JUDGMENT The instant writ application has been moved by the writ petitioner, who admittedly has been issued with a summons under Section 108 of the Customs Act, challenging the said summons and praying for two fold reliefs. 2. Firstly, it has been prayed in the writ petition that writ of mandamus do issue upon the respondents for dealing with and disposing of the representation being Annexure 'F' to the writ petition which has been made by the petitioner. 3. The second relief which has been prayed for is for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to desist from taking any coercive action or police method against the petitioner till the disposal of the aforesaid representation being Annexure ‘F’ to the writ petition and for permitting the petitioner to take the assistance of a Lawyer during the course of investigation/interrogation by the concerned respondent during the normal office hours not more than two hours for his ailing health condition and also a Stenographer if the petitioner's statement is required to be recorded in writing. 4. Although in the writ petition the petitioner has also challenged the legality and propriety of the issue of very summons under Section 108 of the Customs Act it is not necessary for this Court to go into such question in view of the fact that the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner Mr. Somnath Chatterjee at the time of hearing of the application confined his submissions only on the prayer made in the writ petition for allowing the assistance of a Lawyer and a Stenographer as also for a direction upon the respondents to dispose of the aforesaid representation being Annexure 'F' to the writ petition. 5. It is also to be placed on record that both the present writ applications were taken up for consideration by this Court on 30th April, 1998 when after hearing the parties for sometime it was decided by this Court that since the petitioner is now praying for only the aforesaid two reliefs the entire writ petition may be disposed of on merits without any exchange of affidavits which was agreed to by the parties. 6. Thereafter, Mr. Chatterjee concluded his submissions and the matter was fixed on May 5, 1998 for hearing the submission of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 6. Thereafter, Mr. Chatterjee concluded his submissions and the matter was fixed on May 5, 1998 for hearing the submission of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is also to be placed on record that on the aforesaid adjourned date the Court was informed that Sri Ashwini More has been arrested by the respondents in the early morning of the said date. Subsequently, it was submitted by the respondent before the Court that such arrest has been made in accordance with law under the provisions of Section 104 of the Customs Act. The ground of arrest, a copy of which has been produced before this Court on behalf of the petitioner also indicates such facts. In such view of the matter so far as the writ application in the case of Ashwini More being W.P. No. 885 of 1998 is concerned the same appears to have become infructuous. 7. The Court is therefore, now called upon only to decide whether the relief which has been asked for in the case of Mohan Kumar More in W.P. No. 884 of 1998 can be granted. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted, inter alia, that the present writ petition has been moved on the reasonable apprehension that the respondents may resort to third degree method for extracting confession from the petitioner and such apprehension of the present writ petitioner Mohan Kumar More has been strengthened in view of the fact that one of his son Aditya More who was also summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act, was subsequently put under arrest. 8. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that the arrest of the other writ petitioner writ Ashwini More, who is another son of the present writ petitioner during the pendency of the writ petition has further strengthened such apprehension. It has been further submitted that the present petitioner being old and ailing may be allowed the assistance of a Lawyer who however will not interfere with the investigation in any manner whatsoever but will be present in a different room and no prejudice can be caused if the assistance of a Stenographer is gives. 9. Mr. It has been further submitted that the present petitioner being old and ailing may be allowed the assistance of a Lawyer who however will not interfere with the investigation in any manner whatsoever but will be present in a different room and no prejudice can be caused if the assistance of a Stenographer is gives. 9. Mr. Chatterjee has produced a copy of an order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director of Enforcement v. Ajit Kumar Sengupta, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has permitted the assistance of a Stenographer to Sri Sengupta during his interrogation by the FERA Authorities. It has been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that although the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) Poolpandi v. Superintendent of Central Excise reported in 1992 (3) SCC 259 : AIR 1992 SC 1795 , might have held that the assistance of a Lawyer during such investigation is not a matter of right, but the same does not mean that the Court is powerless to grant such assistance of a Lawyer in a fit and proper case. Attention of this Court in this connection has also been drawn to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (2) Dilip Kumar Basu v. State of West Bengal reported in 1997 (1) SCC 416 , where the Supreme Court was of the view that even in a case of interrogation by the Customs Authority of FERA Authority, the person who is being interrogated should be given the opportunity to consult with a Lawyer. It has also been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that in any event there cannot have any reasonable justification why the representation made by the writ petitioner being Annexure 'F' to the writ petition, wherein it has been categorically stated that the petitioner will extend fullest co-operation to the respondents, should not be directed to be considered by this Court inasmuch as without such a direction the respondents will not consider such representation. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Somadder, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand opposed the prayer of grant of assistance of a Lawyer and a Stenographer relaying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Poolpandi as also Division Bench Judgment of this Court where the Division Bench of this Court following the case of Poolpandi set aside the order of the Trial Court granting the order of assistance of a Lawyer. It has also been submitted by Mr. Somadder that in any view of the face no relief can be granted to the present writ petitioner in view of the fact that the apprehension on the basis of which the petitioner is now seeking the assistance of a Lawyer or Stenographer is unfounded as will appear from the pleadings of the petitioner itself. Mr. Somadder in this connection has also relied on a recent Supreme Court decision in the case of (3) Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, Madras reported in JT 1997 (8) SC 135, where the Supreme Court has held inter alia that there is no presumption that a statement which is to be made under Section 40 of the FERA is involuntary. Relying on such decision it has been submitted that there is also no presumption that a state meat which is to be made being summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act by the petitioner will be involuntary and therefore unless and until there is definite materials wherefrom it can be said that a statement is sought to be extracted. There is no reason why the Court should pass any order limiting the hands of the Investigating Authority. It has also been submitted in any view of the matter no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the respondents for consideration and disposal of the writ petition which are not statutory and when the investigation is pending. 11. Considering the respective submission of the parties I am of the view that the question whether during such interrogation or investigation under Section 40 of the FERA or under Section 108 of the Customs Act, the concerned person to be interrogated can have the assistance of a Lawyer has been conclusively decided in the aforesaid case of Poolpandi. 11. Considering the respective submission of the parties I am of the view that the question whether during such interrogation or investigation under Section 40 of the FERA or under Section 108 of the Customs Act, the concerned person to be interrogated can have the assistance of a Lawyer has been conclusively decided in the aforesaid case of Poolpandi. The Supreme Court held that such assistance of a Lawyer cannot be given inter alia for the reasons that the position of such person who is to be interrogated is not that of an accused and therefore no right of the concerned citizen under Article 22 of the Constitution is violated. 12. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Poolpandi merely held that a citizen cannot claim the assistance of a Lawyer as a matter of right and therefore in a fit and proper case the Court can grant assistance of a Lawyer. 13. I am also unable to accept the contention that la view of the observations of Their Lordships in the case of Dilip Kumar Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), such assistance can be granted. 14. It appears to this Court that the question whether such assistance of a Lawyer can be granted or not has been conclusively decided in the aforesaid Poolpandi’s case (supra). 15. In the case of Dilip Kumar Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), the Supreme Court was really considering the question of custodial death and accordingly laid down a series of guidelines which must be scrupulously followed by the police authorities before arresting or during interrogation. 16. It is true that is the said case of Dilip Kumar Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), the Supreme Court also took notice of the interrogation by other governmental authorities like the Customs Authorities, FERA Authorities, etc., in Paragraph 31 and in Paragraph 38 of the report. Their Lordships further observed that the requirements referred to in Paragraph 36 to be followed by the police authorities could apply with equal force to the other governmental agencies also to which reference has been made earlier. 17. Their Lordships further observed that the requirements referred to in Paragraph 36 to be followed by the police authorities could apply with equal force to the other governmental agencies also to which reference has been made earlier. 17. After careful consideration of the aforesaid judgment of Dilip Kumar Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), it however does not appear to this Court that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Poolpandi (supra), has either been set aside or has been deviated from. It appears, in Paragraph 38 of the said judgment itself it has been stated that the requirements referred to above (i.e. in Paragraph 36), are for Articles 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India and need to be strictly followed. The direction for giving the opportunity to the person who is interrogated, to consult his Lawyer, which therefore, would be applicable in the case of an accused who is interrogated because of hi right under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, cannot be made applicable to a person who is interrogated under Section 40 or Section 108 of the Customs Act, where no right under Article 22 of the Constitution is affected as held by Their Lordships in the Poolpandi’s case (supra). 18. That apart, it is well-settled by the decision of tie Supreme Court itself that the decision of the Supreme Court takes its colour an the question involved in the case and the context it was rendered, (4) Income Tax v. Sun Engineering, AIR 1993 SC page 43; (5) Ananta v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC page 218, and even one additional or different fact may make the World of difference between conclusion of two cases even when the same principles are applicable in each case to similar facts, (6) General Manager v. Pawan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC page 1766, Paragraph 7. In the case of (7) Krishnakumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207 , the Supreme Court has also explained what is a binding precedent by holding inter alia that the enunciation of the reasons or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone a binding precedent. 