SUSANTA CHATTERJI, J. ( 1 ) A short point of law, although apparent having far-reaching importance, is argued at the Bar in the present Civil Review applications. ( 2 ) BY judgment dated 30th of October, 1991, a writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India being numbered as O. J. C. 2508 of 1985 was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court constituting Hon'ble B. C. Patnaik, J. (as His Lordship then was) and Hon'ble D. M. Patnaik, J. The Division Bench held inter alia that the Commissioner of Consolidation made an error in holding that opposite party No. 5 had acquired title over plot No. 1181 by way of adverse possession. Accordingly, the judgment of the Commissioner of Consolidation in Revision Case Nos. 583 and 584 of 1984 was set aside as regards plot No. 1181 with direction to record the said plot in the name of the petitioner in Civil Review No. 77/91. The judgment of the Commissioner in regard to plot No. 1185 was however sustained. ( 3 ) IT appears from the materials on record that L. R. plot Nos. 1181 and 1185 comprise areas of 10 dec. and 25 dec. respectively, corresponding to Sabik plot Nos. 899 and 903 respectively under Sabik Khata No. 690 of village Banpur. The Commissioner on perusal of the evidence held that opposite party No. 5 and his predecessor had acquired title to the said two plots by adverse possession. This finding of the Commissioner was the subject-matter of challenge in the writ application. ( 4 ) IT was recorded in the judgment of this Court in the writ application that twenty-five years back there was a house standing over plot No. 1181 and when it collapsed, Govinda admittedly left the place. So the land was lying fallow. As admittedly opposite party No. 5 or his predecessor had not originally any title to the property, but could succeed only on establishing acquisition of title by adverse possession, the Division Bench found that the burden was on him. No evidence of any acts of possession had been adduced. So the land was lying fallow. As admittedly opposite party No. 5 or his predecessor had not originally any title to the property, but could succeed only on establishing acquisition of title by adverse possession, the Division Bench found that the burden was on him. No evidence of any acts of possession had been adduced. On the other hand it was seen that L. R. plot No. 1181 was lying fallow since last twenty-five years, i. e. since 1960, and at least until 1960 Govinda, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was in occupation of the plot by residing in the house standing thereon. Hence, opposite party No. 5 whose burden was to establish acquisition of title by adverse possession had failed to do so. Merely because the owner had abandoned possession, title was not lost to him. Title is acquired by another by being in possession openly and peacefully with hostile animus. ( 5 ) TWO Civil Review applications were listed before us today for disposal. Civil Review No. 77/91 is at the instance of Nilakantha Dash, who was opposite party No. 6 in the writ application. The other Civil Review application No. 15 of 1992 has been filed by the original writ petitioner Dhruba Charan Sahu. Nilakantha Dash is interested so far as plot No. 1181 is concerned as the judgment so far as plot No. 1185 is sustained by the writ Court. Dhruba Charan Sahu is aggrieved against the decision relating to plot No. 1185. ( 6 ) MR. Ashok Mukherjee appears for the petitioner in Civil Review No. 77 of 1991, i. e. Nilakantha Das and Mr. S. Pal appears for the petitioner in Civil Review No. 15 of 1992, i. e. Dhruba Charan Sahu. ( 7 ) MR. Mukherjee in support of the Civil Review application No. 77/91 has eruditely argued at length that the decision of the Writ Court suffers from such error apparent on the face of the record and there are such mistakes that the only course available to remedy the wrong is by way of effective review of the judgment as envisaged under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the spirit and principles of the said provision are available even to the Writ Court to review its own judgment. ( 8 ) IN support of the review application, Mr. ( 8 ) IN support of the review application, Mr. Mukherjee has catalogued the grounds in the review application elaborating in details that the Writ Court in exercise of the jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari can ask for records of the Consolidation Commissioner in the Revision Cases as there are sufficient materials and evidences which clinch the issue that opposite party No. 5 in the writ application had by his overt act set up hostile title against the lawful owner. The finding of the Writ Court that there is no evidence is an error apparent on the face of the records and the records if called for from the Commissioner would prove beyond doubt that the judgment of the Writ Court suffers from such infirmity. It is not necessary to go in appeal against the judgment of this Court and instead it can be rectified and corrected by this Court itself by way of review. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee has laid great emphasis upon a decision of the Federal Court reported in AIR 1950 FC 131 (Mst. Jamna Kuer v. Lal Bahadur) where a Bench consisting of all the Hon'ble celebrated Judges of the Federal Court of India considered the scope of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code - the jurisdiction to review vis-a-vis the error apparent on the face of the record - the origin of error and the relevancy for purposes of exercising jurisdiction. It was found by the Bench consisting of four Hon'ble Judges that when an error is found to be one apparent on the face of the record, whether it occurred by reason of the counsel's mistake or had crept in by reason of an oversight on the part of the Court is not a circumstance which could affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court to review its decision. The question as to how the error occurred is not relevant in such a matter. Where the Court finds that a mistake has in fact crept into a judgment it would be appropriate for it to correct it on a petition for review rather than drive a party to an appeal to a higher Court. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee persuaded this Court to go through the said decision of the Federal Court in between the lines. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee persuaded this Court to go through the said decision of the Federal Court in between the lines. Our attention is drawn to the fact that the said case was before the Federal Court in appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Federal Court was asked to correct a mistake that had crept in the High Court's judgment owing to an oversight. It was observed by the Federal Court inter alia that the review petition was dismissed by the High Court in spite of the finding that the appellant was entitled to a declaration as regards all the properties mentioned in the written statement of 20th August, 1936, on the technical ground that no error on the face of the record was held to be established. The Federal Court came to the conclusion that there could be no doubt that the said appeal had to be allowed. The mistake as to the items of property regarding which Mst. Jamna Kuer had laid claim was apparent on the face of the record. The trial Judge had clearly stated in his judgment that Jamna Kuer's claim related to properties 3 to 37 of the Gazette Notification. In para 15 of the amended objection petition she had laid claims to all the properties left by one Kunj Behari. On the 29th April, 1942, it was admitted by the pleader of the applicants that all those properties related to the estate of Kunj Behari and that so far as the debtors were concerned, they were owners of only two properties mentioned in the Gazette Notification. It was also observed that whether the error occurred by reason of the counsel's mistake or it crept in by reason of an oversight on the part of the Court was not a circumstance which could affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court to review its decision. We have no doubt that the error was apparent on the face of the record and in our opinion the question as to how the error occurred is not relevant to this enquiry. A mere look at the trial Court's decision indicated the error apart from anything else. ( 10 ) MR. We have no doubt that the error was apparent on the face of the record and in our opinion the question as to how the error occurred is not relevant to this enquiry. A mere look at the trial Court's decision indicated the error apart from anything else. ( 10 ) MR. Mukherjee submits that this judgment of the Hon'ble Federal Court as far as 1950 has widened the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC and to appreciate the applicability of the said provision. The same view still holds the field in spite of several subsequent decisions of the Apex Court. This judgment of the Hon'ble Federal by a Bench comprising of four Hon'ble Judges was not brought to the notice of the subsequent Bench decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the subsequent cases comprising of lesser number of Judges. ( 11 ) MR. Mukherjee has also submitted that the latest decision in this regard is reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 (Parsien Devi v. Sumitri Devi) which is quite distinguishable. More so, Mr. Mukherjee argues that this latest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not take notice of the earlier decision of the Federal Court, (AIR 1950 FC 131) (supra), inasmuch as the said latest decision referred to earlier three decisions of the Apex Court, namely, AIR 1964 SC 1372 (Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of AP), (1979) 4 SCC 389 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1047 ) (Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma) and (1995) 1 SCC 170 : ( AIR 1995 SC 455 ) (Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury ). In arriving at the decision as reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 as also the other decisions (supra), none of the Benches consisted of more than three Hon'ble Judges and more so the earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Federal Court by four Hon'ble Judges was not brought to the notice of the Court nor the points were considered. ( 12 ) MR. ( 12 ) MR. Mukherjee has more fortified his argument to strengthen the mind and hands of this Court by relying on another decision reported in 1995 AIR SCW 2254 (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation) where a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 8 of the judgment has found :"it is thus clear that the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha, AIR 1977 SC 308 (supra) on the construction of Section 138 (b) of the M. P. Act has all along been understood and justified on the basis of the presence of the non obstante clause in Section 138 (b) of the M. P. Act and the later decisions have distinguished it on that ground. That is the basis on which the decision in Padma Debi, AIR 1962 SC 151 (supra) was distinguished in Ratna Prabha (supra) AIR 1977 SC 308 itself. It is also obvious that a Bench of 2-Judges only in the later decisions could not overrule the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha (1977) 1 SCR 1017 : AIR 1977 SC 308 and, therefore, none of the later decisions could be so read to have that effect. The Division Bench of the High Court in 1989 MPLJ 20 was clearly in error in taking the view that the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha AIR 1977 SC 308 (supra) was not binding on it. In doing so, the Division Bench of the High Court did something which even a later co-equal Bench of this Court did not and could not do. The view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court in 1989 MPLJ 20 proceeds on a total misunderstanding of the law of precedents and Article 141 of the Constitution of India, to which it referred. But for the fact that the view of the Division Bench of the High Court proceeds on a misapprehension of the law of precedents and Article 141 of the Constitution it would be exposed to the criticism of an aberration in judicial discipline. The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court was, therefore, rightly overruled by the Full Bench in the impugned judgment. " ( 13 ) MR. Mukherjee has also drawn our attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 AIR SCW 3014 (Buta Singh (dead) by L. Rs. v. Union of India) regarding precedents. The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court was, therefore, rightly overruled by the Full Bench in the impugned judgment. " ( 13 ) MR. Mukherjee has also drawn our attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 AIR SCW 3014 (Buta Singh (dead) by L. Rs. v. Union of India) regarding precedents. It was held that in a Two-Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court where attention of Bench was not invited to Three-Judge Bench decision holding field and taking contrary view, the Two-Judge Bench decision is per incuriam inasmuch as attention of Bench was not invited to decision of Three-Judge Bench. Precisely, the spirit of argument of Mr. Mukherjee is that besides the decision reported in AIR 1950 FC 131 (supra) all other subsequent Bench decisions of the Apex Court by Benches of lesser number of Judges are per incuriam and are aberrations and this Court should not be persuaded to dispose of the present review application otherwise, but must be bold enough to decide the same in favour of the petitioner by appreciating his argument. ( 14 ) MR. B. Pal, another learned Senior Advocate of the Bar, in his more balanced view submitted that on principle he does not oppose Mr. Mukherjee's contention, but he feels as an officer of the Court to draw attention of the Court to appreciate things in right perspective in disposing of the review applications. In order to apprise this Court for a proper decision, he has relied on AIR 1960 SC 137 (Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale) wherein it was found by a Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court comprising of three Hon'ble Judges that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evidence and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. Where an alleged error is far from self-evidence and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. It was held that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, namely, that an order for possession should not be made unless a previous notice required by Section 14 of the Bombay, Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, had been given, was not an error apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari. ( 15 ) MR. Pal draws attention of this Court to another decision reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 (M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A. P.) (supra ). This decision has been referred to in a later decision of the Supreme Court in (1997) 8 SCC 715 (supra ). In this case it was found that there was a distinction which was real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a more erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. ( 16 ) SIMILARLY, our attention is also drawn to another decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 1047 (Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma) which was also relied on in (1997) 8 SCC 715 (supra) as also (1995) 1 SCC 170 : ( AIR 1995 SC 455 ) (supra ). ( 17 ) PATIENTLY we have heard. Diligently we have considered. We have tried to understand rightly. ( 17 ) PATIENTLY we have heard. Diligently we have considered. We have tried to understand rightly. Whether we are deciding justly or not, yet this much we are confident in our understanding that the decision reported in AIR 1950 FC 131 (supra) is clear enough as their Lordships have concluded unequivocally that when there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record and the Court is convinced, it would be appropriate for the Court to correct the same. Review must be, and not driving a party to an appeal. This decision is