JUDGMENT 1. This appeal filed under S.28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is directed against the order in O.P. (H.M.A.) No. 259 of 1981 of the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Trivandrum. The petitioner husband in the above O.P. is the appellant before us. The respondent is the wife against whom the above O.P. has been filed. The marriage between the appellant and respondent took place on 9th September 1978 as per the custom prevalent in the community. Out of the lawful wedlock the first child was born on 2nd October 1979 and the second child on 28th April 1981. However, in January 1981, the respondent started residing separately. According to the appellant in spite of all the attempts the respondent refused to come and reside with him. Ultimately the above petition for divorce was filed under S.13(1)(ia), that is to say, on the ground of cruelty. The court below conducted enquiry and ultimately dismissed the petition. Being aggrieved., by the said order the present appeal has been filed. 2. Heard the counsel for the appellant and also the respondent. 3. Before going into the merits of the case, it has to be observed that some attempt had been made by this court to have a reconciliation between the parties. In that process both parties were directed to appear before the court. On appearance the respondent expressed before the court that she is willing to come and reside with the appellant. However, the appellant is not prepared to take her. In that situation the attempt of the court for reconciliation was in vain. However, while examining the case on merit, we do not rely on such circumstances that happened during the pendency of the appeal. 4. As pointed out above, the present petition has been filed under S.13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Under the above provision, any marriage solemnized can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on a petition presenting either by the husband or the wife on the ground inter alia that the other party has after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. What is required under this provision is there must be a solemnized marriage and there shall be a petition either by the husband or the wife and then divorce can be sought on the grounds specified in S.13. What is required under this provision is there must be a solemnized marriage and there shall be a petition either by the husband or the wife and then divorce can be sought on the grounds specified in S.13. The specific ground raised in this case is cruelty as pointed out above. The word 'cruelty' as such has not been defined in the Act. However, the counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane AIR 1975 S.C. 1534 . Placing reliance on this decision the counsel contended that 'mental cruelty' would come within the meaning of S.13(1)(ia). This may not be correct. The respondent may be or may not be mentally cruel but there must be circumstances pointing towards reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the respondent is mentally cruel. Therefore what is required is reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. No doubt, this has to be established by the petitioner who seeks divorce. 5. It is apt to ectype in the present context the following observation contained in Para.50 of the decision referred to above: "These defences to the charge of cruelty must accordingly be rejected. However, learned counsel for the respondent is right in stressing the warning given by Denning, LJ., in Kaslefsky v. Kaslefsky (1950) 2 All E.R. 398 at p. 403 that 'if the door of cruelty were opened too wide, we should soon find ourselves granting divorce for incompatibility of temperament. This is an easy path to tread, especially in undefended cases. The temptation must be resisted lest we slip into a state of affairs where the institution of marriage itself is imperilled:. But we think that to hold in this case that the wife's conduct does not amount to cruelty is to close for ever the door of cruelty so as to totally prevent any access thereto. This is not a case of mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language or a want of civil attention to the needs of the husband and the household. Passion and petulance have perhaps to be suffered in silence as the price of what turns out to be an. injudicious selection of a partner. This is not a case of mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language or a want of civil attention to the needs of the husband and the household. Passion and petulance have perhaps to be suffered in silence as the price of what turns out to be an. injudicious selection of a partner. But the respondent is at the mercy of her inflexible temper. She delights in causing misery to her husband and his relations and she willingly suffers the calculated insults which her relatives hurled at him and his parents: the false accusation that, 'the pleader's sanad of that old hag of your father was forfeited,' 'I want to see the ruination of the whole Dastane dynasty'; bum the book written by your father and apply the ashes to your forehead;' 'you are not a man' conveying that the children were not his: 'you are a monster in a human body', 'I will make you lose your job and publish it in the Poona news papers' these and similar outbursts are not the ordinary wear and tear of married life but they became, by their regularity, a menace to the peace and well being of the household. Acts like the tearing of the Mangal-Sutra, locking out the husband when he is due to return from the office, rubbing chillie powder on the tongue of an infant child j beating a child mercilessly while in high fever and switching on the light at night and sitting by the bedside of the husband merely to nag him are acts which tend to destroy the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony. Assuming that there was some justification for occasional sallies or show of temper, the pattern of behaviour which the respondent generally adopted was grossly excessive," What we see here is the pattern of behaviour generally adopted by the respondent which constitute 'cruelty'. It is arduous for this court to say that the pattern of behaviour of the respondent in this case is such as contemplated by the Supreme Court and that it would constitute 'cruelty'. 6. As aforesaid, the Supreme Court said that under S.10(1)(b) of the Act, the relevant consideration is to see whether the conduct of the respondent is such as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. 6. As aforesaid, the Supreme Court said that under S.10(1)(b) of the Act, the relevant consideration is to see whether the conduct of the respondent is such as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. Therefore what is required to be looked into while dealing with a case of cruelty is whether the acts or pattern of conduct on the part of the wife would be sufficient to create reasonable apprehension in the mind of the husband. When the husband was examined, though he had deposed the allegations raised against the wife, he had no case that the pattern of behaviour of the wife had caused a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious to live with her. This is an aggravated form of mis-behaviour arising out of his or her pattern of behaviour which would normally upset his or her mental equilibrium. 7. Now let us examine as to how the evidence in a matrimonial case to be dealt with. In this case we are not concerned with the criminal offences coming under the Dowry Prohibition Act or under Indian Penal Code. We are only concerned with matrimonial conduct which it is allegedly amounts to cruelty as a ground for divorce. In this context the observation of the Supreme Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi AIR 1988 S.C. 121 is relevant: "Such cruelty if not admitted requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. This Court has not accepted the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." When the court examines the evidence in matrimonial cases the following observation of the Supreme Court in Dastane's case A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1534 supra is very apt to be kept in mind. "The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures." 8. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures." 8. The evidence tendered by the husband as P.W.1 is insufficient to hold that there was cruelty as pleaded in the petition. In support of appellant's case P.Ws. 2 and 3 were examined. According to P. W. 2 there were differences of opinion between the husband and wife and the husband has not received proper treatment from the wife. He further added that there were quarrels between them. Merely because there were quarrel or heated exchange of words between the husband and wife, we cannot say it amounts to cruelty. P.W. 3 deposed that the husband and wife were not in good terms and there were quarrels between them on account of the difference of opinion. His evidence is also insufficient to hold that there was cruelty on the part of the respondent. P.Ws. 2 and 3 did not speak of any sort of reasonable apprehension in the mind of the husband arising out of quarrels or exchange of words between them. When the respondent was examined as C.P.W. 1, she has stoutly denied all the allegations raised by the appellant. On an anxious consideration of entire oral evidence available in the case, we cannot say that the ground of cruelty has been proved on the preponderance of probabilities. 9. The court below has evaluated the evidence and came to the conclusion that no specific instance of cruelty had been made out or pleaded in the petition and even the mental cruelty pleaded by the appellant had not been proved. In the aforesaid background, we confirm the order the court below and dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs.