P. S. MISRA, C. J. ( 1 ) COULD in exercise or revisional power under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a single Judge of the court interfere with the order of the Chief judge, City Sessions Court at Calcutta who acted in obedience to the direction of a Division bench of the Court and decided afresh the application of the opposite party for bail in a case allegedly falling under Section 35 of the foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 on the accusation of contravention of the provision of Sections 8 (1), 9 (1) (b), 9 (l) (d), 16 (l) (a) (b), 18 (2) and 18 (3) read with Section 68 of the said Act ? ( 2 ) THE fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. The opposite party was arrested on 25-5-1996 for the aforementioned offences allegedly committed by him involving about Rs. 53 crores during the period March to October, 1995. He was remanded to custody by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta by the order dated 26th May, 1996. He filed an application for bail in terms of subsection (1) of Section 439 of the Code of criminal Procedure before the Chief Judge, city Sessions Court at Calcutta being Criminal misc. Case No. 573 of 1996. On 30-5-1996, the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, ordered for the release of the opposite party. The petitioner filed an application under Section 439 (2)of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court seeking direction that the opposite party who had been released on bail be arrested and committed to custody. The Division Bench of the Court which heard the application delivered a detailed judgment and order as follows: "accordingly, we set aside the order of bail dated 30-5-1996, directing the learned city Sessions Judge to hear the matter afresh within 10 days or earlier than that if not inconvenient after notice to the parties. We do not make any inflated or deflated remarks about the merit of the matter and it is left open for the learned City sessions Judge for adjudication. However, considering the circumstances, we also direct that the investigating agency is to refrain from re-arresting the accused until decision rendered by the learned city Sessions Judge within the period stipulated by us but the accused-petitioner is not to leave the jurisdiction of the Court. However, considering the circumstances, we also direct that the investigating agency is to refrain from re-arresting the accused until decision rendered by the learned city Sessions Judge within the period stipulated by us but the accused-petitioner is not to leave the jurisdiction of the Court. It appears, however, although the order granting bail to the opposite party was set aside by the above order of the Division Bench of the Court, the petitioner filed an application before the City Sessions Judge for cancellation of bail to the opposite party. The City Sessions judge disposed of the matter as directed by the Division Bench of the Court and the application for cancellation of bail holding inter alia, as follows:"in this case I find that the petitioner is involved in a scam to the tune of rs. 50 crores. It is true that the punishment as codified, does not fluctuate with the amount involved but it cannot be denied that the said amount involved in this case is definitely a high one, rather sky scrapping as stated by me earlier. This gravity of the offence, being influenced by the medical ground, as discussed above, has not been properly given consideration by this Court. And having been given the opportunity by the Hon'ble High Court to reconsider the same, I am of the opinion that the said amount is too high to give facility to the petitioner to the privileges of bail. Therefore, on consideration of the circumstances, the bail order which has already been set aside by the Hon'ble High court is not being revived and the same is being cancelled. "the opposite party, however, moved this Court and labelled his application as one under section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal procedure read with Section 482. Thereafter the application was placed before a single Judge of this Court. Although it was urged before him that the impugned order of the City sessions Judge was interlocutory and the revisional application was not maintainable, the learned single Judge set aside the order of the City Sessions Judge and directed for grant of bail to the opposite party. ( 3 ) A fresh application under Section 439 (2)has been filed. Although it was urged before him that the impugned order of the City sessions Judge was interlocutory and the revisional application was not maintainable, the learned single Judge set aside the order of the City Sessions Judge and directed for grant of bail to the opposite party. ( 3 ) A fresh application under Section 439 (2)has been filed. When the said application was placed before a bench of two Judges of this Court, they referred the matter to the chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench in the interest of justice and the interpretation of law for a decision on the following questions: (1) Whether a single Bench could exercise revisional power under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to consider bail when offences alleged to have been committed under the Foreign exchange Requisition Act, 1973 and/ or such matters which fall under Rule 9 of the Rules of the High Court ? (2) Whether the Court of revision, independent of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could decide the matter; (3) Whether the use of Auxilliary verb 'shall' in the aforementioned rule has made the rule mandatory and the proceedings accordingly must always be entertained by