not in conflict nor in doubt or distinguished by any decision of the Supreme Court at a later stage. Instead, in the case of Thungabhadra Industries, ( AIR 1964 SC 1372 ) (supra) it has been held that there is a distinction which may not always be capable of exposition between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". In a later decision of the Supreme Court considering the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 and Section 114 CPC, it has been held that a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is one which is self-evident and does not require a process of reasoning and it is distinct from "erroneous decision". So re-hearing the matter for detecting an error in the earlier decision and then correcting the same do not fall within the ambit of review jurisdiction. Review jurisdiction cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction. ( 18 ) IN the instant case, the endeavour of Mr. Mukherjee is for this Court to appreciate afresh the evidence on records which had been called for from the lower Court. He submits that the observation of the Writ Court in disposing of the writ application that there was no evidence is not correct. There is already evidence on record and if the same is assessed and looked into, the mistake can be corrected. ( 19 ) MR. Pal though does not oppose Mr. Mukherjee on principle, as stated above, yet places the review application as regards plot No. 1188. ( 20 ) IN order to appreciate the two review applications, this Court has to consider the arguments and counter-arguments. ( 19 ) MR. Pal though does not oppose Mr. Mukherjee on principle, as stated above, yet places the review application as regards plot No. 1188. ( 20 ) IN order to appreciate the two review applications, this Court has to consider the arguments and counter-arguments. The moment this Court considers that the judgment of this Court is vitiated by error apparent on records, it amounts to erroneous decision which can be challenged before the higher forum. ( 21 ) WHILE considering the scope of review within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, the distinction between erroneous decision and error apparent on the record cannot be lost sight of. In the case before the Federal Court, (AIR 1950 FC 131) (supra), the judgment was vitiated since the High Court had made certain declaration which a party was not entitled to. ( 22 ) UPON elaborate consideration, we find that in considering these two review applications, we are to excavate further deep to salvage the evidence which has already sunken in the bed of sea. By reassessing the evidence, we are to answer the controversy. This certainly amounts to erroneous judgment which cannot be remedied within the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. ( 23 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, irrespective of the fact whether we are daring or not, we find that there is no merit in the two review applications. The parties aggrieved may go in appeal before the higher forum to correct the decision of this Court and it is no longer open to them to canvass for remedy available in appeal in the guise of review applications. Accordingly, we dismiss both the review applications. No costs. ( 24 ) D. M. PATNAIK, J. : -. I am wholly agreeable with the reasons expressed and the conclusions drawn by my learned brother Hon'ble Chatterji, J. that the review petition has to be dismissed having no merit. I herewith deal with the single point of Mr. Mukherjee that relates to the ratio decided in the case of Mst. Jamna Kuer, (AIR 1950 FC 131) (supra ). Mr. Mukherjee has put great reliance on the decision stating that the same is binding on us being a decision rendered by Four-Member Bench of the Federal Court, which has not been overruled till now by the decision of a larger Bench. Jamna Kuer, (AIR 1950 FC 131) (supra ). Mr. Mukherjee has put great reliance on the decision stating that the same is binding on us being a decision rendered by Four-Member Bench of the Federal Court, which has not been overruled till now by the decision of a larger Bench. ( 25 ) SO far as the facts of that case are concerned, certain items of property to which the lady was entitled to inherit by virtue of the judgment was found to have been omitted from the schedule. The prayer for review was disallowed by the High Court to which the Federal Court held that she should not be deprived of a portion of the property since her title had been declared in respect of her other properties which found place in the original pleadings. But in the present case, Mr. Mukherjee tries to impress upon us that the finding of this Court that there was no material to prove the possession of the petitioner was wrong because the Court did not consider the documents which it had called for, which were there in the records for perusal. I may point out that in the case before the Federal Court there was omission of the properties to which the lady would not have been entitled but for the order directing review of the judgment, but in the case at hand, argument of Mr. Mukherjee is that the Court did not consider the materials on record and this cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record, but wrong appreciation of evidence which my learned brother Hon'ble Chatterji, J. has rightly held as not to be the matter for review. The review petition fails. Applications dismissed. .