Honble PALSHIKAR, J.–This revision petition is directed against the order passed by the learned Judge acquitting the accused of the offences with which he was charged. (2). The accused was tried for the charges mentioned against him in the judgment and the learned Judge, on appreciation of the evidence on record, recor- ded the finding of acquittal by the impugned order. It is this order which is assailed in the present revision petition on the grounds mentioned in the revision petition. (3). The position in criminal jurisprudence in relation to acquittal is established since long. Our jurisprudence which is Anglosaxon Jurisprudence, believes in innocence of the accused till he is found guilty of charges framed against him beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving a person guilty beyond reasonable doubt lies squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution or the complainant, as the case may be and wherever there is failure on the part of the Prosecuting Agency to discharge this burden, according to law, acquittal should ensue. (4). It is also a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence in India that this pre- sumption of acquittal is further fortified by an order of acquittal recorded by a learned Judge of competent jurisdiction on proper appreciation of evidence on record to assess which he had best opportunity. (5). The Supreme Court of India has also in very categorical term re-affirmed this position in relation to acquittals. In fact this petition has now been crystalised by the Supreme Court of India and it is laid down that normally there should be no interference with an order of acquittal if the same is made on proper appreciation of the evidence on record for valid reasons stated in the order. (6). In AIR 1996 SC page 2035 (1), it has been observed as under: ``This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot cons- titute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acqui- ttal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the con- clusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers the above question in the nega- tive the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infir- mities it can then and then only reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions. In keeping with the above principles we have therefore to first ascertain whether the findings of the trial Court are sustainable or not. (7). It will thus be seen that the law on this point of re- appreciation of evidence and interference in order of acquittal by the appellate court is crystalised by the Supreme Court of India. (8). Then AIR 1996 SC 2478 (2), the Supreme Court has re-stated the position of law in this case in a different way by a different Bench of Honble Judges. It reads as under:– ``Though the Code does not make any distinction between an appeal from acquittal and an appeal from conviction so far as powers of the appellate Court are concerned, certain unwritten rules of adjudication have consistently been followed by Judges while dealing with appeals against acquittal. No doubt, the High Court has full power to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusion whether the appeal is against conviction or acquittal. But while dea- ling with an appeal against acquittal the appellate Court has to bear in mind; first, that there is a general presumption in favour of the innocence of the person accused in criminal cases and that presumption is only strengthened by the acquittal. The second is, every accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding his guilt and when the trial Court acquitted him, he would retain that benefit in the appellate Court also. Thus, appellate Court in appeals against acquittals has to proceed more cautiously and only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused, upon the evidence on record, that the order of acquittal is liable to be interfered with or disturbed. Thus, appellate Court in appeals against acquittals has to proceed more cautiously and only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused, upon the evidence on record, that the order of acquittal is liable to be interfered with or disturbed. (Durgacharan Naik vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 ; Caetano Pleade Fernandes vs. Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR1977 SC 135, Tota Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083 ; Awadesh vs. State of M.P. AIR 1988 SC 1158 ; Ashok Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1990 SC 2134 ). (9). In AIR 1996 SC page 2770 (3), yet another Division Bench of the Supreme Court has observed thus; ``It is well settled that the High Courts power in disposing of appeals from conviction or acquittal are essentially the same. It is equally well settled that where the credibility of the evidence depends upon factores other than the demeanour of witnesses, the appellate court is free to come to its own conclusion as to the credibility. But at the same time if the view taken by the trial court in acquitting the accused is not palpably wrong there would be no occasion for reversal of the order of acquittal. Further the High Court should also consider the reasons advanced by the trial court before altering the order of acquittal to order of conviction. (10). In AIR 1996 SC page 1136 (4), while considering the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court has observed as under: ``Before we record our reading of the evidence produced in the case, let a legal submission advanced by Shri Lalit, appearing for the res- pondent accused, be dealt with. His submission is that as the complainant had approached the High Court in revision and as under the revisional power available to the High Court under Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court could not have altered the finding of acquittal into one of conviction, because of what has been stated in sub-section (3) thereof, if we were to be satisfied that the acquittal was wrongful, it would not be within our competence to convict the respondent; at best the case could be sent back for retrial. We are not impressed with the submission inasmuch as the approach to this Court being under Article 136 of the Constitution, we do not read the limitation imposed by Section 401(3) of the Code qua the power available to us under the aforesaid provision. May it be pointed out that similar submission had been advanced by Shri Lalit himself in the case of E.K. Chandrasenan vs. State of Kerala, 1995(1) JT (SC) 496, then contending that this Court is incompetent to issue rule of enhan-cement as had been done in those cases. It was held in the aforesaid decision that the power available to this Court under Article 136 is not circumscribed by any limitation. In any case, power under Article 142 is available to pass such order as may be deemed appropriate to do complete justice. We, therefore, reject this contention of Shri Lalit and proceed to examine the materials to find out whether case of conviction does exist as the contention of the appellant. (11). According to me, therefore, powers of the High Court to deal with acquittal in a revision petition against the order of acquittal are certainly circumscri- bed by the provisions of Sec. 401. I am also firmly of the opinion that what has been laid down by the Supreme Court of India in relation to appeal against the acquittal applies mutatis mutandis to revisions against the acquittals and therefore, unless the order of acquittal is palpably wrong the findings of not guilty are perverse and also the reasoning for reaching that conclusion are unsustainable in law, no inter- ference by this Court against the acquittal is possible in revision against acquittal. (12). It is keeping in mind these principles of law that the present revision application is required to be decided. (13). The facts giving rise to the acquittal stated briefly are that the accused Chhagna was prosecuted for having committed rape of Smt. Gulabi on 13th May `95. It is alleged by the prosecution that in the afternoon of that day, Smt. Gulabi who was 30 years old, at the time of recording of the evidence, was sweeping the verandah of her house when the accused came and asked her where her people were at that time. On her reply that they had gone out, he closed the door and had intercourse with the prosecutrix. On her reply that they had gone out, he closed the door and had intercourse with the prosecutrix. She has deposed that she was thrown on the ground, her clothes were taken away and the accused sat on her person and ente- red her and had intercourse, which, according to the prosecutrix herself, went on for some time and the accused was lying on her all the time. It is alleged that her sister and her brother came on the site and removed the accused from the person of the prosecutrix. The accused then ran away. (14). The incident was thus known to few more persons than the prosecutrix on that day itself and yet report of the same in the Police Station was lodged five days, thereafter. (15). The learned Judge, on appreciation of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt and he, therefore, proceeded to acquit the accused, the learned Judge, considered the entire evidence on record, the deposition of the prosecutrix and the deposition of the doctor who medically examined her. The prosecutrix has stated that she received injuries and there was blood in her vagina and that she sustained injuries on her buttocks and arms. The doctor has found no such injury anywhere. The doctor has categorically stated that there was no bleeding injury on the vagina of the prosecutrix, nor was there any other injury on her person. It has come in the evidence of the brother of the prosecutrix, as also her sister, that the accused was having intercourse with the prosecutrix at the time when they entered the house and their intervention was instrumental in removing the accused from the person of the prosecutrix, who, thereafter, ran away. Therefore, relying on the testimony of the witnesses, deposition of the doctor, and the circumstantial evidence, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that no case of rape is made out. The learned Judge has observed that the depositions have material contradictions to a great extent and do not spell out any case of illegal violation of the person of prosecutrix. In such circumstances, the order of acquittal cannot be interfered with. The learned Judge has observed that the depositions have material contradictions to a great extent and do not spell out any case of illegal violation of the person of prosecutrix. In such circumstances, the order of acquittal cannot be interfered with. The reasons given by the learned Judge are sound, legal reasons, I have perused the testimony of the prosecutrix and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the learned Judge was completely justified in coming to the conclusion of acquittal. No other conclusion is possible. Even if it is assumed that on the basis of these evidence, conclusion of guilty is possible, taking into consideration the cautions delivered by the Supreme Court in several judgments noted above, I should be slow in interfering with such acquittal and slower in doing so in a revisional jurisdiction. The decision, 1996 Cr.L.J., 1631 (5) cited by the learned counsel for the applicant regarding maintainability of the revision at the instance of the prosecutrix cannot be doubted. I am not refuting that this revision application is not maintainable. I have entertained it on merits and I am dismissing it on merits. The other decision (1997) (2) Crimes 52 (SC) (6), regar- ding interference of acquittal order is entirely at a different circumstance. That also is not applicable. (16). In the result, the revision application fails and is dismissed.