Judgment : The respondents in the eviction petition are the revision petitioners. Their eviction was sought on the ground of owner’s occupation and unauthorised sub-letting. 2. The case of the respondent herein as set out in the petition in R.C.O.P.No.18 of 1995 before the Rent Controller, Nagapattinam, was as follows. .3. The building and the premises referred to in the petition belonged to the respondent/landlady, she having purchased the same under a sale deed dated 15. 1994 from one Balkis Nachiar and others. The first revision petitioner was in occupation of the building as a tenant under the previous owners and after the purchase by the respondent, he attorned to the respondent and entered into an oral tenancy agreement agreeing to pay at the rate of Rs.125 per month as rent, the rent arrangement being according to the English calendar month. The respondent got married in November, 1993. Her husband who was a native of Chidambaram, prior to the marriage was employed in a cycle dealer shop at Chidambaram and thereafter he was employed in Saudi Arabia. After his marriage he was permanently, staying with the respondent at Manjakollai. He was employed as Manager in J.S. Traders, a firm in the adjacent building, run by a third party. He had gained experience in business and he desired to start his own business, for which he required the petition mentioned premises. Neither the respondent nor her husband was in occupation of any other nonresidential building of her/his own within the limits of Nagapattinam and the petition mentioned premises was required by them bona fide for the purpose of the business to be started. The first revision petitioner was informed about the intention of the respondent’s husband to start a business. Though he promised to vacate, he did not keep his promise. A notice was issued by the respondent to the revision petitioners on 25. 1995. There was a reply sent by the revision petitioners on 6. 1995 containing false allegations. The respondent did not demand enhanced rent. Again, the first revision petitioner had sub-let the building to the second revision petitioner without the consent in writing of the respondent. The second revision petitioner was running his business under the name and style of ‘Vaigai Enterprises’ in the petition mentioned premises. The revision petitioners were therefore liable to be evicted on the ground of unauthorised sub-letting. .4. Again, the first revision petitioner had sub-let the building to the second revision petitioner without the consent in writing of the respondent. The second revision petitioner was running his business under the name and style of ‘Vaigai Enterprises’ in the petition mentioned premises. The revision petitioners were therefore liable to be evicted on the ground of unauthorised sub-letting. .4. The second revision petitioner filed a counter. Which was adopted by the first revision petitioner, contending inter alia as follows: The requirement of the premises of the respondent’s husband was not bona fide, that the case of sub-letting was not true, that the petition for eviction had been filed only for the purpose of hiking the rent, that the first revision petitioner was the son of the second revision petitioner and that the licence for the shop stood in the name of the second revision petitioner and also the first revision petitioner. Both the petitioners were looking after the business and there was no sub-letting at all. The respondent’s husband owned the business J.S.Traders in the adjacent premises and it was not true to say that he was only a Manager. The requirement for owner’s occupation for starting a new business by the respondent’s husband was an invented reason and no steps had been taken by the respondent’s husband for starting any new business. The eviction partition was liable to be dismissed. .5. The learned Rent Controller found that there was no sub-letting and that the respondent had not established that her husband was going to start a new business for Which the premises was required. By his order dated 22. 1996, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition. 6. However, on appeal in R.C.A.No.12 of 1996 by the respondent, the Appellate Authority, Nagapattinam, set aside the order of the Rent Controller, allowed the rent control appeal and ordered eviction. Aggrieved the present revision petition has been filed by the revision petitioners. 7. By his order dated 22. 1996, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition. 6. However, on appeal in R.C.A.No.12 of 1996 by the respondent, the Appellate Authority, Nagapattinam, set aside the order of the Rent Controller, allowed the rent control appeal and ordered eviction. Aggrieved the present revision petition has been filed by the revision petitioners. 7. Mr.D. Murugesan, learned counsellor the revision petitioners, submitted that the respondent had not established sub-letting by the first revision petitioner in favour of the second revision petitioner, that the requirement of the respondent’s husband for starting his own business was not bona fide, particularly having regard to the subsequent development, that in respect of the adjacent property proceedings in eviction were taken in R.C.O.P.No.19 of 1995 before the Rent Controller and a compromise was entered into between the parties, under which the respondent got possession of the said premises and if this subsequent development was taken into consideration, the eviction petition was liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority had not considered the relative hardship. The learned counsel in support of his contention relied on the following decisions. 