the Division Bench of the single Judge, as the case may be and departure in no case, is permissible; and (4) Whether there is a need to re-examine and if necessary, to amend the said rule to meet the exigencies ? ( 4 ) SINCE the matter has been placed before the larger Bench and under the administrative orders of the Chief Justice of the Court, the case has been placed for hearing not only to answer the aforementioned questions but also to dispose of the application on merits. ( 5 ) BEFORE we advert to the rules we may for convenience, take up some of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. After making general provisions and provisions for investigation, enquiry and trial of a person who is accused of an offence, the code in Chapter XXIX provides for appeals from any judgment or order of a Criminal code after declaring in Section 372 thereof that no appeal shall lie from any judgment and order of a criminal Court except as provided for by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force. Cases which are not covered by the provisions for appeals are covered by the provisions in Chapter XXX of the Code. Section 397 provides for calling for records to exercise powers of revision and reads as follows:"397 (1) The High Court or any Sessions judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended and if the accused is in confinement, mat he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation :all Magistrates, whether executive or judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the high Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. ''the above is supplemented by Section 399 in respect of Sessions Judges' power of the revision and by Section 401 in respect of High court's power of revision. Section 401 reads as follows:"section 401 (1) - In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court, may in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by sections 386, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Section 307 and when the judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Section 392. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to High Court by any person and the high Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests so to do, the High court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with' the same accordingly. "granting of bail pending investigation, enquiry and/or trial is separately treated in chapter XXXIII of the Code and while speaking when bail may be taken in cases of non-bailable offences, it has under section 437, provided that when any person accused of or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer incharge of a police station or appears or is brought before the Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and if such an offence is cognizable and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more or he has been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable or cognizable offence provided that such a person also be released on bail if he is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm or if the Court is satisfied that it is just and proper to do so for any other special reason. ( 6 ) RELEVANT provision, however, which the opposite party involved at the first instance and moved the Court of sessions is Section 439 which reads as follows :"439 (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody, be released on bail and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that subsection; (b) that any condition imposed by a magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified : provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody. '' anyone, thus, can see that the Code has prescriptions for appeal against judgments or orders of a criminal Court and in cases where right of appeal is not available from any judgment or order of a criminal Court and such judgment made or passed is not an interlocutory order passed in any appeal enquiry, trial or other proceedings for revision by the High Court and the Court of Sessions. Section 482 of the Code has reiterated the inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice by the High Courts (Courts of Record) and said nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinary and extra-ordinary criminal jurisdiction of this court including this Court's superintendence in all criminal matters as in clauses 22, 30 of the Letters Patent of this Court, subject to such specific provisions of the Code which are made in this behalf is saved by section 5 of the Code which says "nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. " ( 7 ) APART from the plenary powers of the Court, Calcutta Court first chartered and later constituted under the Letters Patent of the British Crown has enjoyed the Rule Making power which has been preserved and continued by Section 108 of the Government of India act, 1915, Section 223 of the Government of india Act, 1935 and by Article 225 of the constitution of India. The Court has, thus from time to time framed procedural rules for convenience of its judicial business and rule 9 aforementioned, after amendments, reads as follows:"9. All appeals, reference or revision in respect of sentence or order or any criminal court shall be heard by a single Judge : provided, however, that the following matter shall be placed before a Division bench consisting of two or more judges (i) All appeals or reference relating to an order of sentence of death and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years and all appeals from order of acquittal from offences where the sentence may be of death, imprisonment for life or any term of imprisonment exceeding 7 years; (ii) All bail applications pertaining to terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic substances Act, 1985 and Foreign exchange Regulation Act;'' (iii) All bail applications at the preconviction stage involving offence where sentence may exceed imprisonment for 7 years; (iv) Bail applications relating to appeals involving a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years; (v) Anticipatory bail applications under section 438 Cr. PC; 9a. Transfer applications under Section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be heard by a single Judge. PC; 9a. Transfer applications under Section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be heard by a single Judge. 