19. In the case of (7) Krishnakumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207 , the Supreme Court has also explained what is a binding precedent by holding inter alia that the enunciation of the reasons or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone a binding precedent. 19. This Court, however, is quite conscious of the fact that the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Poolpandi (supra), as also in other cases, pointing out that the right of the investigating authority should not be interfered with as given to them under the aforesaid provisions of the Act, does not give them an unchartered liberty to proceed in whatever manner they like in the matter of such investigation or to extract statements from the persons concerned by perpetuating torture or by applying third degree methods. That, no doubt, will be in clear violation of right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India which is available to all citizens including a person who will be interrogated under Section 108 of the Customs Act, as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Dilip Kumar Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), and therefore in an appropriate case, if it comes to the notice of the Court that such authorities arc exceeding their limit and resorting to third degree methods or perpetuating torture-physically or mentally the Court certainly will not be powerless to pass appropriate direction to protect the interest of the citizen. 20. Such relief, however, cannot be granted by the Court by mere asking. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Somadder, relying on the aforesaid Supreme Court decision of Sampath Kumar (supra), that there can be no presumption of involuntary statement made under the aforesaid provisions of the Act. Therefore, even before submitting to the summons a citizen apprehends that violating of right, the burden indeed will be extremely heavy upon the person concerned to show that such third degree methods will be used or statement will be extracted. In the instant case, no such materials are there in the writ petition. The basis of such apprehension of the present writ petitioner, as pleaded in the writ petition, appears to be on two-fold grounds firstly, because of his son Aditya More has already been arrested and secondly, allegedly he has heard from others that such statements were extracted. In the instant case, no such materials are there in the writ petition. The basis of such apprehension of the present writ petitioner, as pleaded in the writ petition, appears to be on two-fold grounds firstly, because of his son Aditya More has already been arrested and secondly, allegedly he has heard from others that such statements were extracted. No particulars in respect of such "others" have been given. It has also not been stated what actually was done to 'such' persons. Such allegations are indeed vague and without any particulars. So far as the apprehension arising out of the arrest of Sri Aditya More is concerned, it may also be recorded that excepting such allegation, it has not even been stated that Aditya More, during his interrogation under Section 108, was subjected to torture or any statement was extracted from him. On the basis, of such materials, therefore, the question of interference by allowing the prayer of the petitioner, whether for the assistance of a Lawyer or even for a Stenographer, can hardly arise. The order of the Supreme Court, which has been relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee, in the case of Director of Enforcement v. Sri Ajit Kumar Sengupta (supra), is not a judgment, but an order of the Supreme Court, passed obviously under the facts and circumstances of the case where the Enforcement Directorate preferred an appeal against the order of Division Bench granting bail on certain conditions. 21. Be that as it may, as pointed out hereinbefore, since the very basis of the apprehension of the present writ petition does not appear to be based on any sound ground, the Court does not appear to be based on any sound ground, the Court also does not find any reason why such a prayer even for the help of a Stenographer, could be allowed. It is also pertinent to note in this connection that even the allegations made in the writ petitioner as to the apprehension of the writ petitioner of perpetuation of such torture cannot stand scrutiny of the Court in view of the fact that such paragraphs have been affirmed, as true to the knowledge, not by the petitioner but by one of the sons of the petitioner, Sri Aditya More, although the one cannot be true to his knowledge. It appears that the petition has been affirmed by Sri Aditya More as constituted Attorney of the petitioner. Whether such apprehension of the petitioner does exist t or not, however certainly cannot be true to knowledge of the constituted Attorney. 22. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the matter of assistance of a Lawyer or the assistance of a Stenographer. 23. So far as the other prayer of issuing a writ of mandamus upon the respondents for consideration of the representation being, Annexure ‘F’ to the writ petition is concerned, it appears that Annexure 'F' is the representation made to the Hon'ble Minister of State for Revenue, Ministry of Finance, with a copy to the Chairman, Central Board of Customs & Excise, Government of India. 24. When, admittedly, summons under Section 108 has already been issued by the appropriate Officer in exercise of his power under Section 108 of the Customs Act, it is not understood by this Court how the Hon'ble Minister or the Chairman can have any say in the matter. Be that as it may, I am not inclined to go into such question at all in view of the fact that such representations are not statutory and whether the same will be considered or not is entirely a matter for the said authorities to decide. 25. No order is therefore called for or warranted on such prayer. All the points raised in the writ petition falls and the same is hereby dismissed. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner prays for stay of operation of the order. The prayer is considered but refused. Signed copy of the operative portion.