( 1 ) INVOKING the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the complainant petitioner assails the correctness of the order dated 7-1-1997 passed by the learned Judicial magistrate First Class, Raipur in criminal case no. 184 of 1996 whereby he has rejected the complaint of the petitioner on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. ( 2 ) BEREFT of unnecessary details the factual matrix as has been portrayed in the petition is that the petitioner is a duly registered partnership firm having its Head Office at ganjapada Raipur. The non-applicant No. 1 is a Public Limited Company and is represented by one of its Directors who is also the Vice-President of the Company. The non-applicant No. 2 is another director of the company. According to the petitioner on a request being made by the non-applicants the applicant supplied mechanical equipments and electrical goods on credit and the said transactions were reflected in their books of accounts. An amount of Rs. 1086244. 60 had become due to the applicant. In part payment of the aforesaid due a cheque for a sum of rs. 1 lakh was issued by the non-applicant no. 2 on behalf of the non-applicant No. 1 on 29-10-1995 (22-10-1995? ). The cheque was presented by the petitioner to its banker, namely, Union Bank of India, Bhilai Branch. On the same day i. e. , 22-10-1995 it was informed by the Bank that there was insufficient funds in the account and accordingly the cheque was dishonoured. Thereafter, the complainant sent a notice by registered post on 28-10-1995, which was duly received by the non-applicant on 30-10-1995. Despite service of notice the payment was not made within the stipulated time of fifteen days. Having no other alternative the petitioner was constrained to institute the complaint in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, raipur alleging that the non-applicants had committed an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short 'the Act' ). In the complaint-petition it was clearly stated that the complainant-firm has its principal office at Raipur and its partner who represents the firm resides at raipur. In the complaint-petition it was clearly stated that the complainant-firm has its principal office at Raipur and its partner who represents the firm resides at raipur. The learned Magistrate was satisfied with regard to the allegations made in the complaint and by order dated 31-5-1996 registered the complaint and issued process to non-applicants herein fixing the date to 9-7-1996 for their appearance. After their appearance, the non-applicants filed an application before the learned Magistrate for dropping the proceeding on the ground that the cheque was issued at Bhilai, it was drawn at the Bank situate in Bhilai, it was dishonoured at Bhilai, the intimation was received at Bhilai and, therefore, the Court at Raipur has no territorial jurisdiction. This prayer of the nonapplicant was resisted by the complainant by putting a written objection to the effect that the complainant's principal place of business is at Raipur and the debtor had knowledge that he had to send the money to the complainant's residence or to his place of business at Raipur and, therefore, the Court at raipur had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. ( 3 ) THE learned Magistrate on consideration of the petition and the objection came to hold that the Court at Raipur had no jurisdiction to try the matter and accordingly dropped the proceeding. ( 4 ) MR. Alok Aradhe, learned Counsel for the petitioner assailing the impugned order has submitted that the learned Magistrate has fallen into error in his interpretation of the true import of the provision enshrined under Section 142 of the Act. It is his further submission that it was incumbent on the non-applicants to make good of the amount covered under the cheque by making payment to the complainant-petitioner at Raipur and that being last act to be carried out by the non-applicants for determination of their incurring liability for the alleged offence the competent Court at Raipur has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and hence dropping of the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction is totally unwarranted. Mr. Deepak Awasthy, learned Counsel for the non-applicants controverting the aforesaid submission urged with vehemence that all acts had taken place at Bhilai and, therefore, the Court at Raipur has no jurisdiction and the learned trial Magistrate has correctly dropped the proceeding. Mr. Deepak Awasthy, learned Counsel for the non-applicants controverting the aforesaid submission urged with vehemence that all acts had taken place at Bhilai and, therefore, the Court at Raipur has no jurisdiction and the learned trial Magistrate has correctly dropped the proceeding. ( 5 ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, I have carefully gone through the complaint which has been filed as annexure-I to this petition. As alleged in the complaint petition the cheque in question was issued at Bhilai to be drawn at Bhilai and the fact of dishonour was also intimated to the complainant at Bhilai. The notice which was sent by the petitioner was neither replied nor the amount was paid to the complainant. This being the factual position the question that falls for consideration is whether the Court at raipur would have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of present nature. ( 6 ) IN this context it is essential to refer to Section 138 of the Act which reads as under:"dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. This being the factual position the question that falls for consideration is whether the Court at raipur would have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of present nature. ( 6 ) IN this context it is essential to refer to Section 138 of the Act which reads as under:"dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account :where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from mat account by an agreement made with that