9 (1) A Division Bench of the hearing of cases on appeal, reference, or revision in respect of the sentence or order of any criminal Court shall consist of two or more judges. "objection is raised on behalf of the opposite party to the maintainability of the instant application under Section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is urged that the order by the learned single Judge in exercise of power under Section 397 read with section 401 of the Code even though has resulted in the release of the opposite party on bail is not an order under Section 439 (1) of the Code and thus sub-section (2) of the said section is not attracted. Even otherwise, according to the learned Counsel for the opposite party, this Court cannot exercise inherent power under Section 482 of the Code to interfere with the final judgment by the learned single Judge in the revision application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code. Reliance is placed for the said purpose on Section 362 of the Code which says--"save as otherwise provided by this code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. "two questions, thus, arise from the submissions of the learned Counsel for the opposite party (1) Whether the order passed by the learned single Judge after setting aside the order of the City Sessions Judge, rejecting the application for bail and/or cancelling the bail which he had earlier granted after hearing afresh as directed by this court, is an order granting bail to the opposite party and thus is an order falling under Section 439 of the Code and therefore the instant application under Section 439 (2) is maintainable; and (2) Whether although the opposite party has been directed to be released on bail by the learned single Judge, it is a final order disposing of a case and thus is covered by Section 362 of the Code ? ( 8 ) IT is so obvious in the scheme of the code that a person who is arrested and released on bail when he applies under Section 439 (1)of the Code before the Sessions Judge can be subject to an application under sub-section (2)of Section 439. When the opposite party was granted bail by the Sessions Judge, application under Section 439 (2) was filed and the same was allowed by the Division Bench of this court. The order of the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the application afresh thus, was an order refusing bail and the only remedy to the opposite party in such a case, was to move for bail before the High Court under section 439 (1) of the Code of Criminal procedure and not by way of a revision under section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code. Since specific provision for seeking bail in the code was available, to me opposite party, he could not invoke this Court's revisional or inherent jurisdiction under Sections 307, 401 or 482 of the Code. By labelling the application thus as an application in revision against the order of the Sessions Judge and/or an application invoking inherent power of the court, the opposite party could not change the nature of the application. It was obviously an application for bail and for no other relief to the opposite party. Even though the learned single Judge disposed of the application of the opposite party as one purportedly under sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal procedure Code read with Section 482 thereof, the order granting bail to the opposite party has been one under Section 439 (1) of the code and thus the instant application under section 439 (2) is not maintainable. The nature of the order of the learned single Judge being one granting bail to the opposite party, it is difficult to accept the same as a final order under Section 362 of the Code and to exclude the Court's inherent power to review the case. Even though the order is one ostensibly made under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code or under section 482 of the Code it is not a final order disposing of any case. Even though the order is one ostensibly made under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code or under section 482 of the Code it is not a final order disposing of any case. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to Halsbury's Law of england, interlocutory order means 'an order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or - (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed "interlocutory". ( 10 ) IN respect of exercise of inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the code in criminal proceedings and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been pointed out, these provisions do not confer upon the Court any such power, the power is inherent and is only pressed to remove any doubts by showing specific provisions in the two Codes for the said purpose. Since the concept of finality by an order in criminal proceedings is developed as corresponding to the rule of double jeopardy and in civil proceedings to the rule of resjudicata as well as issue estoppel in respect of the findings on questions of fact, it is no doubt necessary to know that a civil Court and a criminal Court having ordinary jurisdiction or exercising ordinary jurisdiction determines in a proceeding all that is specifically raised and said and also that could have been raised and said. ( 11 ) IN S. Kuppuswami Rao v. the governor-General of India reported in AIR 1949 FC 1 the Federal Court dealt with this aspect of the matter. Under the old Code of criminal Procedure and in several cases under the present Code, reference is made to the issue as to when rule of double jeopardy is applied, with reference, however, to the provision in Section 397 of the Code, the supreme Court, in Amarnath v. State of haryana reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185 , categorised the interlocutory orders. In madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1988 SC 4 it, however, pointed out". . . . . . . In madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1988 SC 4 it, however, pointed out". . . . . . . the real intention of the Legislature was not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse of the words 'final order'. There may be an order passed during the course of proceedings which may not be final in the sense noticed in kuppuswami's case (supra) but yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction we think that the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the constitution, yet, it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397 (1 ). " ( 12 ) WE shall deal with however, whether the order of the City Sessions Judge was an order cancelling the bail and whether the order cancelling the bail is a final order and although an intermediate order is not interlocutory but has some finality, in some details. As noticed by us earlier, the order of the learned single judge by which he has set aside the order of the City Sessions Judge and as a consequence allowed the application for bail in respect of which application the Division Bench of this court had given direction to the City Sessions judge to hear afresh, in our view, is not a judgment or final order disposing of a case and this Court's inherent power as preserved in Section 482 of the Code can be invoked to review the same. This part of the judgment of learned single Judge under which he has granted bail to the accused-opposite party is one falling under Section 439 (1) of the code and the same can be cancelled in a proper case in exercise of the power under section 439 (2) of the Code. This part of the judgment of learned single Judge under which he has granted bail to the accused-opposite party is one falling under Section 439 (1) of the code and the same can be cancelled in a proper case in exercise of the power under section 439 (2) of the Code. Review to undo great miscarriage of justice or creating inadvertent prejudice to the mandatory provision of law by an order of the Court which is passed in purported exercise of the revisional or the appellate power, if not permitted the same shall stifle the course of justice and sanction in quite a few cases, abuse of the process of law by astatute litigants. Several types of orders which appear to intervene in a criminal proceeding are not acknowledged as judgments or final orders. In English Law, Judgment in a criminal proceeding is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in the conviction or acquittal of the accused (Halsbury - 2nd Ed. Vol. 9 paras 260 - 264 ). The order of discharge of an accused is not a judgment of final order as there is no pronouncement of the Court as to the truth or otherwise of the accusation. Thus an order setting aside an order refusing to grant bail or an order cancelling bail granted cannot be taken as a final order. Even assuming that the order cancelling bail, when set aside, is not that interlocutory that it would not be revisable under Section 397 of the Code when the order cancelling bail is set aside and thereafter order granting bail is passed it is, indeed interlocutory in character and thus does not fall under Section 362 of the Code. ( 13 ) THE Bench of the Court while making the reference however, obviously has thought why the opposite party instead of moving this court for bail under Section 439 (1) of the code, when the City Sessions Judge refused the prayer of bail, preferred to move this Court under Section 397 of the Code? Excuse for such an application is made by referring to application for cancellation of bail before the city Sessions Judge after the Division Bench order dated 16-7-1996 by which order, the order of bail passed by the City Sessions Judge was set aside. Excuse for such an application is made by referring to application for cancellation of bail before the city Sessions Judge after the Division Bench order dated 16-7-1996 by which order, the order of bail passed by the City Sessions Judge was set aside. The City Sessions Judge however was considering the application for bail afresh as directed by the Division Bench of the Court. The order of bail to the accused-opposite party was already set aside by the Division bench of the Court. There was no bail, thus, which was required to be cancelled. Nonetheless, the City Sessions Judge while disposing of the bail application, said,". . . . . . . . . Therefore, on consideration of the circumstances, the bail order which has already been set aside by the Hon'ble High Court is not being revived and the same is being cancelled. "it was, out and out, as we have said earlier, a case of refusal of bail by the city Sessions Judge. The accused-opposite party could renew his prayer for bail or move this Court for bail under Section 439 (1) of the code. He, however