MRS. S. DIKSHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order dated 21. 5. 80 passed by the District Judge, lucknow, by which the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service. A copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure-9 to the writ petition. The impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is neither bona fide nor has been passed in public interest. It has further been challenged on the ground of having been passed arbitrarily with mala fide intention as the same is based on no material whatsoever. The order is also alleged to be punitive in nature, hence the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the same. ( 2 ) THE facts, in brief, relevant for the purposes of the present petition are as follows: the petitioner entered into ministerial service of the civil court, Lucknow, on 21. 11. 45. Initially he joined the post in officiating capacity as Copyist and thereafter was confirmed on 1. 11. 48. Due to his satisfactory and good performance, he was promoted from time to time as and when the same fell due. He was given the revised pay scale also with effect from 3. 8. 72 and onwards. The petitioner claims that from 1945 to 1976, i. e. , for about 31 years, he worked to the entire satisfaction of the opposite parties and no adverse entry in his character roll was ever recorded. His superiors always considered him to be good, disciplined and honest employee. Unfortunately, in the year 1976 the then District Judge Sri B. L. Goel somehow got antagonised against the petitioner as a consequence thereof three censure entries in succession were awarded to the petitioner on 12. 7. 76. 26. 7. 76 and 12. 8. 76. The possible reason according to the petitioner could be that as elected Secretary of the local Ministerial Association, he had to take up the cause of the member employees to the dislike of the District Judge. According to the petitioner, the employees were by and large unhappy in the regime of Sri Goel as 90 per cent of the staff was awarded adverse entries without any basis and various orders prejudicial to the interest of the employees were also passed by the learned District Judge. The aforesaid three entries read as follows : 1. According to the petitioner, the employees were by and large unhappy in the regime of Sri Goel as 90 per cent of the staff was awarded adverse entries without any basis and various orders prejudicial to the interest of the employees were also passed by the learned District Judge. The aforesaid three entries read as follows : 1. "censured for delaying disposal of urgent application No. 3 of 6. 11. 75 by about five months on account of his negligence in sending the application to the Court of Civil Judge, mohanlalganj, instead of Record Room when working as Head Copyist. " 2. "censured for lack of supervision and for negligence when working as Head Copyist in the month of November, 1975 resulting in issue of incomplete copy of application No. 27 of 12. 11. 1975. " ( 3 ) "severely censured for gross negligence in not checking the decree of O. S. No. 684 of 1971 of the Court of Munsif South and for lack of supervision when working as Munsarim of that Court in May. 1976. " 3. All these remarks were duly communicated to the petitioner. He, therefore, made representations against remark Nos. 2 and 3 through proper channel. In the said representations, he duly explained the reasons why the said orders could not be checked up by him. He further stated therein that he was censured even without first calling for an explanation which shows that the learned District Judge was trying to find something against him for which he could be punished. The said representations, however, remained pending and had not been decided till the filing of the writ petition. The petitioner apprehended that the learned District Judge did not initially forward the same to the High Court and the same were forwarded only after the passing of the impugned order of compulsory retirement. Not only this, a departmental enquiry was also initiated against the petitioner for which a charge-sheet dated 2. 3. 77 was served upon him with the allegation that the petitioner had convened a meeting of the Association in the Court Room of the Small Cause Court in the Court premises on 4. 1. 77 without obtaining prior permission of the District Judge or the Judge of the Small Causes Court or any other superior authority, therefore, he committed an act of insubordination and misconduct. 1. 77 without obtaining prior permission of the District Judge or the Judge of the Small Causes Court or any other superior authority, therefore, he committed an act of insubordination and misconduct. While all this was going on, local lawyers working in the District Courts also agitated against the negative attitude of the said district Judge in general which ultimately resulted into the transfer of the District Judge Sri Goel and the then First Additional District Judge, Lucknow, took over as Officiating District Judge. Besides facing humiliation, the petitioner was also threatened that he shall be compulsorily retired if he would not seek either voluntary retirement or reversion to the next lower post. This threat was communicated to him through other Additional District Judges whose names have been mentioned in the writ petition. Though the petitioner was very agitated on this kind of threat but on the advice of other Additional District Judges, he opted for reversion to the next lower post vide his latter dated 29. 