N. N. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application under Sec. 115 CPC is filed against order dated 12. 12. 1997 passed by the 4th Extra Assistant Judge, Rajkot allowing the plaintiffs appeal and directing that the plaintiffs possession of the suit premises shall not be taken except following due process of law, i. e. , by taking proceedings under the Gujarat Public premises (Eviction Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 and thereby reversed the order passed by the 10th of joint Civil Judge (SD), Rajkot in Civil Suit No. 1292/1997 rejecting the petitioners application Exh. 5. ( 2 ) THE admitted facts are that the respondent-plaintiff was given a stall on Rajkot state Road Transport Corporation Bus Stand in the year 1975 on a licence tor a period of 11 months on Rs. 400/- per month. Fresh licence was issued on expiry of each terms of 11 months on fresh terms and conditions particularly, the lience fee. In the year 1985, eviction proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff-respondent under the provisions of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (for short, the Act of 1972 ). The proceedings could not proceed, hence matter was compromised in the year 1993 where in the plaintiff undertook to vacate the premises on 5. 12. 1997. The corporation, anticipating vacation of the premises, invited tenders on 25. 11. 1997 for the subject stall of fruit juice. Various parties including the petitioner-plaintiff submitted tenders. According to the petitioner-Corporation, the plaintiff submitted tender wherein he did not fill up the column indicating the amount. On the other hand, the say of the plaintiff is that he had mentioned the figure Rs. 3,000/ -. It is also an admitted fact that prior to the filing of the present suit, the plaintiff had filed a suit in the Court of small Causes seeking declaration that he is a tenant in the subject premises and also claimed injuction against the Corporation not to dispossess him. The said suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 209/1997. The Corporation had entered the caveat and therefore, it was contested at the stage of application for ad-interim injunction. The said suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 209/1997. The Corporation had entered the caveat and therefore, it was contested at the stage of application for ad-interim injunction. After hearing the parties, the Court rejected the plaintiffs application for interim injunction, while the said suit is still pending and no appeal has been filed against the order rejecting the application for interim injunction, the plaintiff filed the present suit being Civil Suit No. 1297/1997 in the Court of Civil Judge (JD) on the same facts with an additional plea that the plaintiff cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1972. The Trial Court by order dated 24. 11. 1997 rejected the application for injunction. The appellate Court reversed the order on the ground that the petitioner-Corporation admitted in their earlier written statement-Mark 4/10 that the Act of 1972 applies to the State Corporation. In view of this, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff cannot be dispossessed except with due process of law. ( 3 ) IT is contended by Mr. P. M. Thakkar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner-Corporation that the learned Judge of the Appellate Court committed material illegality in exercise of jurisdiction in extending protection to the illegal occuanpt of the public premises at the cost of inconvenience to the general public, in the name of eviction in accordance with law i. e. , resorting to the procedure under the Act of 1972. It is also submitted that the learned Judge glozed over the fact that the petitioner in the name of "in accordance with law," has abused the process of law. The plaintiff did not vacate the premises and as such eviction proceedings were initiated in the year 1987 which continued and ultimately, the matter was compromised in the year 1993 and the plaintiff promised to vacate the premises by 5. 12. 1997. Instead of vacating the premises, he filed a suit and engaged the Corporation in Court proceedings. The learned Advocate submits that the plaintiff-respondent failed to show that he has any right to continue it the suit premises. ( 4 ) REFUTING the contention, Mr. 12. 1997. Instead of vacating the premises, he filed a suit and engaged the Corporation in Court proceedings. The learned Advocate submits that the plaintiff-respondent failed to show that he has any right to continue it the suit premises. ( 4 ) REFUTING the contention, Mr. S. M. Shah, learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the plaintiff has right to continue in the premises for various reasons including the reason that the licence is irrevocable in view of Sec, 60 (l) (b) of the Easement Act, as he has executed the work of permanent character in the subject premises. In order to appreciate the contention, it will be appropriate to read Sec. 60 as well as the material part of Sec. 62 (c) section 60. Licence when revocable- A Licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force; (b) the licensee, acting upon the licence has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. " section 62 a licence is deemed to be revoked- (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) "where it has been granted for a limited period or acquired on condition that it shall become void on the performance or non-performance of a Specified act, and the period expires, or the condition is fulfilled. " (d) xxx xxx xxx the licence is revocable except by the grantor under Clause (a) if the licence coupled with transfer and such transfer is in force or to say that its revocation would result in defeating the transfer itself. Under Clause (b) a licence is irrevocable if the licensee acting upon the licence has executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. The phrase "acting upon licence" is of significance. It means work has been executed of permanent character, and has incurred expenses. This must have been done acting upon the licence, i. e. , as permitted by the terms of licence. Sec. 62 is independent of Sec. 60. It enumerates contingencies