D. Biswas, J. — This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 26.9.97 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the Civil. Rule No. 1891 of 1996 wherein it has been held that the cut-off dates prescribed by the Executive Council for exercising option to switch over to the GPF-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme (chance given only to the employees on service as on 23.7.93) is an unreasonable classification between the similarly situated employees and directed the respondent University to consider the prayer of the petitioners to allow them to exercise option to switch over to this scheme with effect from 1.1.89. 2. Although the impugned notification have been held to be unreasonable, yet the learned Single Judge has not set aside the aforesaid notification. The direction does not appear to be mandatory on the part of the University to offer an opportunity to the petitioners to exercise option afresh. Situated thus, we would like to examine the validity of the impugned resolution No.95/8/113 dated 13.5.95 (Annexure 4) and the letter dated 11.12.1995 (Annexure 6). 3. At the very outset, let us clear the facts beyond controversy. The petitioners who are the respondent Nos 1 to 28 in this writ appeal were employees under the Guwahati University, and they had duly retired from service during the period between 1.1.89 to 23.7.93. According to them, the Common Pay Committee constituted for the three Universities in Assam including the Guwahati University recommended liberalised person scheme for the employees who are already under the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme. The said report has been brought into force with effect from 1.1.1989, on being accepted by the Governor of Assam, the Executive Council of the University, in its meeting held on 23.7.93, decided to offer communication benefit to the employees of the University who had earlier opted for GPF-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme and further decided to offer a chance to the employees who were under GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme and on service as on 23.7.93 to exercise fresh option for switching over to the GPF-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme. Thus, the employees who were on service of the University on 1.1.89 and retired prior to 23.7.93 have been deprived of the special privilege to exercise option afresh. Thus, the employees who were on service of the University on 1.1.89 and retired prior to 23.7.93 have been deprived of the special privilege to exercise option afresh. The petitioners being in the later category felt aggrieved and filed the writ petition challenging the aforesaid decision on the ground that the cut-off date prescribed by the authority is arbitrary and based on unreasonable classification between the same set of employees subscribing to the GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme. 4. It would appear from the above that the cut-off date ie 23.7.93 prescribed by the Executive Council is in dispute in this writ appeal. It is because of this cut­off date the petitioners who were under the GPF Scheme have been deprived of the opportunity to switch over the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme while other employees subscribing to the same scheme but retiring after 23,7.93, have been allowed to exercise their option. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, during the course of argument emphasised that the Common Pay Committee while recommending liberalised pension to be paid to the employees who were in the group of GPF-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme did not recommended anything about the option to be exercised by the employees pertaining to GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme to switch over to the GPF-cum-Pension Gratuity Scheme. In view of this, the argument advanced by Shri N. Dutta, learned counsel that the respondent-petitioners as well as the beneficiaries of the impugned decision being on service of the University as on 1.1.89 have been classified into two groups does not appear to have any impact. It would appear that the idea to allow an option to be exercised by the employees who were in GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme was initially footed by the Vice Chancellors of the three Universities and it was eventually brought into force by the Executive Council by adopting a resolution in its meeting dated 23.7.1993. This decision appears to be independent of the recommendations of the Common Pay Committee. The acceptance of the report and its effect having been given from 1.1.1989 is altogether redundant for resolving the dispute at hand. The petitioners had already retired when the Executive Council took the decision independent of the Pay Committee Report and they by that time had also drawn their monies payable to them under the GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme. The acceptance of the report and its effect having been given from 1.1.1989 is altogether redundant for resolving the dispute at hand. The petitioners had already retired when the Executive Council took the decision independent of the Pay Committee Report and they by that time had also drawn their monies payable to them under the GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme. As such, the decision of the Council allowing the serving employees as on 23.7.93 to exercise option cannot be said to be based on unreasonable classification as alleged. 6. The Pay Committee dealt with the matter relating to retirement benefit in Chapter VII of the report. Nowhere, the Committee recommended anything relating to the option to be exercised by the employees of the GPF-cum-Gratuity Scheme. Therefore, the date of enforcement of the Pay Committee Report ie 1.1.89 has no significance so far the decision in dispute is concerned. What we find is that there are two sets of employees, namely (1) the petitioners who retired before 23.7.93, and (2) the employees who were on service on 23.7.93 and due to retire thereafter. This being the position, the contention that the petitioners and the employees who were on service on 23.7.93 are similarly situated cannot be accepted. The classification has been made in between the retired and serving employees subscribing to the GPF scheme. In our opinion, the decision of the University cannot be dubbed and denounced as unreasonable classification. 7. The next question that comes for consideration is whether the cut-off date prescribed by the authorities ie 23.7.93 is arbitrary and capricious. In our considered opinion, the Executive Council has to introduce a cut-off date in their discretion and in the instant case, they have fixed the cut-off date 23.7.93 giving the benefit only to the employees who were on service 23.7.93. The petitioners claim would have been altogether different had this decision been taken on the basis of the recommendation of the Common Pay Committee which was brought it force from 1.1.89. It has already been stated hereinbefore that this decision of the Executive Council is independent of the Common Pay Committee, and this independent decision has been taken to extend the benefit to the serving employees as on 23.7.93 to the deprivation of the employees who had already retired by that time. We are, therefore, unable to find any fault with this decision. 8. We are, therefore, unable to find any fault with this decision. 8. We have already concluded just above that the petitioners are not similarly situated with the employees who are going to get the benefit out of the decision and the cut-off date cannot be faulted with. To substantiate our conclusion, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court as reported in Commander Head Quarter, Calcutta & others vs. Capt Biplabendra Chanda, (1997) 1SCC 208 wherein in paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows : "We are of the opinion that the ratio of DS Nakara has no application here. DS Nakara prohibits discrimination between pensioners forming a single class and governed by the same Rules. It was held in that case that the date specified in the liberalised pension rules as the cut-off date was chosen arbitrarily. That is not the case here. No pension was granted to the respondent because he was not eligible therefor as per the Rules in force on the date of his retirement. The new and revised Rules (it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to go into the question whether the Rules that came into force with effect from 1.1.1986 were new Rules or merely revised or liberalised Rules) which came into force with effect from 1.1.1986 were not given retrospective effect. The respondent cannot be made retrospectively eligible-for pension by virtue of these Rules in such a case. This is not a case where a discrimination is being made among pensioners who were similarly situated. Accepting the respondent's contention would have very curious consequences; even a person who had retired long earlier would equally become eligible for pension on the basis of the 1986 Rules. This cannot." In the instant case as well, the petitioner governed by the Pension Rules of 1974 have been paid off whatever was due to them under the said Rules in force at the time of their retirement. Obviously, the distinction made here is not in between the same set of persons. The ratio laid down in Commander Head Quarter vs. Capt Biplabendra Chandra (supra) do not permit this Court to interfere with the cut-off date in the instant case. Obviously, the distinction made here is not in between the same set of persons. The ratio laid down in Commander Head Quarter vs. Capt Biplabendra Chandra (supra) do not permit this Court to interfere with the cut-off date in the instant case. In addition, the views of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Lieut (Mrs) E. lacats, (1997) 7 SCC 334 and Sita Ram Bansal & others vs. State of Punjab & others, (1997) 9 SCC 250 are also relevant to this case. 9. The cardinal principle highlighted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid citations show that fixation of a cut-off date being a matter of executive decision shall not ordinarily be interferred with unless it is illegal and arbitrary. Applying our-mind to the principles and guidelines highlighted by the Apex Court in the cases referred to above and giving due consideration to the factual matrix of this case, we are of the opinion that the University authorities have committed no ^ illegality in introducing the cut-off date. We, therefore, hold that no right of the petitioners under Article 14 of the Constitution has been infringed as alleged. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 26.9.97 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 1891 of 1996 allowing the writ petition is hereby set aside. Consequently, Civil Rule No.1891 of 1996 stands dismissed. Considering the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs is made.