Judgment Sinha, J. All these four appeals arising out of a common judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.O. No. 3109(W)/93, C.O. No. 4067(W)/93, C.O. No. 5241(W)/93 and C.O. No. 3617(W)/93 were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The fact of the matter may be noticed from the case of (1) Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Sri Niranjan Mondal & Ors., (FMAT No. 1218/94). All the writ petitioners being unemployed got their names registered in the Employment Exchange. A requisition was made by the respondent No. 2 for recruitment the category of Junior Operative Trainee. On 10.2.93 they received a letter for appearing at a written test on 21.2.93. According to the petitioners a bipartite settlement in the year 1967 was entered between the management and the Union in respect of recruitment of Junior Operative Trainee, in terms whereof, the selection was to be conducted by interview only and the said process continued till 1992. However, in the year 1993 the management introduced the system of written test for the recrul1meat in the post of Junior Operative Trainee Admittedly the writ petitioners participated in the said written examination without an, protest. They were to sit in four subjects, namely, English, General Knowledge. Arithmetic’s and General Science carrying 50 marks each. Allegedly, no pass mark had been declared and the results were not published but a list of 500 candidates were hanged up wherein the petitioner name had not been mentioned. The petitioners, inter alia questioned the process or recruitment of holding the written examination and contended that as their names had been sponsored by the Employment Exchange, they have a right to be considered for employment. In the aforementioned background the writ petition was filed praying for the following reliefs:- "(a) Writ of or in the nature or Mandamus directing the respondents, their men, agents, or servants not to give effect or further effect to the purported result of the examination of the purported list of successful candidates published on 24.2.93. (b) A writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents, their men and agents to set aside the entire written test held on 21.2.93." 3. (b) A writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents, their men and agents to set aside the entire written test held on 21.2.93." 3. The appellants, inter alia in their affidavit-in-opposition contended that each of the writ petitions where unsuccessful in the written test and as such they had not been called for Interview. 4. In the writ petition despite the fact that the names or successful candidates were notified neither they nor some persons representing the successful candidates had been impleaded in the writ application. The learned trial Judge having considered the rival contentions, inter alia, held :- 1. The petitioners are not estopped from questioning the system of examination and, thus selection of 200 candidates by the respondents authorities are bad in law as the original requisition was sent to the Employment Exchange for selection of 70 candidates. No qualifying marks before holding of the written test having been has, the selection process is bad in law. It was also held that the process of written test was introduced not with the proper approval of the Managing Director but at the behest of some officials of Durgapur Steel Plant and as such the same cannot get legal sanction. Competitive selection is normally held for selection in higher post 5. However, keeping in view the fact that all the 200 candidate had been given appointment, the learned Judge directed:- "Therefore, it would be better for this Court to direct the respondents to absorb the writ petitioners in these writ petitions, who are 13 in number. It appears from the records in C.O. No. 3109(W)/1993, that 3 posts have been kept reserved for the writ petitioners of the said writ petition; namely, Nayan Kumar Roy, Rathin Jowardar and Rajib Bhattacharya, by the orders of this Court and, as such, the respondents are directed to absorb the rest 10 (ten) writ petitioners, namely, Abhijit Debnath, Sarup Dasgupta, Debashis Gayen. Niranjan Mondal, Kamaljit Dhibar, Biswadip Mondal, Kenaram Ruidas Ranjit Kumar Das, Md. Ashikul Haque and Chanchal Fouzdar, within 4 weeks from communication of operative part of this judgment. It is made clear that the writ petition is allowed in respect of the present writ petitioners and confine to the present writ petitioners only." 6. Mr. Niranjan Mondal, Kamaljit Dhibar, Biswadip Mondal, Kenaram Ruidas Ranjit Kumar Das, Md. Ashikul Haque and Chanchal Fouzdar, within 4 weeks from communication of operative part of this judgment. It is made clear that the writ petition is allowed in respect of the present writ petitioners and confine to the present writ petitioners only." 6. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that in view of the fact that the petitioners were unsuccessful candidates, they are estopped from filing the writ application. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (2) Madanlal & Ors. v. State of J & K & Ors. reported in 1995 (3) SCC 486 and (3) Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kr. Shukla & Ors. reported in 1986 Suppl. SCC 285. 