wherein the licence shall deemed to be revoked. One of the contingency at Item (c) is when the licence has been granted for a limited period. Thus, where the licence is for specified period, it shall deemed to have revoked on expiry of such period. Sec. 62 is independent of Sec. 60. It enumerates contingencies wherein the licence shall deemed to be revoked. One of the contingency at Item (c) is when the licence has been granted for a limited period. Thus, where the licence is for specified period, it shall deemed to have revoked on expiry of such period. ( 5 ) IN the instant case, no plea has been taken in the plaint that the licence is irrevocable. No such plea was raised before the appellate Court. For the first time, the plea has been raised in revision before this Court. Such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in Revision. However, the question being of some importance, 1 have dealt with the question. There is no material to show that the plaintiff has raised construction of permanent character. Even if there is such, he was never permitted under the terms of licence to raise the constrution of permanent character. Even if it is so, Sec. 62 being independent of Sec. 60 on expiry of the term of the licence, i. e. , 11 months, the licence is deemed to have been revoked. In view of this, the contention is rejected. ( 6 ) IT is next contended by Mr. Shah that the eviction of the plaintiff from the subject premises cannot be said to be in public interest. It is submitted that the plaintiff is carrying on business since 1975 in the suit premises. He has raised licence fee from time to time and is still prepared to raise to reasonable extent. Further there is no complaint against him as he has provided best service to the public. The learned Advocate, in support of the contention, relies on a decision of the Apex Court in the Case of Dwarkadas Marfatia [m/s] vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1642 . He has invited my attention to para 25 of the judgment wherein the Court has held that where there is arbitrariness in State action, Art. 14 springs in and judicial review strikes such an action down. Dealing with the public premises, the Court held that the public authority shall not act as private landlords. I have gone through the said authority. Dealing with the public premises, the Court held that the public authority shall not act as private landlords. I have gone through the said authority. In the said case, the Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, a statutory Corporation, constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act owned vast areas of land in South Bombay. Different areas were leased out to different parties. The petitioner in that case was sought to be evicted and the land was tenanted to M/s Bombay Bharat and Swadeshi Rice Mills. The question was as to whether the eviction of the petitioner was in the public interest. The Court held that there is a presumption that a governmental action is reasonable and in public interest. It is for the party challenging the validity to show that the action is unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the professed norms or not. Their Lordships further held that the onus is entirely on the tenant and the burden lies on him to establsh that the tenancy is terminated or the proceedings in eviction are taken not in public interest but for a collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of Art. 14 of the constitution of India. This authority is of no help to the petitioner as there is nothing to show that the respondent is sought to be evicted on account of malafide action. Further, in the instant case, the object of leasing out the premises every year after inviting tenders by public advertisement to give a fair deal to all concerned dealing in such business and also to provide best service to the general public visiting the bus stand. The plaintiff-respondent alone does not have monopoly to carry on business of selling fruit juice on the said bus stand. If he is allowed to continue even after inviting the tenders, this will lead to illegally excluding all other persons competing for the stall and it will restrain the corporation from putting it to the best use of public convenience and getting maximum revenue for the benefit of the travelling passengers and the persons visiting the bus stand. If he is allowed to continue even after inviting the tenders, this will lead to illegally excluding all other persons competing for the stall and it will restrain the corporation from putting it to the best use of public convenience and getting maximum revenue for the benefit of the travelling passengers and the persons visiting the bus stand. ( 7 ) AT this stage it is contended by the learned Advocate that even if the plaintiff is held to be a trespasser, he can be evicted only in accrodance with law i. e. , to say that in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1972. He has referred to a decision of the apex Court, in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale vs. Shobha Venkat Rao, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 . I have gone through the said case and it has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, the defendants had surreptitiously taken possession of the premises in collusion and behind the back of the plaintiff, the learned Advocate next relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Ramshree Mahavir vs. Girdhari Lai, reported in 1970 (11) GLR 971. Both the case do not lay down that recourse to law means only remedy by way of suit or proceedings under respective Eviction Act. The Supreme court has recently considered in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, reported in AIR 1997 SC 152 the questin of procedure of hearing consitent with the principles of natural justice before a person is evicted. In the said case, the Division Bench of this Court in a bunch of petitioners filed by alleged encroachers under the threat of dispossession, directed the respondent Corporation before removing the unauthoirsed encroachements, the procedure of having consistent with the principles of natural justice shold be followed on appeal by the Corporation. The Apex court, after considering its earlier judgment including the case of Olga Tellis vs. Bombay municipal Corporation and Ors. reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 held that a pragmatic and realistice approach should be adopted in such cases. No flexible rule of hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each case depends upon its on backdrop. The removal of encroachment needs urgent action. reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 held that a pragmatic and realistice approach should be adopted in such cases. No flexible rule of hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each case depends upon its on backdrop. The removal of encroachment needs urgent action. The Court said :"if the encroachment is of a recent origin, the need to follow principles of natural justice could be obviated in that no one has a right to encorach upon the public property and claim the procedure of opportunity of hearing which would be a tardious and time-consuming process leading to putting a premium for high handed and unauthorised acts of encorachment and unlawful squatting. " ( 8 ) EVEN in a case where possession is of long time, the Court said that reasonable notice of 10 days may be given. The Court further said that if the encroachment is not removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at liberty to have it removed. That would meet the fairness of procedure and principle of giving opportunity to remove the encroachment voluntarily by the encroachers. The Court even went to the extent that on their resistance, necessarily appropriate and reasonable force can be used to have the encroachment removed. ( 9 ) THE Division Bench of the Court (Coram : B N Kirpal, C. J. (as His Lordship then was) and R. K Abichandani, J) in LPA No. 136/1994, dealing with an identical situation, after referring to various Supreme Court decisons, held that a person cannot be permitted to continue in business without a valid licence. In the said case, the petitioner was granted licence for running refreshment room at the Palanpur bus stand. On the expiry of the licence, tenders were invited and the appellant had also submitted tender. Tender of the appellant was not accepted as he was not the highest offerer. He filed petition before the high Court and contended that he should not be removed from the premises without following due process of law. The Court considered this aspect and said that since the petitioner has not been granted fresh licence and if he is allowed to occupy the premises, it will cause great inconvenience to the public at large. He filed petition before the high Court and contended that he should not be removed from the premises without following due process of law. The Court considered this aspect and said that since the petitioner has not been granted fresh licence and if he is allowed to occupy the premises, it will cause great inconvenience to the public at large. The Court also observed that if there is, in a way, a conflict of interest between the private interest in public interest, preference has to be given to the public interest. The Court observed, thus;"we are conscious of the fact that dispossession should be in accordance with law, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. But, at the same time, the Court of law ought not to protect admitted illegal occupations of public premises, when such continued occupation is going to deprive the general public of amenities, which are due to them. We find no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. "a similar view has been taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : r. A. Mehta, J.) in an identical circumstance in a case reported in 1995 (2) GLR 995. In that case, the petitioner was given the stall in 1970 and he continued for 11 years and the licence fee was revised from time to time and lastly it was fixed it Rs. 550/- per month. After expirty of 11 years the licence was not renewed and the petitioner filed writ petition. In that case the Court found that after the period of licence has expired, the licensee must vacate the premise. If he does not do so, the Corporation cannot be asked to resort to provisions of the Act of 1972. In view of the above, I find no substance in the contentions raised by Mr. S. M. Shah that even if he is a trespasser, the Corporation be resorted to provisions of the Act of 1972. ( 10 ) THE Trial Court refused to grant temporary injunction after having found no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. The order of the Trial Court cannot be said to be in any way arbitrary or perverse. ( 10 ) THE Trial Court refused to grant temporary injunction after having found no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. The order of the Trial Court cannot be said to be in any way arbitrary or perverse. In absence of any finding that the order of the trial Court is arbitrary, perverse or capricious and in disregard to the legal process, without considering all relevant records, the learned Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order under order 43 Rule (1) (r ). Thus, in my view, the learned Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction in interfering with a discretionary order, and if such an order is allowed to stand, it would cause failure of justice to the corporation and the persons who are awaiting Licence in respect of the tender submitted by them. Above all, the passengers visiting the Bus stand are suffering. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid, this Revision Application is allowed. The order passed by the 4th Extra Asstt. Judge, Rajkot in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 183/1997 is quashed and set aside. The application Exh. 5 stands rejected. Rule made absolute. No order as to costs. Mr. S. M. Shah, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent submits that operation of the order of this Court may be stayed for a period of 4 weeks to enable his client to approach the Apex Court. Keeping in view the pubic convenience and further the fact that admittedly the licence period of the petitioner has expired and the tenders have already been invited, I am not inclined to grant the prayer. The prayer is accordingly rejected. .