves liable according to the case set up in the plaint for payment of different amounts claimed from them by the plaintiffs by accepting hundis, with an obligation for payment to be made directly to the plaintiff-bank, it cannot be said that there is no nexus between these defendants inters on the basis whereof, they could be sued in the same suit, as in the present case. 32. The pleadings in the plaint, as contained in paragraphs 4 to 7, particularly the latter, which point to the only conclusion that the plaintiff is claiming relief against the defendants primarily on the basis of a contract between it and the first defendant which resulted in a series of transactions between it and them. In other words, in order to succeed in its claim against any of the contesting defendants, the plaintiff-bank had to establish the contract contained in its agreement dated December 18, 1972, with the first defendant. As regards the contesting defendants, it was also necessary for the plaintiff-bank to prove some additional facts peculiar to them. Further, that would not mean that there was no such community of interest so as to necessitate the filing of separate suits qua each one of them by the plaintiff-bank. As regards the contesting defendants, it was also necessary for the plaintiff-bank to prove some additional facts peculiar to them. Further, that would not mean that there was no such community of interest so as to necessitate the filing of separate suits qua each one of them by the plaintiff-bank. It would also not mean that the causes of action in relation to the contesting defendants were so un-connected with the cause of action arising against the main defendant, so that they could not be brought in the same suit. 33. Looking at the issue in question from another angle in relation to the facts of the present case, it is apparent from the record that when Issue No.1 was treated as a preliminary issue and decided separately from the other issues involved in the suit giving rise to these appeals, the trial virtually had come to its concluding stage inasmuch as the parties had already led their evidence in the suit as a whole. In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge was fully justified in holding that it cannot be said that the trial of the various defendants for various causes of action together in one suit would embarrass or dealy the trial of the suit or would otherwise be inconvenient. He re again, we are of the considered view that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, to hold otherwise, as is the import of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant before us, would also defeat the ends of justice. 34. Stretching the argument of the learned Counsel of the appellants further, in the context of the circumstances mentioned here above, even if the trials were separated on the assumption that there was mis-joinder of defendants and causes of action, now to direct the plaintiff-bank to make election in respect thereof, would serve no useful purpose. This is so as there is admittedly no dispute between the parties that any suit for different causes of action which has been joined in the present suit, would have to be tried by this Court i.e. the learned Single Judge. In this context, it bears mentioning that the first defendant in this case was under liquidation at that point of time when the suit was pending before the learned Single Judge, on account of an order made in Company Petition No.1 of 1977. In this context, it bears mentioning that the first defendant in this case was under liquidation at that point of time when the suit was pending before the learned Single Judge, on account of an order made in Company Petition No.1 of 1977. As rightly held by the learned Single Judge under Issue No.1, it is this Court alone, as reflected by the learned Single Judge, which had the jurisdiction to try the present suit giving rise to this appeal irrespective of valuation in view of the provisions of Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956. Moreover, by an order dated May 30, 1979 passed in Coy. Application No. 4 of 1978, the plaintiff-bank was allowed by this Court "to file separate suit for the recovery of the amount due from respondent No.1 and respondents No. 6 to 12....". Respondents No. 6 to 12 who were partners or officers in that case, are the contesting defendants in the present suit. 35. Finally, it must be stressed that the suit giving rise to these appeals i.e. Civil Suit No. 72 of 1979, was filed in the month of October of the year i.e. 1979. It was finally disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned judgment in 1989 i.e. 10 years later. The present appeals have been pending since then. Now to re-open the entire matter on the question of misjoinder of the suit, as is sought to be argued before us on behalf of the appellants, would tantamount to opening virtually a Pandoras box. 36. As a corollary to the argument of the learned Counsel in respect of Issue No.1 as decided by the learned Single Judge, she has also faintly sought to submit that the claim being less than Rs. 1.00 lac, was below the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, the impugned judgment is vitiated in law. This submission of the learned Counsel has to be rejected on the short ground that irrespective of valuation of the suit, this Court and this Court alone has the jurisdiction to try it on account of Section 446(2) of the Companies Act5 1956 in view of the order made by this Court putting the first defendant in liquidation in Company Petition No.1 of 1977. 37. 37. In view of the above discussion, we heave no hesitation in holding that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the suit is not bad for mis-joinder and Issue No.1 has been correctly decided in the impugned judgment under appeal. 