bank, such person (sic) deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, ro with both: provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless: (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. ''on a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is quite clear that whenever a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a Bank and on presentation, the. ''on a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is quite clear that whenever a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a Bank and on presentation, the. cheque is returned by the Bank because of insufficiency of funds to honour the cheque, drawer of the cheque incurs the liability as envisaged under the said provision. But the aforesaid dishonour by itself would not entail the penal consequences unless the conditions precedent as enjoined in the proviso to the section are satisfied. To elucidate, the prerequisites to attract the liability of the aforesaid provision are that the cheque has to be presented within the validity period, the holder of the cheque has to give notice demanding payment within fifteen days of receiving information of dishonour and if the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the amount covered under the cheque within fifteen days of receipt of the notice then only on such failure, the liability to be prosecuted ensues. The complaint is to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. Thus a competent Court as enjoined in the aforesaid provision assumes jurisdiction to entertain a complaint if the cause of action as envisaged under Section 138 (c) arises. The cause of action to prosecute arises if the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the amount under the cheque to the payee within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice of demand. The conditions which have been provided in the proviso are the sine qua non to initiate penal action and the said conditions have to be satisfied cumulatively and absence of any condition would not enable the payee to initiate penal action against the drawer. ( 7 ) ON a careful scrutiny of the provisions there remains no iota of doubt mat the cause of action will be complete when the payee fails to make the payment of the amount within the stipulated time. To constitute the offence there has to be failure of payment. ( 7 ) ON a careful scrutiny of the provisions there remains no iota of doubt mat the cause of action will be complete when the payee fails to make the payment of the amount within the stipulated time. To constitute the offence there has to be failure of payment. For this reason the power conferred on the court to take cognizance has been couched in a manner so that the Court has to be prima facie satisfied whether there has been omission to make the payment within the stipulated period of time. If the drawer on receipt of notice of payment comes forward and pays the amount, offence would not arise. Hence the final step to constitute the criminal culpability rests on the condition i. e. , failure on the part of the drawer to make good the payment covered under the cheque which has been dishonoured. ( 8 ) IN the aforesaid premises the question that requires to be determined is whether the cause of action as enjoined under section 138 (c) has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Raipur. Determination of cause of action has to depend upon the facts averred in the complaint itself. On a scrutiny of the complaint which has been brought on record as Annexure-A1 it is perceptible that the registered office of the complainant is situate at Raipur. Is is also averred that the non applicant had taken goods on credit by opening a credit account with the petitioner firm. As has been stated earlier that demand notice was sent to Bhilai demanding the amount as cheque in question was dishonoured by the Bank. From the aforesaid averments it is crystal clear that the complainant-creditor has its registered office at Raipur and transaction with regard to goods had taken place at Raipur though the cheque was issued at Bhilai, dishonoured at the Bank at Bhilai and information with regard to such dishonour was received by the complainant at Bhilai. All these aspects would not constitute the offence unless a notice of demand is issued demanding payment and the drawer fails to pay within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice. Thus, omission to pay is in the last bead in the cause of action. All these aspects would not constitute the offence unless a notice of demand is issued demanding payment and the drawer fails to pay within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice. Thus, omission to pay is in the last bead in the cause of action. The failure on the part of the drawer culminates in constituting the offence and, therefore, pivotal question that requires determination is which would be the place where the drawer would make good the payment within the stipulated period as provided in law to avoid the criminal liability. ( 9 ) IT has to be borne in mind that dishonour of cheque by itself does not give rise to a cause of action because payment can be made on receipt of notice of demand as postulated in clause (b) of section 138 of the Act. In such an event there would be no commission of offence. In fact, the consequence of failure to pay gives rise to criminal liability. Thus, the complainant becomes entitled to launch prosecution if there is failure on the part of the drawer of the cheque to pay the amount. Undisputedly where the cheque is given or where it is dishonoured or where information is received can be the place where cause of action has arisen but the question that arises is whether the place where the creditor resides can be regarded as a place where the cause of action had arisen. Cause of action ordinarily constitutes a bundle of facts. As far as the cause of action under section 138 (b) is concerned it postulates that failure to pay is the last condition - precedent to give rise to