1. 77. He was accordingly brought down in the pay scale of Rs 230-380. After the transfer of the said learned District Judge, the petitioner made a detailed representation dated 30. 5. 77 to the new incumbent Sri Murli Dhar to again promote him to the second grade with effect from 31. 1. 77 because he had himself sought his reversion in the peculiar facts and circumstances in which he was placed. This representation was duly considered by the then District Judge, Sri Murli Dhar who vide his detailed order dated 18. 11. 77 came to the conclusion that the petitioner is not an official who could be superseded and, therefore, accepted the representation to bring him up in the higher grade and provided that as soon as a next vacancy is caused, he shall be adjusted against it, however, the question of seniority shall be determined on a future date. The departmental enquiry which was initiated against the petitioner was also dropped on 23. 11. 77. Copies of both these orders dated 18. 11. 77 and 23. 11. 77 have been annexed as Annexures-7 and 8 to the writ petition. On 9. 7. 80 the learned district Judge. Lucknow, confirmed the petitioner also in the higher grade of Rs. 250-425 with effect from 1. 4. 78. 11. 77. Copies of both these orders dated 18. 11. 77 and 23. 11. 77 have been annexed as Annexures-7 and 8 to the writ petition. On 9. 7. 80 the learned district Judge. Lucknow, confirmed the petitioner also in the higher grade of Rs. 250-425 with effect from 1. 4. 78. ( 4 ) IN the year 1980 one Sri A. B. Mathur was the District Judge, Lucknow, when an examination was conducted (on 20. 4. 80) for the recruitment of the ministerial staff. At that time, the petitioner was the President of the local staff association. In this examination, shortage of two answer books was reported due to the negligence of the invigilators. In this connection, there was some altercation between the invigilating staff and the learned District Judge. This again created some tension between the staff members and some of the judicial officers. The petitioner, being the President of the Association, had to intervene in the matter and due to his great efforts and pursuasion, the employees withdrew themselves from the examination hall and no ugly situation could be created and the examination was conducted peacefully. However, due to this incident two judicial officers got annoyed and threatened him with dire consequences of being screened out as the screening was in their hands. Infact one of the said senior Additional District judge was a member of the Screening Committee, hence he is alleged to have recommended the name of the petitioner for compulsory retirement and he was retired compulsorily vide orders dated 21. 5. 80. The petitioner immediately submitted a representation to the members of the screening Committee. However, the same was rejected on 24. 5. 80 on the ground that since the order has exhausted itself and the petitioner was advised to approach the Honble High Court for review of the same. A copy of this order has been annexed as Annexure-10 to the writ petition. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred a detailed representation dated 6. 6. 80 before the High Court through proper channel praying for quashing the order of compulsory retirement and to restore him back to his position and treat him in continuous service with all benefits. A copy of this order has been annexed as Annexure-10 to the writ petition. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred a detailed representation dated 6. 6. 80 before the High Court through proper channel praying for quashing the order of compulsory retirement and to restore him back to his position and treat him in continuous service with all benefits. In the said representation, the petitioner stated all the facts and circumstances which allegedly led to his compulsory retirement and the reasons for their annoyance as well as that of Sri B. L. Goel while he was the Secretary as also the President of the Association. The aforesaid representation was rejected vide orders dated 7. 5. 81 by a non-speaking order, therefore, left with no option the petitioner approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition. ( 5 ) THE writ petition has been opposed by the opposite parties by filing a counter-affidavit. A short counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the High Court stating that the representations made by the petitioner was rejected after being duly considered, hence the impugned order is valid and legal. On merits, a counter-affidavit has been filed by opposite party No. 2, the District judge, wherein the service record of the petitioner has been accepted as good. In para 6 of the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that during the tenure of Sri B. L. Goel. District Judge, lucknow, the petitioner was elected Secretary of the local Ministerial Staff Association and since his work was not satisfactory, three adverse entries were awarded to him on 12. 7. 76, 26. 7. 76 and 12. 8. 76 and the same are based on over all assessment of the work and conduct of the petitioner by the then District Judge, it has also been stated in Para 7 that besides the aforesaid three adverse remarks, one of the entries dated 20. 4. 78 which was on the commendable side and contained a remark "but he lacked control over office", but was not communicated to the petitioner as it was not an adverse entry. The representations given by the petitioner against the two adverse remarks dated 26. 