38. On merits, it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants that defendants No. 4 and 5 did not receive any goods from the plaintiff and no consideration had passed Therefore, they could not be held liable. 39. In order to appreciate this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants, some relevant facts need to be stated. The case of the plaintiff, as set up in the suit against the defendants No. 4 and 5 is that defendant No.1, i.e. Hypine Carbons Ltd., had sent activated carbon to defendant No. 4 (Eastern Impex Corporation, one of the appellants in R.F.A. No. 72 of 1989) vide goods receipt No. 00594 dated October 10, 1976. In order to ensure the realisation of the price thereof, the said defendant No.1 had drawn a hundi on defendant No. 4 for a sum of Rs. 85,607.60, payable to the plaintiff-bank or order 60 days after sight. That hundi had been discounted with the plaintiff-bank. Defendant No.5, tie. Shri K.B. Sharma, being a partner of Eastern Impex Corporation-defendant No.4, accepted the goods receipt and the hundi on its behalf but payment of that hundi was not made on the due date and it was received back unpaid. 40. The learned Single Judge has meticulously gone through the evidence on record of both the parties on this aspect of the case as is apparent from the impugned judgment. It is not necessary for us to again discuss the said evidence. Suffice it to say that on the basis of the same and after proper appraisal and appreciation, the learned Single Judge has referred to Section 93 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, according-to which when a promissory note is dishonoured by non-payment, the holder thereof must give notice that the instrument has been so dishonoured to all other parties whom he seeks to make severally liable thereon, and to some one of several parties whom he seeks to make jointly liable thereof. The proviso thereof says that "nothing in this Section renders it necessary to give notice to the maker...... or acceptor .....”. 41. The proviso thereof says that "nothing in this Section renders it necessary to give notice to the maker...... or acceptor .....”. 41. In our considered view, the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the hundi in question-Ex. P-3 on record, having been accepted by defendant No.4 on behalf of defendant No. 5, no notice was necessary in the present case, which is the precise argument raised before us by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Before proceeding further, in all fairness to her, she has referred to the alleged admissions of defendants No.1 and 13 on record but those admissions, if at all they are there, have no bearing on the point in issue especially in view of the legal position mentioned above. 42. Our attention has been invited to the effect of proof of protest under Section 100 of the Act of 1881 ibid. Here again in our view, the approach of the learned Single Judge is faultless while holding that in the present case, it was not necessary for the plaintiff-bank to take recourse to the said presumption, which is to the effect that "in a suit, upon an instrument which has been dishonoured, the Court shall, on proof of the protest, presume the fact of dishonour, unless and until such fact is disproved." In the present case, admittedly defendants- No. 4 and 5 had acknowledged the fact of dishonour of the hundi, inasmuch as it was their own case that they did not honour it because they had returned the goods. Therefore, absence of a notice under Section 93 of the Act of 1881 or of a protest under Section 100/102 thereof, would not have any negative effect on their liability in respect of the Hundi vide Ex. P-3 as otherwise they are liable under it on the facts and circumstances of the present case. 43. Coming now to the second plank of the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants before us, i.e. no consideration had passed insofar as the goods of defendants No. 4 and 5 is concerned, this is specifically incorporated in Issue No. 8 in the present case. On this aspect of the case, the stand of the said defendants in their written statement is that no goods were supplied to them. On this aspect of the case, the stand of the said defendants in their written statement is that no goods were supplied to them. However, in the statement under Order X, Rule 2, C.P.C. on their behalf by their learned Counsel on September 22, 1981, while the suit was pending before the learned Single Judge, it was clarified that the Hundi Ex. P-3 was accepted by them for payment to the plaintiff-bank for a sum of Rs. 86,037.60. Further, the fact that the consignment of activated carbon had been received by the said defendants is apparent from the evidence led on their behalf i.e. that the consignment of five tonnes of activated carbon was returned to defendant No. 1 because the same was not of good quality. 44. The Finished Goods Register, which was produced by DW-6 contains an entry to the effect that the consignment in question was sent to defendant No.4 as per entry Ex. DW-6/2 dated 6.10.1976. It was sent back by defendant No. 4 and was received by the Company on 25.10.1976. This fact is borne out from the entry Ex. DW-6/3. 