the offence. Indubitably in this context where the consequence has occurred would be the place to be enlisted among those places where cause of action has arisen. In this regard I may usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case of M/s. Goutham T. V. Centre and another v. M/s. Apex Agencies and another, 1993 Cri. LJ 1004 wherein it has been held as under: "cause of action is a bundle of facts. In this regard I may usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case of M/s. Goutham T. V. Centre and another v. M/s. Apex Agencies and another, 1993 Cri. LJ 1004 wherein it has been held as under: "cause of action is a bundle of facts. Issuance of cheque, presentation of the cheque, endorsement of dishonour, issuance of a statutory notice and the location of the office of the person in whose favour the cheque was issued are all the factors which are to be taken into account for deciding the cause of action. Cause of action need not confine to a particular transaction where an offence is alleged to have been committed. In cases filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, series of the acts will result at different places. As already discussed (supra), giving the cheque by the accused to the complainant and presenting the same for collection by the complainant at his place will also be the facts constituting the offence. So the place where the cheque has been issued also has got jurisdiction and the place where the intimation has been received from the collecting Bank also confers jurisdiction. ( 10 ) IN this context, Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel for the petitioner has also commended me to the decision rendered in the case of rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan dhondu Jogelkar and another, 1993 Cri. LJ 680, herein the Division Bench of Bombay high Court ruled thus:"the anatomy of Section 138 comprises certain necessary components before the offence can be said to be complete, the last of them being the act of non-payment inspite of 15 days having elapsed after receipt of the final notice. It is true that the cheques may have been issued by the accused at his place of residence or business, the Bank on which it is drawn being often located at a second spot and inevitably the complainant or the payee has his place of residence or business at yet another location. It was for this reason that the Kerala High Court in the cases of p. K. Murleedharan v. C. K. Pareed, reported in 1992 Cri. LJ 1965, took the view that any of the three Courts could exercise jurisdiction. It was for this reason that the Kerala High Court in the cases of p. K. Murleedharan v. C. K. Pareed, reported in 1992 Cri. LJ 1965, took the view that any of the three Courts could exercise jurisdiction. In our considered view, where undoubtedly each of the components constitute a stage in the commission of the offence, the final nonpayment being the ultimate one, section 178, Criminal Procedure Code would clearly apply to an offence of this type. It would be perfectly valid and reasonable to hold, therefore, that the aggrieved party viz. , the complainant is fully justified in approaching the local Court having jurisdiction over the area where the payment was to be made to him in the final instance. " ( 11 ) SIMILAR view has been expressed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of M/s. Ess Bee Food Specialist and others v. M/s. Kapoor Brothers, 1992 cri. LJ 739. I may further refer to the decision of Delhi High Court rendered in the case of canbank Financial Services Ltd. v. Gitanjali motors Ltd. and others, 1996 (85) Com. Cases 485 (Del.), wherein it has been held as follows:"the place where payment had to be made will always retain its primacy in the matter of territorial jurisdiction in the case of offences relating to payment. A cheque is only one of the modes of payment. In fact the proviso to Section 138 supports the view because the proviso brings out the ultimate object of the main section which is to ensure payment to the creditor. Under the proviso after service of notice on the debtor regarding dishonour of the cheque issued by him, 'fifteen days' time is allowed to him to pay. It is only on his failure to avail of this opportunity that he is brought under the dragnet of the Section. Payment for purposes of the proviso is required to be made to the creditor at his place. "similar view has also been taken in the case of rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan dhondu Joglekar, (1993) 78 Co. Cases 822 (Bombay ). ( 12 ) I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Payment for purposes of the proviso is required to be made to the creditor at his place. "similar view has also been taken in the case of rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan dhondu Joglekar, (1993) 78 Co. Cases 822 (Bombay ). ( 12 ) I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. I have been persuaded to take this view, as I am of the considered opinion that the offence ripens only on failure to pay the amount to payee or to the holder in due course of cheque. Such a failure can be avoided by the drawer by making payment where the creditor resides. This being one of the facts constituting cause of action and the ultimate prerequisite one, it can safely be concluded that the obligation to make payment is the place where creditor resides or where his office is situate. The drawer can avoid the prosecution by making payment to the creditor and such an avoidance can be expected to take place at the place where the office of the creditor is situate. This being the position the conclusion arrived at by the learned Magistrate that the Court at Raipur has no jurisdiction in spite of the averment that the complainant creditor has its registered office at Raipur, is vulnerable and does not withstand scrutiny. ( 13 ) IN the result, the revision succeeds and the impugned order is set aside and the learned trial Magistrate is directed to proceed with the complaint in accordance with law. .