7. 76 and 12. 7. 76 were submitted to the Joint Registrar of the high Court vide letter dated 30. 4. 81 and till date of the filing of the affidavit on 30. 11. The representations given by the petitioner against the two adverse remarks dated 26. 7. 76 and 12. 7. 76 were submitted to the Joint Registrar of the high Court vide letter dated 30. 4. 81 and till date of the filing of the affidavit on 30. 11. 93, the orders of the High Court were awaited. It has clearly been admitted in Para 12 Of this affidavit that when the next District Judge, Shri Murli Dhar took over the charge, petitioner was again posted in the higher grade vide order dated 18. 11. 77 and the disciplinary proceedings were also dropped vide orders dated 23. 11. 77. It has also been admitted in Para 14 of this affidavit that it is not disputed that there was no adverse remark against the petitioner after 12. 8. 76. In Para 15 it has been admitted that a written test was held on 20. 4. 80 in civil court premises when because of shortfall in the answer books, a crowd has collected in the verandah but nothing serious happened and the situation was tactfully tackled. In reply to the averments made by the petitioner that there was no adverse material against him when the Screening Committee met in March, 1980, it has been stated that the meeting on the said date could not be convened because the report regarding some of the officials was incomplete, hence it was postponed and held later on when the petitioner was compulsorily retired on the basis of his service record. The mala fides alleged against some of the District Judicial Officers have been simply denied by the deponent of this affidavit. ( 6 ) PETITIONER has filed rejoinder-affidavit reiterating the facts stated in the writ petition as also the prayer to set aside the order of compulsory retirement which has not been passed either in public interest or bona fide but has been passed due to mala fides. ( 7 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the contents of the writ petition and the affidavits along with the annexures. The service record of the petitioner has also been perused. ( 8 ) THE order of compulsory retirement has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner primarily on the ground that the same has neither been passed in public interest nor is based on any material whatsoever. The service record of the petitioner has also been perused. ( 8 ) THE order of compulsory retirement has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner primarily on the ground that the same has neither been passed in public interest nor is based on any material whatsoever. The exercise of power to retire the petitioner compulsorily is therefore wholly arbitrary, illegal and mala fide. According to the learned counsel this power has been exercised only on the basis of one uncommunicated entry dated 20. 4. 78. It has been strenuously urged that the petitioners long career from 1948 to 1976 was admittedly blotless and no adverse entry/remark was ever communicated to him. He was given all increments as and when they fell due including higher grades wherein he was confirmed also. It is after rendering 31 years very satisfactory and honest service that for the first time the then District Judge, Shri b. L. Goel gave three censure entries to the petitioner within a month without even calling upon him to explain as to how the alleged mistakes crept in the record. In support of this contention the learned counsel referred to the explanation of the petitioner which he subsequently gave in his representation stating that in Original Suit No. 684 of 1971 parties names were admittedly wrongly recorded but the same were checked by the dealing clerk as also by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties who had also signed it. The dealing clerk had presented the decree before the presenting officer directly who also put his signatures therefore to censure the petitioner without calling his explanation was wholly unwarranted. Regarding other mistakes too the petitioner explained as to how the same crept in but since his explanation was never called and even subsequently it was not considered and his representations against the censure entries remained pending and were not decided before the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed therefore the same is liable to be quashed. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner further contended that these three censure remarks cannot in any manner be treated to be annual remarks and therefore in either eventuality the same could not be made foundation for retiring the petitioner compulsorily. So far as the alleged adverse entry of 20. 4. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner further contended that these three censure remarks cannot in any manner be treated to be annual remarks and therefore in either eventuality the same could not be made foundation for retiring the petitioner compulsorily. So far as the alleged adverse entry of 20. 4. 