1.Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. I 711. 2. Jainmul Jain and another v. A.R. Nagarajan and another, (1997)2 L.W. 386 and 3.T.Poongothai v. Zamurth Bibi and five others, (1995)2 L.W. 301 . 8. Countering the arguments of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners, Mrs. Prabha Sridevan submitted that it has been found by the appellate authority that the first revision petitioner in the revision petition had sub-let the premises to the second petitioner and the case of sub-letting had been clearly made out and on this solitary ground alone the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority had to be sustained. So far as the subsequent event, viz., the respondent getting possession of the adjacent property was concerned, the learned counsel submitted that that itself would not show that the requirement of the respondent had been satisfied and it was not for the tenants to dictate terms to the landlady as to the area required by her for her own use or for the use of any member of her family. The learned counsel relied on a number of decisions, 1. Mohammed Ebrahim & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sridhar & Co,, (1968)1 M.L.J. 406 : 81 L.W. 10. 2. The learned counsel relied on a number of decisions, 1. Mohammed Ebrahim & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sridhar & Co,, (1968)1 M.L.J. 406 : 81 L.W. 10. 2. Narasu’s Coffee Company (firm) represented by its Managing Partner Mr.R.P. Sarathy v. M. Muhammed Ibrahim Rowther, 96 L.W. 656. 3.K. Ganesan v. Padmavathi Ammal, 100 L.W. 381. 4.Veera Manikandan v. A.K. Chakrapani, (1987)2 M.L.J. 70 :100 L.W. 774. 5.S. Balamani v. V. Periaswami, (1995)2 M.L.J.198. 6.M/s. Vijaya Traders by Executive Partner V. Saradha v. C.K. Sampath and another, (1991)2 M.L.J. 174 , and 7.Sengani Ammal v. Authysekaran, (1996)1 M.L.J. 310 . 9. Let us first take the question of sub-letting. In Thangiah Nadar & Sons v. Rajathi Ammal, (1982)1 M.L.J. 161 , it has been held by this Court that, “the main criterion in the case of sub-letting is whether the tenant had permitted a third party to occupy the premises and had divested himself completely of the possession of the premises or a part thereof and that if the tenant had permitted another person to use the premises along with him, it might not amount to sub-letting.” 10. In Jagadish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1447: (1984)2 S.C.C. 590 : 97 L.W. 107 (S.N.), the Supreme Court had said that, “Merely from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop sub-letting cannot be presumed. As long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, subletting flowing from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed.“ 11. Again, in M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Co. (West)v. Inder Singh, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1564: (1986)3 S.C.C. 62 , in a case where the tenancy was in the name of a firm and subsequently, it was changed in the name of a company, the Supreme Court held that for all practical purposes there was substantial identity between the persons and there was no sub-lease. 12. In Shalimar Tar Products Limited v. H.C. Sharma and others, J.T. (1987)4 S.C. 440, the Supreme Court observed that there must be parting of legal possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. 13. 12. In Shalimar Tar Products Limited v. H.C. Sharma and others, J.T. (1987)4 S.C. 440, the Supreme Court observed that there must be parting of legal possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. 13. In Smt. Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s.S.Chokesiri and Co., (1989)1 S.C.C. 19 , the Supreme Court held as follows: If exclusive possession is established and the version of the tenant as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, as in the present case, it may not be impermissible for the court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of sub-letting in the guise of licenses are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the subtenant and there cannot be direct evidence. It is often a matter of legitimate inference. This was followed in Nihal Chand Rameshwar Dass v. Vinod Rastogi, J.T. (1994)4 S.C. 113: (1994)4 S.C.C. 325 . 14. In M/s. Vijaya Traders by Executive Partner V. Saradha v. C.K. Sampath and another, (1991)2 M.L.J. 174 , Srinivasan, J. as he then was, held as follows: “Whether there is a sub-lease in favour of a sub-lessee is always a matter for inference from the evidence. The landlord cannot be expected to prove that there is a transaction of lease between the tenant and the alleged sub-lessee. The court has to draw the necessary inference only from the evidence placed before it. 15. In Sengani Ammal v. Authysekaran, (1996)1 M.L.J. 310 , S.S. Subramani, J. referred to all the decisions mentioned supra and laid down the criteria regarding sub-letting. 16. In the light of the above decisions if we analyse the facts of the present case, it would be seen that to start with the first petitioner was the tenant under the predecessor in title of the respondent. He was running a shop under the name and style of Thirumagan Agency. Admittedly, the business now run in the premises is under the name and style of Vaigai Enterprises. The said business is run by the second petitioner and the registration certificate stands in his name. He was running a shop under the name and style of Thirumagan Agency. Admittedly, the business now run in the premises is under the name and style of Vaigai Enterprises. The said business is run by the second petitioner and the registration certificate stands in his name. Only in the course of evidence for the first time it was sought to be explained that the first petitioner has some weak eyesight and therefore the business was being run by the second petitioner. In the case of strangers secret pact regarding subtenancy is very difficult to unravel and in a case where son and father are respectively tenant and sub-tenant it will be next to impossible. I am clearly of the view that the respondent had established that the first petitioner had sub-let the premises to the second petitioner, his own father, and it was only the second petitioner, who was running his own business in the premises under the name and style of Vaigai Enterprises. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Jainmul Jain and another v. A.R. Nagarajan and another, (1997)2 L.W. 386 and contended that merely because a stranger draws a cheque and the same was handed over by the tenant, the stranger could not become a tenant and when parties did not have intention to create landlord-tenant relationship, mere payment of rent would not create such relationship. On the basis of this judgment, the learned counsel apparently wanted the court to say that merely because the rent was paid by the second petitioner, it could not mean that he was the tenant and only the first petitioner’s son was the tenant. Unfortunately, this decision instead of supporting the case of the revision petitioners, can be used against them. Admittedly, the business Vaigai Enterprises was standing in the name of the second petitioner and the Registration Certificate, as already stated, was in his name. The respondent had received rent from the second petitioner and had also issued receipt to him. That would not in any way mean that the respondent had recognized the second petitioner as a tenant. By no stretch of imagination it could be said that there was a relationship of owner and tenant between the respondent and the second petitioner. The respondent had received rent from the second petitioner and had also issued receipt to him. That would not in any way mean that the respondent had recognized the second petitioner as a tenant. By no stretch of imagination it could be said that there was a relationship of owner and tenant between the respondent and the second petitioner. Consequently, it has to be held that the case of subtenancy had been established by the respondent and the petitioners were therefore liable to be evicted on the ground of sub-letting. The conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority on the question of sub-letting is unassailable. 18. The next question is whether the recovery of possession of the adjacent property by the respondent from another tenant would militate against her case of bona fide requirement for own occupation. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners brought to my notice the petition, counter, memorandum of compromise and the order passed in R.C.O.RNo.19 of 1995 between the respondent and one S.M.Syed Mohammed and on the basis of Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711 contended that the respondent had suppressed her filing a partition for eviction in respect of the adjacent premises and pending proceedings against the revision petitioners she had come to possess the property covered by the other R.C.O.P. and in view of this subsequent development it should be held that the respondent’s requirement for own occupation had been satisfied and the eviction on this ground must be set aside. 19. In Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711 referred to supra which arose under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, there was an order of eviction passed against the tenant. The landlord acquired the premises during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. The question arose whether the tenant could rely on the subsequent development. The Supreme Court did hold that the court was bound to take this subsequent development into consideration and mould the relief suitably. Indeed as has been held by the Supreme Court in that decision, where possession is sought for personal requirement, the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action, but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. Indeed as has been held by the Supreme Court in that decision, where possession is sought for personal requirement, the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action, but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlord’s requirements is wholly satisfied, then in that case, his action must fail. The Supreme Court has however, further stated that the tenant must show that the need or requirement no more existed because of subsequent events. The court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. In deciding that case, the Supreme Court relied on its own earlier decision in Pasupuleti v. Venkteswarlu, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1405: (1975)3 S.C.R. 958 . In that case, the Supreme Court observed that cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings can and must in many cases be taken into consideration, provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. "In that case the matter was remitted for other purposes. The Supreme Court held that the tenant had made out that the portion taken possession of by the landlord was adequate on the admission of the landlord in that case. .20. In Narasu’s Coffee Company (firm) represented by its Managing Partner v. M. Mohammed Ibrahim Rowther, 96 L.W. 656, Mohan, J. as he then was, referred to Hasmat Rai’s case, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1771 and observed that filing of two petitions in respect of two portions of same building and one of the portions falling vacant subsequently and the landlord occupying it did not bar the maintainability as regards the other portion. The decision of the Supreme Court was reconciled on the ground that the landlord had come forward with a claim that the required both the portions in the occupation of two different tenants. Mohan, J. distinguished Kalahasti Chetti v. Balakrishnamurthi Chetti, (1948)2 M.L.J. 70 (S.N.), saying that in the appeal before the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, in that case the only question which had to be determined was whether the landlord bona fide required the building in the occupation of the tenant. 21. Mohan, J. distinguished Kalahasti Chetti v. Balakrishnamurthi Chetti, (1948)2 M.L.J. 70 (S.N.), saying that in the appeal before the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, in that case the only question which had to be determined was whether the landlord bona fide required the building in the occupation of the tenant. 21. In Ganesan v. Padmavathi Ammal, 100 L.W. 381, Chandurkar, C.J. held that the fact that the landlady came into possession of some accommodation during the pendency of the eviction petition was not a ground for disentitling her to relief of eviction on the ground of requirement for owner’s occupation. The learned Chief Justice referred to Hasmat Rai’s case, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1771 and relied on the same as also M/ s. Variety Emporium’s case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 207: (1985)1 S.C.C. 251 : (1985)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) I. 22. In Veera Manikandan v. A.K. Chakrapani, (1987)2 M.L.J. 70 : 100 L.W. 774, Padmini Jesudurai, J. referred to Hasmat Rai’s case, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1771 and took into consideration the subsequent events and found that the requirement of the landlord would be satisfied only if he got possession of the petition mentioned shop also. 23. In Mohamed Ebrahim & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sridhar & Co., (1968)1 M.L.J. 406 : 81 L.W. 10, Veeraswmi, J., as he then was, held on the facts of that case that the petitioner’s business had expanded manifold and his coming into possession of part of the building during the eviction proceedings against another tenant would not be a ground to suspect the bona fides of the tenant. .24. In the present case, I am satisfied that the very fact that the respondent had filed two separate petitions for eviction of the tenants in respect of adjacent properties would clearly show that she required both the portions for the business purpose of her husband, who had gained experience in a particular line of trade and who wanted to commence independent business in own premises. It cannot be said that the respondent was lacking in bona fides in taking simultaneous eviction proceedings in respect of portions of building for own occupation, particularly when the portions were adjacent. The appellate authority has rightly found that the requirement of the respondent for own occupation for commencing a business by her husband was bona fide and the revision petitioners were liable to be evicted on this ground also. 25. The appellate authority has rightly found that the requirement of the respondent for own occupation for commencing a business by her husband was bona fide and the revision petitioners were liable to be evicted on this ground also. 25. In view of the discussion above, it is not necessary to go into the question of relative hardship. To invoke Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act, there must be irregularity, illegality and impropriety, none of which is present in the decision of the appellate authority. There is no warrant for interference and the civil revision petition is therefore dismissed. The revision petitioners are granted three months time to vacate the premises. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the stay petition C.M.P.No.5478 of 1997 is also dismissed.