ORDER 1. The petition for drawing contempt proceedings against the respondent is filed by one Ketah Shah and has enclosed with the petition as Annexure P/7 a copy of the order-sheet purported 'to have been signed by Shri S.L. Saxena, Advocate General, M.P. It appears that it was in pursuance to Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which provides for motion being made to the Court for drawing proceedings in a case of criminal contempt by the person and one of the category of the persons is any person with the consent of the Advocate General. 2. In the present case opinion is formed by the Advocate General and the relevant paragraph is as extracted: "In my opinion, this is a fit case where necessary consent should be given to enable the petitioner/his Counsel Shri Shukla, to move necessary application before the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971." But consequent upon this, order granting consent is not there and this opinion is founded on the finding of the Advocate General that Shri R.N. Tiwari has tried to interfere with the working of the Court indirectly. However, it is a technicality and technicality is not supposed to come in the way of justice and in the present case as we have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sardar Rajendra Singh, Senior Advocate, we do not consider it proper to reject the petition on the ground of technicality. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent Shri R.N. Tiwari is an Advocate practising at Durg. He filed writ petition No. 3793/97 on behalf of one Paltan Mallah alias Ravi Mallah, who was convicted in connection with some murder in Sessions Trial No. 233/92, vide judgment and order dated 23rd June, 1997 whereunder Paltan Mallah was awarded death penalty and against his conviction he preferred an appeal before this Court numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 1371/97 as well as a reference also came to this Court for confirmation of penalty of death. In the said appeal, the respondent concluded his arguments on 16.9.1997. In the said appeal, the respondent concluded his arguments on 16.9.1997. The next day writ petition No. 3793/97 was preferred before this Court, whereby the following reliefs are sought : "(i) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue appropriate writ, direction or order against the respondent No.2 directing him to produce in person both petitioner including the respondent No.4 before this Hon'ble Court, so that this Hon'ble High Court may assess the quantum of discriminations being illegally exercised by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, in between the petitioner and respondent No.4; (ii) In case the Hon'ble Court arrives to the conclusion that respondents No. 2 and 3 have illegally provided illegal discrimination to respondent No.4 unwarranted under the Rules including the Law prevalent in the Jail Manual, then the Hon'ble Court may issue suitable writ/direction/orders for an action against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 including for their punishments; (iii) Any wither relief which the Hon'ble Court may deem it fit and proper may also be granted in favour of the petitioner." 4. In S.T. No. 233/92 some of the co-accused persons were also convicted but were not awarded the extreme penalty of death. The other appeal filed by accused Moolchand Shah and others is Criminal Appeal No. 1278/97. 5. Learned counsel invited the attention of the Court to the statement made in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.6 of the said writ petition. In regard to Paragraph 5.2, the grievance of the learned counsel is that the following passage was false: "'The petitioner being poor became greedy and accepted the proposal in the year 1991. The Desi Katta with two L.G. Cartridges were prided by respondent No.4 to him, and one Gyan Prakash Mishra had gone with the petitioner to the residence of Niyogi and to achieve the conspiracy, had directed the petitioner to shoot at Niyogi, when he was asleep during night between 27-28 Sept. 1991." The allegation in paragraph 5.6 is regarding sending of a telegram and in the paragraph it is stated that the rumour in the society was that the respondent No. 4 including others are to be acquitted in the case, while the petitioner is bound to be convicted and sentenced. In this circumstance Janak Lal Thakur who is the President of Chhattishgarh Mukti Morcha had sent a telegram addressed to (1). Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Verma, Chief Justice of India (2) Mr. Joginder Singh, Director cm. In this circumstance Janak Lal Thakur who is the President of Chhattishgarh Mukti Morcha had sent a telegram addressed to (1). Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Verma, Chief Justice of India (2) Mr. Joginder Singh, Director cm. "' The aforesaid allegations are sheet anchor for making prayer for drawing contempt proceedings against the respondent. 6. So far as the allegations in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.6 are concerned, they are sworn on personal knowledge, but in paragraph 2 of the affidavit it is stated that contents of paras 1 to 12 are based as per the contents of the charge sheet filed by cm against Pal tan Mallah and respondent No.4 including others. The rest of the paragraphs are stated to be true and correct as having been conveyed and instructed to the present respondent by the petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition. 7. Submission of the learned counsel is that the aforesaid criminal appeals are pending before this Court, wherein, as is stated by the learned counsel the arguments are in progress. We are not concerned with the said appeals in the present petition. We are concerned only whether it is a case for drawing contempt proceedings against the respondent? 8. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Section 2(c) defines "criminal contempt", which is as extracted below :-- "(c) criminal contempt" means the publication (whether. by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which – (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with. or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;" Learned counsel relied on Clause (ii) that the act of the respondent is such which tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding, that is the proceeding pending by way of appeal before this Court. or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;" Learned counsel relied on Clause (ii) that the act of the respondent is such which tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding, that is the proceeding pending by way of appeal before this Court. The allegations made in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.6 were false and on the basis of the false allegations the writ petition was filed by way of camouflage seeking the reliefs as are mentioned above as there was no question or occasion of taking of such a writ petition at the stage when his arguments in appeal of Paltan Mallah were concluded and the arguments in connected appeal of the co-accused were in progress and the object was to prejudice the mind of the Bench, which was hearing the criminal appeals. 9. So far as allegations made in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.6 of the petition are concerned, in the affidavit riled in support of the writ petition. it is clearly stated that same are founded on the charge-sheet filed by the CBI against Paltan Mallah and the respondent No. 4 including others. The allegations made in paragraph 5.6 may not be found on the report of the cm but that is a fact regarding rum our stated in the said paragraph and that related to a different stage i.e. the stage of the trial. 