78 is concerned he contended that firstly it was not an adverse entry as according to the respondents themselves it was a commendable entry and, secondly, the adverse part of the same was admittedly never communicated to the petitioner, hence an adverse entry which was never communicated could not have been taken into consideration at the time of screening for the purposes of judging the suitability of the petitioner for being retained in service. ( 10 ) LASTLY, it was contended that by any standards the material which has been placed on record against the petitioner could not form the foundation for forming requisite opinion to come to the conclusion that the petitioner has lost his utility and has become deadwood and therefore had to be weeded out by passing the impugned order. In support of the ground that an uncommunicated adverse entry could not be taken into consideration for passing the order of compulsory retirement against a U. P. Government Servant, learned counsel referred to the decision of this court in the case of K. P. Sonkar v. State of U. P. , 1993 (2) UPLBEC 1049, as also a decision of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 178 of 1993, State of U. P. and another v. Mahesh chandra Maheshwari, decided on 3. 2. 95. 1995 (13) LCD 385. In both these decisions as also in a recent judgment in the case of Nand Lal v. State of U. P. and others, 1997 ALJ 1497, it has been held that clause 2 (b) of U. P. Fundamental Rules 56 (as amended in 1976) clearly provides that any entry against which a representation is pending cannot be taken into consideration, unless the representation is also taken into consideration. The said clause of Fundamental Rule 56 reads as follows : " (2) In order to be satisfied whether it will be in the public interest to require a Government servant to retire under clause (c) the appointing authority may take into consideration any material relating to the Government servant and nothing herein contained shall be construed to excluded from consideration : (b) any entry against which a representation is pending, provided that the representation is also taken into consideration along with the entry; or" ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that a perusal of the aforesaid provision distinguishes the rule applicable to the employees of the State of U. P. from the rules applicable in other States with regard to compulsory retirement. In the State of U. P. under the aforesaid rule an uncommunicated entry cannot be taken into consideration for passing order of compulsory retirement because if the adverse entry is not communicated, the delinquent would be deprived of making a representation and/or if a representation has been made and the same has not been considered at the time of screening, the order of compulsory retirement so passed shall stand vitiated for non-compliance: of the aforesaid Fundamental Rule as applicable in the state of U. P. Since in the present case, the entry dated 20. 4. 78 was admittedly not communicated to the petitioner as it was not even treated to be adverse, therefore, this uncommunicated entry could not have been taken into consideration for the purpose of compulsory retirement by the Screening Committee as petitioner was not given the opportunity to represent against it, similarly since the representations made by the petitioner with regard to adverse remarks censuring the petitioner dated 26. 7. 76 and 12. 8. 76 remained pending the same also were not taken into consideration by the Screening Committee as per sub-clause 2 (b) of the fundamental Rule 56, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement is rendered illegal. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner next challenged the order of compulsory retirement on the ground that it suffers from the vice of arbitrary exercise of power in the matter of compulsory retirement. According to him, the opposite parties have taken into consideration the solitary uncommunicated entry dated 20. 4. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner next challenged the order of compulsory retirement on the ground that it suffers from the vice of arbitrary exercise of power in the matter of compulsory retirement. According to him, the opposite parties have taken into consideration the solitary uncommunicated entry dated 20. 4. 78 as foundation to compulsory retire the petitioner from service and neither earlier service record or subsequent reports were considered, therefore, on the fact of this case the exercise of power by the opposite party to compulsorily retire the petitioner is wholly arbitrary and based on no material whatsoever. In support of this contention learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of Apex Court in the matter of S. Ramchandra raju v. state of U. P. , 1994 (Suppl.) 3 SCC 424. In this case, Honble Supreme Court has held that exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Apex Court while taking into consideration several of its earlier decisions held that the purpose of the rules to retire an employee compulsorily is to weed the worthless without punitive extremes covered by Article 311 of the Constitution in order to make administration efficient manned by a competent and worthy employee but in this case there is no material to show that it was in public interest to weed out the petitioner. The exercise of power is therefore neither bona fide nor in public interest. ( 13 ) LEARNED standing counsel while repelling the aforesaid contentions submitted that the order of compulsory retirement passed depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the reviewing authority and is not open to Courts interference in absence of allegations of mala fides. Since, there is no material showing mala fides perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness, therefore, it is not open to this Court to review the order of compulsory retirement. In support of his contention the learned standing counsel referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of posts and Telegraphs Board and others v. C. S. N. Murthy, 1992 (2) SCO 317 ; Union of India and others v. Dulal Dutt, 1993 (2) SCC 179 and State of Orissa and others v. Ram Chandra Das, 1996 (5) SCC 331 . I have perused these decisions and I am of the view that these decisions are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. On the basis of these decisions, the learned standing counsel submitted that since the District Judge. Shri B. L. Goel has not been impleaded as a party against whom mala /ides have been alleged therefore the same cannot be accepted. He further submitted that merely because the higher grade was restored to the petitioner and the adverse remarks contained in annual remark dated 20. 4. 78 were not communicated to the petitioner the same would not vitiate the order of compulsory retirement. According to him entire service record of the petitioner was placed before the Screening committee which considered the same objectively and thereafter passed the order which is neither punitive nor arbitrary, hence, calls for no interference by this Court. The order of compulsory retirement in this case according to him is beyond the scope of judicial review. ( 14 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by both the parties. The service record of the petitioner was also perused by me and except the sentence "but lacked control over office" in the annual remarks dated 20. 4. 78, there is no other adverse entry in the whole of the character roll of the petitioner. From the year 1948 to 1975 or say July, 1976, there is no adverse remark. For the three successive censure remarks within one month 12. 7. 76 to 12. 8. 76, the petitioner made out a case of, if not mala fide then at least serious bias of the District judge against him because of Union activities as Secretary and President of the Association. In the counter-affidavit, neither the agitation by the employees has been dented nor the fact that inspire of the censure entry and reversion of the petitioner to the lower grade, he was subsequently confirmed in the higher grade and the charge-sheet issued to him was dropped shows that the then District Judge was annoyed with him. In the counter-affidavit, neither the agitation by the employees has been dented nor the fact that inspire of the censure entry and reversion of the petitioner to the lower grade, he was subsequently confirmed in the higher grade and the charge-sheet issued to him was dropped shows that the then District Judge was annoyed with him. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the elected representatives of such Unions at times do invite annoyance of superior officer as they have to deal with the grievances of the members of the Association, therefore, the allegations of mala fides, ill-will made by the petitioner should not be lightly brushed aside. Had the petitioner been awarded adverse comments by any other District Judge either prior to 1976 or thereafter, then it could be said that his performance was not satisfactory. There appears to be substantial force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also gone through the explanation given by the petitioner in reply to the lapses reflected in two entries dated 26. 7. 76 and 12. 8. 76 which appears to be quite plausible. The misfortune appears to be that these representations were neither decided by the High Court in its administrative side nor the same were placed before the Screening Committee as required under the aforementioned Rules. The question, therefore, arises is as to whether there was any material before the Screening Committee at all on the basis of which it could have formed the opinion that the petitioner had lost his utility and has become a deadwood, for being chopped off in the manner the same has been done. One really wonders how an official whose continuous service of more than 30 years was less without any adverse comment, his integrity never being doubted, promotions and higher grades being granted from time to time, could be cashiered only on the ground of three successive censure remarks within one month and one uncommunicated commendable entry containing the comment "lacked control over office". ( 15 ) I have also gone through the judgments referred to by both the parties. So far as the question of applicability of Rule 56c (2) (b) is concerned, it is very clear that the impugned order is in violation of the aforesaid provisions of Fundamental Rule, hence it cannot be sustained in law. ( 15 ) I have also gone through the judgments referred to by both the parties. So far as the question of applicability of Rule 56c (2) (b) is concerned, it is very clear that the impugned order is in violation of the aforesaid provisions of Fundamental Rule, hence it cannot be sustained in law. The contention of the learned standing counsel that the order of compulsory retirement is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and is not open to Courts interference in absence of mala fides being proved cannot be accepted. No doubt that the order of compulsory retirement is based on subjective satisfaction of the reviewing authority and is not punitive in nature but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is neither any material on which such a subjective satisfaction of the reviewing authority could be arrived at, nor it could be said that mala fides and absence of public interest as alleged cannot be inferred from the facts of the case. Honble Supreme Court in the case of S. Ramchandra Raju (supra), held as follows : ". . . . . The entire service or character rolls or confidential reports maintained would furnish the backdrop material for consideration by the Government or the Review Committee or the appropriate authority. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances alone, the government should form the opinion that the Government Officer needs to be compulsorily retired from service. " ( 16 ) IN the case of Baikunth Nath Das v. Chief Medical Officer Baripada, 1992 (2) SCC 299 . Honble B. P. Jeevan Reddy. J. (as he then was) while speaking for the Apex Court in the said case referred to certain principles which emerged from the discussion on the question of exercise of discretion vested in high power committee and as to when the same could be said to have been exercised validly. One of the principles so enunciated is as follows : "principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. One of the principles so enunciated is as follows : "principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material ; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. " ( 17 ) IN my opinion, the aforesaid principle, if applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case, makes it abundantly clear that the mala fides are apparent in this case and the power to retire an employee compulsorily has been exercised wholly arbitrarily as there was no material on the basis of which the competent authority could have formed the opinion that the petitioner had lost his utility and should not be permitted to serve anymore as he had become a deadwood. At this stage, it would be relevant to quote the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of S. Ramchandra Raju (supra), in Para 9 of its report which reads as follows : "it is thus settled law that though the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and the government employee is entitled to draw all retiral benefits including pension, the Government must exercise its power only in the public interest to effectuate the efficiency of the service. The deadwood needs to be removed to augment efficiency. Integrity fn public service needs to be maintained. The exercise of power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take a punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take a punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest. The entire service record or character rolls or confidential reports maintained would furnish the backdrop material for consideration by the Government or the Review Committee or the appropriate authority. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances alone, the Government should form the opinion that the Government Officer needs to be compulsorily retired from service. Therefore, the entire service record more particularly the latest, would form the foundation for the opinion and furnish the base to exercise the power under the relevant rule to compulsorily retire a Government Officer. When an officer reaching the age of compulsory retirement, as was pointed out by this Court, he could neither seek alternative appointment nor meet, the family burden with the pension or other benefits he gets and thereby he would be subjected to great hardship and family would be greatly affected. Therefore, before exercising the power, the competent appropriate authority must weigh pros and cons and balance the public interest as against the individual interest. On total evaluation of the entire record of service if the government or the governmental authority forms the opinion that in the public interest the officer needs to be retired compulsorily, the Court may not interfere with the exercise of such bona fide exercise of power but the Court has power and duty to exercise the power of judicial review not as a Court of appeal but in its exercise of judicial review to consider whether the power has been properly exercised or is arbitrary or vitiated either by mala fide or actuated by extraneous consideration or arbitrary in retiring the Government Officer compulsorily from service. " ( 18 ) IN the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order of compulsory retirement is not sustainable in law and the same is, therefore, liable to be quashed. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the order of compulsory retirement dated 21. 5. 80 is hereby quashed. " ( 18 ) IN the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order of compulsory retirement is not sustainable in law and the same is, therefore, liable to be quashed. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the order of compulsory retirement dated 21. 5. 80 is hereby quashed. Since the impugned order is of the year 1980, the petitioner must have attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of this writ petition, therefore, the question of his reinstatement on the post in question does not arise- However, the petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits and he should be treated to have continued in service till he attained the age of superannuation with all other service benefits and he paid the arrears of salary and pensionary benefits, etc. accordingly within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the competent authority. The petitioner shall also be entitled to cost quantified to Rs. 3,500 (three thousand five hundred) to be paid along with the arrears, etc. .