instead invoked this court's jurisdiction under Section 397 of the code of Criminal Procedure. ( 14 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the accused-opposite party that since the city Sessions Judge cancelled the bail recourse to Section 439 (2) of the Code was not possible and the only course open was to invoke this court's jurisdiction under Section 397 of the code and thus, the application for revision of the order of the City Sessions Judge was perfectly in order, has intrinsic fallacy which is quite eloquent. It cannot be suggested that the City Sessions Judge instead of carrying out the direction of the Division Bench of this court, to hear the application for bail afresh passed an order on the application of the petitioner for cancellation of bail which order alone accused-opposite party challenged by the application under Section 397 of the Code. One can reasonably have the uneasy feeling that the accused-opposite party took advantage of the expression - "the bail order. . . . . . . . is not being revived and the same is being cancelled" to seek interference by the Court under section 397 of the Code and succeeded in undoing what the Division Bench of the Court had intended. . . . . . . . is not being revived and the same is being cancelled" to seek interference by the Court under section 397 of the Code and succeeded in undoing what the Division Bench of the Court had intended. ( 15 ) FOR the view that order granting or refusing to grant bail at a pre-trial stage is an interlocutory order in a case of cancellation of bail at a pre-trial stage, the order is interlocutory and not a judgment or a final order. Reference may be made to a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Thakur Hari prasadv. State of AP. reported in 1977 Crl. LJ 471. After referring to the judgment of the supreme Court in the Central Bank of India v. Karpoor Ghana" reported in AIR 1967 SC 797, and other judgments of the Courts including Bhola v. State, 1975 Crl. LJ 1274, it is held in the said case that, (a) If the trial Magistrate improperly grants bail, the Court of Sessions or the High Court can cancel the bail under section 439 (2) even though the Court of Sessions cannot revise the order of magistrate under Section 397 (2) of the code. (b) If the trial Magistrate refuses bail or cancels the bail under Section 437 (5)illegally and unjustly the Sessions Judge can grant bail under Section 439 (1)though he cannot revise the order of the magistrate under the said Section. (c) In any case where a Magistrate grants bail to an accused person and the sessions Judge cancels it illegally and unjustly in exercise of his power under Section 439 (2) the High Court can grant bail to such person under section 439 (1 ). The order of Sessions judge cancelling bail is not revisable in exercise of the Court's power under section 397 of the Code. ( 16 ) THE issue, however, as to what orders are interlocutory which do not fall under section 397 of the Code received attention of the Supreme Court in Amar Nath v. State of haryana (supra) and in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) and V. C. Shukla v. State reported in air 1980 SC 962 . Amamath's case fell for a critical examination in Madhu Limaye's case. After quoting from the 3rd Edition of Halsbury vol. Amamath's case fell for a critical examination in Madhu Limaye's case. After quoting from the 3rd Edition of Halsbury vol. 22 page 742 para 1606 and para 1608 and page 744 and 745 and referring to several cases majority decision culled out the tests from some English decisions to decide whether the order is a final order and stated as follows: "inamarnath 's case, AIR 1977 SC 2185 , reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Mohan Lal Magan Lal thackerv. State of Gujarat, (1968) 2 SCR 685 = AIR 1968 SC 733 . After an enquiry under Section 467 of the 1898 Code an order was made directing the filing of a complaint against the appellant. It was affirmed by the High Court. The matter came to this Court on grant of a certificate under Article 134 (l) (c ). A question arose whether the order was a' 'final order'' within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. Shelat ]. , delivering the judgment on behalf of himself and two other learned Judges, said that it was a final order. The dissenting judgment was given by Bachawat J. , on behalf of himself and one other learned Judge. In the majority decision four tests were culled out from some English decisions. They are found enumerated at page 688 (of SCR) = (at p. 737 of AIR ). One of the tests is "if the order in question is reversed would the action have to go on?'' Applying that test to the facts of the instant case it would be noticed that if the plea of the appellant succeeds and the order of the Sessions judge is reversed, the criminal proceeding as initiated and instituted against him cannot go on. If, however, he loses on the merits of the preliminary point the proceeding will go on. Applying the test of Kuppuswami 's case (supra) such an order will not be an final order, but applying the fourth test noted at page 688 in Mohan lai's case 1968-2- SCR 685 = AIR 1968 sc 733 at page 738, it would be a final order. Applying the test of Kuppuswami 's case (supra) such an order will not be an final order, but applying the fourth test noted at page 688 in Mohan lai's case 1968-2- SCR 685 = AIR 1968 sc 733 at page 738, it would be a final order. The real point of distinction, however, is to be found at page 693 (of scr = at page 738 of AIR), in the judgment of Shelat, J. The passage runs thus :"as observed in Ramesh v. Patni, (1966)3 SCR 198 = AIR 1966 SC 1445 , the finality of that order