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1998 DIGILAW 223 (HP)

CONSTABLE AMAR LAL v. UNION OF INDIA

1998-12-08

D.RAJU, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

body1998
JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—CMP No. 1537/98 : Infructuous. CWP No. 813/98 : The above writ petition has been filed challenging the order of the 2nd respondent dated 31.12.1994 wherein the petitioner was ordered to be removed from service w.e.f. 31.12.1994 afternoon. The petitioner indisputably proceeded, during the month of March 1993, on 60 days earned leave with one day suffix and was due to report back to duty on 9.5.1993, but he failed to report to duty on the due date and on his own reported only on 23.4.1994, after unauthorisedly absenting himself from duty for 348 days. This omission on his part was despite notices served on him for re-joining, as indicated in the impugned order itself. A statement of articles of charges with statement of imputation of mis-conduct in support of the articles of charges was issued, his explanation was obtained and an inquiry had been held. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report holding the charges proved and thereupon a second show-cause notice was issued enclosing a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to which also he submitted a reply. Thereupon, the impugned order dated 31.12.1994 came to be passed. The fact that he was absent for the number of days noticed in the charge, is not in dispute and the question very much before the authorities below was whether he was justified in doing so. It is seen from the materials placed on record including the explanation submitted by him as also the final order passed that he had no genuine, plausible or reasonable explanation to exonerate him from the serious lapse committed by him in absenting unauthorisedly for nearly 348 days. The 2nd respondent, who passed the final order also noticed the fact that before passing the final order on the disciplinary inquiry, the petitioner has again over-stayed from- leave w.e.f 17.11.1994 (FN) and he also submitted a resignation on a plain paper from home. Thereupon, he was asked to report to the office by a letter dated 14.12.1994 to attend the final decision to be delivered against him, but he did not appear to have responded to the said leter also. Thereupon, he was asked to report to the office by a letter dated 14.12.1994 to attend the final decision to be delivered against him, but he did not appear to have responded to the said leter also. Once again, he was by a communication dated 23.12.1994 instructed to be present and when contacted at the village, it appears that the petitioner has stated that he has already submitted his resignation from service and the same may be accepted, but it could not be, according to the 2nd respondent, acted upon since the same is not in order and it is in such circumstances the final order came to be passed on merits after considering the gravity of the charge, which has been held proved. After imposing the punishment of removal from services, the 2nd respondent, which is said to be the competent authority also has passed orders relating to the regularisation of the past period of absence in the following manner : "It is further ordered that the absence period is hereby regularised as under :— (i) 10.5.93 to 22.4.94-348 days as leave without pay. (ii) 12.11,94 to 16.11.94-Already sanctioned casual leave. (iii) 17.11.94 to 31.12.94-Leave kind due." 2. It is this order of the year 1994, which is being challenged, as indicated earlier by filing the present writ petition in this Court on 5.11.1998. This writ petition merits dismissal even summarily on account of inordinate delay and laches, particularly, when there is not even any whisper of explanation attempted to explain the belated approach to the Court between the date of the order passed on 31.12.1994 till 5.11.1994. Even that apart, we find there is nothing worth on the merits of the challenge made also. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended by advancing two grounds of challenge to the impugned order of removal from service. Adverting to Section 11 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949, which was relied upon in the proceedings initiated, it is contended that the said provision enabled the authorities to impose minor punishment only and, therefore, the punishment of removal from service, which is a major punishment could not have been imposed against the petitioner and that on this ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The further ground of challenge is that when the 2nd respondent, in the penultimate portion of the impugned order has chosen to regularise the three distinct periods of absence including the one pertaining to 348 days, which was the subject-matter of the charge, which resulted in the order of removal, there was no basis for the charge itself and the very basis for the charge having disappeared by virtue of such regularisation, the order of removal could not be sustained. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In our view, there are no merits whatsoever in the said grounds of challenge urged. The normal and general concept of major and minor punishments under the Rules governing the Government servant in service cannot be imported to a consideration of the kind arising under the Act in question and the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955. Sections 9 to 14 of the Act are included under a Chapter captioned offences and Punishments." 5. Section 9 deals with what is classified to be more heinous offences entailing punishment with transportation for life for a term of not less than seven years or with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to 14 years or with fine, which may extend to three months pay or with fine to that extent in addition to such sentence of transportation or imprisonment. 6. Section 10 deals with what is specified to be less heinous offences for which the punishment ordained is imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one year, or with fine, which may extend to three months pay, or with both. 7. Section 11 classified with the caption of minor punishment reads that the commandent or any other authority or officer, as may be prescribed may, subject to any Rules made under the Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the punishments enumerated under sub-section (1) of Section 11 to any member of the Force, whom he considers to be guilty of dis-obedience, neglect of duty, or remission in the discharge of any duty or of other mis-conduct in his capacity as a member of the Force. Consequently, the word minor punishment used in the Act has to be construed in contrast with the other categories of more heinous or less heinous offences dealt with under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and the very concept of minor punishment engrafted in Section 11 includes and comprises within its fold the imposition of punishment of suspension, dismissal as also of removal. As a matter of fact, Rule 27 of the Rules has also been referred to in the proceeding, which, as could be seen, comprehends within its fold 11 categories/classes of punishments inclusive of both minor and major penalties, as those words are understood vis-a-vis a Government servant in service. Consequently, we see no merit whatsoever in the alleged infirmity. 8. As indicated earlier, there could be no challenge to the merits of the charge or the manner in which the charge has been held proved and we find the petitioner had no genuine or acceptable explanation whatsoever, inasmuch as the excuse of peptic ulcer and the so called Ayurvedic treatment said to have been undergone by him, seems to be pure afterthought and it cannot inspire confidence in his plea in any authority. The subsequent conduct already exhibited by the petitioner as found noticed in the order to which a cursory reference has been made by us supra does not also leave anything to be desired in the manner of conduct exhibited by the petitioner to warrant any indulgence being shown by us in this proceeding. 9. The plea based on the portion of the order under challenge wherein regularisation has been ordered in respect of 348 days, the absence of which was the basis for the charge, which resulted in the order of removal, as leave without pay does not have the effect of either exonerating him of the grave mis-conduct committed by him by unauthorisedly absenting from duty nor could it be said to help him to wriggle out of the charges contending that the basis of charge had disappeared. It is well known in service parlance that for the purpose of settling the financial accounts, the absence be it unauthorised which resulted in the imposition of the penalty too, has to be specifically dealt with under one or other categories and such orders of regularisation are meant only for the purpose of settling his accounts. It is well known in service parlance that for the purpose of settling the financial accounts, the absence be it unauthorised which resulted in the imposition of the penalty too, has to be specifically dealt with under one or other categories and such orders of regularisation are meant only for the purpose of settling his accounts. This has been a well-settled practice required to be adopted in terms of the relevant service Rules including the Fundamental Rules governing the case of a person in service of the State and the same could not be of any assistance to the petitioner to avoid either disciplinary proceedings or the order of removal, passed. 10. For all the reasons stated, we see no merit whatsoever in the writ petition. The writ petitions, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if the order of removal is allowed to stand, the petitioner is entitled to certain monetary and other benefits and they should be directed to be settled. We are not concerned in this writ petition as to the rights, if any, which flow out of the very impugned order of removal passed against the petitioner. If the petitioner, in law has any such right, it is to be worked out separately in the manner known to and in accordance with law, the same being a different cause of action altogether and the dismissal of this petition shall not stand in the way of the petitioner vindicating such rights, if any, as are said to be otherwise available to the petitioner. CMP No. 1536/98 : In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, this application is also dismissed. Application dismissed.