JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above revision petition has been filed against the order of learned District Judge (Forests) Shimla in Execution Petition No.1/S/10 of 1998 wherein the learned Judge in the Court below chose to overrule the objection to the execution proceedings and ordered further action in the execution proceedings to be pursued. The objection taken by the present petitioner who was driver of the vehicle which was involved in the accident, which was the subject-matter of the claim petition for compensation filed in MACT No. 64-S/2 of 1987 on the file of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla were two-fold. Before dealing with the said objection, it may be pointed out that the first respondent in the present revision petition was a claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and he claimed compensation in the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- on account of the injuries sustained by him, as a result of the accident caused by the petitioner as a driver of the vehicle which belonged to second respondent before the Claims Tribunal. The Insurance Company was the third respondent before the Tribunal below. By an award dated 12.10.1987 after fixing the liability for the accident on the driver and owner of the vehicle, a sum of Rs. 1,10,000/- has been awarded as compensation. From the award, it would be seen that the liability was fixed jointly and severally upon all the respondents, vide paragraph 8 of the award, and the Insurance Company in view of the coverage against third party risks has also been directed to deposit the amount. 2. Aggrieved against the award, the Insurance Company filed FAO (MVA) No. 21 of 1989 before this Court. The notice in the proceedings before this Court meant for the petitioner who was arrayed as second respondent, as it could be seen from the records and as clarified by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, on a query being put by me, was served on the mother of the petitioner, though it will now be stated for the petitioner that he was living away from the mother at a different station. It is seen from the award passed by the Tribunal below as also the address given in the memorandum of grounds filed in FAO before this Court, the same and only known address has been given and apparently since the notice has been received by the mother of the petitioner, as it is now stated without demur, there was nothing for this Court to dobut about the correctness of the service. In the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, this Court by an order dated 26.12.1994 considered the only question raised, namely, that the liability of the Insurance Company who was appellant before this Court was confined to Rs. 50,000/- only and that finding that in view of Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 it was to be so and the liability of the Insurance Company has to be confined to Rs. 50,000/- only in all, to that extent the Award against the Insurance Company came to be set aside the modified. It is while doing so incidently it has to be clarified by the Division Bench which dealt with the appeal that since the liability of the Insurance Company was to be only to the extent of Rs. 50,000, the balance will be recovered from the other respondents before the Tribunal below and that the excess amount deposited by the Insurance Company would be refunded to it with interest that accrued thereon. At the expense of repetition, it may be pointed out that clarificatory portion of the order by the Division Bench was only of an obvious resultant position flowing from the result of the appeal by the Insurance Company being partly accepted by this Court and it therefore did not involve any adjudication afresh against the petitioner or the owner of the vehicle. So far as the liability of the owner of the vehicle as also the petitioner who was the driver were concerned, they were already held liable for compensation by the Tribunal below in the award passed by it. 3. So far as the liability of the owner of the vehicle as also the petitioner who was the driver were concerned, they were already held liable for compensation by the Tribunal below in the award passed by it. 3. While the matter stood thus, it is during the execution proceedings initiated to recover the money in excess of the amount held liable to be paid by the Insurance Company, the petitioner/ driver of the vehicle which caused the accident raised following two objections: (1) That there was no proper and sufficient service of notice of the appeal on the petitioner who was arrayed as second respondent in the appeal, and (2) That the third respondent in an appeal before this Court by name Jatinder Sharma, the owner of the vehicle expired on 3.1.1994 and inasmuch as the order of the Division Bench was passed on 26.12.1994 against a dead person, the same is a nullity and, therefore, the same could not be executed against the petitioner. Of course, the learned Judge in the Court below who dealt with the execution proceedings has given in support of his order rejecting the objections, a reason that since it involves the order of the High Court and objection pertains to the same it is not given to the Court below to comment on the same and that therefore, he had no power and jurisdiction to sit over or reverse or modify the order of the High Court. 4. Aggrieved, the above revision petition has been filed. Mr. G.C. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the two objections raised before the Court below contended that the judgment of the Division Bench passed behind the back of the petitioner and also against a dead person remained a nullity and this objection could be raised, pursued and deserve to be considered on its merit by the Court below and the conclusions arrived at by the Court below that it is precluded from going into the same are not tenable in law and, therefore, interference is called for with the order of the Court below. In support of the stand taken for the petitioner, learned Counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Sabitri Dei and others v. Sarat Chandra Rout and others, (1996) 3 SCC 301; Kesar Singh and others v. Sadhu, (1996) 7 SCC 711 and Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar and another, (1998) 5 SCC 567. 5. In (1996) 3 SCC 301 (supra), their Lordships of the Apex Court held that once a decree is held to be a nullity, its invalidity can be set up and pleaded whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in any collateral proceeding. In (1996) 7 SCC 711 (supra), it was held that when a question which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree, the same can be raised and decided even in execution of the decree. The question regarding excitability of appellate decree which was found to have been rendered a nullity on account of subsequent statutory provision was held to be permissible to be raised in execution. In (1998) 5 SCC 567 (supra), it was held that when a decree which was sought to be executed was passed on a suit filed against a person who died even before filing of the suit, the decree passed on such a suit being a nullity, was therefore not executable. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The revision petition in my view as also the objections projected are frivolous and have no merit whatsoever. The claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had his claim against all the three respondents, namely, driver the petitioner herein, owner of the vehicle and the Insurance Company. As indicated earlier, all the three respondents have been held liable for the compensation awarded, though a further direction came to be issued to the Insurance Company, in view of the insurance coverage directing the Insurance Company, to deposit the amount within the stipulated time and imposing a default clause of penalty also. The petitioner who was also one of the person held liable or owner of the vehicle similarly held liable along with the Insurance Company have not chosen to file any appeal challenging the award of the Tribunal below to exonerate themselves of the liability. The petitioner who was also one of the person held liable or owner of the vehicle similarly held liable along with the Insurance Company have not chosen to file any appeal challenging the award of the Tribunal below to exonerate themselves of the liability. It is only the Insurance Company which has filed the appeal questioning the award and it was ultimately confined to the extent that they cannot be made jointly liable for the entire sum and the liability of the Insurance Company is confined to the statutory limit of Rs. 50,000/- and which claim of the Insurance Company found favour of acceptance with the Division Bench of this Court. While that be the position, the execution of the award pronounced by the Accidents Claims Tribunal which so far as the petitioner or owner of the vehicle are concerned the same not having been challenged by them remained intact cannot be objected to by pointing out certain infirmities or irregularities in the manner of disposal of the appeal by this Court, leave alone the question as to what extent such infirmities could enure to the benefit of the petitioner, at any rate in this case, to stall or avoid the execution proceedings against him, merely because in the order of the Division Bench for the sake of clarity the position has been clarified that in respect of the balance amount, remaining after the amount held to be payable by the Insurance Company the same can be recovered from the owner and driver who were the respondents. The same in my view does not amount to any fresh order saddling them with any liability for the first time and even without such clarification, the obvious and resultant position in law would have been the same. On this ground alone the objection petition ought to have been rejected and the same has to fail. 7. So far as the plea about the alleged non-service of notice of the proceedings in appeal before this Court is concerned, the same cannot be said to be such a proved factor which affects the validity of the order passed by this Court at any rate unless and until the petitioner or the person concerned moves this Court and has sought for re-opening of the appeal and re-hearing and disposing of the same afresh in his presence. In spite of coming to know of the order of the Division Bench a strange procedure of taking merely an objection in the execution proceeding only, without even caring to move this Court for such relief has been adopted in this case obviously for the reason that the petitioner must have been aware of the futility of the stand taken by him both in respect of the so-called non-service of notice in the appeal as also of the other grounds as well and the order passed in appeal being otherwise also unassailable. 8. I have called for file of this Court in the appeal and the learned Counsel has also looked into the same. As pointed out earlier, notice has been served and received by the mother of the petitioner and even the service has been taken to the place of the address furnished in the proceedings before the Court below and as found given in the appeal memorandum, based thereon and the mother of the petitioner in the said address has received the same. It does not therefore lie in the mouth of the petitioner now in the subsequent stages to plead collaterally that he has been living away from the mother in some other place. The nature of the plea itself would show that it is not only stale but an invented reason to somehow wriggle out of the liability. There is absolutely no merit whatsoever, in my view in the said objection taken to the order of this Court and the order of this Court could not be said to be a nullity on this ground. 9. As for the ground of nullity pleaded for the reason that the owner of the vehicle Jatinder Sharma was dead by the time the matter was heard and disposed of by this Court and therefore, it is a nullity, is equally a mis-conceived plea. 9. As for the ground of nullity pleaded for the reason that the owner of the vehicle Jatinder Sharma was dead by the time the matter was heard and disposed of by this Court and therefore, it is a nullity, is equally a mis-conceived plea. As pointed out earlier, the respondents before the Tribunal below were all held liable for the claim and even assuming without accepting the position that the death of the owner of the vehicle who was the third respondent in the appeal before this Court occurred before the hearing and disposal of the appeal, such plea of nullity if at all was available and could be raised only by the legal representatives of the owner of the vehicle, for whatsoever its worth even to be considered and it is not given to the petitioner whose liability is independent of the owner of the vehicle, held though jointly and severally, to take advantages of the same. A decree which can be a nullity vis-a-vis a person may be valid and enforceable vis-a-vis another party and so far as the petitioner is concerned, he cannot avail of the factum of the so-called death of the owner of the vehicle to project a plea of nullity of the order of this Court to avoid or evade the execution proceedings. It is made clear that this objection has been dealt with for the reason that it has been raised before me and de hors these objections, as pointed out earlier, nothing precludes the Court below from pursuing the execution of the award under which all the three respondents were held jointly and severally liable to the claim. For all the reasons stated above, the revision petition fails and shall stand dismissed. CMP. No. 512/98. In view of the dismissal of the revision petition, this application is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.