was not to be judged by correlating that order with the controversy in the complaint, viz. , whether the appellant had committed the offence charged against him therein. The fact that the controversy still remained alive is irrelevant. "the majority view is based upon the distinction pointed out in the above passage and concluding that it is a final order within the meaning of Article 134 (1) (c) while bachwat, J. , said at page 695 (of SCR) = (at p. 739 of AIR) "it is merely a preliminary step in the prosecution and therefore an interlocutory order. " Even though there may be a scope for expressing different opinions apropros the nature of the order which was under consideration in mohan Lai's case, in our judgment, undoubtedly, and order directing the filing of a complaint after enquiry made under a provision of the 1973 Code, similar to section 476 of the 1898 Code, will not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2 ). The order will be clearly revisable by the High Court. We must however, hasten to add that the majority decision in Mohan Lai's case treats such an order as an order finally concluding the enquiry started to find out whether a complaint should be lodged or not, taking the prosecution launched on the filing of the complaint as a separate proceeding. From that point of view the matter under discussion may not be said to be squarely covered by the decision of this Court in mohan Lal's case. From that point of view the matter under discussion may not be said to be squarely covered by the decision of this Court in mohan Lal's case. Yet, for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding will surely, be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2 ). " the Supreme Court, in the said judgment, has also referred to another judgment by it in parameshwari Devi v. State, AIR 1977 SC 403 and stated as follows :"we may also refer to the decision of this court in Parameshwari Devi v. State, (1977) 2 SCR 160 = AIR 1977 SC 403 , that an order made in a criminal proceeding against a person who is not a party to enquiry or trial and which adversely affected him is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2 ). Referring to a passage from the decision of this Court in mohan Lai's case (supra), the passage which is to be found in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 22, it has been said by Shinghal, J. , delivering the judgment of the Court at page 164 (of SCR) = (at p. 406 of AIR ). "it may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial against whom it is directed. " as already mentioned, the view expressed in Mohan Lal's case may be open to debate or difference. One such example is to be found in the decision of this Court in prakash Chand Agarwal v. M/s. Hindustam Steel Ltd. , (1971) 2 SCR 405 = AIR 1971 SC 2319 , wherein it was held that an order of the High Court setting aside an ex parte decree in the suit and restoring the suit to the file of the trial court is not a final order within the meaning of Article 133. It is to be noticed that if the High Court would have refused to set aside the ex parte decree, the proceeding for setting it aside would have finally ended and on some of the principles culled out by the majority in Mohan Lal's case, such an order would have been final order. We are, however, not under any necessity to enter into this controversial arena. In our opinion, whether the type of the order aforesaid would be a final order or not, surely it will not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 397 of the 1973 Code. "it is of importance, however, to remember that the judgment in Kuppuswami Rao's case (supra) to exclude intermediary or interlocutory orders from the category of judgment/final orders has received a critical reappraisal in several cases and in Amarnath's case and madhu Limaye 's case view therein is reiterated in the following words :"more often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand a bar has been put in the way of the high Court (as also of the Sessions Judge)for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. "speaking in Madhu Limaye in respect of 482 of the Code the Supreme Court has observed:"on a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court". But if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation what is the harmonious way out? But if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the high Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed, is purely of an interlocutory charater which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High court. '' But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be desireability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the prevention of Corruption Act with out a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquitial a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although, we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes in an interlocutory' order, -does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the high Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end ? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. "it follows, thus, from the above that the Court's revisional power shall not be available to revise interlocutory order yet its inherent power can be used if it is held by the Court that continuance of the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court or it is necessary for securing the ends of justice to interfere. ( 17 ) SUPREME Court in V. C. Shukla 's case (supra) dealing with Section 11 of the Special courts Act (1979) and Section 397 and 482 of the Code has said in its majority judgment as follows:"it may be mentioned here that in the Codes of Criminal Procedure, prior to the Code of 1973, the word "interlocutory" was not used at all and, therefore, it has to be interpreted for the first time only after the code came into force. Section 397 (2) of the code which contains the powers of revision against interlocutory orders runs thus (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. " ( 18 ) IT will be important to note that the words 'interlocutory order' used in this subsection relates to various stages of the trial, namely appeal, inquiry, trial or any other proceeding. The object seems to be cut-down the delays in stages through which a criminal case passes before it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or conviction. So far as the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 is concerned, it has got a wide and diverse area of jurisdiction inasmuch as it regulates the procedure of trial not only of the large number of offences contained in the Indian Penal Code but also in other Acts and Statutes which apply the Code of Criminal Procedure or which are statutes in pan materia the Code. Having regard, therefore, to the very large ambit and range of the Code, the expression "interlocutory order' would have to be given a broad meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act without disturbing or interfering with the fairness of the trial. Fortunately, however, there are a few decisions which have interpreted the expression 'interlocutory order' as appearing in Section 397 (2) of the Code. Before we come to the decisions, certain features may be noticed here. In the first place, the concept of appeal against interlocutory order seems to be by and large foreign to the scheme of the Code or for that matter the scheme of the Code of Criminal procedure right from 1872 up-to-date, Appeal has been provided only against final orders and not against interlocutory orders. Instead of Appeal, the Code of 1898 as also the code 1872 contained powers of revision which vested in the High Court to revise any order passed by a criminal court. In the previous codes, the term 'interlocutory was not used. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction was wide enough to embrace within its scope any order whether interlocutory, intermediate or final. Secondly, by virtue of scores of decisions of the various High Courts in India and the Privy council, it was well-settled that the revisional jurisdiction possessed by the Sessions Judge and the High Court could be exercised only to examine the legality or propriety of the order impugned and more particularly the Courts were to interfere only if there was an error of law or procedure. Previous to the Code, the powers of revision enjoyed by the Session Judge or the District Magistrate or the Chief Judicial magistrate through various amendments were rather limited whereas the power of the High court was wide and unlimited. Apart from the revisional power the High Court under the code of 1898 possessed an inherent power to pass orders ex debito justitiae in order to prevent the abuse the process of the Court. This was a special power which was to be exercised by the High Court to meet a particular contingency not expressly provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in the present Code, the inherent power of the Court has been fully retained under section 482 which runs thus"482. This was a special power which was to be exercised by the High Court to meet a particular contingency not expressly provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in the present Code, the inherent power of the Court has been fully retained under section 482 which runs thus"482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the high Court to make such orders as may be 1998 (2) (Crl.)~f-58 necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. " ( 19 ) ONE of the questions that arose was as to whether an interlocutory order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge, can be further revised under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court because Section 397 (3)permitted the power of revision to be exercised only by the High Court or the Sessions Judge but not by both of them. The limitation contained in Section 397 runs as follows : " (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the high Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of. them. '' sub-section (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in Section 482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High court or Sessions Judge under Section 397 (1)of the Code. We need not dilate on this aspect because we are not called upon to consider the interpretation of Section 397 (3)of the Code, although in one of the cases cited before us this aspect has been gone into and that is why we have indicated the same. Mr. Mridul contended that as the Special courts Act has fully applied the procedure of the Code of the trial of the offences by the special Judge, the expression 'interlocutory order' has been used exactly in the same sense as in Section 397 (2 ). In other words, the contention was that Section 11 of the Act is modelled on Section 397 (2) of the Code by the telescoping sub-section (2) of the said section into Section 11 (1) of the Act. In other words, the contention was that Section 11 of the Act is modelled on Section 397 (2) of the Code by the telescoping sub-section (2) of the said section into Section 11 (1) of the Act. In support of his contention reliance was placed in the case of Amarnath v. State of Haryana, (1978)1 SCR 222 and particularly to the following observations made by this Court:"it seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular