H. L. DATTU, J. ( 1 ) AN officer of Vijaya Bank, aggrieved by the orders of the Appellate Authority dated 10-7-1990 in confirming the orders made by the Disciplinary authority dated 30-11-1989 is before this Court in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) WHILE petitioner was working as an officer in the Foreign Exchange Department at Connaught Circus Branch of the respondent- bank a show-cause notice dated 26-5-1987 came to be served alleging certain irregularities said to have been committed by him. They all relate to the events that took place during the period from 7-5-1983 and onwards. The notice was signed by one Sri S. C. Paul who was working as Assistant General Manager, International Banking Department of the respondent-Bank. The notice required the petitioner to submit his explanation within 7 days of the receipt of the notice. Petitioner filed his explanation by way of defence statement, denying all the allegations and the irregularities said to have been committed by him in the show-cause notice. Not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner, it is asserted in the petition that Sri S. C. Paul had referred the matter to the disciplinary authority for initiating disciplinary enquiry proceedings. This assertion of the petitioner is not denied by the respondents either in their counter affidavit filed before this Court or at the time of hearing of this petition by its learned Counsel. ( 3 ) THE disciplinary authority has issued a charge memo dated 23-4-1988,containing the same allegations made in the show-cause notice. After the formality of holding an enquiry, the disciplinary authority has passed an order dated 30-11-1989 imposing certain punishments as provided in C and D regulations of the Bank. Disturbed by this order, the delinquent employee had preferred an appeal before the Appellate authority. Curiously enough, Sri S. C. Paul, who had issued the show-cause notice decides the appeal in the capacity as Appellate Authority and rejects it and thereby confirms the order passed by the disciplinary authority by his order dated 10-7-1990. It is the legality of these orders which are questioned by the petitioner before this Court being aggrieved by the same. Curiously enough, Sri S. C. Paul, who had issued the show-cause notice decides the appeal in the capacity as Appellate Authority and rejects it and thereby confirms the order passed by the disciplinary authority by his order dated 10-7-1990. It is the legality of these orders which are questioned by the petitioner before this Court being aggrieved by the same. ( 4 ) THOUGH numerous grounds have been raised in support of the prayer for quashing the orders imposed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority in the petition, what has been realty pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is the contention that the orders passed by the Appellate Authority is opposed to rules of natural justice, the reason being the Appellate authority must be deemed to be biased, since the adjudicator of the appeal had personal knowledge of the material facts of the case and had rejected the explanation offered by the petitioner to the show-cause notice issued by him and had further referred the matter to the disciplinary authority of the Bank to initiate domestic enquiry proceedings against the petitioner for the alleged irregularities said to have been committed by the petitioner. ( 5 ) PER contra Sri M. Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the petitioner was aware that the appeal filed by him would be decided by the same officer who had issued the show-cause notice in the capacity of Assistant General Manager of respondent-Bank and having not objected at that stage, petitioner should not be permitted to raise the question of bias for the first time in the writ petition and secondly submits that on the mere suspicion that Appellate Authority hearing the proceedings is biased the entire enquiry proceedings cannot be held to be vitiated. By saying so, the learned Counsel justifies the orders framed by the Appellate Authority. ( 6 ) THE question for consideration and decision is whether the orders passed by the Appellate Authority requires to be set aside on the ground that the same is in violation of rules of natural justice? ( 7 ) IT is an elementary rule of natural justice that a person who tries a case should be able to deal with the matter before him objectively, fairly and impartially. The word 'impartially' is the antonym of the word 'partiality or bias. ( 7 ) IT is an elementary rule of natural justice that a person who tries a case should be able to deal with the matter before him objectively, fairly and impartially. The word 'impartially' is the antonym of the word 'partiality or bias. Bias is a condition of mind which sways judgment and renders judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a particular casc. Bias on the part of the person acting in a judicial capacity is called judicial Bias'. The broad principle evolved by the Courts is that a person trying a cause even in quasi-judicial proceedings must not only act fairly but'must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness. This is bassed on the maxim which is often repeated that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. ( 8 ) THE onus of proving bias is on the person who alleges it. The allegation must be clearly proved, if the proceedings are sought to be set aside. The Supreme Court in the case of International Airport Authority of India v K. D. Bali and Another, observed that it is not every suspicion held by a party must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere apprehension of any whimsical person. The reasonable apprehension, it may be noted must be based on cogent materials. ( 9 ) KEEPING in view these well-settled principles, let me now advert to the facts situation in the present case. Sri S. C. Paul, as an Assistant General Manager, International Banking Department of the respondent Bank had signed the show-cause notice dated 29-1-1987. In the said notice several acts of omissions and commissions said to have been committed by the petitioner had been alleged. Petitioner had filed his reply denying those allegations. The Assistant General Manager of the Bank, not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner had requested the Disciplinary Authority of the Bank to initiate departmental enquiry proceedings against the petitioner on the same allegations made in the show-cause notice. After completion of departmental enquiry proceedings, on an appeal filed by the delinquent officer, the same authority who had issued the notice, decides the appeal and rejects the same, in the capacity of the Appellate Authority. After completion of departmental enquiry proceedings, on an appeal filed by the delinquent officer, the same authority who had issued the notice, decides the appeal and rejects the same, in the capacity of the Appellate Authority. It is the apprehension of the petitioner that justice is not been done to him by the Appellate authority, who had personal knowledge of the material facts of the case and had rejected his explanation. In a case like this official bias is likely to arise when an adjudicator has previous knowledge of the material facts of the case before him by virtue of his dealing with those facts in some other capacity. In such cases, the possibility of predispositions hovering over the mind of an adjudicator for or against a party in the case before him cannot be ruled out and there is every possibility and probability that the administration of justice was less than fair. Further there is every possibility that the adjudicator, who has adjudicated between the parties has not adjudicated the matter before him with an independent mind and without leaning towards one party or other. In my view, nothing is to be done which creates a doubt or suspicion in the mind of the party that there has been an improper interference in the cause of justice. Where the officer who had issued the show-cause notice and who had rejected the defence of the delinquent also hears the appeal and decides it, any reasonable person will definitely entertain a reasonable apprehension that his case has not been considered on its merit and justice has not been done to him. In cases of this nature the test is not whether in fact the judicial bias and the official bias has affected the judgment. The test is whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that bias attributable to the Appellate Authority might have operated against him in the final decision. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but also appears to be done. ( 10 ) IN my view there is reasonable material to come to the conclusion that there was likelihood of bias on the part of the Appellate Authority while deciding the delinquent's appeal. Therefore, the order made by him in my view is in contravention of the rules of natural justice. ( 10 ) IN my view there is reasonable material to come to the conclusion that there was likelihood of bias on the part of the Appellate Authority while deciding the delinquent's appeal. Therefore, the order made by him in my view is in contravention of the rules of natural justice. I hasten to add that this is not a case where doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide. ( 11 ) LASTLY in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Ratan Lal Sharma v Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and Others, this Court can entertain the plea of bias even if it was not raised before the Appellate Authority who decided the appeal. ( 12 ) SINCE I intend to remand the matter to the Appellate Authority I have not considered the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the disciplinary authority. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons stated, the order dated 30-11-1989 which is the result of want of impartiality on the part of the Appellate Authority requires to be set aside. Accordingly, petition is allowed in part. Rule made absolute to that extent. The impugned order dated 30-11-1989 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Appellate Authority (I am informed that the person who had decided the appeal is no more the appellate Authority) for a fresh disposal of the appeal filed by the petitioner against the orders made by the disciplinary authority dated 25-11-1989. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. --- *** --- .