10. Learned State counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in re, P.C. Sen ( AIR 1970 SC 1821 ). It was a case under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and the facts of that case were different. Even in this case the Supreme Court held that ordinarily a Court will not initiate proceedings for commitment for contempt where there is a mere technical contempt and equated the same with the case of Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Chose. AIR 41 Cal. 173 = (AIR 1914 Cal. 69) (SB) where C.J., Jenkins said that proceedings for contempt should be initiated with utmost reserve and no Court in the due discharge of its duty can afford to disregard them. AIR 41 Cal. 173 = (AIR 1914 Cal. 69) (SB) where C.J., Jenkins said that proceedings for contempt should be initiated with utmost reserve and no Court in the due discharge of its duty can afford to disregard them. It was also observed that jurisdiction to punish for contempt was arbitrary, unlimited and uncontrolled and should be exercised with the greatest caution that this power merits this description will be realised when it is understood that there is no limit to the imprisonment that may be inflicted or the tine that may he imposed save the Court's unfettered discretion, and that the subject is protected by no right of general appeal. We may at once observe that since the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act 12 of 1926 and Act 32 of 1952, the power of the Court in imposing punishment for contempt of Court is not an uncontrolled or unlimited power. That, however, does not justify the Court in commencing proceedings without due caution and reserve. That was a case for drawing proceedings against the Chief Minister and the Court observed that the Chief Minister had acted improperly and expressing disapproval of the action and it was said that the case does not call for any interference by this Court. 11. The next case cited by the learned counsel is Bibhabali Devi v. Ramendra Narayan (AIR 1939 Calcutta 672). It was a case of publication of pamphlet during the pendency of proceedings of the case. The pamphlet was printed in the Bengali Language, the title of which rendered into English is 'Fight between the Rani and the Sannyasi (new series).' The pamphlet related to what is commonly called the Bhowal Raj case and upon the outside page or cover of the pamphlet there appears a portrait of the plaintiff in that case in the dress of the Second Kumar of Bhowal. That portrait is one of the actual exhibits in the case being Ex. 58. The pamphlet was, beyond all question, defamatory both of Bibhabati Devi and her brother Satya. In that case the contemner pleaded guilty to the charge brought against him in the proceedings and he admitted frankly that the pamphlet complained of was undoubtedly Contempt of Court and, therefore, the Court did not enter into the details. 58. The pamphlet was, beyond all question, defamatory both of Bibhabati Devi and her brother Satya. In that case the contemner pleaded guilty to the charge brought against him in the proceedings and he admitted frankly that the pamphlet complained of was undoubtedly Contempt of Court and, therefore, the Court did not enter into the details. This case operates in a different field and nothing hinges out from it so far as the present case is concerned. 12. The next case cited was of Hira Lat Dixit v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1954 SC 743 ). The facts of that case were also different and it was a case of civil contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. In this case certain bus operators applied to the Allahabad High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government and its Minister of Transport to withdraw the declaration made under Section 3 of the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1950 in respect of their respective routes and directing them and their officers to refrain from proceeding further under Sections 4 and, 5 of that Act and not to interfere with the operation of their respective stage carriages and for other ancillary reliefs. The applications were dismissed. Thereafter leave to appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India was granted and the appellants obtained orders for stay of proceedings until the determination of their appeals. In pursuance of this many other bus operators plying motor stage carriages or contract carriages approached the Supreme Court with applications under, Article 32 for appropriate writs and obtained interim stay. It appears that on the 15th September, 1954 a leaflet printed in the Hindi language and characters, consisting of 18 pages, intituled "Hamara Vahan Vibhag" meaning "Our Transport Department", purporting to be written by the respondent Hira Lal Dixit and containing foreword purporting to be written by Shri Krishna Dutt Paliwal and a block photograph of the respondent Hira Lal Dixit on the front page was distributed in the Court premises. The leaflet contained a graphic account of the harassment and indignity said to have been meted out to the writer by the State officers and the then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and eventual restoration of his licence in respect of a passenger bus. The leaflet contained a graphic account of the harassment and indignity said to have been meted out to the writer by the State officers and the then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and eventual restoration of his licence in respect of a passenger bus. The second paragraph on page 15 of that leaflet contained a passage of which the following is an English translation prepared by an Advocate of this Court duly authorised in that behalf. The said leaflet though contained allegations against the Government, but affected the credibility of the Judge as it was stated in that pamphlet that the Government acts with partiality in the matter of appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners, etc., who give judgments against Government but this has so far not made any difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon'ble Judges. In that case the Court relied on the case of Brahma Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 10 (B), wherein it was said that it is not necessary that there should in fact be an actual interference with the course of administration of justice but that it is enough if the offending publication is likely or if it tends in any way to interfere with the proper administration of law. The Court found that such insinuations as are implicit in the passage in question are derogatory to the dignity of the Court and are calculated to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the Judges. This case has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. Learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner Paltan Mallah in the said writ petition moved an application to Hon'ble the Chief Justice that he does not want to retain Shri R.N. Tiwari as his counsel in the case and further that he never engaged Shri Tiwari for filing any petition on his behalf before this Court. Prayer in the said application was accepted. However, it is not the controversy here, whether Paltan Mallah has instructed Shri Tiwari for filing the petition or for not filing the writ petition. These are remote facts which do not come within the category of any charge, punishable for Contempt of Court. It may be the professional misconduct, but this Court is not supposed to express its opinion. 14. These are remote facts which do not come within the category of any charge, punishable for Contempt of Court. It may be the professional misconduct, but this Court is not supposed to express its opinion. 14. However, in view of above, we do not find it a fit case for initiating proceedings for Contempt of Court. The petition is accordingly rejected.