45. The main question insofar as the case of defendants No. 4 and 5 is concerned in the present case is not of the liability inter-se, if any, as between defendant No.1 and defendant No. 4 concerning the transaction, rather the question is regarding the claim of the plaintiff-bank for being reimbursed in respect of the amount of Rs. 86,037.60 of the Hundi Ex. P-3, which admittedly had been accepted for payment on behalf of defendant No. 4. As rightly held by the learned Single Judge, there is no evidence on record to indicate that defendant No. 4 had informed the plaintiff-bank about the goods in question having been returned by it to defendant No.1. Further more, defendant No.4 has failed to show that within a reasonable time after the return of goods alleged to be not of good quality the said defendant had dishonoured its liability for payment of the said amount of the Hundi Ex. P-3 to the plaintiff-bank but informing it in this behalf. Indeed, there appears to be variance between the plea taken by defendant No. 4 in the written statement to the effect that he did not receive the goods at all, and the evidence regarding this plea on the record. P-3 to the plaintiff-bank but informing it in this behalf. Indeed, there appears to be variance between the plea taken by defendant No. 4 in the written statement to the effect that he did not receive the goods at all, and the evidence regarding this plea on the record. Thus, the learned Single Judge has rightly found it to be factually wrong. Consequently, there is no escape from the conclusion, as has been rightly clrawn by him in the impugned judgment, while answering issue No. 8 in favour of the plaintiff-bank. In fairness to the learned Counsel for the appellants, certain rulings were cited before us. They may briefly be noticed. Reliance has first been placed on the case of Kanhyalal and others v. Ram Kumar and others, (AIR 1956 Rajasthan 129). It has been held therein that the requirement of a notice of dishonour to an endorser by the endorser underlying Section 35 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a matter of principle and that such notice must be given within a reasonable time where the endorsee wants to raise his claim against the endorser. This requirement may be dispensed with only in the case of negotiable instruments in an oriental language where a local usage or custom is established to the contrary. We fail to see how this ruling of the Rajasthan High Court advances the case of the appellants in the present appeals in the circumstances of the case. 46. Reliance is next placed on another ruling of the Rajasthan High Court reported as Heerachand v. Jeevraj and another (AIR 1959 Rajasthan 1 (FB). On a perusal of the same, we do not find that it is at all relevant to the facts of the present case. In the case of Chandan Lal Joura v. M/s. Amin Chand Mohan Lal, (AIR 1960 Punjab 500), the precise question which is in issue in the present case was not involved, and that authority is also not applicable. The next authority cited before us on behalf of the appellants in the present appeals, i.e. The Official Receiver, Kanpur and another v. Abdul Shakoor and others, (AIR 1965 SC 920) is to the effect that presumption under Section 118 of the Act of 1881 operates only in favour of or against parties to negotiable instrument or their privies and that Section is in terms general. It is manifest that this ruling of the Apex Court has no bearing on the facts before us. 47. The learned Counsel for the appellants has chosen to rewind in point of time and has then relied on Gowardhan Das and others v. R.S. Harlal Ramsukh and another, (AIR 1923 Nagpur 62). This ruling is regarding a case where a wrong view of law was taken and appropriate issue was not framed and tried and, therefore, it was held that there was a likelihood of the plaintiff being prejudiced and, therefore, the case was to be remanded. The facts are otherwise in the present case and thus this Nagpur ruling has no bearing. 48. The last ruling unleashed from her repertoire by the learned Counsel for the appellants is of the year 1910 A.D., namely, Kishan Chand and another v. Jamna Das, (1910 PLR 58). In that case, the plaintiff had sued on a hundi and the defendant pleaded want of consideration. The plaintiff produced hundi in lieu of which it was alleged by him that the hundi in that suit was executed. In these circumstances, it was held in that ruling that the onus of proving, want of consideration was on the drawer of a negotiable instrument and it was thus held that the onus being on the defendant in that case and he not having discharged it, was liable for the amount due on the hundi. Here again, we are at a loss to understand as to how this ruling has any application to the facts of the present case. In otherwords, it is not relevant. 49. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff-bank has briefly submitted before us in support of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. He has, in substance, placed reliance on Sections 446 and 447 of the Companies Act and has cited State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain, (AIR 1977 SC 1680). On going through the same, we find that it has a complete bearing on the facts of the present case. This is so because of the order passed by this Court in Company Application No. 4 of 1978 dated 30.5.1979, the operative part of which has been reproduced in para 8 of this judgment above. On going through the same, we find that it has a complete bearing on the facts of the present case. This is so because of the order passed by this Court in Company Application No. 4 of 1978 dated 30.5.1979, the operative part of which has been reproduced in para 8 of this judgment above. In this view of the matter, the ruling relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants in reply to the submission of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-bank i.e., Sobhag Singh and others v. Jed Singh and others, (AIR 1968 SC 1328) is not at all applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 50. No other point has been urged in these appeals before us. 51. For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in these appeals and the same are consequently dismissed. In view of the contentious-cum-legal issues involved, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.