7. The learned Counsel contended that the policy adopted by the appellant was not unfair and the same had to be taken recourse to in view of the earlier litigations. The employer is always at liberty, contends the learned Counsel, to change the recruitment process. It wall urged that in absence of any allegation of discrimination or arbitrariness on the part of the authorities of the appellant, the writ application is not maintainable. It is also not the case that the procedure adopted had been deviated from or had not been followed and in that view of the matter too, the writ petition is not maintainable. It is submitted that a distinction has to be made between a case of appointment and a case or admission. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (4) State of U.P. v Rafiquidin reported in AIR 1988 SC 162 . 8. It has further been submitted that the function of the Selection Committee being neither judicial nor quasi judicial, no reason is required to be recorded in absence of any statutory provision. What is necessary is only to show procedural fairness. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (5) Maharashtra Board for Secondary and High Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh reported in AIR 1984 SC 1543 ; (6) Ashoke Kumar Jadav v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 454 ; (7) National Institute of Menial Health and Neuro Science v. Dr. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (5) Maharashtra Board for Secondary and High Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh reported in AIR 1984 SC 1543 ; (6) Ashoke Kumar Jadav v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 454 ; (7) National Institute of Menial Health and Neuro Science v. Dr. Kalyano Raman reported in AIR 1992 SC 1806 ; (8) Parveen Zindal v. State of Haryana reported in 1993 (2) Labour Law Journal 710; (9) The Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar reported in JT 1993 (2) SC 138; (10) D.V. Bakshi & Ors., v. Union of India reported in JT 1993(4) SC 180; (11) V.K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2285 ; (12) Asif Hameed v. State of J & K reported in AIR 1989 SC 1899 and (13) R.S. Das v. Union of India reported in AIR 1987 SC 593 . 9. In any event, contends the learned Counsel, non-impleadment of the successful candidates is vital. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (14) Prabodh Verma & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in AIR 1985 SC 167 and (15) S. Jaffar Sahib v Secretary, A.P.P.S.C. & Ors. reported in 1996 (11) SCC 753 . 10. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents submitted that from the requisition sent by the respondent authority it would appear that the procedure for selection as notified was only for interview. It is further stated that the General Manager had no power to adopt a policy decision. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (16) Jagadamba Coal Manufacturing Enterprises v. Union of India reported in AIR 1989 Cal. 337 . It was submitted that the appellants were required to stick to the conditions mentioned in the advertisement and in support of the aforementioned contention reliance had been placed on (17) Prakash Vir v. State of Haryana reported in 1992 (1) SCT 700. It is slated that it was not permissible for the appellant to disclose the qualifying marks in the affidavit-in-opposition for the first time. In any event, posts higher than notified in the said advertisement could not have been filled up and in support of the aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on (18) Surinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. In any event, posts higher than notified in the said advertisement could not have been filled up and in support of the aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on (18) Surinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1993 SC 18 and (19) Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2606. It is submitted that in any event a decision which is basically illegal cannot be allowed to continue just because it was not protested. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (20) Shyam Sundar Rathi v. The Addl. District Magistrate, Bankura & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 Cal 58 . 11. Before adverting to the questions raised at the Bar, we may observe that the direction of the learned trial Judge to the effect that the petitioners be appointed must be held to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioners do not have any fundamental right to be appointed. They had merely a right to be considered therefor. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India do not guarantee any appointment but merely guarantees a right to be considered therefor. The appellant is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and in order to maintain a writ application it is obligatory on the part of the petitioner to show that the appellant has violated any of the provisions contained in Part-III of the Constitution of India. 12. The petitioners had not succeeded in the written examination and, thus, they were not called for at the interview. The right to be appointed, if any, is conferred only on a person who is eligible therefor. Even an empanelled candidate has no right to be appointed. Assuming that there had been a change in the mode of recruitment, the petitioners had appeared at the written test without any demur whatsoever. The petitioners in no uncertain terms admitted that they appeared at the written examination without any protest. They, thus, took a chance by sitting on the fence and thus, could not have been permitted to turn round and the question the mode of selection itself. 13. In (21) Muntnder Kumar & Ors. v. Rajiv Govil & Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC 1607 , the Apex Court has held :- "10. They, thus, took a chance by sitting on the fence and thus, could not have been permitted to turn round and the question the mode of selection itself. 13. In (21) Muntnder Kumar & Ors. v. Rajiv Govil & Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC 1607 , the Apex Court has held :- "10. The next question which arises for consideration is as to what direction would be just and proper in the circumstances of this case. We do not agree with the High Court to quash the entire selection made by the Board for the posts of Assistant Engineers (civil). It may be noted that Rajiv Govil, Vivek Aggarwal and Gyanendra Srivastava who remained unsuccessful had filed the writ petitions after taking chance and fully knowing the percentage of marks kept for interview and group discussion. It is no doubt correct that they cannot be estopped from challenging the rule which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, but in modulating the relief, their conduct and the equities of those who have been selected are the relevant considerations. The appellants have joined the post on 28th December, 1989 and after completing the training are discharging their duties at different places. It has been submitted on their behalf that some of them had left their earlier jobs and have also become overage. Thus we do not consider it proper in the interest of Justice to set aside the selections of the appellants .................." 14 Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in Munindra Kumar & Ors. v. Rajiv Govil & Ors. reported in 1991(3) SCC 368 and Madanlal & Ors. v. State of J & K & Ors. reported in 1995(3) SCC 486 . 15. The learned Trial Judge, in our opinion, was not correct in holding that the appellant was not free to change the mode of selection. It failed to take into consideration the background for such a decision inasmuch as in view of a decision in an earlier writ application each candidate had to be called for interview although the normal procedure is that the employer has a right to short list the candidates. By way of logical corrollary it must also be held that they cannot question the right of the management to short list the candidates. 16. By way of logical corrollary it must also be held that they cannot question the right of the management to short list the candidates. 16. The appellants in their affidavit-in-opposition stated that although for 70 posts, names of 490 candidates were invited from Employment Exchange but owing to some unavoidable circumstance the recruitment could not be made. When the Department was in a position to recruit and fill up the posts, it once again requested the concerned Exchange to sponsor suitable candidates pursuant whereto 4 lists containing the names of 490 candidates had been sent which was replies of the earlier list. It has been stated that in the earlier order keeping in view the scheme, which was prevailing then, a higher weightage was to be granted to certain candidates and following the same 158 candidates were called for interview out of 402 candidates, resulting in institution of various suits in Civil Courts and writ applications before this Court. This Court in one of the writ applications by an order dated 13.8.92 in C.O. No. 5202(W)/92 directed:- "This writ petition is disposed of by directing the Steel Authority of India to allow the remaining candidates to appear at the interview within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order and fill up the vacancy in the post of 'Junior Operative Trainee' as on date under the said organisation immediately in accordance with the Recruitment Policy existing on the date of sponsoring after completion of the interview and in accordance with law." 17. Again a suit was filed by the candidates whose names had not been sponsored and an order of injunction was passed which was ultimately stated by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Having felt difficulties in giving recourse to the aforementioned procedure a meeting was held on 19.8.92 to review the then Recruitment Procedure and after a detailed discussions the methodology therefor was formulated as mentioned in Paragraph 23 of the affidavit-in-opposition. 18. It is not the case of the respondents that without prior notice the bipartite agreement could not have been changed. In any event, it was for the Union to question the flame and not for the candidates concerned. In any view of the matter a bipartite agreement cannot be sought to be enforced in a writ proceedings. 18. It is not the case of the respondents that without prior notice the bipartite agreement could not have been changed. In any event, it was for the Union to question the flame and not for the candidates concerned. In any view of the matter a bipartite agreement cannot be sought to be enforced in a writ proceedings. In the stay petition in respect of the writ petition filed by Sanjib Kumar Boral and (4) Ors., the appellant has stated the factual aspect which is in the following term:- "In or about 1988 DSP desired to recruit 70 JOTs and required the concerned Employment Exchange to send names of eligible candidates having minimum qualification of Higher Secondary Pass in the ratio of 1:7. In response thereto, the concerned Employment Exchange sent/sponsored 490 candidates. According to DSP's the then policy of recruitment, out of 490 candidates DSP short listed 158 candidates for being interviewed. The said 158 candidates were interviewed out of which 70 candidates were being selected for being appointed in the meantime, by an order dated 13th August, 1992, the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta directed DSP to hold interview for all the remaining candidates meaning thereby the candidates who had not been selected. As cut of 158 candidates interviewed 70 candidates had already been selected, only 88 candidates remained there. In view of the order dated 13th August, 1992, all the 490 candidates (i.e. 88+332) were called for interview. These 88 candidates had the opportunity of being selected in interview twice-first at the time when the original 158 candidates were interviewed and second when they were called again for interview by reason of the order dated 13th August, 1992, 332 candidates however, had one opportunity only of being interviewed. Out of the 490 candidates, as more manpower was required by DSP, the appellant selected 73 candidates. In the month of September 1992 DSP with the desire to appoint further JOTs (about 184) required the concerned Employment Exchange to send names of candidates who in response sent/sponsored 1323 candidates (more than 7 times of 184). Out of 1323 candidates only 1119 candidates including the writ petitioners sat for the written test and out of 1119, 527 candidates were called for interview. Out of 527, 208 candidates were appointed. Out of 1323 candidates only 1119 candidates including the writ petitioners sat for the written test and out of 1119, 527 candidates were called for interview. Out of 527, 208 candidates were appointed. On 1st March, 1993 a writ petition was moved by one Sanjay Sarkar and some others when an order of status quo was passed by this Hon'ble Court. There were as many as 21 petitioners in the said writ petition. Sanjib Boral and others move the writ petition on 15th March, 1993. On 18th March, 1993 Nayan Kumar Roy and two others filed another writ petition and other writ petitions were also filed. The aforesaid are the reflection of the records which were produced before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court, however, misread the records." 19. The writ petitioners had also not questioned the validity of the aforementioned resolution dated 19.8.92. The only ground which has been urged before this Court is that only two day's time had been granted for appearing at the written examination and for which no syllabus had been prescribed. However, only at the time of argument it has been submitted that no approval therefor had been taken. Furthermore, a copy of the said procedure was banded over to the candidates. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that as the rule of estoppel applies in all fours in the instant case the petitioners cannot question the same in the writ application. 20. In Shyam Sundar Rathi v. The Addl. District Magistrate, Bankura and Ors. reported in AIR 1975 Cal. 58 , Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) was considering the Provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act. In that decision an application for great of mining lease was made under West Bengal Minor Minerals Rules, and not in terms of Rules 3-A and 3-B of the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules and thus, the petitioners was not estopped by reason of filing objection against the notice issued by the Addl. District Magistrate to show cause why he shall not be prosecuted under Section 4(2-B) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and why steps shall not be taken against him for realization of damage/compensation, the laid decision was rendered on the ground that Section 4(2-B) does not lay down that such show-cause shall be issued. District Magistrate to show cause why he shall not be prosecuted under Section 4(2-B) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and why steps shall not be taken against him for realization of damage/compensation, the laid decision was rendered on the ground that Section 4(2-B) does not lay down that such show-cause shall be issued. Secondly the petitioner in his communication to the respondents did not admit that he was required to obtain a permission in term of Section 4(2-A)(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act or that he was liable to pay damage or compensation. The laid decision has no application in the fact of the present case. 21. In the instant case there had been no advertisement. Only the Employment Exchange was asked to sponsor the names of the candidates concerned. There has been no relaxation in qualification and in that view of the matter the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Prakash Vir v. State of Haryana reported in 1992(1) SCT 700 cannot be said to have any application. 22. In Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in AIR 1993 SC 2606, upon which Mr. Basu relied upon, the recommendations had been made by the Selection Board in respect of a particular number of posts. In the said cast the persons whose appointments were under challenge had been impleaded as parties. On fact it had not been shown that any requisition was made by Director General of Police for a large number or posts although initially the Board was requested to send its recommendation for 8 posts. The Apex Court observed :- "The Board, on its own, could not recommend names of 19 persons for appointment even though the requisition was for eight posts only because the selection and recommendation of larger number of persons than the posts for which requisition is sent. The appointment on the additional post on the basis of such selection and recommendation would deprive candidates who were not eligible for appointment to the posts on the last date for submission of applications mentioned in the advertisement and who became eligible for appointment thereafter of the opportunity of being considered for appointment on the additional posts because if the said additional posts are advertised subsequently those who become eligible for appointment would be entitled to apply for the same. The High Court was, therefore right in bolding that the selection of 19 persons by the Board even though the requisition was for 8 posts only was not legally sustainable." Such is not the position here. 23. It may be noticed that in Surinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. reported in 1997 (8) SCC 488 : AIR 1998 SC 18 , the Apex Court relied on an earlier decision in (22) Prem Singh v. Haryana S.E.B. reported in 1996(4) SCC 319 and held that although filling up of more posts not advertised may be invalid, but what relief should be granted would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Apex Court also held that a waiting list cannot be used as perennial source of recruitment. It was held that it was only in rare and exceptional circumstances and in emergent situation that the rule can be deviated from. However, on analysing the facts the Apex Court held that as the appellant could not claim to fall within first 2461 posts for which advertisement was issued, no interference was made in the matter so as to set the clock back. 24. In the instant case such an issue had not been raised in the writ application at all and is now being sought to be raised. In the instant case the appellant has made out such an exceptional case and particularly in view of the order dated 13th August, 1992 passed by this Court. 25. In view of the several decisions cited by Mr. Chatterjee which has been noticed hereinbefore, there cannot be any doubt that the process of selection is not justiciable unless there exists any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. In such a matter even the principles of natural Justice is not required to be followed nor any reason is required to be recorded. The writ Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would act also take recourse to a roving enquiry. 26. The writ petitions were also not maintainable and the direction given by the learned trial Judge could not have been granted in view of the fact that no successful candidate had been impleaded as a party. 27. In Prabodh Verma and Ors. 26. The writ petitions were also not maintainable and the direction given by the learned trial Judge could not have been granted in view of the fact that no successful candidate had been impleaded as a party. 27. In Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 1985 SC 167 , the Apex Court clearly held that the persons who would be affected by a judgment should be impleaded as a party and where numbers of such persons are high some of them should at least be impleaded in representative capacity. The decision of the Supreme Court in Prabodh Verma (supra) applies in all fours in the present case. 28. Mr. Basu, however, submitted that this Court may, now issue a direction that the cases of the writ petitioners may be considered by the appellant only upon taking interview. No such direction can be issued as this Court cannot direct relaxation of the Rules. The cases of the petitioner would certainly be considered if they are eligible therefor in the event any vacancies arise in future along with other eligible candidates. For the reasons aforementioned the judgments and orders passed by the learned trial Judge cannot be upheld which are accordingly set aside. The appeals are thus, allowed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Dutta, J.: I agree.